WERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


FOR   INTERNATIONAL   PEACE 


Publications  of  the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace 

Division  of  Economics  and  History 
John  Bates  Clark,  Director 


JAPANESE  MONOGRAPHS 

EDITED    BY 

BARON  Y.  SAKATANI,  D.C.L. 

Formerly  Minister  of  Finance  of  Japan 

Conscription  System  in  Japan,  by  Gotaro  Ogawa. 
Expenditures  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  by  Gotaro  Ogawa. 
Military  Industries  of  Japan,  by  Ushisaburo  Kobayashi. 
War  and  Armament  Loans  of  Japan,  by  Ushisaburo  Kobayashi. 
War  and  Armament  Taxes  of  Japan,  by  Ushisaburo  Kobayashi, 
Expenditures  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  by  Giichi  Ono. 
War  and  Armament  Expenditures  of  Japan,  by  Giichi  Ono. 


WAR  AND   ARMAMENT 

EXPENDITURES 

OF   JAPAN 


BY 


GIICHI  0N0 

Councilor  of  Finance  Department 


NEW    YORK 
OXFORD   UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH :  35  West  32wd  Street 
LONDON,  TORONTO,  MELBOURNE,  AND  BOMBAY 

1922 


COPYRIGHT    T922 

BY    THE 

CARNEGIE    ENDOWMENT    FOR    INTERNATIONAL    PEACE 


THE   Rl'MFORD   PRESS,  CONCORD,   N.   H. 


I  I 


CO 
CD 

o 


4GO. 

/  -    - 

NOTE   BY  THE  DIRECTOR 

The  plans  of  the  Division  of  Economics  and  History  of  the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  have  been 
transformed  by  the  World  War.  Problems  now  calling  for 
study  transcend  in  importance  those  with  which  this  Division 
has  been  dealing  and  material  for  research  and  record  so  far 
transcends  any  that  was  formerly  available  that  it  will  demand 
almost  exclusive  attention  for  some  years  to  come.  A  new 
world  has  evolved  suddenly  out  of  the  world  which  we  knew 
and  the  transformation  extends  to  the  foundations  of  gov- 
ctL       ernment  and  of  economic  life. 

<  The  process  of  warfare  itself  is  now  so  unlike  that  of  former 

days  that  many  military  rules  of  the  past  have  gone  into  the 
scrap  basket.     The  late  war  ended  when  its  deadliest  tools 
had   barely  been   brought   into   action.     The   peoples   have 
fought  as  they  had  worked,  by  machinery,  mechanical  and 
g>      chemical  engines  of  destruction  have  decided  the  result  and 
will  decide  in  like  manner  the  result  of  all  wars  of  the  future. 
-<     Machine   shops   and    chemical    laboratories   will    so    largely 
^    determine  what  armies  shall  win  that  fighting  strength  will 
^    be  as  much  a  matter  of  available  capital  and  of  science  in 
£  applying  it  as  of  numbers  of  troops  and  strategy  in  directing 
g  £  them.     It  is  safe  to  say  that  the  death  dealing  arts  and  instru- 
ments will  far  surpass  in  destructiveness  those  which  made 
the  late  war  so  deadly,  and  to  a  soldier  of  the  future  the  order 
to  march  into  a  cloud  of  poisonous  gas  and  a  whirlwind  of 
missiles  will  resemble  an  order  to  plunge  into  the  rapids  of 
Niagara.     This  is  one  central  and  obvious  fact  which  the 
war  has  taught  us  and  it  has  many  corollaries,  some  of  which 
have  to  do  with  the  increased  costs  of  war  and  the  importance 
of  the  particular  resources  that  make  a  nation  powerful  for 
offense  and  defense;  but  there  are  less  conspicuous  economic 
facts  which  are  more  fundamental,  since  they  may  determine 
where  and  when,  if  at  all,  wars  shall  hereafter  occur. 

Causes  of  warfare  are  always  partly  economic  and  those 
which  incited  the  recent  one  were  mainly  so.  The  business 
plans  of  a  powerful  state  reached  to  the  ends  of  the  earth 


o 


if 

O     Co 


227387 


VJ  NOTE    BY    THE   DIRECTOR 

and  so  crossed  and  interlaced  the  claims  of  other  states  that 
some  writers,  then  and  afterwards,  pronounced  the  war  inevi- 
table. If  we  assume  a  settled  purpose  on  the  part  of  such  a 
state  to  encroach  on  the  rights  of  others,  we  may  say  that  it 
doubtless  was  inevitable.  The  victory  of  the  defending 
countries  has  saved  them  from  an  immediate  and  intolerable 
domination,  but  it  can  not  be  taken  as  an  assured  fact  that 
similar  attempts  will  never  again  be  made.  The  economic 
inducement  continues  and  the  means  may  at  some  time  be 
forthcoming. 

Within  the  several  states  war  has  democratized  industry, 
giving  to  labor  an  increase  of  control — a  change  that  if  con- 
tinued will  entail  momentous  consequences;  but  still  greater 
effects  have  been  produced  on  the  relations  of  states  to  each 
other.  The  world  as  a  whole  has  changed  more  than  its 
component  parts  and  the  new  relation  of  the  parts  to  one 
another  is  the  critical  element  in  the  situation.  The  great 
increase  in  the  economic  functions  of  governments  is  one 
cause  of  this  condition.  Within  the  great  international  com- 
munity in  which  the  several  states  are  units  extensive  eco- 
nomic functions  have  gravitated  into  the  hands  of  govern- 
ments and  caused  them  to  face  each  other  as  business  rivals 
and  to  deal  with  each  other  in  a  multitude  of  ways  in  which 
the  merely  self-seeking  policy  of  private  business  is  intoler- 
able. Power  to  invoke  principles  of  justice  and  international 
law  as  interpreted  by  a  competent  court  has  become  an  in- 
dispensable means  of  allaying  strife  and  this  fact  exalts  to 
supreme  importance  the  high  court  of  nations  which  has  just 
been  established.  It  magnifies  also  the  importance  of  the 
economic  facts  and  principles  with  which  the  law  itself  will 
have  to  deal.  It  is  not  merely  individual  men  or  private 
corporations  who  now  meet  each  other  in  the  rough  and 
tumble  of  a  world-wide  mart  but  states  themselves,  each 
representing  its  own  population  and  seeking  to  foster  its 
interests  as  a  zealous  and  faithful  agent.  The  chances  of 
friction  that  are  inherent  in  ordinary  commerce  inhere  today 
in  vast  international  transactions  and  will  increase  in  the 
measure  in  which  the  intercourse  grows.     All  this  means  a 


NOTE    BY   THE   DIRECTOR  Vll 

great  increase  in  incentives  to  warfare,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
in  the  motives  for  preventing  it,  on  the  other.  Private  com- 
merce unites  more  than  it  separates  those  who  participate  in 
it,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  international  commerce 
will  act  in  the  same  way;  but,  in  view  of  what  modern  war 
means,  the  human  race  will  deserve  to  perish,  and  much  of 
it  will  probably  do  so,  if  the  forces  of  strife  are  allowed  to  get 
the  upper  hand.  Whether  they  will  or  not — whether  the 
recent  economic  changes  will  tend  to  reduce  warfare  or  to 
increase  it — depends  on  the  ability  of  nations  to  create  and 
maintain  the  instrumentalities  that  in  the  new  state  of  the 
world  are  necessary. 

Certain  it  is  that  the  feeling  which  prevails  today,  the 
world  over,  is  not  one  of  security.  The  dread  of  further  war 
is  greater  than  it  was  before  1914.  In  some  areas  war  still 
prevails,  in  others  peace  is  held  by  a  precarious  tenure  and 
in  all  it  can  be  firmly  established  only  by  conscious  and  intel- 
ligent action  by  the  states  themselves.  Mere  exhaustion 
holds  war  dogs  temporarily  in  leash,  but  it  will  take  more 
than  that  to  tame  them  as  they  must  be  tamed  if  peace  is 
to  endure. 

We  here  confront  a  wide  difference  between  the  several 
states  in  comparative  desire  for  peace  and  disposition  to 
maintain  it.  One  portentous  fact  is  the  grim  determination 
of  Russian  communists  to  extend  their  system  by  crude  force 
from  state  to  state.  Bolshevism  is  government  by  the  few  and 
largely  the  bad  masquerading  as  government  for  and  by  the 
people.  In  its  mother  country,  Russia,  the  economic  meas- 
ure by  which  it  began  its  career  was  confiscation  of  private 
wealth — in  itself  an  ultra-democratic  measure.  If  this  had 
brought  in  a  true  communism,  it  would  have  been  a  ruthless 
and  unjust  measure  for  creating  a  peace-loving  state.  A 
just  and  orderly  democratizing  of  industry  in  the  several 
states  would  give  new  strength  to  the  forces  of  peace,  and  it 
would  be  highly  improbable  that  any  state  so  influenced  would 
try  to  extend  its  system  over  foreign  countries  by  military 
invasion.  Democracy,  socialism,  communism  and  bolshe- 
vism  all  appear  in  the  aftermath  of  the  war.     The  first  of 


Vlll  NOTE   BY    THE   DIRECTOR 

them  makes  for  future  peace  and  so  does  even  the  conserva- 
tive element  in  the  second,  while  all  else  in  the  series  means 
certainty  of  civil  strife  and  danger  of  international  war. 

The  fact  that  during  the  war  governments  had  to  take  on 
innumerable  functions  that  were  formerly  in  private  hands 
has  lent  an  impetus  to  socialism  and  to  the  perverted  growths 
that  have  accompanied  it,  and  it  has  created  a  new  inter- 
national system  the  meaning  of  which  is  profoundly  signif- 
icant, though  he  who  runs  can  not  so  easily  read  it.  There 
are  dangerous  features  in  the  system  which  the  war  evoked 
and,  happily  for  mankind,  there  are  available  safeguards 
which  were  evoked  with  them  and  need  to  be  retained  if 
human  effort  can  do  it. 

By  a  compulsion  that  there  was  no  resisting,  the  war  forced 
the  nations  of  the  Entente  into  economic  cooperation  with 
each  other.  Commissions  centering  finally  in  the  Supreme 
Economic  Council  adjusted  in  a  harmonious  way  questions 
that  would  otherwise  have  led  to  rivalry  and  conflicting 
action  in  purchasing  war  materials,  securing  ships,  appor- 
tioning food,  controlling  railroads,  financing  the  war  and 
doing  a  multitude  of  other  things  with  the  one  common  pur- 
pose of  victory.  The  special  compulsion  of  the  struggle  is 
(act,  but  it  has  left  an  aftermath  of  issues  grave  enough  to 
make  peace  insecure  unless  something  equivalent  to  the 
Supreme  Economic  Council  survives  in  full  efficiency.  The 
agency  that  did  so  much  to  win  the  war  can  do  so  much  to 
prevent  another  one,  but  to  that  end  it  will  have  to  be  guided 
by  economic  principles  and  it  is  a  saving  fact  that  these  still 
survive.  The  war  has  not  abolished  the  law  of  demand  and 
supply,  though  governments  may  forget  it.  In  the  coming 
era  they  must  build  better  than  they  now  know.  Economic 
knowledge  must  either  go  in  advance  of  action  and  prevent 
disaster  or  follow  action  and  be  learned  from  disaster.  Be- 
yond computation  is  the  importance  of  attaining  the  knowl- 
edge and  using  it  when  evil  impends  and  prevention  is  possible. 

John  Bates  Clark, 
New  York,  Director. 

September  27,  IQ20. 


PREFACE 

The  present  volume  is  intended  to  set  forth  the  results  of  a 
statistical  investigation  of  the  economic  effects  of  the  wars  in 
which  Japan  has  taken  part  since  the  beginning  of  the  Meiji 
Era  (1868),  particularly  from  the  standpoint  of  expenditures 
for  war  and  armament.  This  volume  forms  part  of  the  whole 
historical  investigation  into  the  relations  of  war  and  armament 
to  the  national  economy  since  the  first  year  of  the  Meiji  Era, 
as  embraced  in  the  other  volumes  dealing  with  Taxes  for  War 
and  Armament,  Loans  for  War  and  Armament,  the  System  of 
Conscription,  the  Sino-Japanese  War  Expenditures,  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  Expenditures,  and  the  Development  of 
Military  Industries.  It  may  be  said  that  this  volume  stands 
as  an  introduction  to  all  the  above-mentioned  works. 

The  present  investigation  being  mainly  a  statistical  exposi- 
tion of  the  relations  of  war  and  armament  to  economy  from  the 
standpoint  of  state  expenditures,  it  may  seem  as  if  almost  the 
entire  volume  is  devoted  to  compilations  of  figures.  I  trust, 
however,  that  the  reader  will  duly  appreciate  the  painstaking 
care  which  the  compilers  have  taken  in  extracting  the  figures  of 
expenditures  for  war  and  armament  from  the  Annual  Accounts 
extending  over  the  past  forty-six  years,  in  arranging  them  in  a 
proper  way,  and  in  giving  careful  explanations  of  their  nature 
and  significance.  Those  who  will  study  these  figures  with 
considerable  care  will  be  able  to  comprehend  various  other 
points  not  supplied  by  the  compiler. 

The  value  of  the  materials  of  a  book  is  generally  proportion- 
ate to  their  degree  of  accuracy.  In  the  present  undertaking 
the  compilers  did  their  utmost  to  make  the  figures  correct ;  but 
notwithstanding  all  the  pains  they  have  bestowed  on  its  execu- 
tion, there  may  be  room  for  criticism  of  their  manner  of  select- 
ing and  arranging  the  innumerable  items  laboriously  extracted 
from  the  big  volumes  containing  the  vast  Annual  Accounts. 
In  the  preparation  of  this  volume  and  the  other  volumes  of 

ix 


X  PREFACE 

these  investigations,  the  respective  compilers  have  often  held 
conferences  among  themselves  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  certain 
uniformity  of  method  and  treatment;  but  it  could  not  be 
helped  if  they  have  allowed  certain  discrepancies  or  disagree- 
ments to  creep  in,  owing  to  the  difference  of  objects  for  which 
the  several  volumes  have  been  compiled,  and  also  to  differences 
of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the  several  compilers. 

The  present  volume  has  been  compiled  chiefly  by  Mr. 
Hyoye  Ouchi,  myself  acting  as  supervisor  of  the  work.  In 
the  supervising,  my  chief  aim  was  to  provide  the  skeleton  of 
the  work  and  to  make  a  careful  examination  of  the  figures, 
which  latter  was  the  most  important  task  from  the  nature  of 
the  investigation. 

Our  thanks  are  due  to  the  authorities  in  the  Departments  of 
Finance,  War,  and  Navy,  who  have  given  us  every  facility  in 
the  present  work,  and  to  Mr.  Juichi  Tsushima,  who  began  the 
undertaking,  but,  owing  to  his  having  gone  abroad  on  a 
government  mission,  gave  it  up  and  submitted  to  us  his  valu- 
able materials. 

Giichi  Ono. 

Tokyo,  Japan, 
April,  iqi6. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Department  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce: 

The  Effects  on  Wages  Produced  by  the  War  in  1904  (Meiji  Sanju 

shichinen  Chingin  ni  oyoboseru  Senso  Eikyo),  1904. 
The  Effects  on  Prices  by  the  War  in  1905  (Meiji  Sanju  hachinen 

Bukka  ni  oyoboseru  Senso  no  Eikyo),  1905. 
The  Effects  on  Home  and  Foreign  Trade  and  Commerce  by  the 

Russo-Japanese  War  (Jikyoku  no  Naigai  Boeki  narabini  Shogyo 

ni  oyoboseru  Eikyo),  1906. 

Army  Department,  Annual  Reports  of  the  Army  Department, 
1875-1912  (Rikugunsho  Nempo). 

Board  of  Audit: 

Settled  Accounts  of  Extraordinary  Expenditures  for  Military 
Affairs  in  the  War  of  1 904-1 905  {Meiji  Sanju  shichi  hachinen  eki 
Rinji  Gunjihi  Kessan),  1910. 

Reports  on  the  Settled  Accounts  of  Extraordinary  Expenditures 
for  Military  Affairs  in  the  War  of  1904-1905,  with  particulars 
on  said  Expenditures  (Meiji  Sanju  shichi  hachinen  eki  Rinji 
Gunjihi  Kessan  Hokoku  Sanko  Rinji  Gunjihi  Shimsatsu),  1910. 

Department  of  Finance: 

General  Settled  Accounts  for  the  Fiscal  Years  1875-1911  (Meiji 
Hachinen  yori  Shijuyonen  ni  itaru  Kakunendo  Sokeisan),  1877- 

I9I3- 

Account  Book  of  Eight  Fiscal  Periods  (Hachiki  Keisansho),  1882. 
Short  Historical   Record   of  National   Loans   (Kokusai  Enkaku 

Ryaku),  1889. 
Report  Made  by  the  Coinage  System  Investigation  Society  (Kahei 

Seido  Chosakai  Hokoku),  1895. 
General  Account  of  the  Coinage  Reform  in  1897  (Meiji  Sanjunen 

Heisei  Kaikaku  Shimatsu  Gaiyo),  1899. 
Report  on  the  Postbellum  Financial  Administration  (Sengo  Zaisei 

Shimatsu  hokoku),  1900. 
Report  on  the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  Expenditures  for 

Military  Affairs  for  the  War  of  1894-1895  (Meiji  Niju  shichi 

hachinen  eki  Rinji  Gunjihi  Tokubetsu  Kaikei  Shimatsu),  1900. 

xi 


Xll  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Statistics  of  National  Loans  (Kokusai  Tokei),  1907. 

Bank  Manual  (Ginko  Benran),  1908. 

Investigations  on  War  Notes  (Gunyo  kippu  ni  Kansuru  Chosa)r 

1908. 
Report  on  Financial  Administration  during  the  War  of  1904- 1905 

(Meiji  Sanju  shichi  hachinen  eki  Senji  Zaisei  Shimatsusho),  1909. 
Settled  Accounts  of    Extraordinary   Expenditures   for   Military 

Affairs  in  the  War  of  1904-1905  (Meiji  Sanju  shichi  hachinen  eki 

Kinji  Gunjihi  Kessan),  19 10. 
Report  on  Financial  Administration  after  the  War  of  1904-1905 

(Meiji  Sanju  shichi  hachinen  eki  Sengo  Zaesei  Shimatsusho), 

1911. 
General  Budgets  for  1912  and  1913  (Taisho  Gannendo  Ninendo 

Sokeisan),  1912-1913. 
Reference  Book  for  Monetary  Circulation,  1893-1913  (Kinyu  Jiko 

Sankosho). 
Annual  Reports  of  the  Department  of  Finance,  1875-1913  (Oku- 

rasho  Nenpo). 
Annual  Statistics  of  National  Loans,  1908-1912  (Kokusai  Tokei 

Nenpo). 
Annual  Returns  of  Foreign  Trade  of  the  Empire  of  Japan  (Dainip- 

pon  Boeki  Nenpo). 
Report  on  Banks,  Secured  Debentures  and  Trust  Business  (Ginko 

oyobi  Tanpozuki  Shasai  tsuketari  Shintaku  Jigyo  Hokokusho), 

36  vols. 

Hosokawa,  YrjiRO,  General  Account  of  Financial  Administration 
in  Japan  (Nippon  Zaisei  Soran),  2  vols.,  1892. 

Navy  Department,  Annual  Reports  of  Navy  Department,  1875- 
1912  (Kaigunsho  Nenpo). 

SAKATANI,  Y.  (representing  the  authors),  History  of  Financial 
Administration  in  the  Meiji  Era  (Meiji  Zaiseishi),  15  vols., 
1 904-1905. 

Statistics  Bureau,  Imperial  Statistical  Year  Book,  i4th-36th 
(Teikokn  Tokei  nenkan). 


EXPLANATORY  TABLES 

Value  of  Japanese  Currencies 

Japan  adopted  the  gold  standard  system  in  1871,  but  the  inconvertible  paper 
money  became  principal  currency  a  few  years  later.  In  1886  the  paper  money 
became  convertible  into  silver  and  after  that  date  the  Japanese  currency  system 
was  the  silver  standard  de  facto,  until  on  October  1,  1897,  the  gold  standard  system 
was  legally  adopted.  The  figures  necessary  to  ascertain  the  value  of  Japanese 
currencies  are  given  below: 

(1)  1  gold  yen  (according  to  Coinage  Law  of  1871)  contains  1.5  gramme  pure  gold. 

(2)  1  gold  yen  (according  to  Coinage  Law  of  1897)  contains  0.75  gramme  pure  gold. 

(3)  1  silver  yen  contains  24.261  gramme  pure  silver. 

(4)  The  value  of  I  silver  yen  in  the  English  currency  (according  to  the  demand 

rate  of  exchange  on  London  in  the  average  of  the  year)  is  as  follows: 


1874. 
1875- 
1876. 
1877. 
1878. 

1879. 
1880. 
1881. 


s. 

d. 

4.02.0 

1882 

4 

00.8 

1883 

3 

11 .2 

1884 

3 

11. 7 

1885 

3 

09.4 

1886 

3 

08.0 

1887 

3 

08.9 

1888 

3 

08.4 

1889 

s. 

d. 

3.08.8 

1890 

3 

07.9 

1891 

3 

07.9 

1892 

3 

06.0 

1893 

3 

03.2 

1894 

3 

02.0 

1895 

3 

01 .0 

1896 

3 

01 .1 

1897 

s.      d. 

304. 5 

2.02.6 

2.10.5 

2.06.7 

2.01.2 

2.01.3 

2 . 02 . o 

2.00.4 


(5)  The  value  of  I  yen  of  paper  money  in  the  English  currency  (calculated  on  the 
basis  of  the  above  mentioned  exchange  rate  and  the  quotations  of  the  silver 
price  in  the  Tokyo  Exchange  in  the  average  of  the  year)  is  as  follows: 

s.     d.  s.     d.  s.     d. 


1877. 
1878. 
1879- 


3. 10. 1 
305. 6 
3-00-3 


1880. 
1881. 
1882. 


s. 

2 . 06 . 4 
2 . 02 . 1 
2.04.5 


1883. 
1884. 
1885. 


2. 10.7 
3  04.3 
303. 7 


(6)  1  ryo  (unit  of  value  of  the  old  currency  system)  was  declared  in  the  Coinage 
Law  of  1 87 1  to  be  equal  to  1  yen. 

Chronological  Table 


Meiji  1st 
2d 

3d 

4th 

5th 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

nth 

1 2th 

13th 

14th 


1868  A. 

D. 

Meiji  15th 

1869   ' 

'   1 6th 

1870   ' 

'   17th 

1871   ' 

1  1 8th 

1872   ' 

'  19th 

1873   ' 

'  20th 

1874   ' 

'    2ISt 

1875   ' 

'    22d 

1876   ' 

23d 

1877   ' 

'   24th 

1878   ' 

'   25th 

1879   ' 

'   26th 

1880   ' 

'   27th 

1881   ' 

'   28th 

1882  A.  D. 

1883 

1884 

1885 

1886 

1887 

1888 

1889 

1890 

1891 

1892 

1893 
1894 

1895 


xm 


XIV 


EXPLANATORY   TABLES 


Chronological  Table — (Continued) 


Meiji  29th 

1896  A.  D 

30th 

1897      " 

"     31st 

1898      " 

"          32(1 

1899      " 

33d 

1900      " 

"      34t  h 

1901      " 

"      35th 

1902      " 

"      36th 

1903      " 

"      37th 

1904      " 

"      38th 

1905 

"      39th 

1906      " 

"      40th 

1907      " 

Meiji  41st 

1908 

"        42c! 

1909 

"       43d 

1910 

"      44th 

191 1 

"      45th  \ 
Taisho  1st  J 

1912 

2d 

1913 

"         3d 

1914 

"        4th 

1915 

"       5th 

1916 

"       6th 

1917 

A.  D. 


Weights,  Measures  and  Money 

With  English,  American,  French  and  German  Equivalents 

Great  U.  S.  of 

Japan  Britain  America  France  Germany 

Rt==Z6r£!dir~.  f  2.44030         2.44029  3  92727  392727 

=  2,160  Ken  Miles  Miles  Kiloms.  Kiloms. 

=  12,960  Shaku.  .  .  .  { 

-.,„•!  /LI5152  II5I5I  I    85318  1. 85318 

Ki  (Marine; |  Miles  Miles  Kiloms..  Kiloms. 

Q  mra  p-  /  5-95505         5-9550I  I5-42347  I5-42347 

Square  Ki |  Sq   Miles      Sq   Miles  Km-  Carres  Quadrat  Km. 

ChozY?Jc!!  (2.45064     2.45062  99 .17355  99 17355 

-ioooe  I  Acres  Acres  Ares  Ar. 

=  3,000  Bu { 

Tsubo=\oGo  /3-9.S3f>9         3-95367  3-30579  3  30579 

=  100  Shaku..  ..  \  Sq.  Yards      Sq.  Yards  Centiares.  Quadratm. 

Koku=  10  To  {  [47.65389  1. 80391  1. 80391 

=  100 Sho  I  4.96005      J  Gallons  (Liq.)  Hectolitres  Hectolitres 

=  1 ,000  Go  "J  Bushels       1  5 . 1 1902 

=  10,000  Shaku .  .  {  {  Bushels  (Dry) 

Koku      (Capacity      of/i/ioof  1/10  of  1/10  1/10 

ship) \  one  Ton        one  Ton  de  Tonne  Tonne 

v  ,,  (8.26733         8.26733  3.75000  3.75000 

Kwan  =  1 ,000  Momme      lbs_  ffio]r)  [hs  (Avoir  }  Kil  Kil 

=  10,000  Fun  I0047II       io.o47ii 

=  100,000 Rtn..  .  [lbs  (trroy)    lbg  (Troy) 

(  1.32277         1.32277  0.60000  0.60000 

lbs.  (Avoir.)  lbs.  (Avoir.)  Kilogs.  Kiloms. 
1.60754         160754 
lbs.  (Troy)    lbs.  (Troy) 

Ycn  =  iooSen  {2.0.582         0.4984  2.583  2.0924 

=  1,000  Km  <d_  1)ollar  Francs  Marks 

=  10,000  Mo i. 


CONTENTS 

PART    I. — Historical    Survey    of    Expenditures    for 

War  and  Armament 
chapter  page 

I     Introduction 3 

II     From    the    Restoration    War    to    the    Satsuma 

Rebellion 8 

III  From  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  to  the  Sino-Jap- 

anese  War 29 

IV  From   the  Sino-Japanese   War  to   the   Russo- 

Japanese  War 52 

V  From  the  Russo-Japanese  War  to  the  Present 

Day 80 

YI     Conclusion , .  .      106 

PART    II. — Economic    Effects    of    Expenditures    for 
War  and  Armament 

I      Introduction 121 

II     Effects  on  the  State  Finance 124 

III     Effects  on  the  Money  Market 153 

IV  Effects  on  Industry,  Transportation  and  Com- 
merce    229 

V  Social  Effects 245 

VI     Conclusion 250 

APPENDIX. — Statistical  Tables  of  Expenditures  for 

War  and  Armament 
table  page 

1  Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Army,  from  the 

First  Fiscal  Period  (1868)  to  1876 261 

2  Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Navy,  from  the 

First  Fiscal  Period  (1868)  to  1876 262 

xv 


xvi  CONTENTS 

TABLE  PAGE 

3  War    Expenditures   of   the   Satsuma    Rebellion, 

187/ 263 

Arrangement  by  Items 263 

Settled    Accounts    of    Various    Departments, 

Offices,  and  Prefectures 264 

4  (a)  Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Army,  1877-1893  265 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures ....  265 
4  (b)      Ordinary  Expenditures  under  the  Control  of  the 

Army  Department,  1 877-1 885 267 

4  (c)       Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs  of 

the  Army,  1886-1893 268 

5  (a)  Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Navy,  1 877-1893  269 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures  . .  .  269 
5  (b)      Ordinary  Expenditures  under  the  Control  of 

the  Navy  Department,  1877- 1885 271 

5  (c)       Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs  of 

the  Navy,  1 886-1 893 272 

6  (a)  Military   Expenses   of   the  Sino- Japanese  War, 

1894-1895 273 

Army  Department 273 

Navy  Department 274 

6  (b)  Departmental    Expenses   of    the   Sino-Japanese 

War,    1894-1895 275 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 275 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 275 

Department  of  Finance 276 

Department  of  Communication 276 

6  (c)  Summary  of   Expenses  of   Sino-Japanese  War, 

1894-1895 277 

7  (a)  Military  Expenditures  of  the  Boxer  Uprising,  1900  278 

Army  Department 278 

Navy  Department 279 

7fc(b)  Departmental  Expenditures  of   the  Boxer  Up- 
rising, 1900 280 


CONTENTS  XV11 
TABLE                                                PAGE 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 280 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 280 

Department  of  Finance 281 

Department  of  Communication 281 

8  Armament   Expenditures   for   the  Army,   1894- 

1903 282 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures  ....  282 

Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs.  .  .  283 

9  Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Navy,  1 894-1 903  284 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures  ....  284 

Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs.  .  .  285 

10(a)    Military    Expenditures    of    the    Russo-Japanese 

War,  1904-1905 286 

Army  Department 286 

Navy  Department 286 

10(b)    Details  of  Military  Expenditures  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  1904-1905 288 

Personnel   and   Materiel 288 

10(c)    Departmental   Expenditures   of   the  Russo-Jap- 
anese War,  1904-1905 . .  : 289 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 289 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 289 

Department  of  Finance 290 

Army  Department 293 

Navy  Department 293 

Department  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  ....  294 

Department  of  Communication 294 

10(d)   Summary  of  Departmental  Expenditures  of  the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  1 904-1 905 295 

11(a)   Armament   Expenditures   for   the  Army,    1904- 

1913 296 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures  ....  296 

1 1  (b)    Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs  of  the 

Army,  1904-1913 298 


XV111  CONTENTS 

TABLE  PAGE 

12  Armament   Expenditures   for   the  Navy,   1904- 

1913 300 

Ordinary  and  Extraordinary  Expenditures ....  300 

Details  of  Expenditures  for  Military  Affairs  .  .  .  301 

13  Comparative    Annual    Figures    for    Armament 

Expenditures,  War  Expenditures  Defrayed 
Out  of  General  Account,  Debt  Charges  and 
Administrative  Expenditures 302 

CHART 

1  Diagram  showing  the  Army  and  Navy  Armament 

Expenditures  in  Comparison  with  the  Total 
State  Expenditures 304 

2  Diagram  comparing  the  Army  Armament  Ex- 

penditures with  the  Navy  Armament 
Expenditures 305 

3  Diagram  of  Comparative  Annual  Percentages  for 

War  Expenditures  Defrayed  Out  of  the 
General  Account,  Armament  Expenditures, 
Debt  Charges,  and  Administrative  Expend- 
itures   306-307 

Index 309 


PART  I 

HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF 

EXPENDITURES  FOR  WAR  AND 

ARMAMENT 


Note. — In  the  tables  throughout  this  volume,  fractions  of 
yen  greater  than  one  half  have  been  counted  as  a  whole  yen 
and  the  other  fractions  have  been  disregarded. 


CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 

The  visit  of  Commodore  Perry  in  1853  (the  sixth  year  of 
Kayei)  awakened  Japan  from  a  peaceful  dream  of  seclusion  in 
which  she  had  reposed  for  many  hundreds  of  years.  Confu- 
sion and  disorder  followed,  the  Loyalists  persisting  in  the 
exclusion  of  foreigners,  the  Feudalists  arguing  for  the  opening 
of  the  country  to  foreign  trade  and  intercourse.  Coincident 
with  this,  the  Feudal  Government  was  thrown  into  terrible 
financial  difficulties,  its  influence  and  popularity  fell  to  the 
ground,  and  discipline  grew  lax.  At  length,  on  October  14, 
1867  (the  third  year  of  Keio),  just  fifteen  years  after  the  visit 
of  Commodore  Perry,  the  Shogun,  Keiki  Tokugawa,  surren- 
dered the  political  power  to  the  Emperor,  and  the  feudal 
system  suffered  its  downfall.  Thus  the  restoration  of  the 
Imperial  rule  was  effected. 

In  the  following  pages  dealing  with  the  statistical  history 
and  economic  effects  of  war  and  armament  expenditures  in 
Japan,  it  is  proposed  that  the  investigations  shall  cover  the 
period  from  the  Restoration  to  the  present  day.  Historians 
will  agree  that  the  rise  of  modern  Japan  dates  from  the  year  of 
the  Restoration,  and  that  prior  to  that  her  wars  and  arma- 
ments were  so  different  in  nature  and  purpose  from  those  of 
today  that  they  must  properly  be  left  to  separate  investiga- 
tions. 

Forty-six  years  have  elapsed  since  the  Restoration,  during 
which  time  Japan  has  come  to  be  recognized  as  a  great  power 
in  the  East,  having  risen  from  a  position  so  insignificant  that 
her  very  existence  was  doubted  in  the  West.  No  one  can  deny 
that  the  most  prominent  factors  in  her  rapid  rise  among  the 
nations  of  the  world  are  the  wars  on  which  she  has  staked 
national  destiny  and  the  military  and  naval  armaments  which 
she  has  constantly  supported. 

3 


4  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  cost  of  these  wars  and  arma- 
ments. Before  we  enter  upon  the  subject  in  detail,  however, 
we  deem  it  expedient  to  divide  the  whole  period  of  forty-six 
years  into  several  epochs.  As  the  object  of  a  chronological 
classification  in  history  is  to  facilitate  investigation,  so  here,  in 
our  discussion  of  war  and  armament  expenditures,  it  seems 
desirable  to  arrange  the  epochs  with  reference  to  the  circum- 
stances or  events  by  which  these  expenditures  were  distinctly 
augmented  or  diminished.  Thus,  the  period  with  which  we 
are  concerned  may  conveniently  be  divided  into  four  epochs, 
as  follows: 

First  epoch — -From  the  Restoration  to  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  (1868-1877). 
Second  epoch — From  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  to  the  Sino-Japanese  War  (1877- 

1895)- 
Third  epoch — From  the  Sino-Japanese  War  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1895- 

1905)- 
Fourth  epoch — From  the  Russo-Japanese  War  to  the  present  day  (1905-1914). 

These  are  the  four  epochs  in  the  history  of  modern  Japan  to 
be  distinguished  from  the  standpoint  of  war  and  armament. 
The  first,  covering  the  nine  years  commencing  with  the  War 
of  the  Restoration,  marks  the  reestablishment  of  law  and  order, 
the  introduction  of  new  administrative  systems,  and  the  be- 
ginnings of  diligent  military  and  naval  preparations.  The 
second,  lasting  seventeen  years,  begins  with  the  Satsuma 
Rebellion,  in  which  a  formidable  anti-government  force  was 
subdued  and  national  unity  was  perfected,  and  is  the  epoch 
in  which  the  armaments  on  both  land  and  sea  were  gradually 
extended.  The  third,  or  the  next  ten  years,  opens  with  the 
Sino-Japanese  War,  in  which  long-yielding  Japan  fought  with 
accumulated  energy  against  her  Asiatic  neighbor  and  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing  herself  as  a  strong  power  in  the  Far 
East.  It  is  the  epoch  in  which  she  increased  her  armament 
more  and  more  and  busily  made  ready  to  plunge  herself  into 
the  whirlpool  of  international  competition.  The  fourth, 
occupying  the  next  decade,  begins  with  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  in  which  she  asserted  her  position  as  a  World  Power  by 
fighting  and  defeating  a  great  European  Power,  and  is  the 
epoch  of  aspiration  for  the  development  of  her  army  and  navy 


INTRODUCTION  5 

to  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  great  nations  of  the  world. 
Generally  speaking,  her  war  and  armament  expenditures  in- 
creased steadily  all  through  the  four  epochs,  but  in  each  one 
the  increase  had  its  particular  standard  or  condition.  These 
epochs  naturally  correspond  with  the  divisions  of  time  com- 
monly adopted  in  any  political,  financial,  or  economic  history 
of  the  Meiji  Era ;  and  this  fact  shows  that  war  has  an  important 
bearing  upon  social  events,  and  that -it  is  the  greatest  of  all 
phenomena  in  national  affairs. 

In  the  following  account  the  four  above-mentioned  epochs 
are  allotted  to  four  chapters,  each  of  which  is  divided  into 
sections  dealing  respectively  with  war  expenditures,  armament 
expenditures,  and  the  corresponding  financial  resources. 

What  are  war  expenditures  and  armament  expenditures? 
We  shall  not  undertake  to  define  them  scientifically,  but  we 
may  say  that  the  struggle  of  a  nation  by  the  force  of  arms,  that 
is,  the  dynamic  condition  of  its  military  power,  is  called  war; 
and  that  the  equipment  of  a  nation  with  arms,  that  is,  the 
static  condition  of  its  military  power,  is  called  armament. 
Assuming  that  the  expenses  incurred  in  the  former  are  war 
expenditures,  and  that  those  incurred  in  the  latter  are  arma- 
ment expenditures,  we  shall  accordingly  distinguish  the  two 
kinds  of  expenditure  by  referring  to  the  corresponding  items  in 
the  Japanese  General  Budget  or  Settled  Accounts. 

According  to  the  idea  formulated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph, 
an  internal  disturbance  must  be  regarded  as  a  war,  and  such 
disbursements  as  are  made  in  a  civil  war  must  therefore  come 
under  the  head  of  war  expenditures.  As  a  practical  question, 
however,  it  is  always  difficult  to  draw  an  exact  line  of  demarca- 
tion between  war  expenditures  and  armament  expenditures,  or 
between  these  and  other  administrative  expenditures.  For 
instance,  in  the  case  of  ships  or  horses  which  are  purchased  in 
time  of  war,  but  which  may  be  used  after  the  war,  or  in  the 
case  of  any  administrative  expenditure  in  which  war  purposes 
and  other  purposes  are  combined,  as  of  the  expenses  incurred 
by  the  financial  organ  in  the  collection  of  funds  for  the  de- 
frayment of  war  expenses,  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  discrimi- 


6  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

nate,  as  it  is  entirely  the  degree  or  extent  to  which  such  objects 
or  expenses  are  employed  either  in  war  or  in  armament  that 
determines  to  which  class  of  expenditures  they  properly  be- 
long. Suffice  it  to  say  that  we  do  not  intend  to  make  a  hard 
and  fast  rule  in  the  matter,  but  propose  in  our  discussion  to 
follow  mainly  the  technical  classification  of  accounts  employed 
in  our  government  finance,  making  such  alterations  or  trans- 
fers as  we  deem  necessary. 

With  regard  to  the  interest  payments  on  war  loans  and 
armament  loans,  we  may  say  that  they  might  reasonably  be 
classed  as  armament  expenditures,  since  they  form  a  part  of 
the  ordinary  expenditures  appearing  annually  in  the  General 
Budget  or  Settled  Accounts.  We  shall  not,  however,  include 
the  figures  corresponding  to  these  items  in  our  present  work, 
except  on  special  occasions,  for  the  reason  that  they  occupy 
such  a  special  position  in  our  armament  expenditures  that  their 
details  have  been  left  to  a  separate  investigation. 

Moreover,  with  regard  to  the  financial  resources  for  war  and 
armament  expenditures  set  forth  in  the  following  pages,  we 
shall  merely  enumerate  the  corresponding  items  and  omit 
detailed  explanations  thereof.  This  seems  advisable  because 
public  loans  and  taxes,  which  form  the  main  body  of  the  re- 
sources, have  their  respective  students  elsewhere,  and  we 
wish  to  avoid  repetition  in  this  volume.  Finally,  with  regard 
to  two  wars,  the  Sino-Japanese  and  the  Russo-Japanese,  there 
are  already  elaborate  investigations  by  other  writers,  and  our 
own  discussion  of  them  will  therefore  be  brief. 

The  statistical  data  on  which  our  investigations  are  based 
are  taken  chiefly  from  the  Settled  Accounts  published  by  the 
Department  of  Finance  and  from  the  Imperial  Statistical 
Annual  compiled  by  the  Bureau  of  Statistics,  and  consequently 
they  may  be  said  to  be  the  nearest  correct  and  most  reliable 
materials  obtainable.  But  as  for  our  investigations  regarding 
the  facts  prior  to  1887,  and  especially  prior  to  1875,  we  regret 
that  our  figures  are  more  or  less  approximate  owing  to  the 
imperfect  financial  systems  existing  in  hose  days  and  the  con- 
sequent scarcity  of  material  now  available. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

It  must  be  noted  that  the  figures  collected  in  this  work  rep- 
resent only  the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  in  the 
years  concerned.  As  the  value  of  money  fluctuates  in  course 
of  time,  according  to  the  general  economic  conditions,  and  is 
reflected  in  the  rise  and  fall  of  prices,  the  expenditures  of  the 
state  can  not  be  properly  conceived  without  taking  this  fluc- 
tuation into  account  It  is  to  be  hoped,  therefore,  that  the 
reader  will  always  entertain  due  consideration  of  the  varying 
value  of  money  in  the  different  epochs  of  our  history. 

Finally,  it  remains  to  be  said  that  the  fiscal  year  of  our 
National  Treasury  begins  on  the  1st  of  April  and  ends  on  the 
31st  of  March  of  each  year,  and  that  our  annual  accounts  are 
as  a  rule  produced  in  accordance  therewith.  But  prior  to 
1885  the  fiscal  year  or  period  was  different  and  was  reckoned  as 
follows: 

First  fiscal  period — December,  1867-December,  1868. 


Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Fifth 

Sixth 

Seventh 

Eighth 


— January,  1869-September,  1869  (9  months). 

— October,  1869-September,  1870. 

— October,  1870-September,  1871. 

— October,  1871-December,  1872  (15  months). 

— January,  1873-December,  1873. 

— January,  1 874-December,  1874. 

— January,  1875-June,  1875  (6  months). 


From  1875  to  1884  the  fiscal  period  in  each  year  began  with 
July  and  ended  with  the  following  June,  while  the  fiscal  period 
of  1885  covered  nine  months,  beginning  with  July,  1885,  and 
ending  with  March,  1886. 


CHAPTER  II 

FROM  THE  RESTORATION  TO  THE  SATSUMA 
REBELLION 

The  nine  years  beginning  with  the  Restoration  and  ending 
with  the  outbreak  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  formed  the  most 
stirring  epoch  of  the  period  with  which  we  are  concerned. 
Though  the  administrative  power  was  restored  to  the  Emperor, 
the  real  authority  of  the  Imperial  Government  was  not  yet 
perfected.  There  was  every  necessity,  internally,  of  resorting 
to  arms  in  order  to  subdue  the  remnant  of  Feudalists  in  various 
parts  of  the  country,  and,  externally,  of  guarding  against  any 
foreign  interference.  Fortunately,  ruled  by  a  wise  sovereign, 
assisted  by  capable  men  well  versed  in  the  management  of 
state  affairs,  Japan  was  able  to  accomplish  the  great  work  of 
the  Restoration,  reforming  the  national  institutions  and 
carrying  out  the  national  policy  of  opening  the  country  and  of 
making  progress.  This  memorable  task  of  unifying  the  Em- 
pire was  not  consummated  without  some  bloodshed,  the  first 
of  which  was  in  the  War  of  the  Restoration,  the  second  in  the 
suppression  of  various  local  disturbances,  the  third  in  the  Saga 
Insurrection,  the  fourth  in  the  Formosan  Expedition,  and  the 
fifth  in  the  Korean  Affair  of  1875. 

The  War  of  the  Restoration  was  inevitable  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  new  regime ;  and  as  soldiers  of  numerous  clans  were 
mobilized,  and  as  shifting  operations  were  necessary  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  country,  the  war  expenses  and  their  effects 
were  of  great  importance.  The  local  disturbances  referred  to 
were  conflicts  of  comparatively  minor  importance,  caused  by 
small  internal  movements  of  opposition  against  the  new  rule. 
In  the  Formosan  Expedition,  as  well  as  in  the  Korean  Affair, 
military  power  was  used  overseas,  but  they  were  not  great 
wars  involving  the  destiny  of  the  nation.  The  latter,  espe- 
cially, was  merely  a  little  disturbance  in  diplomatic  relations. 


RESTORATION   WAR  TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  9 

Finally,  the  Saga  Insurrection  may  be  called  only  a  harbinger 
of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  The  war  expenditures  dealt  with 
in  this  chapter  pertain  to  these  five  wars. 

The  country's  armament  in  the  earliest  days  of  the  Meiji  Era 
lacked  almost  everything;  and  the  new  government,  which 
had  just  accomplished,  almost  empty-handed,  the  work  of  the 
Restoration,  was  still  far  from  its  goal.  The  national  finances 
were  in  complete  disorder,  while  the  sources  of  revenue  were 
not  established.  Meanwhile,  as  foreign  war  vessels  were  fre- 
quenting her  coasts,  there  was  urgent  necessity  for  Japan  to 
strengthen  her  national  defense;  and  above  all  it  was  obvious 
that  her  internal  peace  could  be  secured  only  through  the 
building  up  of  an  efficient  military  power.  The  heavy  cares  of 
the  government  at  this  juncture  can  easily  be  imagined,  and  its 
anxious  thoughts  were  at  first  concentrated  upon  the  creation 
of  an  army  and  navy  patterned  after  the  occidental  system. 
After  laborious  application  and  after  enormous  expenditures 
of  money,  the  authorities  saw  their  way  clear  to  meet  the 
emergency.  Thus,  by  the  end  of  the  first  epoch  now  under 
review,  the  so-called  "creation  stage"  in  the  development  of 
our  army  and  navy  was  passed;  and,  though  very  imperfect, 
these  two  organs  of  the  state  came  to  be  recognized  in  Japan, 
adding  much  to  the  power  and  systematic  progress  of  the 
nation. 

War  Expenditures 

War  of  the  Restoration 

Though  on  October  14,  1867  (the  third  year  of  Keio),  the 
administrative  power  was  restored  to  the  Emperor,  the  unifica- 
tion of  national  affairs  was  far  from  complete.  The  Imperial 
Government,  having  no  soldiers  of  its  own,  had  to  rely  upon 
the  united  efforts  of  the  clans  of  Satsuma,  Choshu,  Tosa,  and 
Hizen  in  order  to  acquire  the  sole  political  power.  The 
Shogun,  Keiki  Tokugawa,  after  restoring  his  power  to  the 
Emperor,  retired  to  Osaka,  but  the  partisans  of  the  Shogunate, 
living  chiefly  in  Yedo  and  in  Kwanto  districts,  planned  clan- 
destinely the  revival  of  their  former  regime;  and  what  we  call 


10  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

the  War  of  the  Restoration  was  the  struggle  of  the  Imperialists 
in  subduing  these  opponents.  On  January  2,  1865  (the  first 
year  of  Keio),  a  battle  was  fought  at  Fushimi  and  Toba,  in 
which  the  soldiers  of  the  Satsuma  and  Choshu  clans  defeated 
the  Feudalists  of  the  Aidzu  and  Kuwana  clans  and  demon- 
strated the  superiority  of  the  Imperialist  forces.  The  Shogun 
then  returned  to  Yedo  and  lived  in  seclusion,  but  the  minds  of 
his  adherents  still  dwelt  upon  the  revival  of  the  Shogunate. 
The  Imperial  Government  thereupon  raised  the  armies  for  the 
expedition  to  Kwanto,  which  proceeded  toward  Yedo,  march- 
ing simultaneously  by  different  routes  through  the  districts  of 
Tokaido,  Tosando,  and  Hokurikudo.  Destitute  of  war  funds, 
the  government  resorted  to  borrowing  the  necessary  sums 
from  merchants  and  rich  men,  and  also  issued  paper  notes  to 
meet  the  urgent  requirements.  On  April  1 1  of  the  same  year 
the  Castle  of  Yedo  capitulated;  but  this  did  not  satisfy  the 
hereditary  vassals  of  the  Shogun,  many  of  whom  plotted  a 
rebellion.  Keisuke  Otori,  as  a  revolter,  fled  to  Shimosa; 
Buyo  Enomoto,  after  plundering  eight  warships  of  the  Feudal 
Government,  fled  to  Hakodate,  where  he  shut  himself  up  in 
the  Castle  of  Goryokaku;  and  the  Aidzu  clan,  together  with 
seventeen  other  clans  of  the  Ou  districts,  rebelled  against  the 
coalition  government  of  the  Satsuma  and  Choshu  clans.  The 
Imperial  Government  had  to  overcome  all  these  rebels,  and 
it  was  not  until  after  many  battles  that  the  War  of  the  Restora- 
tion was  at  last  concluded  on  May  17,  1866  (the  second  year  of 
Keio),  with  the  final  surrender  of  the  Hakodate  rebels.  In 
June  of  the  same  year  the  grant  of  rewards  for  military  serv- 
ices was  made  to  440  persons  (4  battalions),  and  the  heredi- 
tary pensions,  life  pensions,  and  temporary  rewards  amounted 
to  a  considerable  sum. 

The  War  of  the  Restoration  was  an  internal  conflict;  and 
as  the  government  did  not  have  a  military  force  of  its  own,  it 
happened  inevitably  that  the  different  clans  quarreled  with 
one  another,  dividing  themselves  into  the  eastern  and  western 
factions.  In  dealing  with  the  corresponding  war  expendi- 
tures,  therefore,   we  must  consider  the  part   borne  by  the 


RESTORATION   WAR  TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  II 

Shogunate  party  as  well  as  that  borne  by  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment; and  these  together  do  not  represent  the  total  ex- 
penditures, since  the  different  clans  engaged  in  the  struggle 
all  paid  their  expenses  out  of  their  own  treasuries.  Conse- 
quently, the  figures  given  below  as  representing  the  cost  of  this 
war  to  the  government  do  not  comprise  the  total  disburse- 
ments; on  the  contrary,  they  would  perhaps  be  doubled  if  the 
expenditures  of  the  different  clans  concerned  were  taken  into 
account.  Moreover,  it  may  be  here  noted  that  in  the  arma- 
ment expenditures  mentioned  below  for  the  first  year  of  Meiji 
certain  items  are  partially  included  that  might  properly  be 
reckoned  as  war  expenditures. 

The  total  war  expenditures  corresponding  to  the  War  of  the 
Restoration,  as  shown  in  the  Government  Statement  of  Ac- 
counts for  the  eighth  fiscal  period,  and  as  produced  in  1878  by 
consolidating  the  accounts  of  the  preceding  years,  was  8,908,- 
333  yen-  This  total  was  obtained  by  computing  the  average 
market  price  of  rice  stored  in  government  warehouses  in  each 
fiscal  period  and  by  taking  into  consideration  the  rice  quota- 
tions in  different  localities.  This  was  done  because  in  those 
days  rice  was  used  largely  as  the  medium  of  exchange  in  paying 
taxes  and  in  borrowing  war  funds  and  supplies  from  the  pub- 
lic.    The  figures  for  the  separate  fiscal  periods  are  as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

First 4,621,633 

Second 2,625,644 

Third 1,546,984 

Fourth 1 14.072 


12  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

The  different  items  of  expenditure  were  as  follows 
Expenditures  for  the  War  of  the  Restoration 


Items  of  expenditure 

Fiscal  period 

Total 

First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Subjugation  of  Kwanto 
districts 

Yen 

3,348,883 

125,446 

828,323 
12,481 
66,000 

109,700 
130,800 

Yen 
752,038 

577,900 

182,708 

564,987 

310,000 
238,010 

Yen 
235,006 

H5,354 

27,979 

319,570 
849,075 

Yen 
95,389 

18,543 
140 

Yen 
4,431,316 

Chastisement  of  rebels 
at  Hakodate 

Expenses  for  those  who 
surrendered  

Emperor's    sojourn    at 
Osaka    and    trip    to 
Kwanto 

703,346 

298,062 

828,323 

Garrisons    and     head- 
quarters  

12,481 

Civil  administration  of- 
fices   

630,987 

Police  office 

27,979 

Special  grants  bestowed 

on  various  clans .... 

Temporary  rewards.  .  . 

757,813 
1,218,026 

Total 

4,621,633 

2,625,644 

1,546,984 

114,072 

8,908,333 

Of  the  above  items,  the  outlays  for  subjugating  the  Kwanto 
districts  and  for  chastising  the  rebels  at  Hakodate  may  be 
reckoned  as  direct  war  expenditures,  but  further  details  of 
them  can  not  now  be  given.  The  garrisons  and  headquarters 
were  located  in  Tokyo  for  commanding  the  troops  mobilized 
for  the  Kwanto  Expedition  and  served  as  presiding  military 
organs;  they  also  performed  the  duty  of  pacifying  those  clans- 
men who  surrendered.  The  civil  administration  offices  and 
the  police  office  were  established  in  order  to  placate  popular 
sentiment  and  protect  life  and  property;  the  former  were 
located  in  the  northeastern  districts,  viz.,  in  Taira  (Province 
of  Iwaki),  Wakamatsu  (Province  of  Iwashiro),  and  Sakata 
(Province  of  Ugo),  and  the  latter  in  Shiraishi  (Province  of 
Iwashiro). 

The  special  grants  bestowed  on  various  clans  in  the  first 
fiscal  period  consisted  of  funds  advanced  to  the  Kagoshima 


RESTORATION   WAR   TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  1 3 

clan  for  the  purchase  of  ammunition,  and  of  further  advances 
to  various  other  clans  for  guarding  Osaka  and  other  cities. 
The  special  grants  in  the  second  fiscal  period  consisted  of  an 
advance  of  200,000  yen  to  the  Akita  clan,  which  alone  worked 
hard  for  the  Imperial  cause  among  other  clans  of  the  Ou  dis- 
tricts and  was  thus  impoverished,  and  of  smaller  advances  to  a 
few  other  clans  whose  men  served  in  the  Imperial  Army  and 
whose  territory  was  ravished  by  troops.  Finally,  the  special 
grants  in  the  third  fiscal  period  include  principally  sums  ad- 
vanced to  the  Wakamatsu  clan,  the  members  of  which, 
numbering  a  few  thousands,  obediently  migrated  to  Hokkaido. 
The  last  item,  temporary  rewards,  refers  to  the  money 
given,  as  circumstances  required,  to  the  officers  and  men  who 
took  part  in  the  fighting. 

Suppression  of  Local  Disturbances 

After  the  fall  of  the  feudal  system  and  the  establishment  of 
the  new  regime,  the  consequent  introduction  of  new  national 
institutions  and  usages  caused  a  considerable  agitation  of 
public  sentiment.  Some  opposed  the  new  system  of  govern- 
ment, some  planned  to  form  a  separate  government,  and 
others  were  discontented  with  the  treatment  accorded  to  the 
former  clansmen.  These  disturbed  people  were  led  to  revolt 
in  various  localities.  Thus,  in  1871  there  was  an  uprising  in 
Watarai  (now  Prefecture  of  Miye) ;  in  1872,  another  in  Ina 
(now  Prefecture  of  Nagano);  in  1873,  others  in  Fukuoka, 
Hojo  (now  Prefecture  of  Okayama),  Oita,  Miye,  Miyazaki, 
Myoto  (now  Prefecture  of  Tokushima) ;  and  in  1874  there  was 
a  movement  of  opposition  in  Tsuruoka  (now  Prefecture  of 
Yamagata).  All  these  were  small  riots,  but  the  government 
could  not  quell  them  save  by  force  of  arms.  The  expenses 
incurred  in  these  wars  were  as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

Fifth 3.638 

Sixth 82,404 

Seventh 43. 889 

Eighth 25,740 

Total 1 55  67 1 


14  HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 

Saga  Insurrection 

The  centralization  of  political  power  in  the  Meiji  Govern- 
ment was  accomplished,  and  the  work  of  remodeling  of  the  na- 
tional institutions  began.  At  this  time  the  authorities  were 
divided  into  two  parties,  the  one  insisting  on  the  necessity  of 
first  reforming  the  internal  administration  of  the  country,  the 
other  urging  the  primary  importance  of  increasing  the  national 
strength  abroad.  At  that  time  it  happened  that  Tai-won- 
kun,  who  was  acting  as  regent  in  Korea,  failed  to  observe  the 
rules  of  propriety  in  receiving  Japan's  envoy  sent  there  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  friendly  relations  with  his  country. 
The  strong  foreign  policy  party  in  Japan  then  clamored  for 
the  chastisement  of  Korea,  and  the  State  Councillor  General, 
Takamori  Saigo,  leader  of  this  party,  insisted  upon  going  in 
person  to  Korea  as  Japan's  emissary  appointed  for  this  pur- 
pose. On  the  other  hand,  the  moderate  party  in  Japan  in- 
sisted that  such  action  was  unnecessary.  Neither  party 
would  yield  to  the  other,  with  the  result  that  on  September  23, 
1873,  when  the  State  Council  decided  against  sending  an 
expedition  to  Korea  for  the  time  being,  the  advocates  of  the 
measure  indignantly  resigned  their  positions  in  a  wholesale 
manner.  This  constituted  the  direct  cause  of  the  Saga  In- 
surrection and  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  and  was  primarily  re- 
sponsible for  the  troubles  in  Korea  which  occurred  on  three 
subsequent  occasions,  as  also  for  the  Formosan  Expedition. 
Indeed,  the  Korean  questions  were  the  nucleus  of  the  events  of 
the  Meiji  Era. 

Shimpei  Et5,  who  returned  to  Saga  indignant  because  his 
plan  of  invading  Korea  had  not  been  carried  out,  was  excited 
by  his  adherents  to  revolt  in  February,  1874,  having  himself 
been  chosen  as  leader  of  the  revolters.  The  insurrection  was 
quelled  by  the  forces  commanded  by  Major-Generals  Nodzu 
and  Yamada,  with  Toshimichi  Okubo,  State  Councillor,  as 
their  head.  The  hostilities  lasted  fifty-two  days  and  involved 
the  use  of  2,000  soldiers  organized  in  fourteen  battalions  of  the 
army,  4,500  additional  men  having  been  mobilized  in  different 


RESTORATION   WAR  TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  1 5 

localities.  Of  the  navy,  four  warships  and  nine  trans- 
ports took  part  in  the  war.  The  expenses  incurred  were 
as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

Seventh 955.614 

Eighth 61,083 


Total 1 ,016,697 

Formosan  Expedition 

In  October,  1871,  fifty-four  inhabitants  of  the  Loochoo 
Islands  were  cast  ashore  in  Formosa,  where  they  were  killed 
by  the  natives.  Subsequently,  in  March,  1873,  four  people 
from  the  Prefecture  of  Oda  were  also  injured  by  the  natives 
there.  The  Imperial  Government  then  considered  the  chastise- 
ment of  Formosa  and  opened  negotiations  with  China  in  re- 
gard to  the  matter;  but  the  Chinese  Government  was  unwill- 
ing to  punish  the  Formosans  on  the  ground  that  they  were  still 
barbarians  and  as  such  beyond  the  Chinese  power  of  assimila- 
tion. Thereupon,  the  Japanese  Government  decided  to  send  a 
punitive  force  to  Formosa,  considering  that  the  public  senti- 
ment aroused  over  the  Korean  Affair  and  the  consequent 
Saga  Insurrection  could  not  otherwise  be  satisfied.  In  May, 
1874,  an  expeditionary  force  commanded  by  Yorimichi  Saigo 
proceeded  to  Formosa  and  subdued  the  natives  there.  In 
September,  1874,  Toshimichi  Okubo  went  to  Peking  and, 
after  negotiations,  obtained  an  indemnity  of  500,000  yen  from 
the  Chinese  Government,  and  in  December  of  the  same  year 
General  Saigo  returned  to  Japan  in  triumph.  The  number  of 
soldiers  employed  in  this  expedition  was  3,658,  of  whom  573 
were  killed  and  17  wounded.  Of  the  navy,  the  Adzuma  and 
four  other  warships,  with  crews  numbering  in  all  289,  served  in 
the  war.     The  total  expenses  were  as  follows : 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

Seventh 2,230,376 

Eighth ., 1,387,684 

Total 3,618,060 


16 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


According  to  the  books  kept  in  those  days  at  the  Formosan 
Expedition  Office,  these  expenditures  were  apportioned  as 
follows : 

Apportionment  of  Expenditures  for  the  Formosan  Expedition 


Payments 


At  Main  Office 

At  Nagasaki  Branch  Office 

At  Expedition  Headquarters 

At  War  Department 

At  Navy  Department 

By  Minister  in  Charge 

At  Shanghai  Consulate.  .  . 

For  Inspection  Tours  in  China 

For  Purchase  of  1 5  Vessels  (Tokyo  Mam,  etc. 

Total 


Gold  and 
silver 


Yen 
813.177 
158,657 
528,801 

48.777 
78,905 
21,420 

169 
100,000 


1,749,906 


Trade 
silver 


Pieces 


775 


775 


Mexican 
silver 


Dollars 
123,937 
53  206 
16,580 

44.324 

U.979 

5,681 

6,610 

1,545,388 


1,807,705 


Korean  Affair  oj  1875 

It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  the  plan  for  the  chastise- 
ment of  Korea  was  not  adopted  by  the  Cabinet;  and  although 
the  excitement  over  the  question  had  almost  subsided  with  the 
carrying  out  of  the  Formosan  Expedition,  an  actual  rupture  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Peninsular  Kingdom  was  brought 
about  in  1875,  when  the  Korean  garrison  at  Koka  Island 
shelled  the  Japanese  warship  Unyo,  which  touched  there  for 
water  and  fuel.  The  Imperial  Government  then  sent  out  a 
punitive  force  to  Korea,  and  succeeded  in  coming  to  a  friendly 
agreement  whereby  the  three  Korean  ports  of  Fusan,  Gensan, 
and  Jinsen  were  opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  the  definite 
statement  was  made  that  Korea  was  not  a  dependency  of 
China.     The  expenses  in  this  war  amounted  to  489,553  yen. 

Armament  Expenditures 

Army 

The  nine  years  beginning  with  1868  and  ending  with  the 
outbreak  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  belong  to  the  epoch  in 
which  the  Japanese  army  was  gradually  and  systematically 


RESTORATION   WAR   TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  1 7 

developed  for  the  first  time.  In  the  feudal  days  each  clan  had 
its  "samurai"  or  class  of  men  who  were  hereditary  soldiers  by 
profession ;  and  it  is  a  fact,  too,  that  even  before  the  Restora- 
tion some  attention  had  been  given  to  military  science  and 
some  progress  had  already  been  made  in  the  manufacture  of 
gunpowder,  cannon  and  rifles.  At  that  time,  however,  these 
were  but  separate  works  in  the  individual  clans,  and  what 
may  be  called  the  awakening  of  the  nation  to  the  question  of 
national  defense  commenced  only  after  the  coasts  of  Japan 
were  menaced  by  foreign  warships  and  the  opening  of  the 
country  to  foreign  intercourse  became  pressing. 

In  1862  the  Feudal  Government  planned  the  organization  of 
an  army  patterned  after  the  occidental  system  and  trained 
13,000  soldiers  in  three  companies.  This  may  be  called  the 
foundation-stone  of  the  modern  Japanese  army.  But  the 
progress  of  this  first  army  was  "checked  by  the  War  of  the 
Restoration,  in  which  the  Imperial  Government,  having  no 
soldiers  of  its  own,  made  use  of  the  soldiers  of  the  different 
clans;  and  by  this  act  the  military  systems  or  equipments  of 
the  Feudal  Government  were  totally  destroyed. 

After  the  Restoration,  the  Imperial  Government  recognized 
the  importance  of  maintaining  its  military  power,  though  it 
allowed  the  soldiers  of  the  feudal  lords  to  return  to  their  own 
clans,  and  freshly  summoned  "samurai"  from  Totsugawa, 
etc.,  and  also  appropriated  the  soldiers  of  the  house  of  Toku- 
gawa.  In  1870,  when  Aritomo  Yamagata  and  Yorimichi 
Saigo  returned  from  their  tours  in  Europe  for  the  investigation 
of  western  military  systems,  it  was  decided  to  organize  the 
army  after  the  French  style  and  the  navy  after  the  English 
style.  The  Military  School  was  moved  from  Tokyo  to  Osaka, 
and  young  men  from  different  clans  were  invited  to  go  there 
to  be  educated  as  officers.  In  February,  1871,  10,000  soldiers 
from  the  clans  of  Satsuma,  Choshu  and  Tosa  were  collected  in 
Tokyo  to  form  an  Imperial  Body  Guard  (the  origin  of  the 
present  Imperial  Body  Guard),  and  subsequently,  the  feudal 
soldiers  having  been  ordered  to  disperse,  it  was  planned  to 
organize  four  garrisons  at  Tokyo,  Sendai,  Osaka  and  Kuma- 


18 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


moto.  For  this  purpose  soldiers  were  levied  from  different 
clans  on  the  basis  of  their  income  at  the  rate  of  five  soldiers  per 
10,000  koku  of  rice.  In  February,  1872,  the  War  Depart- 
ment was  abolished,  and  the  Army  and  Navy  Departments 
were  established  instead.  On  January  20,  1873,  the  principle 
of  a  whole  nation  in  arms  was  finally  adopted  by  the  passage  of 
the  conscription  law;  and  with  this  the  foundation  of  the 
Imperial  military  system  was  laid.  The  entire  country  was 
then  divided  into  six  districts  of  military  jurisdiction,  and  six 
garrisons  were  formed  accordingly,  each  composed  of  fourteen 
regiments  (42  battalions)  of  infantry,  eighteen  sections  of 
artillery,  three  battalions  of  cavalry,  ten  sections  of  engineers, 
one  battalion  of  supply  troops,  and  nine  companies  of  coast 
artillery.  The  total  peace  footing  was  31,680  and  the  total 
war  footing  46,350.  This  organization  was  maintained, 
though  with  more  or  less  revision,  until  the  outbreak  of 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  and  it  seems  that  the  government 
was  able  to  obtain  the  required  number  of  men  as  stated 
above.1 

The  Settled  Accounts  of  the  armament  expenditures  for  the 
army,  from  the  first  fiscal  period  to  1876,  read  as  follows: 

Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Army 


Fiscal  period 


First .... 
Second . . , 
Third 
Fourth .  .  . 
Fifth.  .  .. 

Sixth  

Seventh .  . 
Eighth .  .  . 
1875.:'. 
1876 

Total 


Ordinary 
expenditures 


Yen 
1,008,120 
1.347.562 
1.355.832 
3. 195. 156 
7,346,649 
8,128,141 
8,673,709 
3,642,066 
6,959,736 
6,904,829 


48,561,800 


Index 
number 


100 
133 
135 
317 
729 
806 
860 
362 
690 
685 


Extraordi- 
nary expendi- 
tures 


Yen 

567,614 

95.904 

68,713 

57,8ii 

352,698 

369,614 

59,467 

3.620,533 


5,192,354 


Index 
number 


100 

18 

12 

10 

625 

650 

n 

6,400 


1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  1. 


RESTORATION   WAR  TO   SATSUMA  REBELLION  1 9 

The  above  table  shows  a  rapid  increase  of  both  ordinary  and 
extraordinary  expenditures.  The  figures  for  the  first  four 
fiscal  periods  comprise  all  the  naval  expenditures  except  the 
Warship  Sundry  Expenses,  which  it  was  impossible  to  separate 
for  the  reason  that  until  February,  1872,  the  affairs  of  both  the 
army  and  the  navy  were  under  one  and  the  same  organization, 
called  the  War  Department,  which  in  1869  succeeded  the 
Bureau  of  Military  Affairs  formed  in  the  first  year  of  Meiji 
(1868).  The  figures  of  the  ordinary  expenditures  are  those 
given  in  the  Settled  Accounts  of  the  Department  of  Finance  as 
army  and  navy  expenditures  from  the  first  to  the  fourth  fiscal 
period  and  as  army  expenditures  for  the  fifth  fiscal  period  and 
thereafter.  They  include  the  expenses  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
Departments  for  the  purchase  of  arms,  the  construction  of 
castles,  forts  and  barracks,  and  indeed  all  other  outlays  that 
may  be  classed  as  military  expenses.  But  in  those  days  there 
were  no  such  divisions  as  chapters,  sections,  sub-sections,  and 
items  in  the  Annual  Account;  indeed,  no  definite  form  of 
General  Budget  then  existed,  so  that  temporary  diversions  of 
available  funds,  prolongations  of  particular  fiscal  years,  etc., 
were  of  frequent  occurrence.  Consequently,  it  must  be  noted 
that  the  above  figures  show  only  the  amounts  of  the  actual 
payments  made.  Though  the  army  and  navy  expenditures 
of  the  first  and  the  second  fiscal  periods  are  classed  as  ordinary 
expenditures,  more  than  half  of  the  total  must  have  been  used 
directly  in  the  War  of  the  Restoration;  and  it  is  so  stated  in 
the  remarks  in  the  Settled  Accounts,  as  the  total  amounts  are 
disproportionately  large  in  comparison  with  the  average  ex- 
penditures of  the  other  departments  of  the  government  at  that 
time.  The  ordinary  expenditures  from  the  first  to  the  third 
fiscal  period  increased  from  1,008,120  to  1,355,832  yen,  and 
they  represent  principally  the  payments  to  the  soldiers  who 
fought  in  the  War  of  the  Restoration.  The  extraordinary 
expenditures  in  these  three  fiscal  periods  comprise  584,000  yen 
paid  for  the  settlement  of  debts  contracted  for  weapons  pur- 
chased by  the  Feudal  Government  from  various  French  and 
Dutch  firms,  and  143,000  yen  paid  for  building  barracks  at 


20  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Kanakawa  for  the  protection  of  foreigners  and  natives.  The 
reason  the  expenditures  more  than  doubled  in  the  fourth 
fiscal  period,  as  compared  with  the  third,  is  that,  as  mentioned 
above,  some  10,000  soldiers,  i.e.,  a  few  battalions  each  from  the 
clans  of  Satsuma,  Choshu,  and  Tosa,  were  collected  to  form 
the  Imperial  Body  Guard,  and  subsequently  four  garrisons 
were  organized.  In  the  fifth  fiscal  period  there  was  again 
an  increase  of  about  two  and  a  half  times  over  the  expendi- 
tures of  the  fourth,  due  to  the  fact  that  in  February,  1872, 
the  War  Department  was  abolished  and  the  Army  and  Navy 
Departments  were  instituted  in  its  place;  and  as  both  mili- 
tary and  naval  affairs  were  enlarged,  more  weapons  pur- 
chased, additional  barracks  built,  and  the  number  of  soldiers 
increased,  there  was  consequent  increase  of  expenses.  The 
whole  of  the  extraordinary  expenditures  in  fifth,  sixth  and 
seventh  fiscal  periods,  and  176,567  yen  of  the  same  in  the 
eighth  fiscal  period,  totaling  958,346  yen,  were  used  in  the 
purchase  of  land  and  the  construction  of  buildings  for  the 
Imperial  Body  Guard  and  all  other  garrisons  and  the  Military 
Academy.  The  extraordinary  expenditures  of  3,443,966  yen 
in  the  eighth  fiscal  period  were  used  in  the  manufacture  of 
arms  and  ammunition  at  the  critical  juncture  brought  about 
by  the  disturbed  relations  with  China  in  1874  after  the  For- 
mosan  Expedition,  and  included  other  expenses  toward  the 
expansion  of  affairs  in  general.  In  the  ordinary  expenditures 
of  the  eighth  fiscal  period,  and  of  the  fiscal  years  1875  and 
1876,  we  do  not  see  any  great  increases,  because  those  amounts 
were  just  sufficient  for  the  maintenance  of  the  military  power 
at  the  time. 

In  order  to  set  forth  the  nature  of  the  armament  and  cor- 
responding expenditures  in  those  days,  we  produce  at  this 
point  some  of  the  main  disbursements  in  the  fiscal  year  1875,. 
(July,  1875-June,  1876). 

The  following  figures  are  taken  from  the  first  Annual  Report 
of  the  Army  Department,  in  which,  however,  a  sum  of  457,596 
yen  appears  as  an  extraordinary  expenditure  for  the  purchase 
of  land  in  the  compounds  of  the  Castles  of  Hiroshima  and 


RESTORATION   WAR  TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION 


21 


Himeji,  for  building  barracks  in  the  Loochoo  clan,  for  an 
emergency  fund  for  the  Korean  troubles,  and  for  the  expenses 
of  the  expedition  organized  to  quell  the  riots  in  the  Prefecture 
of  Wakayama.  The  consequence  is  that  in  the  said  Annual 
Report  the  grand  total  of  the  expenditures  of  the  Army  De- 
partment amounts  to  7,231,711  yen,  which,  as  compared  with 
the  aforementioned  Settled  Accounts  of  the  Department  of 
Finance  for  the  same  year,  reveals  a  difference  of  271,975  yen; 
but  the  details  of  this  discrepancy  can  not  now  be  traced. 

We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  in  the  army  expenditures 
now  under  review  the  expenses  of  the  Army  Department 
proper  were  the  largest  (approximately  22  per  cent) ,  and  that 
the  average  expenditure  for  one  garrison  was  470,000  yen. 

Expenditures  of  the  Army  Department  in  the  Fiscal  Year  1875 


Names  of  offices 


Amount 


Army  Department 

General  Staff 

Imperial  Body  Guard 

Garrisons: 

First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Fifth 

Sixth 

Arsenal : 

Head  Office 

Branch  Office 

Engineering  Corps: 

First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Fifth 

Sixth  

Military  Academy 

Toyama  Military  School 

Kyododan  Military  School  (for  training  non-commissioned  officers) 

Military  Preparatory  School 

Main  Hospital 

Law  Court 

Horse  Bureau 

Sick  Horse  Stable 

Armory 

Total 


Yen 
1,510,711 
132,182 
408,079 

786,638 
185,089 
328,176 

57L947 
360,848 
445.002 

433.420 
200,431 

440,662 
23.303 
38,095 
72,198 
18,767 
27,264 

129,797 

8i,54l 
242,839 

45-335 
110,882 

23,069 
113.409 

17.512 

26,919 


6,774.115 


22 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


Apportionment  of  Expenditures  of  Army  Department  in  the  Fiscal  Year 

1875 


Items  of  expenditure 


Amount 


Salaries 

Allowances 

Traveling  expenses 

Office  expenses 

Barracks  furniture 

Ordnance 

Stables 

Expenses  for  students  abroad 

Conscription 

Foreign  employees 

Medical  care 

Penal  servitude 

Prisons 

Marches 

Troops 

Reserve  soldiers 

Ammunition 

Expenses  for  students  at  home 

Building  and  repairs 

Shokonsha  (shrine  for  those  killed  in  war) 
Sundries 

Total 


Yen 

796,819 

1,268,891 

284,702 

243,821 

46,057 

263,591 

102,853 

19,877 

50.042 

129,728 

64,618 

8,831 

9,787 

30,524 

2,623,721 

48,255 

47,230 

61,446 

165,427 

8,750 

499,145 


6,774,»5 


Further,  in  the  items  of  expenditure  enumerated,  we  note  that 
the  allowances  (which  include  clothing  and  food)  are  the  larg- 
est, the  salaries  coming  next;  and  then  follow  the  traveling 
expenses  and  the  ordnance  expenses. 

Navy 

Disregarding  the  fact  that  from  remote  times  until  the 
Middle  Ages  the  Japanese  occasionally  showed  their  naval 
power  in  expeditions  to  the  Chinese  coasts  or  Korea,  we  may 
say  that  they  almost  totally  neglected  the  question  of  mari- 
time defense  for  a  period  of  more  than  two  hundred  years  of 
their  modern  history,  in  which  they  rigidly  adhered  to  the 
principle  of  national  seclusion.  But  the  transitional  move- 
ments of  the  times  had  never  allowed  the  Far  Eastern  waters 
to  remain  permanently  tranquil.  Toward  the  end  of  the 
Tokugawa  regime,  the  visits  to  this  country  of  European  and 
American  ships  had  gradually  increased  in  frequency ;  and  with 


RESTORATION   WAR   TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  2$ 

the  appearance  of  frigates  off  her  coasts  the  old  scholars  in 
Japan  began  to  talk  of  the  urgency  of  maritime  defense. 
When  the  country  was  visited  by  Commodore  Perry,  in  1853, 
there  came  advice  from  the  Dutch  Government  relative  to  the 
creation  of  a  navy  in  Japan.  Thereupon  the  Feudal  Govern- 
ment, planning  the  organization  of  a  navy,  established  a  naval 
school  (1855),  installed  shipbuilding  yards  at  Ishikawajima 
and  Yokosuka  (1864),  and  purchased  and  constructed  several 
war  vessels,  so  that  just  before  the  Restoration  the  government 
had  at  its  disposal  a  fairly  well  organized  naval  force.  Be- 
sides this,  the  clan  governments  of  Satsuma,  Choshu,  Kuma- 
moto  and  Saga  also  worked  toward  the  development  of  the 
navy.  But  the  great  revolutionary  War  of  the  Restoration 
completely  destroyed  the  Feudal  Government,  together  with 
its  navy,  and  the  newly  formed  Imperial  Government  was 
keenly  alive  to  the  necessity  of  reestablishing  the  means  of 
maritime  defense.  In  1869  the  Bureau  of  Military  Affairs 
was  abolished  and  the  War  Department,  with  jurisdiction 
over  both  army  and  navy,  was  established  instead.  In  1870 
the  Naval  College,  the  cradle  of  Japanese  naval  education, 
was  founded  in  Tsukiji,  and  students  from  various  clans  were 
enrolled  there  for  training.  At  this  school  British  teachers 
were  employed,  and  many  students  were  sent  forth  to  pursue 
studies  in  Europe  and  America.  Thus  great  pains  were  taken 
in  laying  the  foundation  of  the  country's  navy. 

In  1872,  with  the  abolition  of  the  War  Department  and  the 
creation  of  the  separate  Navy  Department,  a  number  of  laws 
and  regulations  were  made  for  the  unification  of  naval  affairs, 
and  the  official  organization  of  the  Navy  Department  was  ac- 
complished in  October  of  the  same  year.  It  may  be  said  that 
the  plan  of  the  Japanese  navy  was  now  for  the  first  time 
settled.  Consisting  then  of  two  iron-clad  ships,  one  iron- 
framed  wooden  ship,  and  some  small  wooden  ships,  it  num- 
bered in  all  only  seventeen  vessels,  with  a  total  displacement 
of  13,812  tons.  In  October,  1875,  the  coasts  of  the  country 
were  divided  into  the  eastern  and  the  western  jurisdictional 
districts,  in  which  the  warships  were  properly  distributed;  in 


24 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


August,  1876,  the  naval  stations  were  officially  organized;  and 
in  September  of  the  same  year  the  Tokai  Naval  Station  was 
established  at  Yokohama.  In  1873  the  construction  of  H.  M. 
S.  Jingei  (1,450  tons)  and  of  the  warship  Seiki  (897  tons)  was 
commenced  at  the  Yokohama  Shipbuilding  Yard,  the  former 
being  completed  in  1876  and  the  latter  in  1875.  Thus  the 
infant  stage  or  the  first  epoch  of  the  Japanese  navy  was 
passed,  and  its  strength  was  shown  in  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 
The  Settled  Accounts  of  these  armament  expenditures  for 
the  navy  read  as  follows:1 

Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Navy 


Fiscal  period 


First .  .  . 
Second . 
Third .  . 
Fourth . 
Fifth.  . 
Sixth .  . 
Seventh 
Eighth . 

1875-  •  ■ 
1876.  .  . 

Total 


Ordinary 
expenditures 


Yen 


1,767,450 
1,188,684 
1,685,237 
1,033,713 
2,825,843 
3,424,998 


11,925,925 


Index 
number 


100 

68 

95 

56 

166 

195 


Extraordi- 
nary expendi- 
tures 


Yen 

30,000 
147,000 
301,124 

101,544 
1,629 

2,488,586 


3-069,883 


Index 
number 


100 

490 

1,003 

332 
4 

745 


The  absence  of  figures  of  ordinary  expenditures  for  the  first 
four  fiscal  periods  in  the  above  table  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  as 
mentioned  before,  the  navy  expenditures  in  those  days  were 
included  in  the  army  expenditures.  As  regards  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures,  the  amount  appearing  in  the  first  period 
represents  half  of  the  purchase  price  of  the  warship  Takao 
bought  by  the  Akita  clan,  and  that  in  the  second  period 
represents  a  payment  of  130,000  yen  for  a  warship  previously 
purchased  by  the  Feudal  Government,  and  the  balance  of 
17,000  yen  paid  for  the  Takao.  The  extraordinary  expendi- 
tures in  the  third  period  represent  some  225,000  yen  expended 


1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  2. 


RESTORATION    WAR   TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  25 

for  coast  defense  at  the  time  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  in 
July,  1870,  when  Japan  declared  neutrality  and  dispatched 
warships  to  guard  the  ports  of  Shinagawa,  Yokohama,  Hiogo, 
Nagasaki,  and  Hakodate;  and  also  75,629  yen  expended  for 
repairing  and  transporting  the  warships  of  various  clans  in 
order  to  bring  these  vessels  under  the  centralized  control  of  the 
War  Department,  as  it  was  considered  disadvantageous  for  the 
clans  to  have  warships  under  their  own  control. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  in  the  fifth  fiscal  period  the 
enlargement  of  the  navy  was  planned,  and  ordinary  expendi- 
tures exceeding  1,740,000  yen  were  consequently  made  in  that 
period.  The  figures  of  extraordinary  expenditures  in  the 
same  period  represent  the  amount  paid  for  the  warship  Unyo 
purchased  from  the  Yamaguchi  clan.  The  increase  in  the 
seventh  period  was  due  to  the  general  increase  of  expenditures 
for  purposes  other  than  those  directly  connected  with  war,  in 
consequence  of  the  Saga  Insurrection  and  the  Formosan  Expe- 
dition. It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  eighth  fiscal  period, 
which  lasted  only  six  months  (January,  1875-June,  1875), 
there  was  a  great  increase  in  these  navy  expenditures ;  but  it  is 
attributable  to  the  carrying  out,  in  the  preceding  year,  of  the 
Formosan  Expedition,  which  led  to  the  necessity  of  purchasing 
more  arms,  ammunition  and  warships  in  anticipation  of  a 
possible  conflict  with  China.  Incidentally,  this  temporary 
increment  of  the  navy  served  as  a  preparation  for  the  war  of 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 

Financial  Resources 

In  December,  1867,  the  "Money  and  Cereals  Revenue 
Office"  was  established,  later  to  be  renamed  the  "Bureau  of 
Financial  Affairs."  Though  in  July,  1869,  the  Department  of 
Finance  was  at  last  established,  the  sources  of  revenue  were 
insufficient,  consisting  only  of  trifling  receipts  from  land  taxes, 
customs  duties,  various  business  taxes,  etc. ;  and  while  each 
clan  had  its  own  income  from  taxation,  the  newly  formed 
Imperial  Government  had  no  distinct  revenues  of  its  own. 
Thus,  almost  the  whole  of  the  expenses  incurred  in  the  War  of 


26  HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

the  Restoration  were  defrayed  by  means  of  borrowed  funds 
and  issues  of  paper  money.  Indeed,  there  was  no  war  fund  in 
preparation  during  the  period  between  the  battles  at  Toba 
and  Fushimi  and  the  subjugation  of  the  eastern  districts,  so 
that  the  supply  of  money  and  food  was  always  obtained,  as 
occasion  required,  by  borrowing  from  the  rich  houses  in  dif- 
ferent localities  or  else  by  commandeering.  Evidences  that 
the  government  borrowed  considerable  sums  at  high  rates  of 
interest  are  still  very  clear,  and  the  amounts  borrowed  were 
as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

First 4,732,482 

Second 911,500 

Third 4,782,400 

Total 10,426,382 

Besides  these  loans,  the  government  issued  on  the  19th  of 
the  intercalary  month  of  April,1  1868,  the  so-called  Dajokan- 
satsu  (paper  money  authorized  by  the  State  Council) ;  and  at 
the  same  time  it  was  decreed  that  "by  the  gracious  intentions 
of  the  Imperial  Government  paper  currency  was  ordered  to  be 
issued  as  an  emergency  measure  for  the  relief  of  the  universal 
distress  among  the  people."  While  the  object  of  issuing  these 
notes  was  proclaimed  to  be  that  of  supplying  capital  for  the 
development  of  industry,  it  can  not  be  denied  that  another 
very  urgent  object  was  that  of  meeting  a  large  deficit  in  the 
government  revenue.  The  amount  of  paper  money  issued 
was  first  restricted  to  32,500,000  ryo  (old  yen),  but  was  after- 
wards gradually  increased  as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

First 24,037,390 

Second 23,962,610 

Third 5.354.513 

Fourth 2,145,487 

Total 55,500,000 

The  financial  resources  for  the  expenses  incurred  in  the  War 
of  the  Restoration  were  obtained  through  the  two  means 

1  According  to  the  lunar  calendar  of  the  time,  a  double  month  occurred  at  certain, 
fixed  intervals,  and  this  was  the  year  in  which  the  double  month  occurred. 


RESTORATION   WAR   TO   SATSUMA   REBELLION  27 

referred  to  above,  and  also  through  the  war  contributions 
exacted  from  the  various  clans  and  their  voluntary  donations. 
In  the  intercalary  month  of  April,  1868,  the  government 
decreed  that  the  war  fund  was  to  be  raised  from  the  clans  on 
the  basis  of  their  income  at  the  rate  of  300  koku  per  10,000 
koku  of  rice,  the  payments  to  be  made  annually.  Later,  in 
September,  1870,  the  rate  was  raised  to  450  koku  per  10,000 
koku,  and  the  total  amounts  received  by  the  government  were 
as  follows: 

Fiscal  period  Yen 

First 73-377 

Second 79,137 

Third 378,093 

Fourth 1 ,461 ,064 

Total 1,991,671 

During  the  War  of  the  Restoration,  moreover,  many  of  the 
Feudal  Lords  and  Loyalists  in  various  parts  of  the  country 
voluntarily  contributed  cash  and  rice  to  the  war  fund  of  the 
government,  the  amount  of  these  donations  having  totaled 
655,406  yen  in  the  first  four  fiscal  periods. 

At  that  time  no  special  accounts  were  kept  for  war  expenses, 
and  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  indicate  definitely  the  cor- 
responding financial  resources.  But  the  revenue  from  the 
four  sources  above  mentioned  was  so  large  that  only  one-eighth 
of  the  total  amount  thus  obtained  was  used  for  war  expendi- 
tures. Consequently,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  funds  derived 
from  the  paper  money  issued  and  from  the  other  sources 
were  for  the  most  part  utilized  for  other  purposes.  The 
aggregate  revenue  for  the  first  four  fiscal  periods  was  about 
110,000,000  yen,  of  which  the  paper  notes  represented  50  per 
cent,  the  borrowed  funds  10  per  cent,  and  only  the  remaining 
40  per  cent  represented  the  ordinary  revenue  from  taxes,  etc. 
It  is  apparent  that  the  government  did  not  rely  solely  upon 
this  last  40  per  cent  for  meeting  its  war  expenditures.  It  may 
also  be  deduced  that  the  revenues  from  the  four  financial 
resources  above  mentioned  were  largely  used  in  the  total  war 
expenditures  of  5,279,981  yen  in  the  four  wars  following  the 


28  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

War  of  the  Restoration,  and  also  in  the  total  armament  ex- 
penditures of  68,749,962  yen.  However,  the  income  of  the 
Meiji  Government  had  been  greatly  augmented  during  and 
after  the  third  fiscal  period,  as,  for  instance,  by  a  gradual  in- 
crease in  the  land  tax;  and  it  may  be  said  that  war  expendi- 
tures then  came  to  be  gradually  supplied  through  the  ordinary 
sources  of  revenue.  We  may  further  remark  here  that  after 
the  year  1872  some  spare  notes  were  issued  for  circulation,  as 
will  be  narrated  in  the  following  pages,  for  supplying  the  deficit 
in  the  government  revenue;  and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  these  notes,  which  were  originally  intended  to  replace 
defaced  or  worn-out  notes  in  circulation,  also  served  to  satisfy 
the  requirements  for  armament  expenditures. 


CHAPTER  III 

FROM  THE  SATSUMA  REBELLION  TO  THE 
^JAPANESE  WAR 

Ten  years  passed  after  the  Restoration,  and  during  that  time 
order  was  gradually  restored  within  the  country.     Meanwhile, 
however,  a  cri-  -         -    developing  in  I        gcr  eminent  ha 
The  conflict  of  opinions  between  the  cc  r  i  e  internal 

policy  party  and  the  strong  foreign  policy  par:  na 

vehement  controversy  over  the  question  of  an  invasion  of 
Korea,  and  finally  led  to  the  great  S   bsmna  RebeUion       :  I " " 
But  this  war  served  as  a  touchstone  I        -    the  ability  of  the 
new  regime  and  was  an  indispensable  medium  for  perfec:     g 
the  modern  institutions  and  unified  organization  of  th    staJ 

--withstanding  the  great  sacrifices    ~         -    railed  upon  to 
makv    I  b  .  I  mperial  Government  was  fortunately  able  to  . 
proof  of  its  ability  to  maintain  the  unified  rule  nation, 

and  was  left  virtually  free  to  proceed  on  its  way  toward  ad- 
ministrative reforms  and  general  public  improvements.  \\  e 
have  said  that  the  nir.  -  ng  1  -  be- 

longed to  the  epoch  in  which  :  - 

-  created,  and  we  may  call  the  nex:  -  -    now 

under  review,  the  epoch  in  which  the  developmen: 
national  defense  was  effected. 

Comparative  peace  reigned  in  Japan  from  the  Satsuma 
rllion  to  the  year  1893.  though  a  few  soldiers  1  sent  to 
Korea  in  1882  and  again  in  1884:  and  during  this  epCK 
quiet,  progress  was  made  in  the  development  of  the  army  and 
navy.  At  first,  that  is.  prior  to  1884  r  1885  the  prog-  as 
very  slow,  but  from  then  on  it  was  gradually  accelerated.  In 
other  words,  in  the  first  half  of  the  epoch  the  preparation  for 
the  development  of  the  national  defense  was  made,  and  in  the 
at  nd  half  the  development  was  actually  effected.  This  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  financial  and  economic  status  of  primi- 

29 


30  HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 

tive  Japan  was  seriously  shaken  by  the  war  of  the  Satsuma 
Rebellion,  and  the  country  was  consequently  compelled  to 
pass  through  a  sort  of  preparatory  stage,  though  the  comple- 
tion of  the  national  defense  was  very  urgent. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  first  consider  the  war  ex- 
penditures connected  with  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  which  was 
really  the  last  great  struggle  for  the  unification  of  the  Empire, 
and  shall  then  take  up  the  expenditures  resulting  from  the 
Korean  Affairs  in  1882  and  1884.  Regarding  the  latter,  there 
may  be  more  or  less  objection  to  our  treating  them  as  war 
expenditures;  but  as  they  were  practically  the  expenses  in- 
curred in  moving  soldiers,  and  as  fighting  actually  occurred, 
we  may  say  they  can  not  properly  be  excluded  from  the  items 
of  war  expenditure. 

War  Expenditures 

Satsuma  Rebellion 

Takamori  Saigo,  defeated  in  his  insistent  advocacy  of  the 
invasion  of  Korea,  resigned  his  councillorship  in  the  Cabinet 
and  returned  to  his  native  place,  Kagoshima,  where  he  started 
a  private  school  with  funds  derived  from  the  pension  bestowed 
on  him  by  the  government,  and  was  soon  educating  thousands 
of  students.  The  dissatisfaction  of  these  students  with  the 
Imperial  Government  could  by  no  means  be  controlled,  and  on 
January  30,  1877,  they  revolted  against  it.  On  February  15, 
with  a  force  numbering  about  25,000,  they  crossed  over  the 
boundary  of  their  clan  and  entered  Kumamoto,  where  they 
were  joined  by  a  force  of  Kumamoto  men  under  Kichijuro 
Ikebe.  Together  these  two  forces  besieged  the  Castle  of 
Kumamoto.  The  startling  report  to  the  above  effect  having 
reached  the  Imperial  Court,  the  declaration  of  war  was 
promulgated  on  February  19,  and  the  Imperial  Army  marched 
on  to  Kyoto  under  the  command  of  H.  I.  H.  Prince  Taruhito. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion  the  Minister  of  War,  Aritomo 
Yamagata  (now  Field  Marshal),  called  upon  the  government 
for  a  special  advance  of  200,000  yen  to  meet  the  immediate  re- 
quirements.    But  the  government  was  then  laboring  under 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  3 1 

heavy  expenses  of  all  kinds,  with  inadequate  financial  re- 
sources for  their  defrayment,  and  could  not  meet  the  demand. 
Meanwhile,  the  field  of  the  war  operations  was  expanding  more 
and  more.  The  entire  active  army  was  mobilized,  but  it  was 
not  sufficient.  The  second  reserves  were  then  mobilized,  and 
it  even  became  necessary  to  call  upon  the  territorial  army  and 
the  police  forces.  At  this  juncture  the  home  affairs  of  the 
government  were  not  yet  quite  in  order,  the  attitude  of  the 
public  was  very  uncertain,  and  there  was  very  little  hope  of 
raising  national  loans  with  any  success — the  more  so  because 
the  domestic  loans  already  raised  had  far  exceeded  the  reason- 
able limits  of  the  national  power  of  redemption.  Moreover, 
it  was  then  not  long  since  the  issue  of  an  Imperial  Edict  pro- 
posing a  decrease  in  the  people's  burden  of  taxation,  and  the 
government  had  to  be  prepared  for  the  alienation  of  public 
sympathy  if  it  undertook  to  levy  new  taxes  or  to  raise  the 
rates  of  existing  taxes.  Thus,  the  public  authorities  had  a 
very  painful  experience  in  finding  means  for  defraying  the 
expenses  of  the  war. 

About  that  time  there  was  a  plan  under  consideration  by  a 
noble,  Tomomi  Iwakura,  Director  of  the  Nobles  Board,  for 
utilizing  the  nobles'  Hereditary  Pension  Bonds  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  large  National  Bank.  The  government  then 
granted  various  privileges  to  facilitate  the  carrying  out  of  this 
enterprise  and  promised  to  borrow  at  the  low  rate  of  5  per  cent 
per  annum  the  notes  issued  by  the  bank  to  the  amount  of 
15,000,000  yen.  The  notes  were  taken  into  the  Department 
of  Finance  within  the  year  at  specified  times,  and  in  this  way 
the  government  managed  to  obtain  the  funds  it  needed. 

Meanwhile,  the  field  of  the  war  continued  to  expand.  By 
the  fierce  battle  at  Tawarazaka  the  siege  of  the  Castle  of 
Kumamoto  was  at  last  raised  and  the  rebels  were  compelled  to 
flee  in  the  direction  of  Miyazaki  and  Oita,  where  another 
battle  ensued.  Here  there  were  greater  difficulties  of  trans- 
portation and  provisionment,  resulting  in  a  further  increase  of 
expenditures.  On  June  1  of  the  same  year,  Yorimichi  Saigo, 
commander  of  the  Imperial  Army,  applied  to  the  government 


32  HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 

for  an  advance  of  12,500,000  yen  for  the  defrayal  of  war  ex- 
penses for  the  four  months  commencing  with  June,  and  the 
Department  of  Finance  complied  with  this  application  by 
means  of  the  bank  notes  issued  by  the  Fifteenth  Bank  (the 
bank  established  as  explained  above).  But  for  future  needs 
the  government  did  not  have  sufficient  funds.  Just  at  that 
time  difficulty  was  being  encountered  in  circulating  the  bank 
notes,  which  were  in  the  nature  of  inconvertible  paper  money. 
In  December  of  the  same  year,  therefore,  the  government  was 
compelled  to  decide  on  another  means  of  meeting  the  pressing 
need,  that  of  issuing  27,000,000  yen  of  new  paper  notes  out  of 
the  paper  reserve  kept  for  the  replacement  of  worn-out  paper 
money,  giving  notice  that  the  new  notes  were  to  be  gradually 
exchanged  for  coin  during  the  next  fifteen  years.  Fortu- 
nately, however,  in  the  month  of  August  the  Imperial  Army 
was  able  to  confine  the  rebels  in  Kagoshima,  and  on  September 
24  Takamori  and  his  followers  committed  suicide  and  the 
rebels  were  all  subdued.  In  this  connection,  therefore,  it 
must  be  noted  that  the  new  paper  notes  issued  as  explained 
above  were  used  chiefly  in  the  settlement  of  affairs  in  the 
regions  where  the  hostilities  took  place  and  in  the  with- 
drawal of  troops. 

The  war  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  lasted  eight  months. 
The  number  of  soldiers  and  civilians  attached  to  the  Imperial 
Army  exceeded  52,200,  of  whom  more  than  6,200  were  killed 
and  more  than  9,500  wounded.  Of  the  navy,  eleven  warships 
(Adzuma,  etc.)  and  three  transports  (Takao,  etc.)  took  part 
in  the  action,  while  the  sailors  and  civilians  attached  to  the 
navy  numbered  about  2,280.  Besides,  some  600  men  of  the 
territorial  army  and  some  11,000  members  of  the  police  force 
participated  in  the  war.  Thirty-eight  steamships  of  the 
Mitsubishi  Co.  were  employed  in  transporting  the  troops. 
The  number  of  men  who  fought  in  the  rebel  army  was  about 
40,000,  of  whom  about  20,000  were  killed. 

For  the  adjustment  of  the  expenses  of  this  war,  the  Army 
Department  first  made  out  on  February  20  a  series  of  regula- 
tions  for   the   classification   of   accounts   for   war   expenses, 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO  S1NO- JAPANESE  WAR  33 

specifying  fifteen  titles  or  headings  for  the  purpose;  and  the 
Navy  Department  followed  its  example.  In  August  the  Ex- 
peditionary Expenses  Control  Bureau  was  formed  in  the  De- 
partment of  Finance  for  consolidating  the  war  expenses. 
This  bureau  was  changed  in  November  to  an  office  belonging 
to  the  Dajokan  (State  Council,  abolished  in  1885),  and  Shi- 
genobu  Okuma  (now  Count)  was  appointed  chief  of  the  office. 
Here  the  responsible  officials  in  charge  of  other  government 
offices  were  called  in  and  the  settlement  of  accounts  for  war 
expenses  was  effected.  The  accounts  ran  only  to  the  end  of 
October,  but  the  payments  made  thereafter  (such  as  those  for 
withdrawing  troops  and  temporary  rewards  to  discharged 
soldiers)  were  included  in  the  Settled  Accounts.  Let  us  now 
consider  the  so-called  Campaign  Expenditures  itemized  in  the 
Settled  Accounts,  as  set  forth  in  the  table  on  page  34. 

The  Campaign  Expenditures  enumerated,  totaling  35,295,- 
580  yen,  comprise  all  the  expenses  incurred  directly  for  cam- 
paign purposes,  and  represent  three  quarters  of  the  total  of 
the  expenditures  corresponding  to  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 
The  Relative  Expenditures  mentioned  on  page  35  make  up 
the  balance.  The  Campaign  Expenditures  in  the  army  were 
disbursed  by  the  Army  Department,  Police  Bureau,  Hokkaido 
Colonial  Government,  and  the  prefectural  governments  of 
Fukuoka,  Kumamoto,  Oita,  and  Kagoshima.  The  details  of 
the  outlays  made  by  these  different  offices  are  shown  in  Table 
No.  3  of  the  appendix,  in  which  the  amounts  recorded  for  the 
Police  Bureau  and  the  Hokkaido  Colonial  Government  are 
comparatively  large,  owing  to  their  having  sent  to  the  front 
large  contingents  of  the  territorial  army  and  police  forces. 
Of  the  Campaign  Expenditures  of  the  army,  some  8,000,000 
yen  of  allowances  to  employees  and  about  7,500,000  yen  of 
transportation  expenses  are  the  largest,  together  amounting  to 
one-half  of  the  total.  This  is  due  not  only  to  the  fact  that  the 
rate  of  wages  in  this  war  was  necessarily  high,  but  also  the 
fact  that,  as  the  fighting  took  place  in  mountainous  and  rugged 
regions,  large  numbers  of  coolies  were  hired  for  army  service 
(their  number  reaching  to  some  20,350,000  in  all,   reckoned 


34 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 


c       c 

.2  TJ  bt-3 
j-i  S  •  —  ~  * 

h)«  rt  e   (I 


CJ 


C 

•■2  3  8 

2  2  bS 

u.    O   c    ai 


U     I^f|    H     m     -    !/)[<)      .    H 


^OOCOCOO 


O  m  o  o 


K   t^OO    oo  00  0<    <+ O    O  O   — 

ft, 


C  X    O    oo  >C  OO 

~    O  oo  C^  O   tN    CO  N  it,  f,  ; 

^  o~  m  ■*  to  t^  of  o  «  -  s?  o 

P-i    —    ID  01    O)    ->   vC    •"  ■+         C 


-mNO  o^  o  o  »*5 1^»  o 
io»  o»  <n  <*o  m  o*  —  ctoo 

i/%  —  X    01    0) 


o  a 


a> 


5   B 

.2a- 
«  2.2 


'u  js 

rt   O 


a  c 
c 


u    S" 


10  t3 


it 

•S.2  c  = 


c/}  <  H  Oh  U  5>  ca  U  H IH  U  Pl,  Q  c/)  J 


;->•_= 


liOOO   r»  lO  f*5  *f  "*■  CI   rOO>fO 


X    N    ~    l/> 

3   O   ~   O 


«j   ON  O   On  t>.  -+\0   -t-  01   t^  O   oo 


On  N   -   i/5 


00  to  t^O  h  O  (>h  moo  H  !0»  O  O^OMO  ^ 
m  N  ION  IO00  "1  i-i  UO^O  '^■O  O  OiNCO  0000 
O  VO  OO30  t>  f^l  ^  fO  N  -  t>.  1/5  </5X  -t"  OO  On  1/5 
£00  Mt'lid  •-<  0)  CM  01  of  01  O  —  "t  N  rO  -F  1/5  01 
N  O^  NIC  t^\0  00  NN  t^M  m  CI  O  IOO^Nm 
N  ON  "i-NO    Ol    rO  -f         ID  OO00  f5         00  i-i 

m"  jC  tF  of  to  ■<*■         t^ 


tn    OJ 

8  °«c 


_rt_0  £ 


22    c3 
-    C 


aP  c 


o  c 

•-  a  c 

O  "C  3 

a  c  u 


OJ  "C 


3  o  u  .y  o 


•^  c.tj^  c  S  c2  c 


3  ^ 


J:  <  H  Oh  U  >  ca  U  H  -St  U  Ph  Q  c^  j  x  «  u,  -y) 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR 


35 


according  to  the  unit  rate  of  payment  per  head).  The  large 
amount  of  traveling  expenses  is  due  to  the  extensive  employ- 
ment of  police  forces. 

The  Campaign  Expenditures  in  the  navy  amount  to  less 
than  2  per  cent  of  the  total  Campaign  Expenditures,  because 
there  was  no  regular  naval  force  in  existence  at  the  time. 
Moreover,  there  was  no  navy  of  the  enemy  to  fight  with,  while 
the  geographical  conditions  at  the  seat  of  war  did  not  allow  the 
use  of  warships. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  expenditures  other  than  the 
Campaign  Expenditures,  that  is,  those  relative  to  the  war,  as 
set  forth  in  the  following  table. 

These  Relative  Expenditures  in  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 
amount  to  one-seventh  of  the  total  expenditures  in  the  war 
and  one-sixth  of  the  Campaign  Expenditures.  The  recruiting 
expenses  were  those  incurred  in  recruiting  the  soldiers  of  the 
second  reserve,  the  police  forces  and  the  territorial  army, 
numbering  altogether  over  32,300.     The  guard  expenses  were 

Relative  Expenditures  in  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 


Names  of  offices 


Dajokan  (State  Council) 

Foreign  Office 

Home  Office 

Finance  Department 

Army  Department 

Navy  Department 

Educational  Department 

Engineering  Department 

Department  of  Justice 

Imperial  Household  Department 

Hokkaido  Colonial  Government 

Post  Office 

Police  Bureau 

Temporary  Law  Court  in  Kyushu  District . 

Expeditionary  Force  (General  Office) 

Fukuoka  Prefecture 

Oita  Prefecture 

Kumamoto  Prefecture 

Kagoshima  Prefecture 

Other  prefectures  outside  the  war  districts. 


Total 6,272,146 


Amount 


Yen 

306,762 
29,469 

13.977 

51,020 

116,804 

2,250 
13659 
23-975 
256.138 
93.865 
44,101 

!, 0)0,147 

15,848 

3.IOO 

119,624 

202,244 

950,440 

[,292,503 

646,220 


36  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Apportionment  of  Expenditures  in  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 


Items  of  expenditure 


Amount 


Recruiting  expenses 

Guard(ing)  expenses 

Imperial  sojourning  expenses. 

Dispatching  expenses 

Rewards 

Charitable  donations 

Criminal  proceedings 

Sundry  expenses 

Total 


Yen 

1,446,320 

1,678,123 

256,138 

103,098 

267,861 

1,524,298 

181,296 

815,012 


6,272.146 


those  incurred  in  guarding  and  defending  different  localities  in 
the  time  of  war,  and  represent  27  per  cent  of  the  total  Relative 
Expenditures.  The  charitable  donations  were  made  to  all 
people  in  various  districts  who  suffered  from  the  hardships  of 
war,  and  represent  19  per  cent  of  the  Relative  Expenditures. 
Comments  on  the  other  items  seem  unnecessary.1 

Korean  Affair  of  1882 
After  the  troubles  with  Korea  in  1875,  the  policy  of  opening 
the  country  to  foreign  intercourse  was  adopted,  and  the 
political  power  fell  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  men  who 
entertained  friendly  feelings  toward  Japan.  Tai-won-kun, 
however,  became  offended  at  the  situation.  In  July,  1882,  he 
incited  some  discontented  Korean  soldiers  to  murder  a  number 
of  our  officers  and  students  in  Korea  and  to  attack  our  Lega- 
tion, forcing  our  Minister,  Yoshitada  Hanabusa,  to  make  his 
escape  to  Chemulpo.  Upon  receipt  of  this  report,  Masayoshi 
Matsukata,  then  Minister  of  Finance,  made  out  a  rough  esti- 
mate of  2,000,000  yen  required  for  the  settlement  of  the  dis- 
turbance, and  it  was  proposed  to  raise  this  amount  by  tempo- 
rarily borrowing  from  the  reserve  fund  set  apart  for  the 
redemption  of  paper  money  at  the  time.  The  government 
caused  a  demonstrative  movement  by  placing  two  companies 
of  soldiers  under  Major-General  Takashima,  and  three  war- 
ships (Kongo,  Amagi  and  Nisshin)  under  Rear-Admiral  Nirei; 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  3. 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE   WAR 


37 


and  in  this  way  it  opened  negotiations  with  Korea.  The 
negotiations  were  concluded  by  an  agreement  whereby  Korea 
was  obliged  to  redeem  50,000  yen  of  the  relief  fund  raised  for 
the  persons  who  suffered  by  the  incident  and  500,000  yen  of 
the  expenses  for  the  guarding  army,  and  thereafter  to  permit 
one  battalion  of  the  Japanese  Army  to  be  stationed  in  Seoul 
for  the  protection  of  the  Japanese  residents.  The  expendi- 
tures in  connection  with  this  affair  were  as  follows : 

Expenditures  for  Korean  Affair  of  1882 


Items 


Yen 

3.946 

i,585 

1,700 

662 

119,691 

41-685 

3.932 

27,623 

2,278 

7,576 

36,599 

1,151 

1,151 

2,175 

•     1,285 

308 

582 

857,596 

28,740 

3,327 

9,697 

139,609 

609,730 

66495 

145,525 
1,906 

105 

8,620 

595 

34,821 

99,479 

4,483 

645 

17 

6 

3,8i5 


Total 1,134,569 


Dajokan  (State  Council) 

Foreign  dispatching 

Rewards 

Sundries 

Foreign  Affairs  Department   .... 

Foreign  dispatching 

Domestic  dispatching 

Temporary  offices 

Rewards 

Reception  of  Korean  envoy .  .  . 

Sundries 

Home  Affairs  Department 

Sundries 

Finance  Department 

Foreign  dispatching 

Domestic  dispatching 

Sundries 

Army  Department , 

Domestic  dispatching 

Rewards 

Sundries 

Brigade  expenses 

Armament 

Detachment  sent  to  Korea 

Navy  Department 

Foreign  dispatching 

Domestic  dispatching 

Rewards 

Sundries 

Armament 

Warships 

Imperial  Household  Department. 

Foreign  dispatching 

Domestic  dispatching 

Sundries 

Banquets  and  presents 


Settled 

accounts  of 
1882 


Settled 

accounts  of 

1883 


Yen 


37 


997 
274 


37,723 
65,021 


65 


,021 


103,018 


Total 


Yen 

3,946 

i,585 

1,700 

662 

1 19,691 

41,685 

3.932 

27,623 

2,278 

7.576 

36,599 

1,151 

1,151 

2,175 

1,285 

308 

582 

895,593 
28,740 

3.327 

9,97i 
139,609 
609,730 
104,218 
210,546 

1,906 
105 

8,620 

595 

99,842 

99.479 

4,483 

645 

17 

6 

3,8i5 
1,237587 


227387 


38  HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 

The  total  expenditures  in  this  disturbance  were  1,237,587 
yen,  of  which  what  may  be  called  the  actual  Campaign  Ex- 
penditures were  1,052,878  yen,  viz.,  the  aggregate  amounts 
spent  for  armament,  brigade  expenses,  and  detachment  sent 
to  Korea  by  the  Army  Department,  plus  the  amounts  spent 
for  armament  and  warships  by  the  Navy  Department.  The 
balance  of,  say,  184,700  yen  (15  per  cent  of  the  total)  forms  the 
Relative  Expenditures  occasioned  by  the  disturbance. 

Korean  Affair  of  1884 

After  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  garrisons  were  stationed  in 
Seoul,  following  the  disturbance  of  1882,  there  took  place  in 
Korea  a  series  of  violent  political  quarrels  between  the  pro- 
Japanese  party  and  the  pro-Chinese  party.  In  the  year  1884, 
when  China  became  involved  in  a  difficult  situation  with 
France,  the  Independent  Party  in  Korea,  which  favored 
Japan,  took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  and  on  December  4 
murdered  a  number  of  high  Korean  officials  belonging  to  the 
Jidaito  Party  (a  party  advocating  truckling  to  a  stronger 
power),  which  favored  China.  Thereupon  the  Korean  King 
addressed  an  autograph  letter  to  the  Japanese  Minister  re- 
questing protection  of  the  Royal  Palace.  The  commander  of 
the  Chinese  garrison  in  Korea,  Yuan  Shi-Kai,  thought  the 
moment  too  critical  for  losing  standing  in  the  Peninsular 
Kingdom,  and  on  the  6th  day  of  the  same  month,  after  con- 
spiring with  the  Jidaito  Party,  he  entered  the  Royal  Palace 
with  2,000  Chinese  soldiers  and  was  there  joined  by  a  de- 
tachment of  Korean  soldiers.  The  combined  forces  opened 
fire  on  the  Japanese  soldiers  who  were  guarding  the  palace,  and 
the  Japanese  Minister  again  made  his  escape  to  Chemulpo. 
Japan  at  once  proceeded  to  negotiate  with  Korea  and  China. 
The  former  apologized  and  made  reparation,  while  the  latter 
concluded  with  Japan  the  so-called  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  where- 
by it  was  agreed  that  both  countries  should  withdraw  their 
garrisons  from  Korea  and  that  they  should  confer  with  each 
other  in  case  the  necessity  of  sending  forces  to  Korea  should 
again  arise.     The  expenditures  in  this  affair  were  as  follows : 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE   AVAR 
Expenditures  for  Korean  Affair  of  1884 


39 


Items 

Fiscal  period 
of  1884 

Fiscal  period 
of  1885 

Total 

Foreign  Affairs  Department: 

Foreign  dispatching 

Domestic  dispatching 

Temporary'  offices 

Rewards 

Reception  of  Korean  envoy 

Sundries 

Yen 
108,400 
224 
6,503 

2,554 

585 

13,867 

Yen 
1 

1,700 

5,254 

Yen 

108,401 
224 

8,203 

2554 

585 

19,121 

Total 

132,133 

6,955 

139,088 

Armament  Expenditures 
Army 
The  war  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  in  1877  supplied  many 
instructive  suggestions  for  the  development  of  the  Japanese 
Army.  In  this  war  men  who  entirely  lacked  regular  military 
training  were  recruited  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the  second  reserve 
army,  and,  as  the  result  was  extremely  unfavorable,  the 
necessity  of  training  men  in  accordance  with  the  new  western 
methods  was  clearly  recognized.  As  for  mountain  and  field 
guns,  ten  or  twelve  four-kin  brass  muzzle-loaders  were  used ; 
but  as  they  did  not  prove  effective,  the  necessity  of  supple- 
menting the  artillery  was  likewise  recognized.  In  the  year 
1878,  accordingly,  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  the  army 
was  divided  into  three  parts,  namely,  the  Army  Department, 
the  General  Staff  Office,  and  the  Military  Supervision  Office. 
The  first  managed  the  affairs  of  the  military  administration,  the 
second  had  to  do  with  matters  relating  to  national  defense  and 
military  strategy,  and  the  third  dealt  with  military  commands 
and  accounts.  At  the  same  time  the  completion  of  an  artillery 
force  was  planned.  In  1879  the  conscription  law  was  revised 
so  as  to  make  the  duration  of  service  both  in  the  active  army 
and  in  the  first  reserve  three  years  and  in  the  second  reserve 
four  years.  Subsequently,  in  1883,  the  length  of  service  in 
both  the  first  and  second  reserves  was  prolonged  one  year  in 
order  to  solve  the  problem  of  providing  the  required  effectives 


40  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

in  war  time.  Further,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  principle  of  the 
whole  nation  in  amis,  the  obligation  to  military  service  was 
extended  to  men  in  all  ranks  of  society.  In  1882  an  Imperial 
Rescript  for  military  expansion  was  issued,  and  was  subse- 
quently followed  by  an  Imperial  Edict  for  the  augmentation 
of  the  army  and  the  navy.  Consequently,  great  reforms  in  the 
army  organization  were  introduced.  The  Imperial  Body 
Guard  division  and  six  other  divisions  were  organized,  and  a 
plan  was  formed,  to  be  carried  out  in  ten  years,  for  making 
each  division  consist  of  two  infantry  brigades,  one  regiment 
each  of  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  one  battalion  each  of  engi- 
neers and  supply  troops,  thus  making  the  number  of  soldiers  in 
one  division  in  time  of  peace  about  10,000.  The  present 
organization  of  the  Japanese  Army  originated  in  this  plan. 
In  1883  the  Military  Staff  College  was  created  for  training  staff 
officers.  In  1884  the  regimental  organizations  were  altered  to 
brigade  organizations,  and  the  number  of  men  in  the  cavalry 
was  also  considerably  increased.  In  1886  the  Fortress  Con- 
struction Office  was  established  for  erecting  fortifications  in 
important  places  along  the  coasts,  in  line  with  the  system  of 
five  naval  jurisdictional  districts,  and  the  distribution  of  gar- 
rison artillery  in  different  localities  was  effected.  By  1888  the 
vacancies  in  the  different  classes  previously  planned  had  been 
filled,  so  that  the  official  organization  of  all  the  divisions  was 
promulgated.  The  Imperial  Body  Guard  division  and  six 
other  divisions  were  finally  established  with  the  infantry, 
cavalry,  artillery,  engineering  corps;  and  the  army  service 
corps  was  properly  arranged,  in  order  that  each  division  should 
have  independent  fighting  powers.  In  addition,  several  com- 
panies of  garrison  artillery  were  formed,  together  with  a 
battalion  of  railway  corps;  and  at  last  the  military  foundation 
for  fighting  on  the  continent  was  laid.  Just  before  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  accordingly,  the  military  strength  was  cal- 
culated at  73,000  men  in  time  of  peace  and  274,000  men  in 
time  of  war.  Compared  with  the  force  of  45,000  men  at  the 
beginning  of  the  second  epoch  under  review,  this  represented 
an  increase  of  more  than  600  per  cent. 


SATSUMA    REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE   WAR 


41 


As  to  the  expenditures  required  for  completing  the  army  as 
described  above,  we  give  below  the  Settled  Accounts  for  the 
consecutive  fiscal  periods:1 

Expenditures  for  Completing  the  Army,  i 877-1 893 


Fiscal  Near 

Ordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

1877 

1878 

'  879 

1880 

1881 

1882 

1883 

1884 

1885 

1886 

1887 

1888 

1889 

1890 

1891 

1892 

1893 

Yen 
6,087,934 

6,828,561 
8,121,931 

8,763,593 
8,502,268 

8,877,913 
10,530,617 
10,992,366 

9,853,190 
11,938,322 
12,181,619 
12,192,776 
12,558,096 

12,885,787 
13,184,665 
13,117,691 
13,170,669 

100 
113 
L34 
144 
140 
146 

165 
166 
162 

197 
200 
200 
209 
203 
216 

213 
213 

Yen 

831,630 

1,262,990 

298,110 

464,5'=i6 

722,599 

319,210 

510,162 

583,658 

18,583 

577,056 

93L978 

L9i9,34i 

3,005,090 

1,463,086 

2,137,016 

2,301,397 

100 
151 
35 
56 
87 
38 
62 
70 
2 

69 
1 12 
230 
368 
176 
256 
277 

Total.  .  .  . 

179,787,998 

17,346,509 

The  total  of  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary  army  ex- 
penditures for  1 877-1 893  was  197,134,507  yen.  While  it 
amounted  to  some  6,000,000  yen  in  1877  and  about  7,600,000 
yen  in  1878,  it  rose  to  more  than  15,000,000  yen  in  1892  and 
1893,  which  means  that  both  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  doubled  in  the  latter  years.  Such  an 
increase  was  inevitable,  owing  to  the  army  increment  plan 
already  referred  to  and  the  expenses  incident  thereto. 

In  the  ordinary  expenditures  there  was  in  the  year  1878  an 
increase  of  more  than  600,000  yen  for  the  establishment  of  the 
General  Staff  Office  and  the  Military  Supervision  Office;  in 
1879,  an  increase  of  about  1,400,000  yen  for  artillery  increase, 
etc. ;  and  in  1880,  an  increase  of  960,000  yen  for  the  creation  of 
auxiliary  transports  and  increases  of  supply  troops  and  the 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Tables  Nos.  4(a),  4(b),  and  4(c). 


42  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

first  reserve  army.  In  the  extraordinary  expenditures,  about 
400,000  yen  were  required  in  1879  and  1880  for  arms  and  am- 
munition, and  some  150,000  yen  in  1878,  1879,  and  1880  for 
temporary  rewards  to  men  who  served  in  the  Satsuma  Re- 
bellion; and  about  150,000  yen  were  also  disbursed  in  the  said 
three  years  for  the  construction  of  barracks  at  Kanazawa, 
Sendai,  and  Kokura.  Though  in  the  year  1881  there  was  a 
slight  decrease  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  some  240,000  yen 
in  the  extraordinary  expenditures  were  spent  for  the  construc- 
tion of  fortresses;  and  in  each  of  the  ensuing  five  years  nearly 
the  same  amount  was  spent  for  the  same  purpose  in  the  ordi- 
nary expenditures.     But   in   the  four  years  beginning  with 

1882.  some  700,000  yen  in  the  extraordinary  expenditures  wen- 
spent  for  the  arsenal,  and  this  sum  was  used  principally  for 
supplementing  the  artillery  and  for  making  cartridges  for 
Murata  rifles  and  shells  for  mountain  and  field  guns.  With 
the  year  1882  the  era  of  army  expansion  was  entered  upon, 
and  that  is  why  in  that  year  some  increase  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
ordinary  expenditures,  followed  by  a  pronounced  increase  in 

1883.  Besides,  from  the  year  1882  a  special  reserve  fund  for 
supplementing  armament  expenditures  was  formed  by  trans- 
ferring some  1,800,000  yen  from  the  General  Account.  In 
1884  an  increase  of  about  500,000  yen  was  seen  in  the  Army 
Department  expenditures,  owing  to  the  increase  made  in  the 
number  of  soldiers.  The  fact  that  very  little  decrease  is 
observable  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  in  1885,  although  the 
fiscal  period  of  that  year  was  only  nine  months,  shows  that  ex- 
penditures were  increasing.  In  the  year  1886  the  term  of  the 
fiscal  year  and  the  forms  of  the  General  Budget  and  Settled 
Accounts  were  all  changed,  and  there  was  an  increase  of  about 
1,000,000  yen  in   the  army  expenditures  as  compared  with 

1884.  In  the  next  few  years  there  was  no  significant  increase 
in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  but  the  increase  in  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  was  conspicuous.  This  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  there  was  decided  upon  and  commenced  the  disbursement 
of  8,265,000  yen  for  the  construction  of  the  Tokyo  Bay  Bat- 
tery as  a  continuing  expenditure  for  forty-three  years  from 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  43 

1887,  1,603,000  yen  for  the  construction  of  the  Shimonoseki 
Battery  as  a  continuing  expenditure  for  fifteen  years  from 

1887,  1,513,000  yen  for  the  construction  of  the  Kitan  Channel 
Battery  as  a  continuing  expenditure  for  sixteen  years  from 

1888,  and  7,836,000  yen  for  arms  and  ammunition  as  a  continu- 
ing expenditure  for  seventeen  years  from  1889.  Thus,  in  the 
years  1889,  1890,  and  1891  some  2,600,000  yen  were  disbursed 
for  the  construction  of  batteries  in  different  places,  and  some 
2,000,000  yen  for  arms  (ordnance)  and  ammunition.  In  the 
year  1892,  as  the  budget  failed  to  meet  the  approval  of  the  Diet 
and  was  not  adopted,  the  government  produced  a  supplemen- 
tary budget  and  shortened  to  eighteen  years  the  term  of  contin- 
uing expenditures  for  the  construction  of  the  Tokyo  Bay  Bat- 
tery and  arranged  to  disburse  for  this  item  about  400,000  yen 
in  1892  and  about  300,000  yen  in  1893.  It  also  prolonged  for 
four  years  the  term  of  the  continuing  expenditures  for  arms  and 
ammunition,  arranging  to  disburse  for  this  account  900,000 
yen  in  1892  and  600,000  yen  in  1893.  In  these  circumstances 
some  480,000  yen  of  battery  construction  expenses  were  dis- 
bursed in  1892  and  some  1,380,000  yen  in  1893;  and  in  1892 
the  amounts  for  making  cannon  and  magazine-rifles  and  the 
continuing  expenditures  for  arms  and  ammunition,  totaling 
1 ,320,000  yen,  were  expended ;  and  a  total  of  420,000  yen  of  the 
same  two  items  was  also  expended  in  1893. 

In  the  foregoing  paragraphs  we  have  considered  the  causes 
of  the  increase  that  took  place  year  after  year  in  the  ordinary 
and  extraordinary  expenditures.  As  regards  the  different 
items  of  expenditure,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Tables  No.  4(a), 
No.  4(b),  and  No.  4(c)  in  the  appendix.  The  first  of  these 
tables  shows  the  armament  expenditures  of  the  army  for  the 
period  1 877-1 893,  in  which  the  different  items  are  given  re- 
spectively for  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  expenditures. 
The  second  of  the  three  tables  shows  the  particulars  of  the 
ordinary  expenditures  for  the  army  for  1 877-1 885,  less  the 
expenses  for  Army  Department  proper,  the  territorial  army, 
and  the  gendarmerie;  and  the  third  table — No.  4(c) — shows 
the  details  of  expenses  for  military  affairs  in  Table  No.  4(a) 


44  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

for  1 886-1 893.  In  the  fiscal  year  1886  the  financial  system 
and  regulations  were  reorganized,  so  that  the  classification  of 
the  items  of  expenditure  is  different  in  that  year  from  that 
in  the  preceding  years. 

Navy 

The  new  men-of-war,  Fuso  (3,717  tons),  and  Kongo  and 
Hiyei  (2,248  tons  each),  ordered  from  abroad  according  to  the 
naval  expansion  scheme  adopted  in  1875,  were  completed  and 
arrived  in  Japan  in  1878;  and  the  gunboats  Iwaki,  Tateyama, 
Kaimon,  Tenryu,  and  Tsukushi  were  subsequently  either  com- 
pleted or  in  course  of  construction.  But  in  view  of  the  rapid 
progress  that  was  being  made  both  scientifically  and  practi- 
cally in  the  navies  of  western  countries  at  the  time,  Japan  could 
not  continue  to  take  merely  temporizing  measures  in  naval 
affairs.  In  1 88 1 ,  therefore,  the  government  adopted  a  warship 
construction  program  (revised  in  January,  1882)  providing  for 
the  construction,  in  an  eight-year  continuous  undertaking,  of 
six  large  warships,  twelve  each  of  middle-sized  and  small- 
sized  warships,  and  twelve  torpedo  boats.  This  program 
called  for  an  annual  disbursement  of  3,300,000  yen,  or  a  total 
outlay  of  27,000,000  yen  in  eight  years.  The  naval  strength 
in  those  days  was  reckoned  at  30,700  tons,  22,000  horse  power, 
and  155  guns,  with  crews  numbering  4,500.  But  the  warships 
were  mostly  of  the  old  style  and  unfit  for  the  requirements  of 
the  new  era.  In  December,  1882,  an  Imperial  Rescript  for 
military  expansion  was  issued,  and  it  was  determined  to  carry 
out  the  aforesaid  naval  expansion  scheme.  In  1886  certain 
alterations  were  introduced  into  the  scheme,  and  it  was  de- 
cided that  the  funds  necessary  for  its  execution  should  be 
raised  by  means  of  naval  loans.  Furthermore,  it  was  decided 
to  construct  six  first-class  and  second-class  coast  defense  ships, 
one  first-class  iron-clad,  one  coast  iron-clad,  four  cruisers  of 
the  first,  second,  and  third  classes,  six  first-class  and  second- 
class  dispatch  boats,  eight  first-class  and  second-class  gun- 
boats, and  twenty-eight  torpedo  boats,  making  a  total  of 
fifty-four  vessels.     Besides,  it  was  proposed  to  establish  naval 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANKSK   WAR  45 

stations  in  Kure  and  Sasebo,  and  to  establish  marine  divisions 
instead  of  barracks  in  places  where  the  naval  stations  were 
located,  and  gradually  to  establish  torpedo  divisions  in  all  the 
naval  ports.  According  to  these  plans,  the  construction  of 
twenty-two  vessels  was  completed  between  1883  and  1889,  of 
which  the  Unebi  and  Takachiho,  of  3,700  tons,  and  the  Mat- 
sushima,  Hashidate,  and  Itsukushima,  of  4,200  tons,  were  the 
largest.  Moreover,  twenty  torpedo  boats  and  torpedo  service 
boats  were  constructed. 

In  this  manner  the  first  naval  increment  in  the  epoch  now 
under  review  was  effected,  and  our  navy  was  at  once  largely 
augmented  and  strengthened.  In  1891  another  plan  was 
made  for  constructing  five  second-class  cruisers,  including  the 
Yoshino  (4,216  tons).  In  1892  the  government  called  upon 
the  Diet  for  2,250,000  yen  for  the  establishment  of  an  iron 
foundry,  together  with  2,750,000  yen  for  the  construction  of 
two  battleships,  and  the  Xaval  Minister,  Sukenori  Kabayama, 
delivered  a  violent  speech  in  the  Diet  urging  the  passage  of 
these  bills.  He  explained  the  urgent  necessity  of  establishing 
the  iron  foundry  for  the  sake  of  national  independence  in  the 
manufacture  of  ordnance  and  pointed  out  that  the  construc- 
tion of  the  new  vessels  was  inevitable;  but  the  Diet  would  not 
consent  to  his  overture.  The  bills  were  again  presented  to  the 
Diet  in  its  session  in  1893,  but  the  Diet  insisted  upon  a  reduc- 
tion of  the  amount  demanded.  Meanwhile,  the  government 
adhered  tenaciously  to  its  opinion  of  the  so-called  120,000  ton 
principle  of  the  navy,  and  the  two  were  obstinately  opposed  to 
each  other.  Just  at  this  time,  or  on  February  10  of  that  year, 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  was  graciously  pleased  to  issue  an 
Imperial  Rescript  concerning  national  defense,  to  the  effect 
that  by  economizing  the  expenses  of  the  Imperial  household 
a  sum  of  300,000  yen  was  to  be  set  apart  annually  for  warship 
construction  expenses  for  six  years,  and  further  to  the  effect 
that  the  government  officials  were  ordered  to  disburse  one- 
tenth  of  their  salaries  as  a  contribution  toward  the  same  ex- 
penses. The  government  and  the  Diet  were  now  enlightened 
enough  to  come  to  an  agreement,  and  they  decided  upon  the 


46 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


disbursement  as  seven-year  continuing  expenditures,  com- 
mencing from  1893,  of  15,420,000  yen  for  constructing  two 
iron-clad  vessels  and  2,650,000  yen  for  constructing  one  cruiser 
and  one  dispatch  boat.  Thus  the  naval  strength  at  the  close 
of  1893,  or  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino- Japanese  War, 
was  calculated  at  thirty-four  ships  with  a  total  of  63,493  tons 
and  twenty-six  torpedo  boats  with  a  total  of  1,637  tons. 

The  expenditures  involved  in  the  naval  expansion  as  stated 
above  are  shown  in  the  following  table.1 


Expenditures  in  Naval  Expansion,  1877-1893 


Fiscal  year 

Ordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

1877 

1878 

1879 

1880 

1881 

1882 

1883 

1884 

1885 

1886 

1887 

1888 

1889 

1890 

1891 

1892 

1893 

Yen 
3,167,512 
2,804,021 

3,079,859 
3,165,222 

3,014.758 
3,160,492 
3,080,634 
3.193.300 
2,634,658 
4.370,441 
4,965,955 
5,504.589 
5.317.883 
5,848,118 

5.507.255 
5,463,645 
5.315,130 

100 

89 

97 

100 

95 
100 

95 
100 

83 
138 
156 
175 
167 
184 
175 
173 
167 

Yen 

16,494 

58,892 

250,650 

245,961 

249,162 

3,079,965 
3,067,565 
2,699,473 
4,538,208 
4,876,752 
4,34i.oo3 
4,045,825 

4.372,924 
4,089,201 
3,785,920 
2,959,445 

100 
360 
1,562 
I.53I 
1.556 
I.950 
1,917 
1,690 
2,836 
3.098 
2,710 
2,528 
2,732 
2,555 
2,366 
1,849 

Total 

69,593.472 

42,677,440 

The  naval  expenditures  as  given  above  for  the  period  1877— 
1893  total  112,270,912  yen  if  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  are  added  together.  The  ordinary  expen- 
ditures increased  from  3,160,000  yen  in  1877  and  2,800,000  yen 
in  1878  to  5,460,000  yen  in  1892  and  5,310,000  yen  in  1893, 
showing  an  increase  of  approximately  70  per  cent  as  compared 
with  the  first-named  year.  The  extraordinary  expenditures 
increased  from  16,000  yen  in  1878  to  3,780,000  yen  in  1892  and 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Tables  Nos.  5(a),  5(b),  and  5(c). 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE   WAR  47 

2,950,000  yen  in  1893,  or  more  than  two  hundred  times  over. 
In  1877  there  were  no  special  outlays  for  naval  armament,  and 
even  great  economy  was  effected  in  the  expenses  of  the  Navy 
Department;  for  it  was  the  year  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 
In  1878  there  was  a  decrease  of  some  300,000  yen  in  the  naval 
expenditures,  because  the  warships  the  construction  of  which 
was  planned  in  1875  were  completed  and  the  expenses  for  them 
ceased.  In  the  same  year  170,000  yen  were  disbursed  from  the 
ordinary  expenditures  for  repairing  warships  used  in  the  war  of 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  The  increase  of  200,000  yen  in  the 
ordinary  expenditures  of  1879  was  due  principally  to  the  dis- 
patching of  the  Hiyei  and  four  other  warships  to  India  and 
Korea,  and  to  the  purchase  of  accessories  for  torpedo  boats.  I  n 
the  extraordinary  expenditures  of  the  same  year,  41,000  yen 
were  expended  for  shipbuilding  and  16,000  yen  for  the  manu- 
facture of  gunpowder.  In  1880,  though  there  was  a  decrease  of 
more  than  500,000  yen  in  the  Navy  Department  expenditures, 
the  ordinary  expenditures  showed  an  increase  of  90,000  yen 
owing  to  the  new  recruiting  of  sailors,  to  establishing  the  Tor- 
pedo Practice  School,  and  to  completing  the  equipments  of 
men-of-war.  In  the  extraordinary  expenditures,  100,000  yen 
for  shipbuilding  and  140,000  yen  for  the  manufacture  of  gun- 
powder were  expended  as  continuing  from  the  preceding  year. 
In  the  years  1882  and  1883,  though  there  was,  generally  speak- 
ing, no  increase  in  current  expenditures,  there  appeared  in  the 
latter  year  a  new  item  of  warship  construction  expenses  in  the 
extraordinary  expenditures,  amounting  to  2,770,000  yen, 
which  sum  was  almost  equal  to  the  yearly  total  of  ordinary 
expenditures  for  the  navy ;  and  this  large  amount  was  disbursed 
as  the  result  of  the  great  naval  expansion  decided  upon  in  1882, 
as  already  stated.  These  warship  construction  expenses  were 
defrayed  in  1884  to  the  amount  of  3,000,000  yen  and  in  1885  to 
the  amount  of  2,400,000  yen,  according  to  the  general  plan  of 
disbursing  3,300,000  yen  per  annum  for  such  expenses.  At  the 
time  of  the  revision  of  the  financial  system  and  regulations  in 
1886,  the  affairs  of  the  navy  were  also  expanded  and  the  ordi- 
nary expenditures  in  that  year  showed  an  increase  of  over 


48  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

1,000,000  yen  as  compared  with  1884.  In  the  extraordinary 
expenditures  a  new  fund  for  "Special  Expenses"  was  obtained 
by  raising  naval  loans  for  the  construction  of  new  ships  to  the 
amount  of  5,000,000  yen,  and  out  of  this  fund  4,160,000  yen 
were  disbursed.  Naval  loans  were  also  raised  in  March,  1887, 
to  the  amount  of  6,000,000  yen;  in  March,  1888,  to  the  amount 
of  2,000,000  yen;  and  in  April,  1889,  to  the  amount  of  4,000,000 
yen.  It  was  principally  from  these  resources  that  the  new 
warship  construction  expenses,  or  the  so-called  "Special  Ex- 
penses," were  defrayed  to  the  amount  of  4,670,000  yen  in 
1887,  3,290,000  yen  in  1888,  and  3,290,000  yen  in  1890.  The 
completion  of  these  new  men-of-war  naturally  resulted  in  the 
increase  of  ordinary  expenditures,  so  that  the  Ordinary  Ex- 
penses for  Military  Affairs  showed  an  increase  of  600,000  yen 
each  in  1887  and  1888  as  compared  with  the  preceding  years. 

In  the  meantime,  the  construction  of  numerous  offices  and 
barracks  was  begun,  and  for  that  purpose  a  new  item  of  civil 
engineering  expenses  was  made  in  the  extraordinary  expendi- 
tures from  the  year  1889;  and  between  500,000  yen  and  700,000 
yen  were  expended  annually  from  that  year  until  1893.      In 

1 89 1  it  was  decided  to  disburse,  from  the  annual  surplus  of 
revenue,  about  5,210,000  yen  in  all  for  warship  construction 
expenses  as  a  five-year  continuing  expenditure  until  1895,  in 
order  to  supplement  the  naval  expansion  scheme  of  1882.      In 

1892  a  supplementary  outlay  of  2,750,000  yen  was  decided 
upon  as  the  estimated  cost  of  constructing  two  iron-clad  cruis- 
ers, and  the  amount  was  to  be  included  in  the  expenses  for 
warship  construction  begun  in  1892.  Thus  730,000  yen  in 
1 89 1,  2,160,000  yen  in  1892,  and  1,930,000  yen  in  1893  were 
disbursed;  but  as  in  these  years  there  were  balances  remaining 
of  the  "Special  Expenses"  that  were  being  defrayed  since 
1883,  according  to  the  naval  expansion  scheme  of  1882,  viz., 
2,330,000  yen  in  1891,  840,000  yen  in  1892,  and  240,000  yen  in 
1893,  the  said  balances  were  also  employed  for  constructing 
new  warships. 

In  the  foregoing  paragraphs  we  have  outlined  the  causes  of 
the  annual  increase  in  the  naval  expenditures  from  1877  to  the 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  49 

outbreak  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  or  during  the  second 
epoch  in  our  present  researches.  As  regards  the  particulars  of 
the  items  of  expenditure  in  the  consecutive  years,  the  reader  is 
again  referred  to  the  appendix.1 

Financial  Resources 

As  already  stated,  it  is  clear  that  the  funds  for  the  Satsuma 
Rebellion  were  chiefly  obtained  by  borrowing  from  the  Fif- 
teenth Bank  and  by  the  issue  of  paper  money,  or  by  the  use  of 
the  paper  reserve  set  apart  by  the  government  for  replacing 
worn-out  paper  money.  The  total  amount  borrowed  was 
15,000,000  yen;  and  the  total  amount  of  paper  money  issued 
was  27,000,000  yen;  and  the  combined  total  of  42,000,000  yen 
was  enough  to  meet  the  total  war  expenditures  of  41,560,000 
yen.  There  was  also  a  contribution  from  the  Prefecture  of 
Sakai  of  10,000  yen  accumulated  from  the  balances  of  the  fixed 
salaries  of  the  subordinate  prefectural  officials.  Thus,  the 
financial  resources  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  totaled  42,010,000 
yen,  and  the  balance  of  this  sum  remaining  after  the  expendi- 
tures of  the  war  were  paid,  viz.,  440,000  yen,  was  transferred  to 
the  ordinary  revenue  of  the  government. 

With  reference  to  the  expenses  of  the  Korean  Affair  of  1882, 
it  may  be  said  that  they  were  easily  met,  for  the  financial  condi- 
tion of  the  government  at  the  time  was  sound.  Although  in 
the  Settled  Accounts  of  that  year  there  was  an  excess  of  6,666,- 
544  yen  of  the  year's  total  expenditures  over  the  budget  esti- 
mates of  73,480,666  yen,  and  the  expenses  in  the  Korean  Affair 
took  up  20  per  cent  of  the  excess,  there  was  no  need  of  seeking 
special  resources  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  Korean  Affair, 
because  in  that  year  the  revenue  of  the  Settled  Accounts  ex- 
ceeded the  budget  estimates  so  much  that  the  amount  of  the 
excess  was  more  than  sufficient  to  confiscate  the  above-men- 
tioned excess  of  actual  expenditures.  As  regards  the  Korean 
Affair  in  1884,  the  expenses  incurred  were  small;  and  owing  to 
the  fact  that  in  that  year  and  in  1885,  as  in  the  year  1882,  the 
increase  of  revenue  was  more  than  the  increase  of  expenditure, 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Tables  Nos.  5(a),  5(b),  and  5(c). 
5 


50  HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF    EXPENDITURES 

the  expenses  were  easily  defrayed  out  of  the  so-called  "natural 
increase"  of  revenue. 

With  regard  to  the  financial  resources  for  the  total  arma- 
ment expenditures  of  309,405,419  yen  in  this  epoch,  we  have 
not  much  to  say.  Generally  speaking,  they  formed  part  of 
the  General  Revenue  Account;  and  as  discussions  of  the  de- 
tails of  the  General  Revenue  Account  are  rather  out  of  place  in 
the  present  treatise,  we  will  mention  here  only  some  of  the 
sources  of  revenue  specially  connected  with  the  armament 
expenditures  in  this  epoch. 

(1)  Naval  Loans. — For  carrying  out  the  naval  expansion 
scheme  adopted  in  1883,  naval  loan  bonds  were  issued  for  three 
years  from  1886  to  the  total  amount  of  17,000,000  yen,  to  be 
left  unredeemed  for  five  years  and  to  mature  in  thirty  years. 
As  stated  previously,  a  total  of  17,244,100  yen  was  raised  in 
this  way  between  July,  1886,  and  April,  1889,  and  this  amount 
was  spent  chiefly  in  naval  expansion  up  to  the  year  1890,  or  in 
the  extraordinary  expenditures  such  as  warship  construction 
expenses,  civil  engineering  expenses,  etc. 

(2)  Imperial  Subsidy  and  Public  Donations  for  the  Naval  De- 
fense Fund. — In  March,  1887,  an  Imperial  Proclamation  con- 
cerning a  Naval  Defense  Fund  was  issued,  and  a  subsidy  of 
100,000  yen  was  contributed  by  His  Majesty.  A  great  many 
public  donations  followed  this  Imperial  example,  and  the 
amounts  thus  obtained  were  as  follows: 

Yen 

1887 1,647.365 

1888 243,205 

1889 210,844 

1890 3,033 

1891 20,100 

1892 1,230 

1893 1,099 

Total 2,226,876 

(3)  In  March,  1893,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  anxious 
about  the  urgent  question  of  national  defense,  gave  special 
orders  to  economize  the  expenses  of  the  Imperial  household  in 
order  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  Naval  Defense  Fund,  and 
also  ordered  the  government  officials  to  set  apart  one-tenth  of 


SATSUMA   REBELLION   TO   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  5 1 

their  salaries  for  supplementing  the  funds  for  warship  con- 
struction. In  1893  the  Imperial  contribution  was  300,000 
yen  and  the  officials'  contributions  amounted  to  1,346,492  yen, 
making  a  total  of  1,646,492  yen.1 

(4)  Expenses  for  Manufacture  of  Army  Rifles  and  Ammu- 
nition.— i\fter  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  the  attention  of  the 
government  was  drawn  to  the  improvement  of  arms  and  ord- 
nance, and  consequently  a  plan  with  that  object  was  made  for 
disbursing  188,300  yen  every  year  for  fifteen  years  beginning 
with  1878;  but  in  the  year  1886  the  circumstances  of  the  time 
made  it  necessary  to  move  up  or  advance  the  instalments  of 
later  years.  The  funds  for  that  purpose  were  loaned  by  the 
Bank  of  Japan,  which  made  advances  totaling  3,701,281  yen 
in  the  years  1 886-1 889,  as  follows: 

Yen 

1886 176,999 

1887 995-940 

1888 859,691 

1889 668,649 

Of  the  above  amounts,  a  total  of  2,363,982  yen  was  con- 
verted from  other  loans,  so  that  the  actual  amount  borrowed 
was  1,337,298  yen. 

To  sum  up,  the  resources  for  war  expenditures  in  this  epoch 
were  supplied  by  loans  and  issues  of  paper  money;  and  as 
regards  the  armament  expenditures,  both  the  ordinary  and  the 
extraordinary  expenditures  were  in  general  taken  from  the 
General  Revenue  Account.  Besides,  for  naval  expansion 
naval  loans  were  raised  to  the  amount  of  17,000,000  yen, 
together  with  the  Imperial  Subsidy  and  public  donations  to 
the  amount  of  3,000,000  yen  and  special  loans  to  the  amount 
of  1,330,000  yen. 

1  These  special  means  for  armament  expenditures  were  continued  until  the  year 
1897.     Cf.  Chapter  IV,  Section  on  Financial  Resources,  post,  p.  70. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FROM  THE  SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO  THE 
RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 

Our  army  and  navy  created  in  the  first  epoch  and  improved 
in  the  second  epoch  had  an  opportunity  to  exhibit  their 
real  power  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War  of  1894-95.  The  cause 
of  the  breach  lay  in  the  fact  that,  while  Japan  was  making  it  a 
constant  national  policy  to  observe  the  independence  of  Korea, 
actuated  by  the  necessity  of  guarding  her  own  interests,  China, 
the  oldest  large  country  in  the  Far  East,  was  regarding  the 
Peninsular  Kingdom  as  her  own  dependency.  But  the  result 
of  this  war  was  a  sudden  recognition  of  Japan's  intrinsic  value 
as  a  strong  nation  in  the  Far  East.  Japan  had  already  estab- 
lished her  constitutional  government,  with  various  national 
institutions  reformed  and  improved,  but  her  position  in  rela- 
tion to  other  countries  was  such  that  she  was  unable  even  to 
conclude  a  treaty  on  equal  terms  with  them.  It  may  be  said, 
therefore,  that  by  virtue  of  this  war  the  international  position 
of  Japan  was  clearly  established.  Not  only  did  it  give  her 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  extend  her  national  glory  abroad, 
but  it  also  taught  her  two  important  lessons  regarding  her 
national  defense,  namely,  that  her  armament  on  both  land  and 
sea  was  greatly  lacking  in  scientific  improvement;  and,  above 
all,  that  the  perfection  of  war  preparation  was  necessary,  as 
without  this  even  the  dearly-bought  effects  of  victory  would 
be  hard  to  retain,  as  actually  happened  in  the  retrocession  of 
Liaotung,  to  the  profound  regret  of  both  the  government  and 
the  people.  The  nation  keenly  perceived  the  value  of  these 
two  lessons,  which  steadily  resulted  in  the  formulation  and 
execution  of  various  plans  for  national  defense.  In  the  ten 
years  with  which  we  are  concerned  in  this  chapter,  accordingly, 
armament  projects  of  very  broad  scope  were  formulated,  and 
their  execution  was  undertaken  in  a  high-spirited  manner.     As 

52 


SINO-JAPANKSE   WAR   TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  53 

described  in  the  following  pages,  the  military  and  the  naval 
armaments  were  developed  by  veritable  leaps  and  bounds 
toward  the  end  of  this  epoch. 

With  reference  to  the  North  China  Disturbance  of  1900,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  occasion  resembled  a  competitive  mili- 
tary exhibition  on  the  part  of  various  European  countries  and 
of  Japan.  Although  our  national  destiny  was  not  at  stake, 
that  is  to  say,  although  we  had  no  large  forces  specially  engaged 
in  continued  actual  warfare,  we  nevertheless  learned  not  a 
few  instructive  lessons  concerning  the  importance  of  military 
training  for  our  national  defense.  While  Japan  was  zealously 
applying  herself  to  the  question  of  national  defense,  Russia 
was  busily  engaged  in  ceaseless  planning  in  Manchuria  and 
was  conspicuously  showing  a  tendency  to  advance  southward. 
Dark  clouds  of  war  hovered  over  Manchuria  and  East  Asia, 
and  at  length,  in  1903,  it  was  generally  thought  that  the  break- 
ing of  the  storm  was  inevitable. 

War   Expenditures 

Sino- Japanese   War 

It  is  evident  that  at  the  outset  of  the  troubles  regarding 
Korea  the  Imperial  Government  was  most  concerned  about 
the  funds  required  for  the  settlement  of  the  affair.  Kunitake 
Watanabe,  the  Minister  of  Finance  at  that  time,  laid  down 
the  financial  scheme  for  the  purpose  in  three  ways.  In  the 
first  case,  supposing  that  the  war  would  end  in  the  course  of 
1894,  and  estimating  the  monthly  cost  at  6,000,000  yen,  or  at 
50,000,000  yen  in  all,  the  resources  therefor  were  to  be  obtained 
by  appropriating  the  surplus  revenue  of  the  year  1893  and  the 
funds  of  various  special  accounts,  and  by  raising  public  loans. 
In  the  second  case,  assuming  that  hostilities  would  continue 
until  June,  1895,  at  a  total  cost  of  100,000,000  yen,  the  funds 
were  to  be  raised,  over  and  above  the  sums  proposed  in  the 
first  scheme,  by  revising  the  taxes  on  sake  and  tobacco  and 
the  income  tax,  to  yield  5,000,000  yen;  also  by  appropriating 
15,000,000  yen  out  of  the  revenue  of  1895,  and  by  raising  pub- 


54  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

lie  and  other  loans  to  the  amount  of  38,000,000  yen.  In  the 
third  case,  supposing  that  the  war  would  last  until  the  end  of 
1895,  at  a  eost  of  150,000,000  yen,  additional  resources  were 
to  be  obtained  by  making  an  increase  of  7,000,000  yen  in  the 
land-tax  revenue,  and  by  further  increasing  the  amounts  of 
public  and  other  loans. 

At  last  the  war  with  China  opened.  To  meet  the  immediate 
requirements  the  government  made  a  disbursement  out  of 
the  General  Reserve  Fund;  and  further,  with  the  Imperial 
sanction,  it  disbursed  25,000,000  yen  out  of  the  Treasury  sur- 
plus. After  the  fifth  army  division  started  in  advance,  the 
sixth,  second,  first,  and  fourth  divisions,  as  well  as  the  Imperial 
Body  Guard  division,  were  all  mobilized  or  ordered  to  the 
front ;  and  as  the  Treasury  surplus  became  scarce,  the  govern- 
ment decided  in  August,  1894,  according  to  the  above-men- 
tioned first  scheme,  and  in  conformity  with  an  Imperial  Ordi- 
nance of  Financial  Emergency,  to  use  the  funds  belonging  to 
various  special  accounts  for  war  expenditures,  to  borrow 
money,  and  to  raise  public  loans.  In  the  same  month  5  per 
cent  loans  were  raised  for  the  first  time  to  the  amount  of 
30,000,000  yen,  and  the  diversion  of  various  special  account 
funds  was  also  carried  out.  In  this  manner  the  war  expenses, 
totaling  56,000,000  yen,  were  defrayed  until  October  18, 
when  a  special  session  of  the  Diet  was  opened  in  Hiroshima. 
At  this  session  the  government  submitted  a  budget  for  the 
total  war  expenses  of  150,000,000  yen,  enlarging  the  aforesaid 
second  scheme,  seeing  that  the  war  was  to  cost  a  great  deal 
more  than  expected  and  that  it  was  not  to  end  in  the  year 
1894.  As  of  this  total  of  150,000,000  yen,  56,000,000  yen  had 
been  expended  already,  ex  post  facto  consent  was  asked  for  in 
the  Diet.  Regarding  the  remaining  1 00,000,000  yen,  the  amount 
was  to  be  raised  principally  by  public  loans  and  partly  from  the 
Treasury  surplus.  This  budget  was  unanimously  approved 
and  passed  by  both  Houses  of  the  Diet.  The  government 
then  planned  a  second  issue  of  5  per  cent  bonds,  and  called  a 
meeting  of  the  bankers  of  the  whole  country  to  ask  their  assist- 
ance in  floating  the  war  loans.     On  November  22,  the  second 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  55 

war  loan  was  issued  to  the  amount  of  30,000,000  yen.  Mean- 
while, the  war  steadily  progressed,  and  Japan  gained  victory 
after  victory.  On  August  17,  in  the  battle  near  Hai-Yang 
Island,  our  main  squadron  won  a  signal  victory  over  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy's  fleet  and  obtained  command  of  the  sea. 
Our  army,  too,  expelled  the  enemy's  forces  from  Korea.  The 
first  army  corps  captured  the  Castles  of  Kiu-Lien  and  Feng- 
Huang  and  established  a  Civil  Administration  Office  in  the 
Province  of  Antung;  and  the  second  army  corps  landed  on  the 
Liaotung  Peninsula  and  captured  the  Castle  of  Kinchow. 
On  February  19,  1895,  Admiral  Ting-Ju-Chang  committed 
suicide  and  the  Chinese  naval  force  was  annihilated.  The 
first  and  the  second  army  corps  combined  were  to  subdue 
Liaotung,  cross  the  Liao  River,  and  by  a  single  effort  to  press 
on  to  Tientsin  and  Peking. 

On  February  18,  1895,  the  Minister  of  Finance  submitted  to 
the  Diet  in  its  ordinary  session  a  supplementary  budget  pro- 
viding for  a  further  sum  of  100,000,000  yen,  seeing  that  the 
war  was  likely  to  continue  until  the  end  of  1895.  The  cost 
was  estimated  at  15,000,000  yen  a  month  and  at  a  total  of 
the  said  100,000,000  yen,  as  there  was  then  48,000,000  yen  yet 
remaining  unused  of  the  150,000,000  yen  already  sanctioned 
by  the  Diet.  After  due  consideration  both  Houses  expressed 
unanimous  approval  of  this  second  budget  of  100,000,000  yen, 
and  the  House  of  Representatives  especially  declared  that  it 
was  quite  ready  to  approve  any  further  funds  for  war 
expenditures,  in  order  to  attain  the  final  object  of  the  war. 

On  March  19,  1895,  peace  envoys  of  both  countries  met  at 
Shimonoseki,  and  on  March  30  a  truce  was  concluded.  A 
treaty  of  peace  was  finally  signed  on  April  17,  1895,  and  the 
Sino- Japanese  war  came  to  an  end.  Further  expenses  were 
necessarily  incurred  in  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  field, 
and  in  other  aftermaths  of  the  war,  and  in  March,  1896,  pub- 
lic loans  to  the  amount  of  25,000,000  yen  were  raised  as  a  part 
of  the  war  expenses  already  approved  by  the  Diet.  These 
loans  were  met  with  the  funds  belonging  to  the  Deposit  Money 
in  the  Department  of  Finance.     At  the  same  time  5  per  cent 


56  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

public-  bonds  were  issued  to  the  amount  of  10,000,000  yen,  and 
these  were  subscribed  to  by  the  general  public. 

Before  proceeding  to  explain  in  further  detail  the  war 
expenditures  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  we  may  refer  briefly 
to  certain  financial  rules  for  the  occasion,  in  order  that  the 
figures  of  the  Settled  Accounts  may  be  better  understood. 
With  a  view  to  treating  the  extraordinary  war  expenditures  in 
the  affairs  connected  with  China  and  Korea  quite  distinct 
from  the  General  Account,  the  government  made  a  draft  of  a 
law  providing  a  Special  Account  for  Extraordinary  War 
Expenditures.  In  accordance  with  this  law,  which  came  into 
operation  after  being  approved  by  the  Diet  at  its  special  ses- 
sion in  October,  1894,  the  accounts  of  the  revenues  and  expen- 
ditures for  the  extraordinary  war  expenditures  were  entirely 
separated  from  the  ordinary  administrative  expenditures,  and 
a  particular  fiscal  year  was  made  for  the  purpose,  beginning 
with  June  1,  1894,  and  ending  with  the  conclusion  of  the  hos- 
tilities. By  a  law  promulgated  in  March,  1895,  it  was  fixed 
that  these  revenues  and  expenditures  belonging  to  the  fiscal 
year  allotted  to  the  Special  Account  for  the  Extraordinary  War 
Expenditures  should  be  settled  and  concluded  on  March  31, 
1896,  and  that  the  accounts  regarding  contracts  for  manu- 
factures, constructions,  etc.,  for  which  the  payments  were  not 
ye1  finished  by  that  date,  should  be  transferred  thereafter  to 
and  dealt  with  in  the  General  Account.  Regarding  public 
loans,  this  law  also  provided  that  only  those  for  which  the  sub- 
scription was  opened  prior  to  March  31  were  to  be  included  in 
the  Special  Account  for  the  Extraordinary  War  Expenditures. 
Moreover,  in  order  to  prevent  any  misappropriation,  the  law 
further  provided  that  even  the  war  expenses  previously 
decided  upon  in  the  budget  should  be  carefully  disbursed  in 
such  a  way  that  the  Minister  of  Finance  on  receipt  of  applica- 
tions for  disbursements  from  the  army  and  the  navy  would 
have  to  apply  to  the  Prime  Minister  for  their  approval  by  the 
Cabinet  Council  and  for  the  final  Imperial  sanction. 

It  is  now  clear  that  the  statistics  of  the  expenditures  for  the 
Sino-Japanese  War  should   be  sought  in  the  special  account 


SINO-JAPANESE    WAR   TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  57 

in  question  and  in  the  General  Account  during  and  after  1896. 
We  must  also  calculate  all  the  expenses  specially  incurred  by 
various  departments  of  the  government  in  connection  with 
the  war.  For  this  purpose  Tables  No.  6(a)  and  No.  6(b)  in 
the  appendix  have  been  prepared  to  showr  the  Expenses  for 
Military  Affairs  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  and  various  rela- 
tive expanses  occasioned  thereby.  The  total  Expenses  for 
Military  Affairs,  as  given  in  the  Settled  Accounts,  amount  to 
232,609,771  yen,  of  which  the  particulars  and  percentages  of 
the  total  amounts  are  to  be  found  in  Table  A  at  the  end  of 
this  chapter.1 

The  grand  total  of  the  Expenses  for  Military  Affairs  in  the 
Sino-Japanese  War  was  232,609,773  yen,  of  which  the  army 
expenditures  were  about  194,000,000  yen,  or  83  per  cent. 
The  war  lasted  nine  months,  and  the  number  of  soldiers  sent 
overseas  was  170,000;  the  number  of  cannon  was  300.  It  is 
not  surprising,  therefore,  that  so  large  an  amount  was  re- 
quired for  the  army  expenditures,  of  which  the  chief  items  were 
transportation  ( 18  per  cent),  provisions  (13  per  cent),  clothing 
1 12  per  cent),  and  employees  (10  per  cent). 

The  navy  expenditures  amounted  to  38,705,000  yen,  or  only 
17  per  cent  of  the  total  expenses.  Twenty-nine  battleships 
were  engaged  in  the  war,  with  a  total  displacement  of  60,600 
tons,  and  twenty-two  torpedo  boats,  with  a  total  of  1,400 
tons,  besides  a  number  of  transports  and  four  converted 
cruisers.  The  loss  on  our  side  was  only  two  torpedo  boats, 
while  thirteen  warships  with  16,000  tons  and  four  torpedo 
boats  were  gained  as  trophies.  The  largest  amount  in  the 
navy  expenditures  was  the  warships  item,  amounting  to  14,- 
600,000  yen,  or  37  per  cent  of  the  total  navy  expenditures; 
and  then  followed  arms  and  ammunition  (26  per  cent),  and 
warship  maintenance  (11  per  cent);  and  it  may  be  noted,  as 
distinct  from  the  army  expenditures,  that  the  amounts  for 
salaries  and  allowances,  employees,  transportation,  and  cloth- 
ing were  all  comparatively  small.  The  relative  expenses  in 
the  Sino-Japanese  War  are  as  follows:2 

1  See  post,  p.  76.  2  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  6(b). 


58  HISTORICAL   SURVEY    OF    I-  XPENDITURES 

Department  Amount 

Yen 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 3°7.83i 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 241,4115 

Finance  Department  100,849 

Department  of  Communications i40,<)4<) 

Total 791,125 

The  above  total  represents  only  a  small  fraction  of  the 
aggregate  war  expenditures  of  233,400,896  yen. 

North  China  Disturbance  l 

After  the  Sino- Japanese  War,  Russia  entered  into  a  secret 
treaty  with  China  and  started  upon  her  Manchurian  program. 
Other  Powers,  too,  began  to  lease  important  places  in  China, 
so  that  the  alienation  of  Chinese  territory  became  a  matter  of 
international  concern.  At  that  time  the  Empress- Dowager 
Hsi-Tai-Hou  was  acting  as  regent  in  China,  and  Twan-Chun- 
Wang  was  holding  the  political  power.  A  conservative  anti- 
foreign  policy  was  being  pursued.  In  1900  the  Boxer  bandits 
rose  up  in  Shantung  on  the  pretext  of  expelling  foreign  resi- 
dents and  missionaries,  and  in  May  of  the  same  year  they 
marched  into  Chihli  in  formidable  strength.  The  Chinese 
Court,  regarding  them  as  heroes,  would  not  restrain  them, 
whereupon  the  Boxers  destroyed  the  Peking-Tientsin  railway 
and  threatened  the  foreign  legations  and  residents  in  Peking. 
The  western  Powers  now  landed  their  troops  in  China  for  the 
relief  of  Peking,  and  desired  Japan's  aid;  and  then  Japan  sent 
an  armed  force  for  the  purpose.  On  June  23  the  allied  troops 
captured  Tientsin,  and  under  command  of  the  British  general, 
Seymour,  marched  on  Peking,  the  siege  of  which  was  raised 
on  August  14  by  the  German  marshal,  Waldersee.  The 
Powers  thereupon  opened  negotiations  with  the  Chinese 
Government,  and  on  September  4  the  affairs  were  concluded 
by  China's  agreeing  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  450,000,000  taels. 

On  the  outbreak  of  this  disturbance,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment issued  an  Imperial  Ordinance  of  Financial  Emergency, 
by  which  it  was  decided  to  make  disbursements,  beyond  the 

1  Boxer  Uprising. 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  59 

budget,  out  of  three  Special  Accounts,  viz.,  the  Warship  and 
Torpedo-boat  Supplementing  Fund,  the  Catastrophe  Reserve 
Fund,  and  the  Educational  Fund.  Thus  20,000,000  yen  was 
diverted  from  the  first-named  Special  Account,  besides  2,000,- 
000  yen  was  taken  out  of  the  General  Reserve  Fund,  and  these 
urgent  financial  measures  were  approved  by  the  Diet  at  its 
session  in  February  of  the  following  year.  Further,  on  March 
16,  1901,  the  government  called  upon  the  Diet  for  23,500,000 
yen  from  the  Treasury  surplus  under  control  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Finance  for  paying  the  Chinese  Affairs  Expenses,  and 
this  as  a  supplementary  budget  to  the  General  Account,  the 
resources  for  which  were  sought  in  a  temporary  loan  of  17,000- 
000  yen  and  in  monopoly  profits  and  tax  increases  of  6,000,000 
yen.  Actually,  however,  the  revenue  from  the  increased  taxes 
did  not  come  up  to  the  amount  anticipated,  and  the  loan  from 
the  Bank  of  Japan  amounted  to  15,500,000  yen.  In  1902  and 
1903  a  budget  for  2,500,000  yen  each  was  allotted  in  these  re- 
spective years  to  Chinese  Affairs  Expenses.  In  1902  the  loans 
made  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  the  Warship  and  Torpedo- 
boat  Supplementing  Fund  were  redeemed  by  means  of  the 
indemnity  of  33,301,800  yen  received  from  China. 

No  special  account  was  made  out  for  the  expenses  of  the 
North  China  Disturbance,  so  that  the  corresponding  statistics 
can  be  sought  only  in  the  General  Account.  Thus,  Table  No. 
7  has  been  compiled  from  the  data  taken  from  the  General 
Account  to  show  the  Expenses  for  Military  Affairs  of  the 
North  China  Disturbance  and  various  Relative  Expenses 
occasioned  thereby.  According  to  this  table,  the  disburse- 
ments in  1900  and  1901  were  30,861,507  yen  for  Expenses  for 
Military  Affairs  and  4,782,294  yen  for  Relative  Expenses. 
While  these  appear  to  be  the  only  disbursements  anent  this 
disturbance,  an  annual  sum  varying  from  640,000  to  2,520,000 
yen  was  spent  thereafter  until  1908  as  expenses  for  troops  sta- 
tioned in  China.  These  annual  sums  must  also  be  reckoned 
in  the  war  expenditures  of  the  North  China  Disturbance, 
as  in  the  Settled  Accounts  they  stand  as  Chinese  Affairs 
Expenses. 


60  HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

The  Expenses  for  Military  Affairs  in  the  North  China  Dis- 
turbance are  shown  in  Table  B  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.1 

The  total  Expenses  for  the  Military  Affairs  of  the  North 
China  Disturbance  were  approximately  38,165,000  yen,  of 
which  the  army  expenditures  were  approximately  31,550,000 
yen,  or  83  per  cent.  The  war  lasted  two  months.  The  num- 
ber of  soldiers  who  took  part  in  it  was  13,000,  viz.,  thirteen 
battalions  of  infantry,  three  squadrons  of  cavalry,  ten  batteries 
of  artillery,  and  one  battalion  of  sappers.  The  number  of 
cannon  used  was  fifty-eight.  The  chief  items  in  the  army  ex- 
penditures were  weapons  (16  per  cent)  and  transportation  (12 
per  cent).  The  navy  expenditures  were  6,600,000  yen,  or  13 
per  cent  of  the  total  Expenses  for  Military  Affairs.  The  naval 
forces  actually  engaged  in  the  war  were  chiefly  the  naval  bri- 
gade; and  the  men-of-war  that  served  were  the  Kasagi  and 
seven  others,  with  a  total  displacement  of  24,800  tons.  The 
principal  item  in  the  navy  expenditures  was,  of  course,  the 
warship  maintenance  (56  per  cent),  with  salaries  and  allow- 
ances (12  per  cent)  following  next.  The  expenses  incurred  in 
the  departments  other  than  those  of  the  army  and  the  navy  in 
connection  with  the  disturbance  totaled  5,437,122  yen,  the 
details  of  which  are  as  follows:2 

Department  Amount 

Yen 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 1,120,256 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 15, 167 

Finance  Department 3,999,942 

Department  of  Communications 301,757 

Total 5,437,122 

This  total  of  Relative  Expenses  of  5,437,122  yen  comes  to 
\2\  per  cent  of  the  total  war  expenditures  of  43,602,243  yen 
obtained  by  adding  the  former  to  the  above-mentioned  total 
Expenses  for  Military  Affairs.  This  is  not  a  small  percentage, 
and  the  disbursements  of  the  Department  of  Finance  were 
great,  especially  because  the  compensations  given  in  this  war 
were  mostly  defrayed  from  the  item  of  temporary  rewards. 

1  See  post,  p.  78.  -  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  7. 


sino-japanese  war  to  russo-japanese  war  6 1 

Armament  Expenditures 

Army 

After  the  Sino-Japanese  War  the  government  aimed  to  in- 
crease the  size  and  strength  of  the  army.  First  of  all,  in  1895, 
the  conscription  law  was  revised;  the  period  of  service  was 
made  to  extend  over  12  years  and  four  months,  instead  of 
twelve  years  only;  the  reservist  system  was  changed  to  con- 
script reserve  service;  and  the  militia  service  was  divided  into 
the  first  and  the  second  terms.  In  1896  it  was  decided  to  raise 
the  organization  of  colonial  troops  to  that  of  a  division;  to 
make  five  more  army  divisions  in  the  country,  in  order  to  have 
thirteen  divisions  in  all;  to  organize  a  composite  brigade  in 
Formosa;  to  construct  batteries  at  Naruto,  Kure,  Gei-Yo 
Channel,  and  Sasebo;  and,  by  extending  the  arsenal,  to  plan 
the  replenishment  and  independence  of  arms  and  ordnance. 
This  was  the  so-called  ten-year  plan  of  the  army,  which  was  to 
be  completed  before  the  year  1905.  The  plan  was  largely 
carried  into  effect,  and  at  the  end  of  1903,  or  just  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  we  had  thirteen  divisions 
of  infantry,  and  two  brigades  each  of  cavalry  and  artillery, 
viz.,  one  hundred  fifty-six  battalions  of  infantry,  fifty-four 
cavalry  squadrons,  six  field  artillery  batteries,  and  thirty- 
eight  companies  of  sappers.  Besides,  other  forces  were 
formed,  such  as  the  garrison  artillery  at  Tsushima,  the  inde- 
pendent garrison  at  Formosa,  the  gendarmerie,  etc.  The 
peace  footing  then  was  calculated  at  170,000  men,  and  the 
war  footing  at  600,000  men.  To  sum  up,  the  development  of 
the  army  in  this  epoch  was  due  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  so- 
called  ten-year  plan  described  above,  and  the  result  was  that 
the  military  strength  was  trebled. 

Before  going  on  to  explain  the  annual  disbursements 
concerned,  we  may  here  describe  the  financial  side  of  the  army 
expansion  scheme  made  after  the  termination  of  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War.  In  December,  1895,  when  the  war  ended,  the 
government  submitted  an  expansion  bill  to  the  Diet,  where, 
though  heated  discussions  arose,  the  budgets  for   1896  and 


62 


HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 


thereafter  were  passed,  as  the  nation  was  at  one  in  regard  to 
the  necessity  of  increasing  its  military  power.  The  first  post- 
bellum  army  expansion  budget  was  as  follows: 

First  Army  Expansion  Budget  after  Sino-Japanese  War 


Item 

Amount 

Remarks 

Battery  Construction : 

Naruto  Channel  battery 

Yen 

686,981 
1,237.471 
2,009,033 

880,319 
9,258,089 

17.334.891 

8,486,767 

2,949,108 

479.575 

Six  years'  continuing  expenditures  (1 896-1901) 

Gei-Yi>  Channel  buttery 

,, 

"        "               "                      "                        " 

Repairing  and  furnishing  of  arms 
and  implements  for  campaign 

Four  years'  continuing  expenditures  (1896-1899) 

This  is  the  first  recorded  instance  of  a  requisi- 
tion of  this  nature. 

Enlargement    of    factories    and 

Two  years'  continuing  expenditures  (1896-1897) 

Expenses    of   lumber   for   tern- 

To  be  defrayed  in  four  years  but  not  as  con- 

tinuing expenditures. 

43.322,234 

Subsequently  in  1897,  the  second  post-bellum  army  expan- 
sion budget  was  decided  upon  as  follows: 

Second  Army  Expansion  Budget  after  Sino-Japanese  War 


Item 

Amount 

Remarks 

Battery  Construction: 

Yen 

164,572 
271.366 
596,444 
532.017 
4,896,121 

19.363.747 
9.854.539 

2,679,790 

Four  years' 
Five       " 

Seven    " 
Six          " 

continuing  expenditures 

(1897- 
(1897- 

(1897- 
(1897- 

1900) 

1901) 

Repairing  and  furnishing  of  arms 
and  implements  for  campaign 

1903) 

1902) 

Deficit  in  funds  for  use  in 

fac- 

38,358.596 

Besides  the  two  army  expansion  programs,  the  continuing 
expenditures  of  9,829,134  yen  for  the  construction  of  batteries, 
and  of  8,220,583  yen  for  repairing  and  furnishing  arms  for  cam- 
paign use,  making  a  total  of  18,049,717  yen,  were  introduced  in 
the  budget  of  1899  for  the  completion  of  the  seventh  division 
and  the  construction  of  batteries  at  Tsushima,  Keelung,  and 
Pescadores.  The  seventh  division,  it  may  be  remembered, 
was  a  reorganization  of  the  Hokkaido  territorial  army. 


SINO-JAPANESE   WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 


63 


In  the  budget  of  1900  the  above-named  new  continuing  ex- 
penditures were  inserted,  and,  moreover,  owing  to  the  rising 
market,  increases  of  5,208,477  yen  and  3,541  yen  were  made, 
respectively,  in  the  two  items  of  repairing  and  furnishing  arms 
and  implements  for  campaign  use  and  the  expenses  of  lumber 
for  temporary  buildings;  and  owing  to  circumstances  in  con- 
struction, a  decrease  of  351,351  yen  was  effected  in  the  Gei-Yo 
Channel  battery  construction  expenses,  besides  certain 
alterations  in  the  yearly  allotment  of  the  other  continuing 
expenditures.  We  may  say,  in  summary,  that  the  post- 
bellum  military  expansion,  with  its  first  and  second  programs, 
was  commenced  in  1896  and  completed  in  1903,  with  an 
aggregate  expenditure  of  106,487,336  yen.  It  was  natural 
that  with  this  expansion  scheme  there  were  increases  in  the 
ordinary  expenditures;  and  though  the  increase  in  1896  was 
only  2,600,000  yen,  the  increases  thereafter  ranged  from 
14,000,000  to  25,000,000  yen. 

As  already  stated,  these  expenses  for  military  expansion 
were  defrayed  generally  in  conformity  with  the  original  pro- 
grams, side  by  side  with  the  gradual  completion  of  the  expan- 
sion, up  to  the  year  1903.  The  Settled  Accounts  of  both  the 
ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  expenditures  read  as  follows:1 

Expenses  for  Military  Expansion,  1 893-1903 


Fiscal   year 

Ordinary- 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

1893 

1894 

1895 

1896 

1897 

1898 

Yen 
13,170,669 

8,593,474 

9,221,979 

25,022,276 

31,179,879 

34,877,127 

37,979,171 
38,692,333 
40,257,659 
42,268,800 
42,732,070 

100 

67 
69 
192 
242 
266 
290 

303 
308 
321 

328 

Yen 

2,301,397 
2,580,871 
1,605,724 
10,213,655 
25,486,162 
18,309,620 
i6,95i,752 
21,929,421 

13,477,237 
8,206,454 
6,382,093 

100 

113 

69 
440 
1,100 
790 
742 
950 
586 

349 
262 

1899 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

Total 

310,824,768 

281 

125,142,989 

652 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  8. 


64  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 

The  ordinary  and  extraordinary  expenditures  in  the  years 
1 894-1903  thus  aggregated  the  enormous  total  of  435.967,757 
yen.  The  ordinary  expenditures  in  the  years  [894  and  1895 
were  only  between  8,000,000  and  9,000,000  yen,  as  in  these 
years  many  of  the  accounts  were  treated  as  war  expenditures; 
but  in  1896  there  was  a  sudden  increase  to  25,000,000  jew,  fol- 
lowed in  1897  by  a  further  increase  to  more  than  30,000,000 
yen.  The  upward  trend  continued  until  1902  and  1903,  when 
an  amount  about  five  times  as  large  as  that  of  the  years  1894 
and  1895  was  reached.  As  for  the  extraordinary  expenditures, 
their  amount  was  the  greatest  in  the  year  1897,  when  t  hex- 
reached  25,000,000  yen;  but  they  gradually  decreased,  until  in 
1902  they  amounted  to  8,000,000  yen  and  in  1903  to  only 
5,000,000  yen.  The  average  increase  in  the  armament  expen- 
ditures in  this  epoch  ending  with  1903,  or  the  year  preceding 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  was  280  per  cent  in  the  ordinary  and 
650  per  cent  in  the  extraordinary  (excepting  from  the  average 
the  two  war  years  1 894-1 895). 

In  the  war  years  of  1894  and  1895  there  were  no  new  dis- 
bursements for  armament  purposes  either  in  the  ordinary  or 
the  extraordinary  expenditures.  It  was  natural  that  the 
former  did  not  specially  increase,  as  most  of  the  expenses  for 
expeditionary  forces  were  included  in  the  war  expenditures. 
As  for  the  year  1896,  the  new  army  expansion  program  neces- 
sitated increases  in  various  items  of  expenditure,  the  most 
considerable  of  which  were  12,000,000  yen  in  the  expenses  for 
military  affairs,  [,500,000  yen  in  the  gendarmerie,  and  1,500.- 
000  yen  in  the  decorations  and  annuities,  pensions,  compas- 
sionate allowances,  and  gratuities  (temporary  rewards).  The 
ordinary  expenditures  in  1896  totaled  some  25,000,000  yen,  as 
compared  with  some  9,000,000  yen  in  the  preceding  year,  th.it 
is,  an  increase  of  some  270  per  cent.  Regarding  the  extraor- 
dinary expenditures,  the  battery  construction  expenses  (in- 
cluding the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition  mentioned 
in  the  aforesaid  budget  estimates,  which  must  be  remembered 
hereafter,  as  it  was  so  adjusted  in  our  Settled  Accounts)  com- 
menced gradually  to  increase ;  and  as  there  was  also  an  increase 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  65 

of  5,000,000  yen  for  the  new  item  of  repairing  and  furnishing  of 
arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use,  and  an  increase  of 
1,200,000  yen  in  the  manufacture  of  arms,  the  extraordinary 
expenditures  in  1896  amounted  to  an  unprecedented  total  of 
10,213,655  yen. 

In  1897  we  note  still  further  increases  in  all  the  items,  of 
which  the  chief  were  5,000,000  yen  in  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs,  1,800,000  yen  in  battery  construction,  7,000,000  yen 
in  the  repairing  and  furnishing  of  arms  and  implements  for 
campaign  use,  2,000,000  yen  in  the  enlargement  of  arsenals, 
and  1,000,000  yen  in  the  Temporary  Army  Transportation 
and  Communication  Office,  resulting  in  an  increase  of  6,000,000 
yen  in  the  ordinary  and  15,000,000  yen  in  the  extraordinary 
expenditures.  In  each  of  the  years  1898  and  1899  we  note  an 
increase  of  3,000,000  yen  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  as 
compared  with  the  preceding  years,  owing  principally  to  the 
increased  expenses  for  military  affairs  consequent  upon  the 
increased  cost  of  maintaining  forces  in  the  new  divisions  and 
batteries.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were  decreases  of  from 
7,000,000  to  9,000,000  yen  in  the  extraordinary  expenditures, 
owing  chiefly  to  the  decreases  in  the  repairing  and  furnishing 
of  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use,  which  in  turn 
meant  that  the  barracks  and  barracks  outfits  were  being 
brought  near  to  completion. 

Thereafter,  until  the  year  1903,  the  ordinary  expenditures 
increased  about  1,000,000  yen  yearly,  whereas  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  gradually  decreased,  except  that  in  the  year 
1900  new  expenses  were  added  for  completing  the  seventh 
division  and  constructing  batteries  at  Tsushima,  Keelung,  and 
Pescadores. 

In  short,  the  extraordinary  armament  expenditures  of  the 
army  in  this  epoch  amounted  to  a  large  total,  and  the  con- 
sequent increase  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  was  significant. 
This  was  especially  the  case  during  and  after  1896,  the  increase 
ranging  from  50,000,000  to  60,000,000  yen  in  the  six  years  be- 
ginning with  1 897.  For  the  details  of  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Table  No.  8  in  the  appendix. 


66  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Navy 

In  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  the  Japanese  Navy  acquired 
seventeen  Chinese  ships  and  bought  one  warship.  The  war- 
ship construction  scheme  made  out  in  1892  was  brought  to 
completion  in  the  year  1896,  with  the  result  that  the  naval 
force  was  increased  by  two  battleships  (Fuji  and  Yashima,  of 
12,400  tons  each),  one  cruiser  and  one  dispatch  boat.  Yet  the 
post-bellum  national  defense  measure  called  for  a  still  greater 
enlargement  of  the  navy.  Therefore,  in  1896  a  further  scheme 
was  made  for  constructing  four  battleships  of  15,000  tons  each, 
six  first-class  cruisers  of  9,700  tons  each,  ten  ships,  including 
second-class  cruisers  and  other  ships,  twenty-three  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers,  sixty-three  torpedo  boats,  and  five  hundred 
eighty-four  ships  for  various  uses;  and  they  were  all  completed 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  At  the 
same  time,  the  regulations  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  navy 
were  revised  in  order  to  raise  it  to  equal  rank  with  the  General 
Staff  of  the  army,  a  naval  station  was  established  at  Maizuru, 
the  secondary  naval  station  at  Takeshiki  and  the  torpedo  divi- 
sion at  Ominato  were  extended;  and,  moreover,  by  enlarging 
arsenals  and  other  works,  independence  in  shipbuilding  and 
in  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition  was  aimed  at. 
This  was  the  first  naval  expansion  program  made  after  the 
Sino-Japanese  War,  and  on  the  whole  it  was  accomplished  by 
1902  or  1903.  In  1903  a  second  expansion  scheme  was  formed 
for  constructing  eight  men-of-war  and  for  making  accompany- 
ing accommodations  on  land;  but  this  second  expansion  was 
not  completed  before  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  as  it  was  a  ten- 
year  undertaking. 

The  naval  expansion  in  this  epoch  was  as  described  above, 
and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  strength  of 
the  navy  was  represented  by  six  first-class  battleships,  one 
second-class  battleship,  eight  first-class  cruisers,  ten  second- 
class  cruisers,  seven  third-class  cruisers,  ten  gunboats,  four 
dispatch  boats,  ten  third-class  coast-defense  ships,  and  one 
torpedo-boat  depot  ship,  making  fifty-seven  vessels  with  a 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 


67 


total  of  265,000  tons.  Besides,  there  were  seventeen  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  with  6,100  tons  and  eighty-four  torpedo  boats 
with  7,400  tons,  making  a  grand  total  of  278,900  tons.  This 
was  an  increase  of  four  times  in  the  naval  strength,  as 
compared  with  the  beginning  of  the  epoch  now  under 
review. 

Before  explaining  the  annual  expenditures  in  connection 
with  this  expansion,  let  us  say  a  few  words  regarding  the 
financial  side  in  the  first  and  the  second  expansion  programs. 
The  budget  for  the  first  program  came  into  existence  in  1896, 
and  in  1897  the  amount  of  the  annual  allotment  was  increased 
and  the  number  of  years  to  be  continued  was  prolonged. 
Finally,  in  1899,  it  was  revised  again,  and  this  finally  revised 
amount  was  as  follows: 


Naval 

Expansion  Expenses  Revised,  1899 

Item 

Amount 

Remarks 

Yen 
63,355,072 
20,125,990 

Ten  years'  continuing  expenditures  (1896-1905) 

Total 

83,481,062 

The  carrying  out  of  this  expansion  plan  rendered  increases 
in  the  ordinary  expenditures  inevitable;  and  though  the  in- 
crease was  only  770,000  yen  in  1896,  the  annual  increase  there- 
after was  expected  to  become  10,000,000  yen. 

As  for  the  second  naval  expansion  program,  the  following 
was  the  amount  first  decided  upon,  though  it  afterwards  under- 
went considerable  alteration  as  a  result  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War: 


Warship  Construction  and  Other  Construction  Expenses,  1903 

Item 

Amount 

Remarks 

Yen 

62,348,269 

29.001,313 

8,510,723 

Eleven  years'  continuing  expenditures  (1903-13) 

■1           ii               ■■                     1.                   ,. 

Total 

99,860,305 

68  HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 

The  Settled  Accounts  of  the  armament  expenditures  of  the 
navy  in  this  epoch  read  as  follows: l 

Armament  Expenditures  of  the  Navy,  1893-1903 


Fiscal  year 

( )rdinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 

expenditures 

Index 
number 

i8qi 

Yen 

5.315,130 

4,767,806 

5,091.454 
7.632,529 

9,855,473 
11,523,44s 
14,968,528 
17.334.477 
19,935471 
21,571,093 
22,094,699 

100 
89 
96 

143 
187 

191 
282 
327 
376 
405 
451 

Yen 
2,959.445 

5.679.550 
8,607,025 
11,204,668 
40,242,383 
47,023,682 
46,961,910 
35,520,462 
23,521,429 
15,259,424 
14,566,631 

100 

1894 

1895 

1896 

1897 

1 898 

192 

281 

378 

1,360 

I.490 

1899 

1 900 

1901 

1 902 

1903 

1 ,480 

1,190 

795 

514 

458 

Total 

134.774,978 

299 

248,587,164 

959 

The  total  naval  expenditures  for  the  ten  years  1 894-1 903 
were  383,362,142  yen,  of  which  the  ordinary  expenditures  show 
sudden  increases  from  some  5,000,000  yen  in  1894  and  1895  to 
7,600,000  yen  in  1896  and  to  9,800,000  yen  in  1897.  A  further 
annual  increase  of  3,000,000  yen  appears  thereafter,  until  in 
the  year  1903  the  ordinary  expenditures  reached  a  total  of 
22,000,000  yen,  or  four  times  that  of  1893.  As  regards  the 
extraordinary  expenditures,  they  made  a  great  bound  in  1896 
and  1897  and  reached  the  enormous  amount  of  47,000,000 
yen  in  1898,  or  fifteen  times  that  of  1893.  But  afterwards  they 
decreased  gradually  to  14,000,000  yen  in  1903.  The  average 
increase  in  this  epoch,  excepting  the  war  years  1 894-1 895,  or 
in  the  eight  years  1 896-1 903,  was  about  three  times  in  the  ordi- 
nary expenditures  and  about  nine  and  one-half  times  in  the 
extraordinary  expenditures. 

It  was  for  obvious  reasons  that  the  ordinary  expenditures 
did  not  specially  increase  in  the  war  years  1894-1895,  but  in 
the  extraordinary  expenditures  the  notable  amounts  of  4,900,- 
000  yen  in  1894  and  7,600,000  yen  in  1895  were  disbursed  as 
continuing  expenditures  planned  in  1892  to  run  until  1896  for 
1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  9. 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  69 

constructing  two  battleships  and  two  other  ships.  In  1896 
a  sum  of  6,000,000  yen  was  allotted  for  the  same  continuing 
expenditures,  and  4,000,000  yen  crept  in  as  the  first  instalment 
of  the  first  naval  expansion  budget.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
ordinary  expenditures  increased  to  7,600,000  yen,  an  increase 
of  2,600,000  yen  over  those  of  1 895,  owing  to  the  general  expan- 
sion of  naval  affairs,  though  the  increase  in  the  expenses  for 
military  affairs  directly  affected  by  naval  expansion  was 
less  than  1,000,000  yen.  In  1897  there  was  an  increase  of 
2,000,000  yen  in  the  expenses  for  military  affairs,  and  in  the 
extraordinary  expenditures  there  were  disbursements  of  5,800,- 
000  yen  as  continuing  expenditures  from  1893  and  32,000,000 
yen  belonging  to  the  first  naval  expansion  budget.  As  for 
1898  and  1899,  the  disbursements  as  continuing  expenditures 
running  from  1893  became  trifling,  but  the  expansion  expenses 
increased  to  no  less  than  45,000,000  yen;  and  consequently  the 
extraordinary  expenditures  reached  46,000,000  or  47,000,000 
yen,  while  the  ordinary  expenditures  showed  an  increase  of 
1,800,000  yen  in  1898  over  that  of  1897  and  a  further  increase 
of  3,400,000  yen  in  1 899  over  that  of  the  preceding  year.  These 
increases  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  were  attributable  prin- 
cipally to  the  general  expansion  of  naval  armament  in  connec- 
tion with  the  completion  of  new  warships,  torpedo  divisions, 
naval  stations,  and  secondary  naval  stations.  For  the  same 
reasons  the  ordinary  expenditures  continued  to  increase  until 
the  year  1903,  but  the  extraordinary  expenditures  decreased 
a  great  deal  in  1900,  1901,  and  1902.  This  was  due  to  the 
gradual  decrease  of  payments,  as  the  first  naval  expansion 
plan  was  nearing  completion.  In  1900  a  disbursement  of 
1,100,000  yen  for  the  extension  of  the  naval  arsenal  at  Kure 
was  decided  upon;  and  after  disbursing  700,000  yen  in  1900 
and  1901,  the  extension  plan  was  enlarged  in  1902,  and  it  was 
decided  to  spend  7,450,000  yen  thereafter  until  1905.  Thus 
1,300,000  yen  in  1902  and  1,900,000  yen  in  1903  were  dis- 
bursed for  the  purpose.  In  1903  the  second  naval  expansion 
program  began  to  be  carried  out,  and  2,600,000  yen  came  on 
the  budget  as  the  first  year's  portion  of  the  warship  construe- 


70  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

tion  expenses.  For  the  details  of  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs,  the  most  important  item  in  the  ordinary  expenditures, 
and  for  the  details  of  both  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary 
expenditures  in  this  epoch,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Table  No.  9 
in  the  appendix. 

Financial  Resources 

As  a  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  War  Expenditures 
was  made  for  the  expenses  of  the  Sino- Japanese  War,  the  finan- 
cial resources  therefor  also  received  special  treatment.  As 
has  been  explained  previously,  the  government  adopted  an 
emergency  measure  for  the  Sino- Japanese  War  of  drawing 
upon  the  General  Reserve  Fund  and  the  Treasury  surplus,  and 
also  decided  upon  the  flotation  of  the  first  war  loan  amount- 
ing to  50,000,000  yen.  In  the  extraordinary  session  of  the 
Diet  in  October,  1894,  the  raising  of  the  second  and  third  war 
loans  to  the  amount  of  100,000,000  yen  was  decided  upon,  and 
in  February,  1895,  it  was  determined  to  issue  another  100,000,- 
000  yen  as  the  fourth  war  loan.  Thus  the  government  was 
also  to  raise  loans  to  the  limit  of  250,000,000  yen;  but  the  war 
loan  bonds  actually  issued  amounted  to  only  125,000,000  yen, 
of  which  35,000,000  yen  belonged  to  the  special  issue.  When, 
after  the  year  1896,  it  became  necessary  to  issue  loans  to  the 
amount  of  80,000,000  yen  to  meet  the  war  expenditures,  the 
Chinese  indemnity  was  made  to  serve  these  requirements  and 
the  budget  estimate  of  thus  utilizing  the  indemnity  to  the 
amount  of  79,000,000  yen  was  made  in  February,  1896.  The 
Settled  Accounts  of  the  revenues  for  the  Special  Account  of 
Extraordinary  War  Expenditures  for  the  Sino-Japanese  War 
are  shown  in  the  table  on  page  71. 

If  we  compare  the  above  revenues  with  the  expenditures  in 
the  Special  Account,  we  find  that  there  was  a  surplus  of  24,754,- 
624  yen,  which  was  brought  forward  into  the  General  Account 
in  the  year  1896  as  Extraordinary  War  Expenditure  Fund. 
Besides,  there  was  a  balance  of  5,906,669  yen  of  the  proceeds 
from  the  war  loans  belonging  to  the  Special  Account.  Con- 
sidering now  that  the  Settled  Accounts  of  the  funds  paid  as 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 


71 


extraordinary  war  expenditures  out  of  the  General  Account 
were  32,134,262  yen,  we  see  after  all  that  the  deficit  in  the 
financial  resources  for  this  war  was  only  5,500,000  yen,  and 
this  deficit  was  covered  by  the  ordinary  revenues.  As  regards 
the  Relative  Expenses  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War  (Extraor- 
dinary Affairs  Expenses  defrayed  by  various  government 
departments),  they  amounted  to  791,000  yen  and  were  of 
course  defrayed  from  the  General  Account. 

Financial  Resources  for  the  Sino-Japanese  War 


Sources  of  revenue 


Amount 


Public  loans 

Treasury  surplus 

Public  contributions: 

to  war  funds 

to  Soldiers'  Relief  Fund 

to  Sailors'  Relief  Fund 

Sundry  incomes 

Incomes  from  occupied  territories 

Incomes  from  Formosa  and  Pescadores.  . 
Fund  transferred  from  Chinese  indemnity 

Total 


Yen 
116,804,926 
23-439.086 

160,800 

2,210,650 

578,090 

1. 519.305 
624,425 

935.679 
78,957.165 


225,230,126 


The  financial  resources  for  the  Sino-Japanese  War  were  as 
stated  above,  but  besides  we  must  make  mention  of  the  tem- 
porary measures  taken  for  securing  them.  We  mean,  first, 
the  funds  borrowed  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  by  virtue  of  Law 
Xo.  25  of  1894  and  Law  No.  8  of  1895,  authorizing  the  govern- 
ment to  borrow  from  the  bank  in  case  the  revenues  for  the 
Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  WTar  Expenditures  actually 
fell  short  of  the  amounts  required.  The  borrowed  fund 
according  to  the  former  law  was  20,500,000  yen,  and  that  ac- 
cording to  the  latter  law  was  20,260,000  yen,  totaling  40,760,- 
000  yen.  Secondly,  there  were  the  funds  borrowed  from  the 
Bank  of  Japan  as  a  temporary  means  before  transferring  the 
aforesaid  79,000,000  yen  from  the  Special  Account  of  the 
Chinese  Indemnity  to  the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary 
War  Expenditures.  Concisely  speaking,  70,824,703  yen  in  all 
was  borrowed  on  eight  occasions  during  the  period  between 


72  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

May  20,  1896,  and  April  29,  1897,  because  the  accommodated 
treasury  funds  for  the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  War 
Expenditures  and  the  funds  borrowed  from  the  Bank  of  Japan 
by  virtue  of  the  above-mentioned  law  were  to  be  reimbursed  as 
soon  as  possible;  and,  besides,  there  was  the  convenience  of 
closing  up  the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  War  Expen- 
ditures by  opening  the  Indemnity  Account  with  the  Bank  of 
Japan  pending  the  withdrawal  of  the  indemnity  money  from 
London,  which  required  a  certain  interval  of  time. 

The  financial  resources  for  the  North  China  Disturbance 
were  not  obtained  by  raising  public  loans,  but  by  using  first  of 
all  2,000,000  yen  of  the  General  Reserve  Fund  by  diverting 
20,000,000  yen  from  various  special  accounts  in  1900,  by  bor- 
rowing 15,500,000  yen  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  in  1901,  and  by 
obtaining  107,000  yen  from  public  contributions  to  the  war 
fund  between  1900  and  1902.  But  in  order  to  equip  the  Gen- 
eral Reserve  Fund  for  the  purpose,  the  taxes  on  sake  and  sugar 
and  the  custom  duties  were  increased,  and  the  annual  income 
of  14,167,000  yen  obtained  by  these  increases  in  taxation  may 
be  called  the  direct  financial  resources  for  the  expenditures  of 
the  North  China  Disturbance. 

As  for  the  great  armament  expansion  after  the  Sino- Japa- 
nese War,  the  government  made  it  a  principle  to  cause  all  the 
ordinary  expenditures  therefor  to  be  paid  from  the  ordinary 
sources  of  revenue,  and  in  like  manner  the  extraordinary  ex- 
penditures from  the  extraordinary  sources  of  revenue.  The 
government  then  effected  an  extensive  reform  in  the  taxation 
system,  in  order  to  make  the  ordinary  revenues  keep  pace 
with  the  increases  in  the  ordinary  expenditures.  Since  the 
increased  revenues  from  taxation  were  used  for  the  general 
expansion  of  national  affairs,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  fix  defi- 
nitely what  part  of  them  was  disbursed  as  armament  expen- 
ditures. This  increased  taxation  meant  26,000,000  yen  (ex- 
clusive of  the  taxes  that  were  abolished  at  the  same  time)  of 
the  annual  revenue  in  1896  derived  from  the  newly  established 
registration  tax  and  business  tax,  the  opening  of  the  tobacco 
monopoly,  and  the  increased  tax  on  sake;  and  the  annual 


SINO-JAPANESE   WAR   TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 


73 


revenue  of  42,000,000  yen  in  1899  derived  from  the  increases 
in  land  tax,  income  tax,  sake  tax,  tonnage  dues,  registration 
tax,  tobacco  monopoly  profits,  tax  on  convertible  bank-notes, 
soy  tax,  license  fees  on  the  tobacco  trade,  and  posts  and  tele- 
graphs receipts.  As  regards  the  extraordinary  expenditures, 
they  depended  solely  on  the  extraordinary  revenues,  viz. : 


Source? 


(1)  Imperial  donation 

Contributions  by  civil  officials  and  military  officers  as  one- 
tenth  of  their  salaries  (used  as  a  supplementary  fund  for 
warship  construction  from  1894  to  1898) 

(2)  Chinese  indemnity: 

Disbursed  as  army  expansion  fund  from  1896101903 

Disbursed  as  navy  expansion  fund  from  1896  to  1905 

(The  disbursements  during  and  after  1904  were  601,733  yen 

and  those  up  to  1903  were  138,657,654  yen) 
{3)  Public  loans  (forming  part  of  the  loans  raised  for  post-bellum 

enterprises) : 

Disbursed  as  army  expansion  fund  from  1897  to  1905 

(The  disbursements  during  and  after  1904  were  21,355  yen 

and  those  up  to  1903  were  18,148,320  yen) 

Disbursed  as  navy  expansion  fund  from  1897  to  1905 

(The  disbursements  during  and  after  1904  were  682,834  yen, 

and  those  up  to  1903  were  58,316,1 13  yen  I 


Amount 


Yen 
1,200,000 

4.96i,305 

56,798,638 
139.259,387 


18,169,755 
58,998,947 


The  total  of  the  above  three  items  is  278,082,030  yen,  of 
which  the  revenues  of  the  first  item  were  used  for  warship  con- 
struction as  continuing  expenditures  from  the  year  1892,  and 
those  of  the  latter  two  items  in  the  expenditures  in  the  first 
and  the  second  army  expansions  and  in  the  first  navy  expan- 
sion. The  said  total  represents  75  per  cent  of  the  total  373,- 
730,153  yen  of  the  extraordinary  armament  expenditures  of 
the  army  and  the  navy  in  this  epoch,  the  remaining  25  per 
cent  having  been  taken  from  the  General  Revenue  Account. 
The  financial  resources  for  the  second  naval  expansion  in  1903 
were  obtained  through  administrative  adjustments  and  the 
postponement  of  work  on  various  undertakings. 

Organization  Expenses  of  the  Iron  Foundry 

In  1892,  Viscount  Kabayama,  Minister  of  the  Navy,  asked 
the  Diet  for  2,500,000  yen  for  the  establishment  of  an  iron 


74  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

foundry,  earnestly  explaining  its  importance  from  the  stand- 
point of  national  independence  in  the  manufacture  of  arma- 
ment; but  as  the  Diet  did  not  agree  to  his  proposal,  the 
starting  of  the  enterprise  was  deferred  for  the  time  being. 
After  the  Sino- Japanese  War,  however,  it  was  decided,  for  the 
same  reasons,  to  establish  an  iron  foundry  at  a  continuing 
expenditure  of  4,095,793  yen  in  all  from  1896  to  1899,  the 
financial  resources  for  which  were  sought  in  the  loans  for 
public  enterprises  to  the  amount  of  3,500,000  yen  and  in  the 
Chinese  indemnity  for  the  balance.  In  1898,  after  the  work  of 
establishing  this  iron  foundry  was  begun,  an  additional  expen- 
diture of  6,474,056  yen  was  voted  in  1898,  and  in  1899  the  work 
had  progressed  so  far  as  to  enable  the  foundry  to  make  some 
trial  manufactures.  Then  there  arose  the  necessity  of  setting 
apart  a  working  capital  for  carrying  on  the  manufacturing 
works,  and  at  the  same  time  it  came  to  be  realized  that  the 
foundry  itself  must  own  mines  producing  iron,  coal,  and  other 
necessary  materials.  Thereupon,  a  further  sum  was  voted  to 
the  total  amount  of  3,632,845  yen  to  be  disbursed  until  1901. 
These  two  increases  in  the  foundry's  expenditures  were  all  to 
be  met  with  the  proceeds  of  the  loans  for  public  enterprises. 
While  these  extensions  were  being  gradually  completed,  the 
market  prices  of  all  materials  steadily  increased ;  and,  moreover, 
as  the  hostilities  with  Russia  broke  out,  the  existing  scale  of  ex- 
penditure of  the  foundry  became  inadequate.  To  meet  the  en- 
hanced requirements  of  the  situation,  the  government  effected 
a  makeshift  by  applying  some  3,000,000  yen  over  and  above 
the  budget  to  reinforcing  the  foundry's  expenditures,  and  made 
a  plan  of  establishing  a  productive  capacity  of  130,000  tons  by 
authorizing  expansion  expenses  of  10,880,000  yen  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  This  last  plan  having 
been  found  still  unsatisfactory,  another  plan  was  formed  in 
191 1  for  increasing  the  productive  capacity  to  300,000  tons  by 
authorizing  a  further  expenditure  of  12,000,000  yen  until  the 
year  191 5.  The  following  table  shows  the  expenses  required 
in  the  organization  and  expansion  of  the  iron  foundry  (the 
figures  for  1 91 2  and  191 3  being  based  on  the  budget  estimates) : 


SI  NO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 

Organization  Expenses  of  Iron  Foundry 


75 


Fiscal  year 


1 896 .  .  . 

1897.  • 

1898.  .  . 

1899.  •  . 
1900. .  , 

1901 .  .  , 

1902.  .  . 

1903.  .  . 
1904. •  • 
1905.  •  • 
1906. .  . 
1907. •  • 

1908.  .  . 

1909.  .  . 

1910.  .  . 

1911 .  .  . 

1912 .  .  . 
1913- •  • 

Total 


Organization 
expenses 


Yen 

157,529 

709,224 

1,747,572 

3,011,008 

7,126,198 

5.853.335 

490,117 

820,011 

289,596 

1,181,055 

3,498,886 

4,729.547 

4.407,073 

1,470,113 

255.428 

421,664 

3,022,186 

3.797,535 


42,988,078 


Organization 
expenses  of  the 
iron  foundry, 
in  the  depart- 
mental extraor- 
dinary expenses 

in  connection 
with  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War 


Yen 


3L905 

1.576,872 

2.307,271 

724,378 


4,640,426 


Subsidy  to  the 
organization  ex- 
penses of  the 
iron  foundry 


Yen 


322,762 

495,429 

20,454 


838,645 


Maintenance 

expenses  of  the 

Akadani  mine 


Yen 


386 


5,386 


Supplement  to 

the  working 

capital  of  the 

foundry 


Yen 


2,640 

898 

990 

869 

1,790 

1,397 

1,577 

880 


711 
185 
175 
720 
986 
539 
391 
963 


11,136,670 


While  the  establishment  of  the  iron  foundry  was  important 
as  a  means  of  fostering  home  industries  and  as  a  military  in- 
dustry, the  expenditures  for  its  organization  and  expansion 
are  doubtful  armament  expenditures.  However,  in  view  of 
the  circumstances  in  which  this  iron  foundry  was  started  and 
operated  as  a  government  enterprise,  we  believe  that  they 
may  be  included  in  our  extraordinary  armament  expenditures. 
Still,  as  it  is  impossible  to  draw  a  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  army  and  the  navy  with  regard  to  these  expenditures,  and 
as  they  are  under  the  control  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture 
and  Commerce  and  not  of  the  Department  of  Finance,  we  de- 
cided to  treat  them  here  instead  of  in  the  main  body  of  the 
present  treatise.  Incidentally,  it  must  be  noted  that,  in  the 
organization  expenses  of  the  foundry,  the  sum  of  4,640,000 
yen  disbursed  from  the  departmental  extraordinary  expenses 
in  connection  with  the  Russo-Japanese  War  refers  to  the 
identical  expenditures  mentioned  in  the  following  pages  under 
the  head  of  Relative  Expenses  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War.1 


1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  10(c). 


76 


HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


r  >  ^  y 


o  oj.o  >, , 


o  £ 

C  O 


+2  n 


i         k    B 


rt.3 


t    C^  w.  to  I*»  - 

•tx  0) 

•  ir,o   oi   to 

<o    CO  O   oi   —  nC 

0>X    11 

CO  -C  €  X 

v  o  o  s  —  o 


Oi  m  oi  i/o  i/o 

vO  r^  i-i   to  o* 

s  q>  ■*  o_  to  q» 

N^   S  C?  O  of  co 
"    0>  t>-  t-»  0)    to 

vO   m    -ftON 


t^  Q\  01  00    i-i    01    01    O 

u^»  w  hi  t^.  o_  "5  ■* 

l/S  o"  vO 

o"  tF 


VD    1^00    hi 

«    N    M    CO 


u  o  rt 

2-2  o 


.3  u  3 

ttf  r- 

3  -  c 

=  .-  3 

o  ia  5 


^ajjoa-S  js 


—  rt    - 

BJ'rJ    to 

_  s 


"     U     "J 
O    Q.  O 

^  ""  s 

*a  a—  £  o  c  x 
oj  .  =  c3  o  a—  cj 


en 


T3 
3 

a! 


-  0J3 
OT3 


£'-3  S  B  >  8 


-a  <« 

c  S 

3    O 
C/jU 


.3.5 

3    E? 

i"  o  a 
3  c  u 
a  a  o 
a  a*  c 


•£  3  — 


a - 


—  x  >- 
.2  <u .°  b  M 

o  3  u.t!  «? 

Co  2  r=  ■— 

O    +J    3    p    [Cj 


^  oo  wwo  -t  O 
ft,         MM 


OOIOOOi-iQcOm 


hi  n m  o  "; ^ o       o  n  o  ")h  oito- 


ft, 


hi      i-^OMOM 

IOM    l^  1O00    1^ 

ON00    O^fOO  N 

-F  oT  oo"  i  ^  o"  ~t 

tO  N    O    C    ^  M 
tOOO    (O  1^00  vO 


t -^  n  O  ^O  m\0  O^OO 
t^  hi  in  (^  hi  t^  C4  00 
vO  00   O   •<£  tO  1-;  0^  00 

1^.00   ci   ci   ^f  to  O   *+■ 

oi  0^  ^t-  O^oo  O  00  O 
O^O0  vO   01  vO   01    to  "-f 

rf      \o"  to  hi  rC  oT 


to 


o| 


"c    ^^ 


tn 

3 

hH       Q) 

2  c 

+^    X 


>  *n  "£!  be  ^ 


u"S.3  rt  to  5 
rt  O  o  3  k  -^ 
y-;  CU  U  <  X  en 


->,la-S^l" 

r>>  aj    a-— i    o    l-i  -ri 

a1-    ,n    tO    OJ^S-M    l-i 

p -a  2  3  >  a  <2  ^3 
3ct«rtrtc5c 

^301-^-303 


SINO-JAPANESE  WAR   TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 


77 


O 

<T>  "" 

On          1- 

t^ 

O 

O  o       m 

ON          C 

o 

o  c 

o 

M        O 

o 

>c 

-+ 

o  c 

o 

"0        c 

o 

NO 

o  c 

o 

o      o 

6 

NO 

OOC 

o 

ON            -t 

lO 

M 

O  OC 

00 

r-»        O 

O 

O     <N 

00 

*?      ~. 

N 

vq 

ri  - 

NO~ 

CC         KD 

iO 

10 

i-i    W 

O 

ir.         - 

M 

0 

- 

00" 

J3 

tn 

^ 

4J 

u 

in 

a 

tn 

3 
tn 

E 

3 

O 

to 

is 

O 
a. 

Q. 
X 

"Si 

a 
u 

u 

-  in 

>> 

QJ    GO 

u 

£    "rt 

> 
C3 

3   <2   <f 

OJ 

CO       -O 

"S  x 

3 

O   C    a, 

35 

U              OJ 

•3    0) 

f^ 

S 

°         C 

•=3 

rt 

.3   X   S 

s     u 

1-    O 

O 

be  i>  c 

u 

0) 

if) 

H 

o 

v£)          -j- 

IO              M    OC 

ro               "0 

0 

0 

ON 

" 

NO             <N 

<*          M    C 

ro               O 

o 

M             O 

M            00     C 

O               O 

On 

ON 

00        o 

i-i       m  t-».      00            •+ 

NO 

io 

o 

rO        M 

(N         00    C 

<N                  O 

<-C 

o 

i-i         C 

M         OC 

O                  O 

VO 

-t- 

l^.       o        O  no        1^  c 

lO                00 

M 

vO 

-t- 

oo        i-i        0 

O           «    !>.          T+-                 -js 

t^ 

00 

M 

"5        -I-        O  NO         rOOC 

x            0 

t^ 

o 

NO       c        o 

ro        (*)p- 

ON                    O 

•rf- 

ON 

o 

p»       ts.       1-1 

—         fN  nC 

C3               on 

0 

vq 

CI 

M_          -f 

00_        On  >- 

NO 

q; 

ro 

rO 

N~         lO 

ON 

!      o 

x>  o 

be    •   tn 

a) 

in 

O 

u          c  « 

E  E-H-S  ° 

tn 

O 
tn 

c 
o 

tn  "O 

■p    ■  rt    ■ 

E 

3 

aj 
a 

X 

OJ 

hips . 
strati 

Jj  B 

0    12 

rt-c 

«3  0-5.S 

"o      1 

J1^^3 

>, 

._      "c. 

3 

B        ^ 

i    2^ 

«  S  3  Ptu 

E 

seo: 
Hmi 

So 

'u    C 

.3  Uh     00    £ 

.ilT  Ota    K 

■as  a  ?.e 

£   cfl   cfl  J2   2 
4)    1>    5s    t-  -w 
w   in-   S  a 
cfl    3-3,-C    bfi 

u 

03 

urcha 
ivil  a 

•    ctj    <U 

(U    p    J» 

<->  5  ? 

2  i  c3"S 

§T3    O    tj    3 

£    as 

0        £.rt 

'rt 

0 
H 

Oh 

U 

'/. 

O        (A) 

O 

H£ 

^       « 

i 

78 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF   EXPENDITURES 


< 
» 

u 

W 

X 

c 

a 

s 

H 


cd 


8  2  >JA 

2*n    rt   C 


O    *    O    ;>, 

Si  S  g  * 


<aNOOO«oo-+OOOOC^l-'0000 
(X,   w  lO 


<4>WOOOO«OOOOOn    -ooooo 


>D  M    0<    O    lOMlO  1^.00    On  f)  NO    ON  M    l~-  "*  O 

O   N   OnnO   O  Nf)iOO   rO(N   row   -f-O   lONO 
g   ONt^-'-3-ONONr^roC)NO   i-i  t^00   rf-O   O   Oi<H 

k?5  oo  co  o  of  d"  rCvo  r-^No""  on  «  i-T  o~  of  on  io  ro 

00  lO  CO  N         f^t^) 

CO 


5    Q-bfl 


o 

■  ig 


b" 


•£  a;  ^ 

b   u   ** 

c/)OH 


c 
_  o 

-a-G'> 
c  a)  o 
3  a  j- 

C/)CftP-c 


"O  D 
CT3 
03  C 
Ofi  3 

■fig 

.£  n  n 
-IH.y 

U<S)LT) 


a-  y  c 
12  «  a 

U3   "" 


g.S 

H^    ■ 
u   03   en 

a'- 


■^  a  h,  M 

in .«   bfi  c 
—  _C   O  •=     •  +j 


•5  ° 

c  S 


Pi 

< 


w 
J 
pq 

H 


•2-3  *  « 


So 


b    4> 


G     x     u 

O  2  (Li  .b   o3 


O  +-> 


01 


Ri 


ft,         w 


^^-Tt-t^t^Tf-Oi-ii-iOOOOrOMMOO 


a,      - 


t^  1O00   *j"  rooo   r)   1^  cOnO   i-i   ■*  O   ON  rONO   O 
i-i  nO   rOvO   On  Ol    On  "000   <N   O   On  uO  rOOO   i-i   Tf 

§   of  ON  iO  rf  no"  CN   i-T  ro  ci"  >0  t^ioo"  lO  ^f  oo"  fO  lO 

•Coo   ^-iO«tH   rfCN   ON  fONO   i-i  NO   i-i   1^  tN   **•  rO 
n   iO«C^  C>_  NO_  fO  rf  rO  i-i  00   rOOO   N   OiO 


'C    Q.X! 


H    *m  « 

bo  g  oj 

3-    «)   4J   2  & 

b  S  rt  <u  tn.2 


^  F.  « 


S  Is"0 


V)    C 


o>« 


c  o  c 


w>&  ti 


5e  y  w?  s 


_  c  >  a^-a  jj 

C    M   o3   a3    - 


0)    a! 
rtt3    >    t^d. 

SoOnn  5   c    "   ««   fi   „ 
-     «    CN^^oS^oi-i^t-O 


i» 

0) 

_ 

c 

o 

cd 

SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 


79 


o  o 
o  b 


o  o 
o  o 


M  mo 

NO    rO  <N 


-t- 


C     Cfi     (K 

ill 

-  a  £ 
<      £■'■ 


O  t^  «        c 


C*5 

ON 

+  ON 

rO 

ro 

t^ 

o> 

vO 

O   -+00 

M 

M 

NO 

o 

M 

O  NO    On 

c 

o 

<NI 

00 

<N 

vO 

O    t^  i-c 

00 

vO 

<N) 

NO 

vO 

o 

O  00  00 

00 

io 

t^. 

<N 

00 

to 

O    co  >/} 

o 

00 

M 

00 

lO 

•+ 

"0  rOOO 

o> 

1^ 

M 

O 

io 

-t- 

M     -tvO 

00 

>*■ 

•o 

<-o 

n0 

"2 

2  c  .2 


"0*0    cfl 


E-S 


CZ 


b£j:  '**'->. 


S-S--S 

a  e^- 

IM   _      O 

O    O 


F5  o 


rt  c  _+j  c  rt 


c  o.  c    - 


1>    OJ  ' 

HP* 


^ 


m  to  rrt  b/D  ™ 
t/)  m  <u  "Jj  a!  S 
~  X  X  3~  <u 


o    I-    "1 

w   aj  0> 

CO 


-2  0P-- 


3  = 

<u 

.a  C 

a 

•n-s 

X 

01 

e.- 

>, 

o  c 

O    3 

s 

^ 

u 
cd 

-o  3 

O 

a. 

en 

H 

CHAPTER  V 

FROM  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO  THE 
PRESENT   DAY 

After  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  both  the  government  and  the 
people  of  Japan  applied  themselves  with  great  energy  to  the 
national  armament  expansion.     As  a  result  of  Japan's  victory 
over  China,   the  great  country  in  the  Orient,   her  national 
strength  acquired  sudden  recognition  throughout  the  world. 
Meanwhile,  however,  all  the  Western   Powers  had  begun  to 
extend  their  influence  in  the  Orient,  thus  making  international 
relations  in  the  Far  East  more  and  more  complicated.     For 
Japan,  accordingly,  it  became  more  necessary  than  ever  to 
develop  a  real  military  power  which  would  enable  her  to  main- 
tain her  position  in  the  Far  East.     Unless  Japan  was  able  to 
assert  herself  in  Far  Eastern  affairs,  it  was  apparent  that 
China's  territorial  integrity  would  be  doomed;  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Japan  always  feared  the  alienation  of  the  Chinese 
territory,  as  that  would  place  Japan  in  a  very  disadvantageous 
position  with   regard  to  her  national  defense.     Though  the 
retrocession  of  Liaotung  was  effected  in  accordance  with  the 
friendly  counsel  of  Germany,  Russia,  and  France,  the  Japanese 
nation  was  shocked  by  this  incident;  and  considering  that  it 
was  no  other  than  coercive  interference  in  the  absence  of 
sufficient  military  strength  on  the  part  of  Japan,  the  whole 
nation  was  quite  ready  to  endure  anything  to  the  end  of  com- 
pleting her  military  forces.     Such  was  the  motive  by  which 
the  army  and  navy  expansions  were  steadily  and  decisively 
carried  out  on  a  large  scale  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War. 
The  Russo-Japanese  War  was  unprecedentedly  great  in  the 
size  of  the  forces  employed  by  both  belligerents,  in  the  fierce- 
ness of  the  fighting,  in  the  magnitude  of  interests  affecting 
both  countries,  and  in  the  immensity  of  the  expenses  incurred. 
Fortunately  for  Japan,  victory  was  on  her  side,  and  having 
80 


RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR   TO   PRESENT   DAY  8 1 

attained  the  objects  of  the  war,  she  could  gain  a  very  advan- 
tageous position  with  regard  to  her  national  defense,  with  the 
result  that  her  prestige  was  expanded  more  than  ever  and  her 
military  strength  was  fully  recognized  by  all  the  Powers. 
But  this  enhancement  of  her  national  position  did  not  release 
her  from  the  problems  and  burdens  of  armament;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  only  convinced  her  of  the  still  greater  necessity  of 
devoting  her  energies  to  military  and  naval  preparations. 
This  was  much  more  the  case  for  the  reason  that,  as  a  result 
of  the  war,  it  was  found  that  elaborate  improvements  were 
necessary  in  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition,  in 
the  construction  of  men-of-war,  in  military  education,  and  in 
all  warlike  measures.  All  this  was  due  to  the  influence  of 
the  competitive  efforts  that  were  being  constantly  put  forth 
by  other  Powers  to  the  end  of  strengthening  their  armaments 
on  both  land  and  sea.  Accordingly,  most  of  the  expenditures 
after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  were  made  for  armament  ex- 
pansion purposes,  though  the  headings  or  items  in  the  budget 
estimates  were  expressed  in  the  form  of  recuperation  of 
armament  or  completion  of  warships,  except  where  they  were 
actually  used  for  restoring  losses  and  damages  sustained  in 
the  war.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  stated  that  the  expan- 
sions effected  in  this  epoch  were  not  so  conspicuously  large 
as  in  the  epoch  following  the  Sino-Japanese  War.  The  ex- 
penditures to  be  treated  in  the  present  chapter  are  those 
for  war  and  armament  in  the  epoch  commencing  with  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  and  ending  with  the  year  191 3. 

War  Expenditures 

After  October,  1903,  the  negotiations  with  Russia  became 
more  and  more  active  and  caused  enormous  expenditures  of 
money,  so  much  so,  indeed,  that  the  ordinary  sources  of  rev- 
enue were  found  insufficient.  In  December,  1903,  an  Impe- 
rial Ordinance  of  Financial  Emergency  was  issued,  by  which 
the  government  was  enabled  (1)  to  make  temporary  loans, 
(2)  to  divert  part  of  the  funds  belonging  to  various  Special 
7 


82  HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Accounts,  and  (3)  to  issue  Exchequer  Bonds,  all  for  meeting 
the  expenditures  of  supplementing  the  national  armament. 
The  government  thus  found  means  of  forestalling  the  enemy, 
in  case  of  necessity,  by  obtaining  100,000,000  yen  of  the  income 
from  Exchequer  Bonds,  25,000,000  yen  diverted  from  various 
special-account  funds,  and  30,970,000  yen  proceeding  from 
temporary  loans.  Now  the  Russo-Japanese  negotiations 
became  more  and  more  difficult.  Japan's  demands  regarding 
Korea  and  Manchuria  were  disregarded  by  Russia,  while 
Russia's  war  preparations  were  steadily  completed  against 
Japan.  The  Imperial  Government,  perceiving  that  war  was 
inevitable,  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Russia  on 
February  5,  and  on  February  9  some  Russian  men-of-war 
were  sunk  off  Chemulpo.  Then  the  bombardment  of  Port 
Arthur  commenced,  and  the  Imperial  declaration  of  war  was 
issued  on  February  10.  The  Diet,  which  had  been  dissolved 
at  the  end  of  the  preceding  year,  was  on  March  18  convened  at 
Tokyo,  where  the  government  presented  a  bill  for  380,000,000 
yen  of  extraordinary  war  expenditures,  the  first  budget  for 
expenses  for  military  affairs  for  this  war. 

According  to  this  budget,  the  financial  resources  for  the 
380,000,000  yen  were  to  be  obtained  from  280,000,000  yen 
derived  from  public  loans,  Exchequer  Bonds,  and  temporary 
loans;  from  30,000,000  yen  diverted  from  special-account 
funds;  from  62,000,000  yen  derived  from  increased  taxation; 
and  from  8,000,000  yen  of  the  General  Account  surplus. 
Regarding  the  Relative  Expenses  in  the  war  (or  the  expenses 
incurred  in  various  departments  other  than  those  of  the  army 
and  navy),  another  bill  for  40,000,000  yen  was  submitted  to 
the  Diet,  the  resources  for  which  were  to  be  sought  in  a  sur- 
plus to  be  created  by  economizing  the  expenditures  from  the 
General  Account.  Both  Houses  of  the  Diet  unanimously 
passed  these  bills;  and  the  fact  that  the  Diet,  which  in  the 
preceding  few  years  had  always  collided  with  the  government 
on  various  questions,  showed  so  splendid  an  attitude  of  con- 
sent on  this  occasion  proved  that  the  hostile  feeling  of  the 
nation  had  reached  its  height,  just  as  on  the  occasion  of  the 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT  DAY  83 

Sino-Japancse  War.  Further,  the  Diet  then  resolved  that  it 
was  ready  to  approve  any  further  war  expenditures,  as  it 
was  thought  that  this  war  might  be  of  long  duration. 

The  war  expenditures  were  met  from  December,  1903,  by 
means  of  diversions  of  Treasury  funds  and  by  temporary 
loans  from  the  Bank  of  Japan;  but  in  February,  1904,  the  gov- 
ernment, according  to  the  right  given  by  the  above-mentioned 
Imperial  Ordinance  of  Financial  Emergency,  issued  100,- 
000,000  yen  of  5  per  cent  Exchequer  Bonds.  Subsequently, 
according  to  the  aforesaid  first  budget  estimates,  Exchequer 
Bonds  were  further  issued  to  the  amount  of  100,000,000  yen 
in  May,  and  80,000,000  yen  in  October,  1904.  Prior  to  this 
the  government  saw  that  the  domestic  resources  were  not 
sufficient  to  meet  the  enormous  demands  in  this  war,  and 
owing  also  to  the  necessity  of  keeping  specie  in  the  country  it 
was  decided  to  negotiate  foreign  loans.  In  May,  1904,  accord- 
ingly, 6  per  cent  Sterling  Bonds  were  floated  in  London  and 
New  York  to  the  amount  of  £10,000,000,  and  they  were  sub- 
scribed to  and  paid  for  with  very  satisfactory  results.  The 
war  funds  obtained  through  these  loans  were  gradually  turned 
into  the  Treasury,  and  thus  monthly  incomes  ranging  from 
18,000,000  yen  to  53,000,000  yen  were  received  in  the  interval 
between  April  and  October,  1904.  Meanwhile,  the  Japanese 
forces  advanced  on  the  wings  of  victory  after  each  successive 
battle,  and  on  May  26  Kinchow  was  captured  and  Port  Arthur 
was  besieged.  General  Oyama  was  sent  to  the  front  as  com- 
mander-in-chief, and  our  corps  marched  on  to  the  fields  of 
Manchuria. 

In  November,  1904,  the  twenty-first  session  of  the  Diet 
was  convened  in  Tokyo,  at  which  the  government  asked  for 
700,000,000  yen  as  a  supplementary  budget  for  extraordinary 
war  expenditures  and  80,000,000  yen  as  a  Reserve  Fund  for 
Extraordinary  Affairs.  This  was  the  second  budget  estimate 
made  in  this  war.  The  resources  for  the  above  war  expendi- 
tures were  to  be  found  in  571,000,000  yen  obtained  from  pro- 
ceeds of  public  loans,  the  income  from  Exchequer  Bonds  and 
from  temporary  loans,  8,000,000  yen  diverted  from  special- 


84  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 

account  funds,  1,500,000  yen  of  contributions  to  the  war  fund, 
and  500,000  yen  of  sundry  receipts,  the  balance  of  1 19,000,000 
yen  being  sought  in  increased  taxation  and  in  the  salt  mo- 
nopoly. As  regards  the  above-mentioned  Reserve  Fund,  the 
resources  therefor  were  to  be  obtained  by  economizing  the 
expenditures  from  the  General  Account  and  by  temporary 
loans.  Of  the  570,000,000  yen  of  proceeds  of  public  loans, 
belonging  to  the  second  budget  estimate,  117,000,000  yen 
was  already  obtained  by  floating  the  second  issue  of  Sterling 
Bonds  in  England  and  America  in  November,  1904,  to  the 
amount  of  £12,000,000,  according  to  the  above-mentioned 
financial  emergency  measure,  and  therefore  this  amount  was 
submitted  to  the  Diet  only  for  ex  post  facto  consent  as  form- 
ing a  part  of  the  second  budget  estimate.  In  consequence, 
the  amount  of  the  public  loans  to  be  raised  thereafter  accord- 
ing to  the  second  budget  estimate  was  433,000,000  yen. 

At  the  beginning  of  1905  the  government  issued  100,000,000 
yen  of  fourth  Exchequer  Bonds,  followed  by  another  100,000,- 
000  yen  of  fifth  Exchequer  Bonds  in  April  of  the  same  year. 
In  March,  1905,  \\  per  cent  Sterling  Bonds  to  the  amount 
of  £30,000,000  were  issued  in  England  and  America,  and  the 
raising  of  public  loans  belonging  to  the  second  budget  estimate 
was  thus  finished.  Then  a  further  emergency  measure  was 
adopted  whereby  the  fourth  Sterling  Bonds  to  the  amount  of 
£30,000,000  were  issued  in  England,  Germany,  and  America. 
Meanwhile,  the  army  proved  to  be  continually  victorious. 
The  great  decisive  battle  at  Mukden  was  fought  on  March  10, 
and  the  Russian  Baltic  fleet,  which  had  come  a  long  way  from 
the  West,  was  annihilated  by  a  single  effort  on  May  28.  The 
Japanese  victory  was  now  assured.  After  the  occupation  of 
Saghalien  on  August  4,  peace  negotiations  were  opened  with 
Russia  through  the  mediation  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States;  and  though  on  September  5  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
finally  signed,  still  further  expenditures  were  necessary  for 
the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  front  and  for  the  grant  of 
rewards  for  military  services.  Such  being  the  case,  the  funds 
allotted  by  the  budget  estimates  for  the  extraordinary  war 


RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR   TO   PRESENT   DAY  85 

expenditures  ran  short  prior  to  the  opening  of  the  Diet  in 
December,  1905,  and  those  for  the  departmental  expenses  in 
connection  with  the  war  (or  the  Relative  Expenses)  were  also 
exhausted.  But  as  the  war  expenses  pertaining  to  the  army, 
amounting  to  60,000,000  yen,  and  the  various  departmental 
expenses  in  connection  with  the  war,  amounting  to  28,000,000 
yen,  making  a  total  of  88,000,000  yen,  were  urgent  expendi- 
tures which  could  not  wait  till  the  supplementary  budget  was 
passed,  they  were  accordingly  paid  out  as  disbursements  un- 
provided for  in  the  budget.  As  sources  of  revenue  to  meet 
these  expenditures,  60,000,000  yen  were  taken  out  of  the  un- 
used balance  of  the  proceeds  of  the  loans  belonging  to  the 
Special  Account  for  Extraordinary  War  Expenditures,  and 
24,000,000  yen  out  of  the  surplus  of  the  General  Account. 
When  the  Diet  was  convened  in  December,  the  government 
presented  the  third  budget  estimate  for  extraordinary  war  ex- 
penditures calling  for  an  appropriation  of  450,450,000  yen, 
and  to  meet  this  amount  it  was  proposed  to  take  88,000,000 
yen  of  the  unused  balance  of  the  proceeds  of  the  loans  belong- 
ing to  the  Special  Account  for  Extraordinary  War  Expendi- 
tures and  362,450,000  yen  of  the  proceeds  of  new  loans.  In 
accordance  with  this  budget,  the  government  raised  a  loan 
for  extraordinary  war  expenditures  in  February,  1906,  to  the 
amount  of  200,000,000  yen. 

In  this  way  the  funds  for  carrying  on  this  unprecedented ly 
great  war  were  raised.  Our  successive  victories  greatly 
assisted  the  satisfactory  raising  of  loans  in  the  foreign  markets 
on  terms  advantageous  to  us,  and  also  increased  the  national 
willingness  to  bear  the  burdens  of  increased  taxation  and  to 
subscribe  to  the  Exchequer  Bonds.  We  must  not  forget  the 
fact  that  the  victories  of  our  soldiers  facilitated  the  carrying 
out  of  our  financial  measures  to  a  very  great  extent.  Before 
going  on  to  explain  the  details  of  these  war  expenditures,  we 
shall  here  call  attention  to  their  amounts  according  to  the 
budget  estimates  and  the  corresponding  sources  of  revenue  as 
shown  in  Table  A  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.1 

1  Post,  p.  104. 


86  HISTORICAL   SURVEY  OF  EXPENDITURES 

The  expenditures  for  the  Russo-Japanese  War  were  thus 
enormous,  and  as  the  corresponding  sources  of  revenue  were 
different  in  nature  from  those  in  ordinary  cases,  a  special 
account  was  opened  for  them  as  on  the  occasion  of  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War;  and  similarly  a  particular  fiscal  year  was  made 
for  the  purpose,  beginning  with  the  commencement  and  end- 
ing with  the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  As  the  budget  for  the 
extraordinary  war  expenditures  and  the  departmental  expendi- 
tures was  voted  by  the  Diet  as  a  lump  sum  without  itemiza- 
tion, the  government,  with  a  view  to  precluding  any  mistakes 
in  the  defrayment  of  the  expenses,  adopted  elaborate  formali- 
ties for  the  control  of  such  disbursements.  Thus,  before  any 
payment  was  made,  the  Minister  of  War  or  of  the  Navy  was 
to  consult  privately  with  the  Minister  of  Finance,  who  was  to 
give  his  assent  after  he  had  examined  the  proposed  application, 
reported  it,  with  his  opinion  appended  thereto,  to  the  Min- 
ister President,  and  obtained  his  approval.  The  Minister  of 
War  or  of  the  Navy  was  then  to  apply  formally  for  the  dis- 
bursement, and  the  Minister  of  Finance  had  to  obtain  Im- 
perial sanction,  before  the  disbursement  could  be  made. 

Now,  let  us  consider  the  Settled  Accounts  of  the  expendi- 
tures of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  aforesaid  special 
account  for  these  expenditures  was  settled  on  March  31,  1907, 
and  the  receipts  and  disbursements  were  closed  up  by  the  end 
of  November.  At  the  same  time,  the  balance  remaining  of 
the  Settled  Accounts,  amounting  to  212,739,718  yen,  was 
transferred  to  the  General  Account,  and  130,700,000  yen, 
which  still  had  to  be  paid  out  as  war  expenditures,  was  changed 
to  be  paid  out  of  the  General  Account.  Thus,  the  statistics 
having  direct  connection  with  the  Russo-Japanese  War  are 
to  be  found  in  the  Settled  Accounts  under  the  Special  Account 
for  Extraordinary  War  Expenditures,  in  the  General  Account 
after  1907,  and  in  the  various  Departmental  Expenses  con- 
nected with  the  war.  The  figures  of  Settled  Accounts  col- 
lected from  these  three  sources  are  shown  in  Table  B  at  the 
end  of  this  chapter.1 

1  Post,  p.  105.     (I.  also  Appendix,  Tables  Nos.  10(a),  10(b),  and  10(c). 


RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR   TO   PRESENT   DAY  87 

We  now  see  that  the  grand  total  of  the  expenditures  for  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  was  1,639,267,194  yen,  of  which  the 
army  expenditures  covered  86  per  cent  and  the  navy  expendi- 
tures 14  per  cent.  The  military  forces  engaged  in  the  war 
were  seventeen  divisions  of  field  corps,  two  divisions  of  the 
second  reserve,  seven  mixed  brigades  of  the  second  reserve, 
and  seven  brigades  of  infantry  of  the  second  reserve,  besides 
the  militia  and  other  reserve  forces.  The  area  of  hostilities 
extended  from  Korea  and  Liaotung  far  into  Manchuria,  to 
Mukden  and  Changchung,  also  to  Saghalien  in  the  north. 
When  we  consider  that  the  attack  on  Port  Arthur  and  the 
engagement  at  Mukden  were  among  the  greatest  battles  that 
have  taken  place  in  modern  history,  we  do  not  wonder  that 
the  expenditures  involved  in  this  war  came  to  so  enormous 
an  amount.  The  greatest  item  of  expenditure  in  the  army, 
amounting  to  19  per  cent  of  the  total  army  expenditures,  was 
that  of  provisions,  which  included  all  kinds  of  food  and  forage. 
Next  came  the  item  of  transport,  covering  18  per  cent  of  the 
whole  expenditure,  and  including  the  construction  expenses 
of  the  Seoul- Yichou,  Eastern  Chinese,  Antung-Mukden,  and 
Fushun-Tieling  railways,  the  cost  of  materials  therefor,  and 
the  payments  for  chartered  vessels.  Then  followed  the  items 
of  arms  and  clothing,  each  of  which  amounted  to  13  per  cent 
of  the  total  army  expenditures. 

Of  the  navy  there  were  employed  fifty  men-of-war  (255,- 
000  tons),  twenty-two  torpedo-boat  destroyers  (7,200  tons), 
and  fifty  torpedo  boats  (5,400  tons),  totaling  267,000  tons; 
and  they  all  participated  in  several  fierce  battles.  The  heavi- 
est item  in  the  navy  expenditure  was  that  of  warship  and 
torpedo-boat  replenishing  expenses,  which  were  used  for  con- 
verting chartered  merchantmen  into  war  vessels  and  for  gen- 
eral replenishment;  and  if  we  add  to  this  account  the  sum  of 
16,000,000  yen  used  for  the  purchase  of  warships  (i.e.,  the 
two  men-of-war,  Nisshin  and  Kasuga,  purchased  for  immedi- 
ate use  in  war),  the  sum  total  covers  27  per  cent  of  the  total 
navy  expenditures.  The  next  largest  items  were  those  of 
naval   ordnance  and    repairs  and   shipbuilding   and   repairs, 


88  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 

the  sum  total  of  the  two  covering  21  per  cent  of  the  total 
navy  expenditures.  The  item  of  warship  maintenance, 
including  the  expenses  for  coal  and  all  other  necessaries  in 
navigation,  was  also  considerable,  amounting  to  17  per  cent 
of  the  total  figure- 

The  various  departmental  expenses  incurred  in  connec- 
tion with  this  war  also  amounted  to  a  considerable  sum,  the 
details  of  which  are  as  follows:1 

Relative  Expenses  in  Russo-Japanese  War 


Department 


Amount 


Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 

Department  of  Finance 

Army  Depart  ment 

Navy  Department 

Department  of  Education 

Department  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  . 
1  >epartment  of  Communications 

Total 


Yen 

8,82.).-.::, 

2,015.580 

128,824,849 

36,265  5  (2 
25,039,391 

2  5'), 203 

4,919.471 

15,427,849 


22I,58l,6o8 


If  this  total  of  221,581,608  yen  is  added  to  the  aforesaid 
total  of  the  extraordinary  war  expenditures,  the  grand  total 
comes  to  1,860,848,801  yen,  the  final  grand  total  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  expenditures.  The  relative  or  departmental 
expenditures  covered  12  per  cent  of  the  final  grand  total, 
and  as  much  as  58  per  cent  of  these  expenses  was  defrayed 
by  the  Department  of  Finance. 

Armament  Expenditures 
Army 
To  meet  the  unparalleled  requirements  of  the  great  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  four  new  divisions  of  the  army  were  hastily 
organized  in  the  midst  of  the  hostilities.  These  were  found 
insufficient,  and  while  further  increment  schemes  were  under 
contemplation   the   war  came  to  an  end.     The  four  newly 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  Nos.  10(c)  and  10(d). 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT   DAY  89 

organized  divisions  were  continued  after  the  war,  however, 
and  with  the  establishment  of  two  other  new  divisions  the 
total  number  of  army  divisions  was  increased  from  thirteen 
to  nineteen.  At  the  same  time  other  increments  were  effected 
by  making  a  special  independent  corps  of  four  cavalry  bri- 
gades and  three  artillery  brigades.  The  garrison  artillery 
was  reformed  to  heavy  artillery,  and  thereby  the  number  of 
artillery  soldiers  was  increased.  The  communications  brigade, 
the  railway  battalion,  the  telegraph  battalion,  and  the  bal- 
loon battalion  were  newly  organized,  and  besides  there  were 
established  the  Formosan  garrison,  the  Manchurian  independ- 
ent garrison,  and  a  special  detachment  in  Korea,  whereby 
also  the  number  of  soldiers  was  noticeably  increased.  In 
October,  1907,  a  system  of  two-year  instead  of  three-year 
service  was  adopted  for  the  infantry,  as  a  result  of  which 
the  number  of  soldiers  was  to  be  increased  25,000  yearly  or 
250,000  in  ten  years. 

The  above  is  the  gist  of  the  army  expansion  scheme  formed 
after  the  Russo-Japanese  War;  but  besides  this  we  may  men- 
tion the  establishment  of  the  Horse  Administration  Bureau 
in  1906  for  the  encouragement  of  stud  breeding,  and  the 
issuance  in  the  same  year  of  the  Invalid  Soldiers'  Asylum 
regulations  for  the  relief  of  disabled  soldiers.  All  this  shows 
that  the  government  has  labored  incessantly  for  the  comple- 
tion of  all  the  necessary  equipments  and  provisions  of  the  army. 

Regarding  the  financial  side  of  these  increment  plans,  we 
may  note  that  in  the  war  years  of  1904  and  1905  many  of  the 
ordinary  expenses  were  defrayed  as  war  expenditures,  and 
on  the  other  hand  a  considerable  amount  was  saved  by  gen- 
eral economies  in  the  annual  expenditures.  But  in  1907 
large  budget  estimates  were  made  out  for  organizing  six 
new  divisions.  The  first  estimate  was  for  repairing  and 
furnishing  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use,  being 
continuing  expenditures  for  eleven  years  (1907-19 17)  and 
amounting  to  110,000,000  yen  and  including  24,000,000  yen 
for  purchase  of  land,  33,000,000  yen  for  building  expenses,  and 
52,000,000  yen  for  arms,  etc.;  and  the  second  estimate  was 


9o 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 


for  the  post-bellum  adjustments,  being  continuing  expendi- 
tures for  five  years  and  amounting  to  59,000,000  yen,  of 
which  the  chief  item  was  51,000,000  yen  for  the  restoring  of 
arms,  etc.  These  continuing  expenditures  were  readjusted 
several  times  during  the  years  1908,  1909,  and  1910  on  account 
of  financial  and  other  circumstances,  and  in  the  meantime 
several  new  enterprises  were  also  introduced. 

The  addition  of  six  new  divisions  and  the  adoption  of  the 
two-year  system  for  the  infantry  naturally  caused  a  consider- 
able increase  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  and  it  was  expected 
that  the  amount  of  such  increase  would  be  7,000,000  yen 
annually. 

The  figures  for  the  armament  expenditures  of  the  army  in 
this  epoch  (the  figures  for  191 2  and  191 3  being  according  to 
the  budget  estimates)  were  as  follows : x 

Armament  Expenditures  for  the  Army,  1903-1913 


Fiscal  year 

Ordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

191 1 

1 9 1 2 

1913 

Yen 
42,732,070 
12,905,832 
18,346,414 
67,009,748 
76,000,338 

91,850,931 
92,640,363 
98,087,875 
100,901,210 
101,835.900 
94,097,458 

100 
32 
48 
157 
178 
212 

213 
231 

237 
237 
221 

Yen 

6,381,093 
2,395,66o 
1,925,145 
1,640,372 
35,087,328 

49,934,999 
21,534,523 
16,434,399 
24,746,916 
17,720,252 
19,780,673 

100 
37 
29 
26 

54o 
785 
338 
253 
387 
279 
310 

Total.  .  .. 

753,676, 129 

21 1 

191,200,267 

365 

Excluding  the  war  years  of  1904  and  1905,  we  find  that 
the  ordinary  expenditures  of  the  army  gradually  increased 
from  the  year  1906  to  the  years  191 1,  1912,  and  191 3,  when 
they  became  nearly  stationary,  reaching  about  100,000,000 
yen.  The  increase  was  from  220  to  240  per  cent  as  compared 
with  the  year  1903,  and  the  average  increase  for  the  eight  years 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  N'os.  1 1  (a)  and  1 1  (b). 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT  DAY  9 1 

from  1906  was  210  per  cent.  As  regards  the  extraordinary 
expenditures,  they  increased  abnormally  to  35,000,000  yen 
and  50,000,000  yen  in  the  years  1907  and  1908;  and  though 
they  decreased  somewhat  in  after  years,  their  average  increase 
for  the  eight  years  from  1906  was  370  per  cent  with  respect 
to  the  year  1903.  The  total  of  the  ordinary  and  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  of  the  army  in  the  ten  years  was  944,876,396 
yen. 

In  both  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  expenditures 
for  1904  and  1905  we  see  a  considerable  decrease,  and  this  is 
explained  by  the  fact  that,  when  the  proposed  budget  for 
1904  was  not  adopted  and  that  for  the  previous  year  had  to 
be  carried  out  instead,  the  Russo-Japanese  War  broke  out. 
Then,  according  to  the  first  budget  for  extraordinary  war 
expenditures,  economy  and  postponement  were  effected  in 
the  general  expenditures,  and  thereby  50,920,000  yen  was 
squeezed  out  as  resources  for  extraordinary  war  expenditures. 
Consequently,  many  of  the  army  and  navy  armament  expendi- 
tures came  to  be  disbursed  as  war  expenditures.  Thus,  in 
1904,  12,544,176  yen  was  curtailed  in  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs  under  the  control  of  the  army  department,  and  470,- 
516  yen  in  the  extraordinary  expenses  such  as  building  and 
repairs,  surveying  expenses,  general  repairing  and  furnishing 
arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use.  In  1905  about  the 
same  curtailment  was  effected  for  the  same  reasons,  except 
in  a  case  such  as  the  battery  construction  expenses,  where 
the  works  were  carried  out  as  prearranged  and  disbursements 
were  made  accordingly.  In  1906  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs  returned  to  the  same  condition  as  before,  and  as  the 
annuities,  pensions,  compassionate  allowances,  and  gratuities 
suddenly  increased  (the  total  of  the  four  items  amounting  to 
28,600,000  yen),  the  ordinary  expenditures  increased  by  60 
per  cent  as  compared  with  those  of  1903.  In  1907  the  ex- 
penses for  military  affairs  increased  by  1,200,000  yen,  which 
was  due  indirectly  to  the  organization  of  new  divisions.  As 
regards  the  increased  extraordinary  expenditures  in  the  same 
year,  the  chief  disbursements  therefor  were  16,000,000  yen  as 


92  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

a  part  of  the  annual  instalment  of  33,000,000  yen  for  1907  of 
the  aforesaid  eleven-years  continuing  expenditures  for  furnish- 
ing arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use  of  the  total  110,- 
000,000  yen;  and  4,000,000  yen,  the  annual  instalment  for 
post-bellum  adjustments,  which,  as  stated  above,  was  a  new 
account  created  chiefly  for  restoring  worn-out  arms.  The 
expenses  for  military  affairs  after  1908  underwent  an  annual 
increase  of  3,000,000  yen  and  reached  73,000,000  yen  in  191 1. 
After  that  not  much  change  took  place,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
in  the  year  191 1  the  armament  repletion  plan  adopted  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  almost  com- 
pleted. The  other  ordinary  expenditures,  such  as  gendarme- 
rie, contributions  to  Yasukuni  Shrine,  Horse  Administration 
Bureau,  annuities,  pensions,  allowances,  and  gratuities,  were 
made  almost  in  the  same  amounts  every  year,  the  minimum 
being  25,000,000  yen  in  1908  and  the  maximum  28,000,000  yen 
in  1912.  The  extraordinary  expenditures  reached  their  maxi- 
mum (49,340,000  yen)  in  1908,  in  which  year  the  item  of  fur- 
nishing arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use  amounted  to 
no  less  than  37,000,000  yen,  as  there  were  large  payments  of 
these  expenses  brought  forward  from  previous  years  in  connec- 
tion with  the  establishment  of  the  six  new  divisions.  The 
annual  allotment  of  these  expenses  was  very  large  in  this  year, 
and  there  was  also  a  disbursement  of  4,000,000  yen  for  the  two 
regiments  newly  stationed  in  Korea  since  the  end  of  1906.  In 
1 909  various  equipments  were  nearly  completed  for  the  six  new 
divisions,  and  consequently  the  expenses  for  furnishing  arms 
and  implements  for  campaign  use  began  to  decrease,  as  the 
chief  of  these  expenses — the  construction  expenses — decreased 
in  that  year  to  10,000,000  yen  from  27,000,000  yen  in  the  pre- 
ceding year.  The  post-bellum  readjustment  expenses  in 
the  same  year  underwent  an  increase,  however,  because  in 
the  chief  item  of  these— the  restoration  expenses — there  was 
made  a  payment  of  1,000,000  yen  brought  forward  from  the 
preceding  year,  in  19 10  the  extraordinary  expenditures 
decreased  to  16, 000,000  yen,  in  spite  of  disbursements  of  400,- 
000  yen  representing  the  first  instalment  of  the  three-years 


RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  TO   PRESENT   DAY  93 

continuing  expenditures  of  1,763,619  yen  for  building,  for 
furnishing  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use,  and  for 
the  Formosan  Ordnance  Department,  and  of  262,000  yen 
for  military  balloon  investigation  expenses.  In  191 1  the 
extraordinary  expenditures  were  increased  by  8,000,000  yen 
on  account  of  1,000,000  yen  expended  for  a  detachment  sent 
to  Korea  and  of  7,000,000  yen  for  restoration  expenses  of 
post-bellum  readjustments;  and  in  the  same  year  the  number 
of  continuing  years  and  the  amount  of  the  annual  instalments 
for  furnishing  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use 
and  for  the  Tokyo  Bay  battery  construction  were  revised. 
In  1912  the  item  of  post-bellum  readjustment  expenses  was 
abolished  and  consolidated  with  that  of  repairs  and  furnish- 
ing arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use;  and  the  number 
and  the  amount  of  annual  instalments  of  this  latter-named 
item  were  revised,  the  item  being  made  a  continuing  expendi- 
ture for  eight  years  beginning  with  1912  for  a  total  of  64,821,- 
220  yen.  The  first  annual  instalment  of  1,000,000  yen  was 
disbursed  in  1912,  and  the  second  of  11,000,000  yen  in  1913. 
However,  the  building  and  other  expenses  connected  with  the 
post-bellum  army  expansion  were  generally  concluded  by 
this  time,  and  the  extraordinary  expenditures  in  191 2  and 
1 91 3  consequently  decreased. 

Navy 
The  naval  strength  of  Japan  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  was  suddenly  increased.  Though  Japan 
lost  eleven  warships  (44,000  tons)  and  seven  torpedo  boats 
(600  tons),  she  captured  twenty-two  warships  and  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  (135,000  tons).  During  the  war,  moreover, 
two  warships  (15,000  tons)  were  purchased  and  three  warships 
(10,000  tons)  were  constructed,  so  that  by  the  end  of  1906  the 
total  displacement  of  Japan's  navy  amounted  to  451,000 
tons.  Taught  by  the  experience  of  this  war,  and  studying 
the  tendency  in  the  naval  construction  methods  employed  by 
the  other  Powers,  Japan  found  that  her  warships  were  imper- 
fect in  many  respects,  and  she  saw  the  necessity  of  augment- 


94 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 


Budget  Estimates  of   Naval   Repletion  Scheme  Adopted  after   Russo- 

Japanese  War 


Items 

Amounts 

Remarks 

(i)  Warship  construction  and 
building  expenses: 

Shipbuilding 

Yen 

62,348,269 

29,001,307 

8,510,721 

To  be  disbursed  in  eleven  years 
(  [903-1913).  The  amounts  of 
the  annual  instalments  were 
revised  in  1908,  1909  and  1910 
and  made  to  extend  to  i<)H>. 

These  were  required  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  battleships 
Kashima  and  Katori  (16,000 
tons),  the  cruiser  Ibuki  and  the 
gunboat  Toba.  The  construc- 
tion plans  were  made  in  [903, 
as  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  but  the  actual  dis- 
bursements were  made  in  this 
epoch. 

Naval  ordnance 

Total    

99,860,297 

(2)  Warship  and  torpedo-boat 
replenishing  expenses: 

Shipbuilding 

Naval  ordnance 

35,783,424 
28,293,867 

To  be  disbursed  in  six  years 
(1907-1912);  prolonged  two 
years  in  1908. 

These  were  required  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  cruisers  or  dis- 
patch boats  Tsukuba,  Ikoma, 
Mogami,  Tone  and  Kurama, 
and  the  battleships  Aki  and 
Satsuma  (19,800  tons  and 
19,350  tons,  respectively). 

Total 

64,077,291 

(3)  Supplementing  of  warships 
and  torpedo  boats: 

Shipbuilding 

47,955,593 
28,621,509 

To   be   disbursed   from    1^07   to 

I9I3- 
These  were  required  for  the  con- 
struction   of    the    battleships 
Kawachi    and    Settsu    (20,800 
tons)  and  the  cruisers  Hirado 
and  Yahagi. 

Naval  ordnance 

Total 

76,577,102 

(4)  Adjustments    and     equip- 
ments: 

Shipbuilding   and  naval 

ordnance  repairs 

Building 

79,846,728 
31,724,428 

To  be  disbursed  in  seven  years 
(1907-1913);  revised  in  1909 
and  19 10  and  made  to  extend 
to  1916. 

These  were  required  principally 
for  repairing,  restoring  and 
making  improvements  and  not 
for  constructing  new  warships. 

Total 

111,571,156 

(5)  Supplement   to   armament 
repletion  expenditures 

88,233,170 

To  be  disbursed  from  191 1  to 
1916.  In  191 1  the  four  above- 
mentioned  continuing  expendi- 
tures were  combined  under  one 
account  for  armament  repletion 
expenditures,  which  by  the 
addition  of  82,233,170  yen 
were  made  to  total  434,309,616 
yen.  Another  addition  of  6,- 
000,000  yen  was  made  in  1913. 

RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  TO   PRESENT    DAY  95 

ing  her  naval  strength  to  an  aggregate  displacement  of  500,- 
000  tons.  According  to  this  necessity,  the  post-bellum  naval 
repletion  scheme  was  put  into  practice,  and  the  correspond- 
ing budget  estimates  were  in  the  main  as  shown  on  the 
previous  page. 

The  balances  remaining  in  and  after  191 1  of  the  first  four 
items  mentioned  above,  plus  the  supplement  in  the  fifth  item, 
formed  the  so-called  armament  repletion  expenditures.  The 
warships  that  were  being  or  have  been  constructed  since  191 1 
by  means  of  these  armament  repletion  expenditures  are  the 
cruisers  Kongo,  Hiyei,  Haruna  and  Kirishima  (27,500 
tons  each),  the  battleships  Fuso  (30,600  tons)  and  Nos.  4,  5 
and  6  (each  30,800  tons),  and  the  gunboat  Saga.  For  the 
completion  of  all  these  ships,  it  was  estimated  that  90,000,000 
yen  more  was  needed.  By  the  end  of  191 3,  the  navy  was  to 
consist  of  sixty-eight  warships  (549,000  tons),  besides  fifty- 
nine  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  fifty-four  torpedo  boats,  and 
thirteen  submarines.  Comparing  this  naval  strength  with 
that  at  the  end  of  1906,  the  increase  in  tonnage  is  not  great, 
but  the  substantial  improvements  carried  out  are  conspicuous. 
Further,  when  the  six  ships  in  course  of  construction  at  the 
end  of  1 91 3  are  completed,  there  will  be  an  added  strength  of 
185,000  tons.  Among  the  other  causes  of  the  post-bellum 
increase  of  expenditures  may  be  mentioned  the  establishment 
of  the  Port  Arthur  naval  station  and  the  Chin-hai  Bay  second- 
ary naval  station. 

These  armament  repletions  naturally  resulted  in  an  annual 
increase  of  the  ordinary  expenditures,  which  may  be  seen  in 
the  following  figures  taken  from  the  Settled  Accounts. l 

Excluding  the  war  years  of  1904  and  1905,  and  basing  our 
calculation  on  the  figures  of  1903,  we  find  that  the  ordinary 
expenditures  continued  to  increase  rapidly,  from  29,000,000 
yen  in  1906  to  45,000,000  yen  in  1913,  showing  an  average 
annual  increase  of  170  per  cent  for  the  eight  years  beginning 
with  1906.  The  extraordinary  expenditures  also  increased 
greatly  after  1907,  reaching  the  maximum  of  65,000,000  yen  in 

1  Cf.  Appendix,  Table  No.  12. 


96 


II  STORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 


191 1,  the  average  annual  increase  as  above  having  been  290 
per  cent.  The  total  of  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary  ex- 
penditures during  these  ten  years  was  686,287,464  yen. 


Table  Showing  Anni  u.  Increase  of  ] 

EXPENDITURES, 

t903-l9i3 

Fiscal  j  ear 

( (rdinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

Extraordinary 
expenditures 

Index 
number 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1907 

1908 

[909      

1 9 1 0 

191 1 

1912 

1913 

Yen 
22,0  >4,6  )9 
8,803,971 
13085  535 
2  1,209,791 
32,985,632 
36,137-882 
37,077-328 

40.456,595 
42,500,564 
43.116,309 
45,227,909 

100 

37 
56 
32 
149 
163 
162 
182 
191 

'95 
202 

Yen 
14,566,631 
12,365,466 

11,030,754 
12,584,512 

31,918,260 
36,247,176 
35  648,795 
45,431,464 
65,854,965 
51,968,508 
54,636,048 

IOO 

85 
76 
86 
220 
250 
246 
342 
453 
358 
376 

Total 

328,601,516 

172 

357,685,948 

292 

In  the  war  years  of  1904  and  1905  the  items  of  the  expenses 
for  military  affairs,  such  as  traveling  expenses,  special  allow- 
ances, shipbuilding  and  naval  ordnance  repairs,  etc.,  which 
were  defrayed  as  extraordinary  war  expenditures,  amounted 
to  more  than  10,000,000  yen,  and  thereby  there  was  a  great 
decrease  in  the  ordinary  expenditures.  In  the  extraordinary 
expenditures,  the  naval  expansion  expenses  defrayed  accord- 
ing to  predetermined  budget  estimates  decreased  by  5,000,000 
yen  in  1904  and  8,000,000  yen  in  1905  (owing  to  the  completion 
of  some  of  the  warships),  as  compared  with  those  of  1903;  but 
the  decrease  was  not  great,  because,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
was  an  increased  expenditure  of  3,500,000  yen  in  each  of  these 
two  war  years  in  the  warship  construction  and  building  expen- 
ses as  continuing  expenditures  since  1 903,  and  because  theKure 
arsenal  extension  expenses  did  not  diminish  in  comparison 
with  1903.  In  1906  there  was  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
ordinary  expenditures  owing  to  the  increased  expenses  for 
military  affairs  (6,000,000  yen  over  1903  and  15,000,000  yen 
over  1905)  caused  by  the  increased  number  of  warships.     There 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT   DAY  97 

was  no  special  increase  in  the  extraordinary  expenditures, 
however,  as  the  post-bellum  schemes  were  not  as  yet  carried 
out.     In  1907  we  find  that,  while  the  ordinary  expenditures 
showed  normal  increases  only,  the  extraordinary  expenditures 
suddenly  increased,  showing  the  commencement  of  the  work- 
ing of  new  schemes,  as  there  was  disbursed  a  total  of  20,800,000 
yen,  the  first  annual  instalments  of  warship  and  torpedo-boat 
replenishing  expenses,  warship  and  torpedo-boat  supplement- 
ing expenses,  and  adjustment  and  equipment  expenses,  viz., 
the  second,  the  third  and  the  fourth  of  the  above-mentioned 
naval  repletion  budget  estimates,  the  first  of  which,  or  the 
warship  construction  and  building  expenses,  being  a  continu- 
ing expenditure  since  1903.     During  the  years  1908-1913,  we 
see  a  gradual  increase  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  due  to  the 
progress  of  the  naval  repletion  work,   the  yearly  increases 
ranging  from  700,000  to  2,500,000  yen.     The  increased  items 
were  expenses  of  the  Navy  Department  proper,  expenses  for 
military  affairs  of  the  navy,  navy  pensions,  allowances  to  sur- 
viving families  of  naval  officers  and  sailors,  etc.     In  the  extra- 
ordinary expenditures  there  were  considerable  disbursements 
during  1 908-1 910  for  warship  construction,  warship  and  tor- 
pedo-boat replenishing,  and  adjustment  and  equipment  ex- 
penses.    In  191 1  the  extraordinary  expenditures  amounted  to 
more  than  64,000,000  yen,  as  the  result  of  the  additional  dis- 
bursements for  warship  and  torpedo-boat  replenishing.     At 
last,    in    1 91 3,    the   work   of   the    so-called    naval    repletion 
scheme   was   nearly  accomplished,   and    the  object   of   sup- 
plementing the  naval  strength,  after  the  experience  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  was  attained,  enabling  Japan  to  fall 
in  line  with  the  world's  tendency. 

Financial  Resources 

With  reference  to  the  sources  of  revenue  to  meet  the  ex- 
penditures of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  general  explanation 
has  already  been  given.  Moreover,  as  taxes  and  public  loans 
are  subjects  which  do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  present 


98  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

treatise,  we  shall  here  give  only  the  statistics  corresponding  to 
the  financial  resources  in  question. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Settled  Accounts  of  these  revenues 
belonging  to  the  Special  Account  of  the  Extraordinary  War 
Expenditure  were  as  follows: 

Yen 

Proceeds  from  public  loans  and  Exchequer  Bonds 1,418,731,229 

Funds  transferred  from  General  Account  (taxes  stamp  revenues, 

tobacco-monopoly  profits,  and  Treasury  surplus) 182,430,129 

Funds  diverted  from  Special  Accounts  (forestry  fund,  warship 

and  torpedo-boat  replenishing  fund,  and  educational  fund) ....  69,31  I  .(>77 

Voluntary  contributions  to  war  fund 2,331 ,1  76 

Sundry  receipts  (penalties,  fines,  forfeitures,  compensations,  and 

interesl  on  deposits) 16,107,521 

Proceeds  from  sale  of  government   properties  (buildings,  provi- 

sionsand  forage,  night-soil  and  horse-dung  and  cattle) 18,875,115 

Special  Receipts  (disposal  of  captured  articles  and  trophies) 3.516,325 

Receiptsfrom  South  Manchurian  and  Korean  railways '1,1,08,784 

Total 1,721,212,256 

Thus,  the  total  receipts  of  the  Special  Account  of  Extraor- 
dinary War  Expenditure  amounted  to  1,721,212,256  yen; 
and  if  we  compare  this  with  the  total  disbursements  of  1,508,- 
472,538  yen  of  the  same  account,  we  find  that  there  remained  a 
surplus  of  212,739,717  yen,  which  was  transferred  to  the  Gen- 
eral Account  on  November  30,  1907. 

In  the  second  place,  as  regards  the  financial  resources  for  the 
war  expenditures  of  130,794,655  yen  to  be  disbursed  from  the 
General  Account  during  and  after  1907,  we  need  not  explain 
them  beyond  saying  that  these  disbursements  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  General  Account ;  but  we  may  mention  that  they 
were  abundantly  covered  by  the  above-mentioned  surplus  of 
the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  War  Expenditure  trans- 
ferred to  the  General  Account,  as  this  surplus,  minus  the 
aforesaid  130,794,656  yen  still  left  a  balance  of  81,945,061  yen. 

In  the  third  place,  regarding  the  financial  resources  for  221,- 
580,000  yen  of  various  Departmental  Expenses  in  connection 
with  the  war,  we  can  not  give  accurate  figures  of  these  resources 
from  the  Settled  Accounts.  However,  as  the  budget  for  238,- 
280,000  yen  of  these  Departmental  Expenses  was  made  out 
simultaneously  with  that  for  extraordinary  war  expenditures, 
but   independently  of  the  General  Budget,  we  can  make  an 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT  DAY 


99 


approximate  estimate  and  say  that  the  government's  financial 
arrangements  for  meeting  the  said  budget  for  Departmental 
Expenses  directly  formed  the  financial  resources  in  question. 
Such  approximate  financial  resources  for  the  Departmental 
Expenses,  estimated  according  to  the  financial  measures  taken 
on  the  occasion,  are  as  follows: 

Approximate  Financial  Resources 


Departmental  expenditures 

Amount 

Resources 

Disbursement    through    financial 
emergency  measure  of  Decem- 
ber, 1903 

Yen 
257,893 

Temporary  loans 

Budget  of  1904 

40  000  000 

Surplus  of  Annual  Account 

Budget  of  1905 

87,200,000 

Surplus   and    temporary   loans 

Disbursements  (December,  1905) 
unprovided  for  in  budget 

28,825  409 

Surplus  of  Annual  Account 

Budget  of  1906 

82,000,000 

Surplus  of  Annual  Account 

Thus,  we  may  say  that  the  financial  resources  of  the  various 
Departmental  Expenses  in  connection  with  the  war  were  in 
the  main  sought  in  the  surplus  of  the  Annual  Account  and  to  a 
small  extent  in  temporary  loans. 

With  reference  to  1,418,731,229  yen  obtained  as  a  financial 
resource  for  the  Russo-Japanese  War  expenditures  from  the 
proceeds  and  receipts  of  public  loans  and  Exchequer  Bonds,  we 
shall  not  give  here  any  detailed  explanations,  but  shall  simply 
enumerate  the  issues  with  the  corresponding  dates  and 
amounts,  as  shown  in  the  table  on  page  100. 

We  have  already  stated  that  the  Imperial  Government,  in 
order  to  obtain  revenue  to  meet  the  expenditures  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  adopted  two  schemes  of  increased  taxation. 
The  first  scheme,  which  took  the  form  of  extraordinary 
special  taxes,  increased  the  land  income,  business,  sake,  and 
soy  taxes,  the  sugar  excise,  the  mining,  registration,  bourse, 
and  shooting-license  taxes,  the  tax  on  sake  exported  from  the 
Prefecture  of  Okinawa,  and  various  import  duties;  it  also  im- 


IOO  HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Receipts  from  Public  Loans  and  Exchequer  Bonds 


Date  of  issue 


Kinds 


Amount  of 
issue 


Actual 
receipts 


March  21,  1904.  .  .  . 

June  25,  [904    

November  [8,  [904  , 

April  10,  1905 

May  15,  1905 

.March  31,  1906.  .  .  . 

May  17,  1904 

December  15,  1904 
March  29,  1905.  .  .  . 

July  11,  1905 

July,  1906 -June,  1907 


Exchequer  Bonds: 

First  issue 

Second  issue 

Third  issue 

Fourth  issue 

Fifth  issue 
Extraordinary  Military  Ex- 
penditure Loan 
Sterling  Loans: 

First  6  per  cent 

Second  6  per  cent 

First  4§  per  cent 

Second  4A  per  cent 
Gratuities  Substitution  Loan 


Yen 

100,000,000 
100,000,000 
80,000,000 
100,000,000 
100,000,000 

200,000,000 

97,630,000 

117,156,000 
292,890,000 
292,890,000 

171,722,050 


Yen 

92,376,124 
90,981,796 
71,288,675 
90,254,962 
89,984,081 

189,064,218 

86,834,171 

100,463,595 
251,158,987 
251,137,817 
1 10,722,950 


posed  consumption  taxes  on  woolen  textiles  and  kerosene; 
increased  the  amount  of  stamps  to  be  affixed  to  documents 
relating  to  civil  suits  and  non-contentious  commercial  cases; 
by  amending  the  regulations  regarding  ceidasters  it  raised  the 
fees  chargeable  in  connection  therewith;  and  by  altering  the 
formalities  for  registration  it  laid  down  in  the  detailed  rules 
attached  to  the  said  regulations;  finally,  it  increased  the  regis- 
tration tax,  and  put  into  operation  the  tobacco-manufacture 
monopoly.  The  second  scheme  increased  the  revenues  from 
taxation  by  amending  the  law  regarding  the  extraordinary- 
special  taxes;  it  further  increased  the  land,  income,  business, 
and  sake  taxes,  the  sugar  excise,  the  patent  medicine  business 
tax,  the  mining,  registration,  bourse,  and  shooting-license 
taxes,  the  tax  on  sake  exported  from  the  Prefecture  of  Okinawa, 
and  the  stamp  duty;  it  also  increased  the  existing  import 
duties  and  imposed  new  ones;  it  introduced  a  transit  tax,  a 
stamp  duty  on  cheques,  and  a  placer  tax,  and  imposed  a  con- 
sumption tax  on  textiles  other  than  woolens;  it  caused  stamps 
to  be  affixed  to  documents  relating  to  administrative  suits;  it 
established  an  inheritance  tax;  and  it  put  into  operation  the 
salt  monopoly.  The  receipts  from  these  two  schemes  of  in- 
creased taxation  were  as  follows: 


RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  TO   PRESENT   DAY  1 01 

Yen 

1904 60,568,345 

1005 154,091,858 

1906 184,839,433 

Total 399.499.636 

A  few  words  must  also  be  said  in  regard  to  the  temporary 
loans,  though  they  are  not  items  included  in  the  Special  Ac- 
count revenues.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  it 
was  often  necessary  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  to  secure 
advances  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  to  make  the  Treasury  re- 
ceipts and  disbursements  balance.  Although  these  advances 
were  all  made  in  the  form  of  short-term  loans  and  were  re- 
deemed before  the  closing  of  the  Special  Account,  they  may  be 
looked  upon  as  temporary  or  special  sources  of  revenue.  Their 
amounts  were  as  follows: 

Temporary  loan  for  armament  repletion  (Imperial  Ordinance  Xo.  Yen 

291  of  1903) 41 ,500-000 

Special  loan  for  warship  and  torpedo-boat  construction 2,500,000 

Temporary  loans  for  extraordinary  affairs: 

Law  no.  1  of  1904 239,000,000 

Law  no.  12  of  1905 66,000,000 

Law  no.  1  of  1905 12,750,000 

Law  no.  1  of  1906 55. 500,000 

Besides  the  above,  it  must  be  stated  here  that  I5>253>358 
yen  of  the  temporary  loan  for  the  redemption  of  war  notes  was 
also  a  source  of  revenue  for  the  Russo-Japanese  War  expendi- 
tures. This  loan  was  necessary  for  the  post-bellum  redemp- 
tion of  the  war  notes  issued  in  Manchuria  during  the  war,  and 
was  the  money  borrowed  from  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank, 
which  had  charge  in  1905  of  the  circulation  and  redemption  of 
these  war  notes.  This  loan  is  not  included  or  found  in  the 
Settled  Accounts  of  the  receipts  and  disbursements  of  the 
Special  Account  of  the  Extraordinary  War  Expenditures. 

We  may  now  refer  to  the  financial  resources  for  the  arma- 
ment expenditures  in  the  last  ten  years.  It  must  be  noted 
that  most  of  the  armament  expenditures  belong  to  the  dis- 
bursements from  the  General  Account  and  that  consequently 
no  special  explanations  can  be  given  regarding  the  correspond- 
ing sources  of  revenue.     However,  as  it  has  been  customary 


102  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

in  the  case  of  specially  large  disbursements  to  express  their 
financial  resources  in  the  budget  estimates  or  in  the  govern- 
ment's financial  scheme's,  we  may  give  here  the  outline  of 
these  resources  as  follows: 

In  1 907,  or  the  first  year  of  the  post-bellum  financial  scheme, 
there  were,  in  both  the  army  and  the  navy,  not  only  many  of 
the  continued  undertakings,  either  running  from  the  previous 
years  or  transferred  from  the  extraordinary  Departmental  Ex- 
penditures, but  there  were  also  not  a  few  new  expenditures 
started,  such  as  for  the  construction  of  new  warships,  for  the 
establishment  of  the  Port  Arthur  naval  station,  expenses  for 
garrisons  in  Manchuria,  Korea,  and  Saghalien,  adjustment 
expenses  of  the  remaining  works  of  the  war,  expenses  for  re- 
pairing arms,  etc.,  increases  in  warship  and  torpedo-boat  re- 
plenishing expenses,  adjustment  and  equipment  expenses, 
pensions  and  rewards,  increases  in  Expenses  for  Military 
Affairs  attendant  on  armament  expansion,  repairs,  and  fur- 
nishing of  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use  in  connec- 
tion with  the  adoption  of  the  two-year  system  of  infantry  and 
the  establishment  of  four  additional  divisions,  and  construc- 
tion expenses  of  supplementary  warships  and  torpedo  boats. 
All  these  were  continuing  expenditures  disbursed  from  the 
year  1907,  amounting  in  total  to  86,500,000  yen.  For  the 
financial  resources  corresponding  to  these  new  expenditures,  no 
public  loans  were  specially  raised,  but  they  were  secured  by 
continuing  the  extraordinary  special  taxes  inaugurated  during 
the  war,  and  by  transferring  100,000,000  yen,  the  surplus  of  the 
Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  War  Expenditure,  to  the 
General  Revenue  Account.  These  resources  served  also  for 
armament  expenditures,  and  the  result  was  that  there  still 
remained  a  certain  surplus  in  the  General  Account.  In  1908 
a  large  deficit  in  the  General  Account  was  met,  but  as  the 
market  conditions  then  did  not  allow  the  raising  of  new  public 
loans,  additional  funds  were  provided  by  increasing  the  taxes 
on  liquors,  the  sugar  excise  and  kerosene  tax,  and  by  raising 
the  fixed  ] trices  of  monopoly  tobacco;  and  also  by  postponing 
various  undertakings  the  equilibrium  of  receipts  and  disburse- 


RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  TO   PRESENT   DAY  IO3 

ments  was  planned.  As  the  said  deficit  was  caused  principally 
by  armament  expenditures,  it  follows  that  the  said  increased 
taxation  was  caused  by  the  armament  requirements.  Thus, 
with  the  gradual  growth  of  the  figures  of  the  General  Account 
the  financial  difficulties  became  greater  and  greater,  and  the 
government  became  convinced  of  its  having  gone  too  far  in 
its  post-bellum  undertakings,  so  that  in  1909  a  policy  of  re- 
trenchment was  adopted  and  several  undertakings  were  post- 
poned. In  this  way  surpluses  in  the  General  Account  became 
more  and  more  plentiful  during  and  after  1910,  enabling  the 
government  to  ameliorate  the  taxation  system  and  to  effect 
extraordinary  redemptions  of  public  loans.  In  191 1,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  four  great  continuing  expenditures  of  the 
navy  were  consolidated  in  one  item  called  the  armament  reple- 
tion expenditures,  and  thereby  the  armament  scheme  was 
expanded,  no  special  revenue  measures  were  necessary  in  that 
year.  In  both  191 2  and  191 3  the  General  Account  continued 
to  show  surpluses  and  under  easy  circumstances  could  meet 
enormous  expenditures  for  armament.  However  that  may 
be,  the  superabundance  of  public  loans  and  the  continuation  of 
the  war-time  taxes  are  the  weak  points  in  Japan's  finances, 
and  discussions  regarding  the  redemption  of  loans  and  the 
reduction  of  taxes  are  becoming  more  and  more  frequent  and 
important. 


104 


HISTORU  Al     SURVEY    OF    KXPENDITURES 


-  i 


X 


2 


W 

—  ^ 

wV 

Cu  o 

X  X 

>  » 

Q  w 

as  a 

2  " 

*  3 

m  a 
w 

H 


ir. 

rO 

-~ 

fS 

M 

Q 

0 

O   m 

0 

f; 

C 

'v. 

c 

1^ 

c 

000 

rO 

C 

CO 

re 

~ 

— 

0 

q  q_ « 

<-o 

_" 

ro 

«* 

Cl" 

rT 

0 

0"  c  c^ 

-f 

-    N 

00 

c 

r-. 

1^ 

0 

0  c  "o 

O 

0) 

8    -t 

N 

1  - 

00 

00 

0 

ir.  W)  3> 

1^ 

O 

_Z    O 

-f 

pj 

10 

t^ 

-      0 

■* 

Eh 

-t- 

CO 

X 

10 

vO 

"* 

00 

1^. 

N 

q 

<-\ 

"2 

M 

q; 

" 

4-J 

1/ 

O 

0 

N 

X 

0 

M  w 

5 

3 

: 

-t 

10 

0 

"O  S--v 

q 

q 

q 

N 

•     •  t^ 

0 

a  0 

0" 

0 

ro 

:  0 

o~ 

~S 

c 

"- 

-f 

.   .  0 

10 

c 

-?- 

vO 

oq_ 

■+ 

.3  m v—^ 

0 

c* 

N 

<~C 

/ 

cf 

_C    1J 

>n 

X 

rr 

ro 

H 

-t 

i/-: 

ir 

m 

Ements 

imber, 

excess 

0 

o> 

a 

C 

C 

» 

0 

5 
8   6 

0 
10 

z 
<* 

IT 

. 

: 
0 

3 

3 
1C 

0 

£  8.S-5 

3   O      _  u) 

-    z 

ci 

N 

.      .   O 

Cl 

r 

X 

c 

- 

00 

00_ 

J3  Q  JO  * 

en        O  ■— 

6 

so 

00* 

c 

-f 

-f 

00" 

c 

ci 

X 

z 

0 

00 

5-5  ?° 

+J 

bo 

0 

0 

: 

c: 

c 

O 

0  0  t*» 

c 

IP 

c*3  «h 

0 

0 

c 

0 

2 

5 

O    C    1- 

0 

3 
8  d 

c 
c 

z 

q 

c 

Q 

6  6  x' 

c 
0" 

rH    O 

0 

z 

0 

g 

C     Z     <N 

ic  "0  \r. 

0 

O   m  " — ' 

c 

iC 

t> 

c 

x" 

- "       ir-. 

r-C 

u  <u 

X 

X. 

in 

1^ 

10 

00 

u 

r- 

r> 

\r. 

t^. 

CO 

t  budget 

imates 

1904) 

0 

: 

_ 

Z 

c 

0 

c 

0 

s 

P. 

z 

0 

CI 

0 

c 

c 

q 

co 

z 

c 

'  "I 

c_ 

?  0 

0" 

3 

6 

c 

!    !  00 

0" 

^  0 

c 

c 

3 
3 

c 

0 
0 

0 

c 

0 

0 

£   cnw' 

0 

0 

0 

n* 

c 

c 

i^- 

c 

.3    0 

00 

-t 

ri 

\C 

r 

ro 

•+ 

0 

fc 

r*5 

•^ 

N 

-+ 

0>         >_    ^ 

Amounts 
bursed  und 

Imperial 
rdinance  0 
cembcr,  1 9  c 
or  financial 
Emergency 

measure 

10        •+ 

0 

^ 

0 

cO        O 

f 

i 

P( 

3 

CI 

q_     oq_ 

>lO>          CI 
"0 

0 
/- 

1/ 

. 

q;      q 
00"      d 

ci         C 
N         C 

":       <-i 

q; 

CO 
C4 
N 

vO 
10 

-3        Q 

, 

, 

~         1- 

, 

- 

U) 

'   in 

s 

0 

. .    1- 

V 

O 

C 

;  3 

U 

U     X 

-  u 
c  i 

«  .3 

p 
— 
u 
J3 

u 

X 

W 

- 

•  C 

- 

■ 

1 

- 

S 

O      • 
r. 

O 

3 
XI 

z.  r 

V) 

E 
0 

1-1 

'in  h  f 

c  c  C 

ill 

c/)    fS    C 

u   u   c 

3"S  c 

•£>  1  \ 

T3 
.     C 
>,   II 

2  x 

C    0 

•~  — 

2  2 

- 

c 

E- 

urces  of  Rc\  enm 

Receipts  from  in 

tavntinn.  etc.  . 

T3 
C 

rt  c 

c/T  c 

-a 
c  > 

0  £ 

Funds  diverted 
special  accoun 

Voluntary  contri 
tr>  war  fund 

•x   3 
3    C 
O   U 

QJ    0 

c< 
=  2 

QJ         l-H 

(J  0 

tn   C 
•  -  <u 

r 
— 
Z 

E- 

Q 

O 

rt  c  E 

|8§ 

-a  u 


a  * 


S3^ 
c-s  2 
.2  .•§ 

3  2  » 

_  rtJ3 

0  S  g 
>>'3  oi 

•°  S  C 
J3  ti  O 

253 


=  -  3 
"5.5  2 


7. 

.r: 

R 

"5 
a 
0 

u 

= 

u 

d 

<1 

e 

T3 

— 

c 

id 

c 

Ed 

o  _  ° 


S3  rt 

• 2  V  3 

rt  E  £ 

a  %  v 


= 

'. 

ed 

B 

0 

c 

c 

a 
0 
S 

•a 
S 

3 

a  4; 

0 

J3 

^ 

.: 

* 

tu 

H 

"^ 

3 

RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  TO   PRESENT  DAY 


105 


Q 

y, 

a 

6. 

w 

>< 
> 

< 

Q 
< 

< 


CQ 


0  >.  s 
2  °  & 


III 

ti  — *3 

O  ^  c 
C.'S  <" 

o2  a 


H  3 


c  rt  3 

.2  is  .5 

tj  — T3 

0  ri  C 

S"  o  0. 

Oh  <" 


K   rfrft^rorOOO  f*500  »/i  N  Ov  u} 


o  00  o  o  1^ 


O  Ov  r^co  CO  (*}  M  fO  O  s©  CC  in  ^3 
10  CO  lOO  ror*}<N  "*  -^  <N  PI  W  Ov 
Tf  c-  1-1  00  rooo  t—  f^'O  O  OvoO  1^ 

-  :>  -t  rl  ~>  ro  "^  N  CO  roco  O  O 
t^  in  -f  t-        m  o"       1^  o"       loifl 


O  w  Ov       Oi 


egs 


-3;£   ri   3   £   p   5"g-"  £   rt. 


:~2  SS? 


■    •  i 
■is 

:  >» 

■   Bt 

•  C 

•a 
c 

Si 

nphal  cele- 

ory  of  naval 
Russo-Jap- 

:■§  c 

.   U 

* 

.2   -.1  v 

'.  rt-7 

•3 

0  2  *•   ■„_*• 

•  ?  ;3 

•'o  o-E-^1*-  m  O  ">■? 

1- 
•  c 

u  .3  0  -*- 

.  1 

8  8  55  £•??'§?§  ^    H 

J  "  x  -^  O  ~ 
Oi      W     U 


>*Ov  Ov 
1/1  "3- 


t^vO  l~-  fO-O  Ov  m  O  rO  "i"  Ov 

O  fOOO  O  "-»  moo  n  ^O  •& 


ro  r*)oo  ro  10 


*  vO  «  ^       m 


t— CO   ^tO  00    fO  Ov  OvCO   (N    M 


*t  r~co  ro  O 


Ov  Ov       fOfOO 


"3  rt 

a-2 


?o 


S"S 


3   5  °   > 


U   C 

£■5  « 


?       J3 

at  c«  0  to 

•so      c 

5~  =  3 

^•l> 


b-§rt^S2SS|3 


CHAPTER  VI 
CONCLUSION 

We  may  now  recapitulate  what  we  have  stated  in  the  last 
five  chapters,  and  conclude  by  adding  some  statistical  com- 
ments. 

Since  the  Meiji  Restoration  there  have  been  in  all  eleven 
occasions  on  which  disbursements  have  been  made  as  war 
expenditures,  and  the  amounts  expended  were  as  follows: 


Period 

Xumber  of 

wars 

Expenditures 

First 

Second  

5 
3 

2 
I 

Yen 

14,188,291 

42,944,401 

277,011,130 

1,860,848,801 

Third 

Fourth 

Total 

II 

2,194,992,632 

This  simple  table  shows  us  that,  while  the  number  of  wars 
is  decreasing,  the  expenditures  required  in  one  single  war  are 
enormously  increasing.  We  may  not  determine  the  exact 
rate  of  this  increase,  but  we  may  say  that  the  increasing 
tendency  in  the  cost  of  war  is  indisputably  great. 

Two  comparative  tables  showing  expenditures  incurred  in 
four  wars,  i.  e.,  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  the  Sino-Japanese 
War,  the  North  China  Disturbance,  and  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  arc  given  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.1  It  seemed  best  to 
exclude  the  War  of  the  Restoration  from  these  tables,  because 
the  classification  of  the  expenditures  for  this  war  was  different 
from  that  for  other  wars;  moreover,  their  total,  as  explained 
in  the  earlier  pages,  could  not  include  the  whole  of  the  war 
expenditures. 

We  may  enumerate  five  principal  factors  affecting  the 
amount  of  war  expenditures:   (1)   war  preparations  or  the 

1  See  post,  pp.  1 1 6,  117. 
106 


CONCLUSION  107 

development  of  armament  in  time  of  peace;  (2)  the  number 
of  soldiers  engaged  in  the  war;  (3)  the  duration  of  the  war; 
(4)  the  strength  of  the  hostile  forces;  and  (5)  the  extent  and 
conditions  of  the  scene  of  the  hostilities.  As  minor  factors, 
moreover,  we  may  mention  the  prices  of  commodities,  the 
management  of  accounts  and  supplies,  the  economic  condi- 
tions in  general,  the  degree  of  patriotic  sentiment,  and  others 
too  numerous  to  mention.  These  principal  and  minor  factors 
must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  making  a  comparative 
study  of  the  war  expenditures,  and  the  foregoing  table  fur- 
nishes no  more  than  a  basis  for  making  a  few  investigations 
by  comparing  some  of  these  causes  with  the  amount  of 
expenditures  concerned. 

In  the  above  table  we  observe  that  the  expenditures  for  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  are  about  forty  times  as  great  as  those 
for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  or  the  North  China  Disturbance, 
and  more  than  eight  times  as  great  as  those  for  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War.  It  is  most  interesting  to  observe  how  greatly 
the  expenditures  increased  in  each  successive  war.  But  con- 
sidering the  duration  of  the  war,  the  extent  of  the  scene  of 
hostilities,  and  the  military  strength  of  both  the  belligerents, 
•we  may  not  only  find  the  reasons  for  the  greatness  of  the 
expenditures  incurred  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  but  we 
may  even  learn  that  war  on  a  large  scale  seems  to  involve 
proportionately  less  expenditure. 

In  the  above  table  we  have  assembled  the  different  items 
of  expenditure,  which  are  practically  similar  in  the  main, 
although  their  classification  differed  at  various  times  and  in 
the  various  departments.  Except  in  the  case  of  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  the  ratio  between  the  Expenses  for  Military 
Affairs  of  the  army  and  the  navy  (War  Expenditures)  and 
the  various  Relative  or  Departmental  Expenses  (expenses 
incurred  in  the  departments  other  than  those  of  the  army 
and  the  navy)  was  85  or  88  for  the  former  to  15  or  12  for  the 
latter.  This  shows  that  in  mobilizing  or  working  the  army 
and  the  navy  there  must  always  be  certain  attendant  dis- 
bursements in  the  general  administrative  branches. 


108  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

If  we  compare  the  Expenses  for  Military  Affairs  of  the  army 
with  those  of  the  navy,  we  find  a  curious  ratio.  Though  in 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion  the  smallness  of  the  navy  expenditures 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  almost  no  navy,  it 
is  curious  to  note  that  in  every  war  the  army  expenditures 
are  from  four  to  six  times  as  great  as  the  navy  expenditures. 
Neither  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War  nor  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  can  we  say  that  the  army  played  a  more  important  part 
than  the  navy,  nor  that  Japan  thought  a  great  deal  of  the 
army  and  little  of  the  navy;  and  yet  the  war  expenditures 
were  much  lower  on  the  side  of  the  navy.  Of  course,  in  our 
calculation  we  have  not  taken  into  account  in  both  the  army 
and  the  navy  the  loss  or  gain  of  warships  and  arms,  and  we 
have  computed  only  the  disbursements  from  the  Treasury; 
therefore,  if  Japan  had  suffered  defeat,  we  may  imagine  that 
the  loss  might  have  been  specially  heavy  on  the  part  of  the 
navy.  Nevertheless,  viewing  the  amount  of  expenditures 
only,  we  must  conclude  that  there  is  always  a  great  difference 
between  the  war  expenditures  required  for  the  army  and  those 
required  for  the  navy.  The  question  is  important,  however, 
in  making  the  preliminary  estimates  of  war  expenditures  or 
in  deciding  national  defense  questions.  It  is  at  least  safe  to 
say  that  the  principal  factors  responsible  for  such  a  difference 
between  the  two  expenditures  are  (i)  the  number  of  com- 
batants, (2)  the  means  of  transportation,  and  (3)  the  nature 
and  quantity  of  munitions. 

In  every  war  we  see  that  the  greatest  item  of  army  expendi- 
ture has  always  been  transportation;  but  in  the  navy  this  item 
is  trilling,  even  if  it  is  combined  with  the  ship  expenses.  The 
greatest  item  next  to  transportation  is  that  for  amis  and 
ammunition.  As  the  latter  forms  a  principal  item  in  the 
army  as  well  as  in  the  navy,  this  and  the  former  item  may 
be  called  the  accounts  of  foremost  importance  among  the 
expenses  for  military  affairs.  Next  to  arms  and  ammunition 
come  provisions  and  clothing,  which  are  especially  large 
amounts  in  the  army  and  much  smaller  in  the  navy,  the  ratio 
being  about  twenty  to  one.     Also,  in  the  foregoing  table  the 


CONCLUSION 


IO9 


expenses  of  personnel,  such  as  salaries,  wages,  traveling 
expenses,  and  sundry  allowances,  were  summed  up  as  one 
item  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  and  the  sum  total  generally 
corresponds  with  the  figures  of  provisions  in  the  army  and 
those  of  provisions  and  clothing  in  the  navy.  But  this  sum 
total  in  the  case  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  comes  to  a  partic- 
ularly large  amount,  owing  to  the  fact,  as  explained  before, 
that  it  included  much  of  the  wages  in  the  actual  nature  of  the 
transportation  expenses.  We  may  add  that  horses  in  the  army 
and  warships  maintenance  in  the  navy  are  all  very  important 
accounts,  as  also  construction,  building  and  repairs,  secret 
service  fund,  mobilization  expenses,  and  temporary  rewards 
in  the  army,  and  hydrographic  expenses,  naval  station  and 
secondary  naval  station  expenses,  and  warship  and  torpedo- 
boat  replenishing  expenses  in  the  navy;  but  we  need  not 
indulge  in  any  more  general  comment  on  these  items. 

Turning  our  attention  to  the  armament  expenditures,  we 
shall  first  of  all  recapitulate  their  gross  totals  for  the  different 
epochs  as  follows : 

Armament  Expenditures 


Period 

Army 

Navy 

Total 

First 

Yen 

53,754,154 
196,811,673 

435,967,757 
944,876,396 

Yen 

i4,995,8°8 
112,270,912 
383,362,142 
686,287,464 

Yen 

68,749,962 

309,082,585 

819,329,899 

1,631,163,860 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Grand  total 

1,631,409,980 

1,196,916,326 

2,828,326,306 

From  the  above  figures  we  can  see  clearly  the  wonderful 
consecutive  increases  in  the  armament  expenditures.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  they  have  steadily  increased,  rising  slowly 
but  surely  from  1,600,000  yen  in  the  first  epoch  to  10,320,000 
yen  in  1876.  After  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  the  rate  of  increase 
was  about  the  same  until  the  end  of  the  second  epoch,  though 
a  gradual  acceleration  is  observable  after  1883  or  1886.  But 
in  the  third  epoch,  or  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  the  expend- 


IIO  HISTORICAL  SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

itures  increased  by  leaps  and  bounds,  as  from  24,520,000 
yen  in  1895  to  106,760,000  yen  in  1897.  After  this  latter  year 
the  increasing  tendency  still  continued  for  a  few  years,  when 
in  1 901,  1902  and  1903  there  were  decreases  of  from  20,000,000 
to  30,000,000  yen.  The  huge  increases  above  mentioned 
were  merely  the  result  of  the  working  out  of  the  post-bellum 
armament  schemes  on  both  land  and  sea  after  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War;  but  such  extraordinary  increases  can  not  be 
found  in  any  other  portions  of  the  national  expenditures. 
We  do  not  know  whether  or  not  armament  expansion  is  always 
the  inevitable  result  of  a  war  in  all  countries,  but  in  Japan  we 
can  not  deny  that  it  was  the  Sino-Japanese  War  that  caused 
such  a  tremendous  expansion  of  armament.  In  the  arma- 
ment expenditures  in  the  war  years  of  1904  and  1905  there 
were  considerable  decreases,  but  these  were  due,  as  already 
explained,  to  the  transfer  of  many  of  these  expenditures  to 
the  account  of  war  expenditures.  In  1906  we  saw  for  the  sec- 
ond time  an  abnormal  increase  in  the  armament  expenditures, 
which  in  that  year  exceeded  100,000,000  yen.  This  rapid 
rate  of  increase  did  not  slacken  in  the  following  years,  1 907 
and  1908,  producing  an  unprecedented  amount  of  more  than 
200,000,000  yen.  Looking  into  these  armament  expansions 
after  the  two  great  wars,  we  find  that,  comparing  the  ante- 
bellum armament  expenditures  (or  those  in  1893  and  1903) 
with  the  post-bellum  armament  expenditures  (or  those  in 
1898  and  1908),  the  annual  increase  after  the  Sino-Japanese 
War  was  about  93,000,000  yen,  or  five  times  as  much  as 
before  the  war,  and  the  annual  increase  after  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese War  was  about  129,000,000  yen,  or  between  two  and 
three  times  as  much  as  before  the  war.  We  therefore  see  that, 
though  there  was  a  large  increase  of  armament  expenditures 
after  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  rate  of  increase  was  below 
that  which  followed  the  Sino-Japanese  War.  The  highest 
record  was  230,000,000  yen,  reached  in  1910,  and  though  there 
were  slight  decreases  thereafter,  the  annual  amount  of  arma- 
ment expenditures  has  ever  since  been  not  far  from  this  high- 
est record.      If  we  compare  this  greatest  annual  record  of 


CONCLUSION  1 1 1 

230,000,000  yen  with  the  record  of  10,000,000  yen  in  the  first 
epq£h,  we  find  that  the  increase  is  twenty- three  times;  and 
comparing  it  with  the  record  of  26,000,000  yen  in  the  second 
epoch,  we  find  that  the  increase  is  nine  times;  and  compared 
with  that  of  113,000,000  yen  of  the  third  epoch,  it  is  twice 
as  much.  It  is  indeed  astonishing  to  see  these  great  and  con- 
tinual increases  in  the  armament  expenditures. 

From  the  foregoing  explanations  an  idea  may  be  formed  of 
the  proportionate  increases  of  the  army  and  the  navy  arma- 
ment expenditures.  Let  us  now  see  the  ratio  between  the 
two  expenditures  in  each  of  the  four  epochs.  Taking  the 
army  armament  expenditures  as  100,  the  ratio  of  the  navy 
armament  expenditures  was  27  in  the  first  epoch,  57  in  the 
second,  89  in  the  third,  and  72  in  the  fourth.  Calculating 
the  whole  of  the  navy  armament  expenditures  spent  from 
the  Meiji  Restoration  to  the  present  day,  they  amount,  to 
about  73  per  cent  of  the  whole  of  the  army  armament  expendi- 
tures of  the  same  period.  At  the  present  time  this  ratio 
continues  to  hold  good.  We  can  not  clearly  define  on  what 
principle  of  national  defense  such  a  ratio  is  maintained,  nor 
can  we  possibly  decide  whether  this  country  is  a  military 
power  or  a  naval  power  in  character;  but  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  money  spent  for  both  we  may  say  that  neither  the  army 
nor  the  navy  was  considered  more  important,  as  they  have 
generally  kept  pace  with  each  other,  with  only  a  slight  advan- 
tage observable  on  the  side  of  the  army. 

As  for  relative  explanations  of  different  items  of  armament 
expenditures  in  the  different  epochs,  we  shall  here  omit  them 
for  the  sake  of  brevity;  but  regarding  their  details  the  reader 
is  referred  to  the  tables  in  the  appendix.  One  thing,  however, 
may  be  noted,  and  that  is  that  the  proportion  of  the  ordinary 
and  the  extraordinary  expenditures  is  very  different  in  the  navy 
armament  and  the  army  armament.  In  the  former  the  ordi- 
nary expenditures  are  in  most  cases  smaller  than  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures,  while  in  the  latter  they  are  just  the  reverse. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that  in  the  army  the  principal  items  are 
clothing,    provisions,    horses,    etc.,    which    require    constant 


112  HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF   EXPENDITURES 

replacing,  while  in  the  navy  the  principal  item  is  the  construc- 
tion of  warships,  which  require  large  temporary  expenditures. 
However  that  may  be,  the  details  of  classifying  the  expendi- 
tures as  ordinary  and  extraordinary  are  left  chiefly  to  the  tech- 
nical convenience  of  the  financial  accountants;  but  if  more 
scientifically  taken,  an  item  such  as  warship  construction 
expenses  may  properly  be  classed  as  an  ordinary  expenditure, 
because  it  is  in  nature  an  item  requiring  a  regular  annual 
outlay  for  appropriate  replenishment.  Such  being  the  case, 
little  scientific  value  may  be  attached  to  what  we  have  said 
above  regarding  the  proportion  of  the  ordinary  and  the  ex- 
traordinary expenditures.  It  may  be  said  that  the  principal 
items  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  are  the  expenses  for  mili- 
tary affairs  in  a  narrow  sense,  and  that  the  principal  items  in 
the  extraordinary  expenditures  are  buildings  and  repairs  and 
furnishing  of  arms  and  implements  for  campaign  use  in  the 
army,  and  warship  and  torpedo-boat  construction  in  the 
navy. 

To  say  more  about  the  armament  expenditures,  we  must 
add  a  few  words  in  regard  to  decoration  annuities.  These 
annuities  are  given  to  the  recipients  of  the  Order  of  the  Ris- 
ing Sun,  established  in  1877,  and  of  the  Order  of  the  Golden 
Kite,  established  in  1894.  As  the  former  of  these  two  orders 
may  be  bestowed  on  civilians  who  have  rendered  specially 
meritorious  services,  as  well  as  on  soldiers,  this  fact  must  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  including  the  corresponding 
amounts  in  the  armament  expenditures.  However,  the  num- 
ber of  civil  officials  who  are  receiving  these  annuities  of  the 
Rising  Sun  Order  is  very  small;  and  as  their  meritorious  serv- 
ices were  in  most  cases  rendered  in  connection  with  war,  the 
amounts  of  these  annuities  have  been  reckoned  in  the  arma- 
ment expenditures.  As  these  decoration  annuities  are  given 
in  a  lump  sum  and  are  not  distinguishable  as  between  the 
army  and  the  navy,  we  have  only  for  the  sake  of  convenience 
reckoned  them  in  the  army  armament  expenditures.  The 
decoration  annuities  prior  to  1894  are  those  belonging  to  the 
Rising  Sun  Order,  bestowed  in  connection  with  distinguished 


CONCLUSION  113 

services  rendered  in  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  and  the  Saga 
Insurrection.  That  their  amounts  suddenly  increased  in 
1896  and  in  1906  is  of  course  a  result  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War 
and  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
their  latest  figures  are  over  10,000,000  yen  annually. 

We  have  seen  how  great  an  amount  is  disbursed  by  the 
state  for  armament  expenditures,  and  it  forms  an  interesting 
subject  of  study,  from  the  standpoint  of  politico-economic 
science,  to  compare  this  amount  with  other  expenditures  in 
the  country's  General  Revenue  Account.  Prior  to  the  year 
1877  we  find  that  the  proportion  of  the  armament  expendi- 
tures in  the  General  Account  never  exceeded  19  per  cent  of 
the  total,  but  it  gradually  increased  thereafter  until  it  reached 
the  climax  of  51  per  cent  in  the  year  1898.  Then  it  gradually 
decreased  until  it  came  to  amount  to  about  36  or  37  per  cent 
(excepting  the  war  years  of  1904-5).  The  percentages  of 
armament  expenditures  against  the  total  General  Account 
expenditures  at  different  epochs  (excepting  the  war  years  of 
1894-95  and  1904-5)  are  18  per  cent  in  the  first  epoch,  24  per 
cent  in  the  second  epoch,  37  per  cent  in  the  third  epoch,  and 
34  per  cent  in  the  fourth  epoch.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
present  proportion  of  armament  expenditures  as  compared 
with  the  total  General  Account  expenditures  is  about  35  per 
cent  annually.  The  annual  increase  of  public  expenditures 
in  recent  years  is  a  phenomenon  common  to  all  countries  of 
the  world,  and  it  is  scientifically  a  settled  opinion  that  the 
increase  of  armament  expenditures  should  be  counted  as  the 
chief  cause  of  the  general  expansion.  The  same  is  of  course 
true  in  the  case  of  Japan,  and  as  the  armament  expenditures 
occupy  so  important  a  position  in  the  General  Account,  and 
as  also  the  increases  and  decreases  of  armament  expenditures 
are  so  closely  related  to  those  of  the  total  annual  expendi- 
tures, we  may  say  that  the  increase  in  armament  expenditures 
is  the  greatest  reason  of  the  expansion  of  our  annual  expendi- 
tures. 

In  our  explanation  regarding  the  comparative  position  or 
importance  of  armament  expenditures  in  the  total  annual 


114  HISTORICAL    SURVEY   OF    KXPENDITIKI - 

expenditures,  we  have  excluded  from  our  consideration  not 
only  the  war  expenditures  but  also  the  debt  charges  incident 
to  war  loans  and  armament  loans.  As  stated  in  our  Intro- 
duction, we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  interest  on  war  and 
armament  loans  must  be  included  in  armament  expenditures. 
This  interest  may  be  calculated  at  from  75,000  to  925,000  yen 
annually  in  the  second  epoch,  at  about  10,000,000  yen  annu- 
ally in  the  third  epoch,  and  from  35,000,000  to  65,000,000 
yen  annually  in  the  fourth  epoch;  and  if  we  include  these 
amounts  in  the  armament  expenditures,  a  considerable  dif- 
ference will  surely  be  seen  in  the  latter's  annual  total 
figures  and  percentages  against  the  total  annual  expendi- 
tures. 

Forty-six  years  have  elapsed  since  Japan  was  opened 
to  foreign  intercourse.  The  basis  of  national  wealth  and 
military  strength  has  now  been  established,  and  the  glory 
of  the  Empire  has  already  been  spread  abroad.  As  we  look 
back  upon  the  history  of  this  national  growth,  we  may  say 
that  we  have  passed  through  many  years  full  of  great  events 
both  at  home  and  abroad.  Thanks  to  our  constant  and 
zealous  application  to  the  task  of  completing  our  armament, 
and  also  to  our  having  achieved  splendid  results  in  each  of 
the  many  wars,  the  country  has  been  enabled  to  enjoy  the 
opportunity  of  diligently  endeavoring  to  equip  herself  with 
all  the  paraphernalia  of  modern  civilization.  However,  con- 
sidering the  fact  that  the  grand  total  of  the  expenditures  for 
armament  and  war  amounts  to  5,023,318,438  yen,  we  can  not 
but  feel  that  it  was  no  easy  matter  for  us  to  join  the  great 
Powers  and  acquire  the  same  rights  as  they.  If  the  latest 
annual  armament  expenditures  are  apportioned  to  the  popula- 
tion of  the  country  (census  of  19 10),  the  annual  rate  per 
capita  becomes  4  yen.  This  rate  concerns  only  the  expendi- 
tures made  by  the  government;  and  if  we  consider  the  other 
burdens  of  the  whole  nation  in  connection  with  armament, 
such  as  the  national  duty  of  military  service  and  the  inci- 
dental expenses  incurred  by  public  and  social  bodies,  the 
figures  representing  these  charges  will  be  far  above  the  figures 


CONCLUSION  II5 

of  the  armament  expenditures.  It  is  hard  to  decide  whether 
armament  is  necessary  for  war  or  war  is  caused  by  expansion 
of  armament ;  or  whether  war  is  necessary  to  bring  about  peace 
or  peace  is  secured  by  armament.  But  at  any  rate,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  the  armament  and  the  war  expenditures  are  the 
greatest  burdens  of  the  state. 


116 


HISTORICAL   SURVEY   OF    EXPENDITURES 


Per- 

;ntage 

epart- 

lental 

xpen- 

itures 

ITi 

Tf 

" 

U"C  K  V'U 

CJ                       T, 

Mi           ,    HI 

rt    *•    U    y    "- 

S  o  &  g  a 

o            o 

00 

-  u  "  ts'-a 

<->  -i.  ■-  re  ^ 

CO 

r              co 

00 

-    --   OJ 

a,           & 

*o 

O                     C] 

H 

01 

a              ■* 

o 

r^ 

00                            r! 

00 

_  a 

re- 

=  c: 

d              n 

O                   3 

oc" 

CO                    to 

00 

d 

t 

~>                              T}- 

<o 

* 

N 

oo 

. 

_ 

re  H 

o 

i«~.                    M 

oo 

■* 

c 

S  =1 

-o 

g£ 

2  N' 

—                    I- 

„* 

£n 

0                   fO 

00 

-  c 

1-             ■* 

re  o 

o 

^~. 

- 

0>  x 

Q  " 

f*>        m 

o 

_,                     w 

ro 

!3       " 

00 

a 

rt       £ 

t/3 

c      — 

"3  b-- 

o              c 

-o 

—     rt  -^ 

°Sg 

>s  j- 

PI               z 

d 

o 

X        * 

w 

o 

o              o 

c 

tfl 

>, 

to   l/> 

o              o 

o 

> 

S    N 

°.              °. 

q 

i§ 

re 

z 

£2 

O                   P) 

-o 

N 

«3   si 

'-I 

V  t 

o 

0                   0 

o 

C    M 

>> 
B 

< 

8  O 

o              o 

o 

re 

u  O 

q              q 

c 

C. 
re 

•  c 

6               >^ 

d 
o 

o_ 

M 

A    St             O 

re 

tn 

'C 

o 

«  O  re        " 

5  c 

01 

o      •- 

w     8 

•5 

3 

s;      E      oi  _ 

£ 

°5 

c 

_0 

is 

41" 

m  o  ° 

c  ".  -     y   .  1 

c  H    - 

re 

c    r.J 

o  o  c      £>,„•„ 

o    :  j. 

Q 

oca 

E  rt  o 

g  c  re      o  «  M 

c  m  o 

00 

w                      t 

1-1 

M 

c 
o 

.«      c 

.rt 

•— ; 

^ 

01 

01 

Pi 
« 

E 

3 

ai          re 
£          c 
c         IE  c 

0) 

c 
re 
a 
re 

6          ta 

6 

c             c  -" 

3 

W          X 

Oi 

CONCLUSION 


117 


rr 

t- 

b 

ir,  £    -t        O 

i/\               i ..  c 

n 

N 

_      .          ~t  - 

V 

O  vO               00 

1,-1 

NO»h 

oc        r*i    •  r 

< 

Q 
Z 

w 
X 

w 
>- 

as 

s 

« 
o 

« 

u 


z 
o 

H 

o 
o 

- 


a.  u 


fc 


u.2 

X- 


X 


cd  j> 


£ 


12 


z 


«  r^  av  d  « 


O  O 

Rg 

c  > 
05  O 
u    u 


■C    en 


u  o 

.S  rt 
"3  >. 

•    O   ^    3 

-  c  a>_ 

;  o  n  5 

£    !*    * 

-  T-I         -    <0 

-  ^    C/2    o    u 

c  v  «i  e 
«•£  C  c. 


S.  S. 


an  U 


sis 

•3  3      a 

c  a     > 
ax     tj 


2  E 


o 


£ 


PART  II 

ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF 

EXPENDITURES  FOR  WAR  AND 

ARMAMENT 


CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 

The  national  economy,  in  its  true  character,  is  a  great 
mechanism  or  organic  combination  of  the  various  economic 
bodies  in  society,  and  any  change  brought  about  in  any  one  of 
its  parts  will  have  an  effect  on  another  part,  the  influence  of 
which  will  gradually  spread  to  all  the  other  parts.  Thus,  the 
law  of  cause  and  effect  is  continually  working  in  the  field  of 
national  economy.  As  the  state  itself  is  the  greatest  factor  in 
the  national  economy,  the  economic  achievement  of  a  state 
must  in  most  cases  produce  the  greatest  change  in  its  financial 
condition.  As  already  set  forth  in  Part  I  of  this  volume,  the 
war  and  armament  expenditures  of  Japan  in  the  past  forty-six 
years  have  always  occupied  the  most  important  position  in  the 
state  finance,  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  the  effects  of 
these  expenditures  on  the  national  economy  have  been  very 
great.  However,  it  is  by  no  means  an  easy  task  to  determine 
the  relationship  and  importance  of  these  effects,  which  are 
so  varied  and  wide  that  they  are  often  vague  and  difficult  to 
discern.  The  reason  for  this  may  be  traced  to  the  methods 
employed  in  gathering  and  dispersing  the  funds  for  these  ex- 
penditures. While  their  financial  resources  are  variously 
sought  in  the  present  income  of  the  nation,  in  the  wealth  or 
capital  accumulated  in  the  past,  and  in  the  future  financial 
obligations  incurred  in  the  form  of  loans,  the  purposes  of  their 
disbursements  are  also  varied,  some  being  made  for  purchas- 
ing home  products  or  for  payments  to  foreign  countries,  and 
others  for  making  materials  destined  only  to  be  consumed  in 
the  smoke  of  battle  on  both  land  and  sea. 

As  the  economic  effects  in  question  are  so  complicated,  it  is 
necessary  for  us  to  limit  the  sphere  of  our  present  treatise.  In 
the  following  pages  we  shall  not  undertake  to  deal  with  all  the 
relations  of  war  and  armament  to  the  national  economy,  but 


122  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

shall  merely  endeavor  to  set  forth  in  what  manner  the  expen- 
ditures for  war  and  armament  affect  the  national  economy. 
For  instance,  the  economic  effects  of  the  acquisition  and  admin- 
isl  ration  of  colonies,  or  of  the  development  of  war  industries,  or 
of  the  enforcement  of  the  conscription  system  must  be  excluded 
from  the  scope  of  our  present  inquiry,  though  each  forms  an  im- 
portant subject  of  investigation  in  the  history  of  the  economic 
effects  of  war  and  armament.  Furthermore,  we  have  here  to 
confine  ourselves  to  those  economic  effects  of  war  and  arma- 
ment expenditures  which  are  in  their  nature  more  direct  and 
important,  and  in  which  the  relations  between  cause  and 
effect  are  more  clearly  defined. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  most  direct  economic  effects  of 
war  and  armament  expenditures  lie  in  the  field  of  the  state 
finance,  because  these  expenditures  themselves  form  part 
thereof.  According  to  our  definition,  therefore,  the  increase  or 
decrease  of  these  expenditures  must  mean  the  expansion  or 
contraction  of  the  state  finance.  Both  are  closely  connected, 
and  for  that  reason  we  begin  with  the  effects  on  the  state 
finance  in  the  next  chapter. 

Next  to  state  finance,  the  money  market  of  the  country  is 
most  directly  affected  by  the  expenditures  for  war  and  arma- 
ment. In  the  modem  economic  system  the  production,  con- 
sumption, and  distribution  of  goods  are  all  affected  by,  and 
change  in  consonance  with,  the  changes  in  the  money  circula- 
tion. If  the  state,  as  the  greatest  factor  in  the  national 
economy,  receives  and  disburses  large  sums  of  money,  the 
money  market  of  the  country  is  necessarily  tightened  or  slack- 
ened thereby;  and  this  influence,  in  turn,  will  produce  innu- 
merable effects  in  various  other  fields  of  the  national  economy. 
For  this  reason  we  deal  in  Chapter  III  with  the  effects  on  the 
money  market. 

As  regards  the  effects  of  war  and  armament  expenditures 
in  the  other  fields  of  the  national  economy,  viz.,  production, 
communications,  consumption,  distribution,  social  life,  move- 
ment of  the  population,  etc.,  we  find  to  our  regret  that  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  ascertain  and  explain  them  definitely, 


INTRODUCTION  1 23 

for  the  reason  that  these  effects  are  closely  hound  up,  in  irregu- 
lar complexity,  with  many  causes  other  than  the  expenditures 
in  question.  Our  explanations  in  this  connection  must  there- 
fore be  of  comparatively  limited  dimensions.  Of  course,  it 
would  be  an  easy  matter  for  us  to  describe  fully  the  bare  facts 
in  war  times  in  the  fields  above  enumerated  or  to  give  their 
history  in  the  past ;  but  that  would  be  rather  beyond  the  scope 
of  the  present  investigation.  We  say  that  our  explanations  in 
these  fields  are  necessarily  limited,  because  we  are  going  to 
dwell  only  upon  the  places  where  the  relations  of  cause  and 
effect  are  specially  notable.  But  the  reader  must  not  assume 
that,  because  our  explanations  are  limited,  the  effects  in  these 
fields  of  the  national  economy  are  also  limited  or  unimportant. 
Students  of  economic  phenomena  are  all  aware  that  many 
effects  very  often  exist  where  the  causes  are  not  direct  and 
apparent;  and  the  same  must  apply  to  the  economic  effects  of 
war  and  armament  expenditures.  Accordingly,  we  must  rely 
upon  the  reader's  ability  to  discern  the  truth  in  those  cases 
where  these  expenditures  form  the  causes,  though  indirectly 
and  obscurely,  of  some  extensive  economic  effects  which  are 
not  dealt  with  in  this  volume. 


CHAPTER  II 
EFFECTS  ON  THE  STATE  FINANCE 

In  dealing  with  the  effects  of  war  and  armament  expendi- 
tures on  the  state  finance,  it  is  convenient  to  adopt  the  com- 
mon classification  of  subjects  employed  in  financial  science, 
viz.,  revenues,  expenditures,  and  public  loans.  But  the 
revenues  are  treated  in  another  volume,  entitled  War  and 
Armament  Taxes  of  Japan,  l>y  Ushisaburo  Kobayashi;  the 
expenditures  have  already  been  treated  in  Part  I  of  this 
volume;  and  the  public  loans  are  treated  in  War  and  Arma- 
nent  Loans  of  Japan,  by  Ushisaburo  Kobayashi,  which  con- 
stitutes another  volume  of  this  series.  What  remains  to  be 
supplied  here,  accordingly,  is  a  general  explanation  of  how 
the  above  three  financial  subjects  are  combined  or  related  to 
one  another. 

From  the  Restoration  War  to  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 

We  have  already  observed  that  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Meiji  Government  the  national  finances  were  so  disorganized 

and  straitened  that  there  were  no  available  means  of  obtaining 
the  necessary  war  funds  other  than  those  of  raising  compul- 
sory loans  from  the  wealthy  classes  and  issuing  inconvertible 
notes.  Immediately  after  the  Restoration,  the  government 
had  established  it>  five  fundamental  policies,  viz.,  (i)  adjust- 
ment of  the  administrative  organs,  (2)  creation  of  the  army 
and  the  navy,  (3)  consolidation  of  the  debts  of  the  former 
clans,  (4)  settlement  of  capitalized  pensions,  and  (5)  en- 
couragement of  industries.  For  the  carrying  out  of  this  pro- 
gram large  sums  of  money  were  required,  and  in  order  to  meet 
the  financial  requirements  the  government  began  steadily  (a) 
to  enforce  the  paper  currency  policy,  (b)  to  create  the  taxation 
system,  and  (c)  to  raise  public  loans.  Let  us  now  give  brief 
outlines  of  these  three  subjects: 
124 


EFFECTS  ON    THE   STATE   FINANCE  125 

(a)  Enforcement  of  the  paper  currency  policy. — In  order  to 
meet  the  emergency  of  supplying  funds  for  the  War  of  the 
Restoration,  the  government  issued  official  paper  currency. 
The  first  issued  was  the  Dajokan-satsu,  or  notes  of  Dajokan 
(State  Council),  which  were  purely  inconvertible  notes  to  be 
withdrawn  from  circulation  by  the  year  1880.  These  notes 
were  issued  to  the  amount  of  48,000,000  yen  in  the  years  of 
1868  and  1869,  but  the  people  did  not  like  to  use  them  because 
of  their  sad  experiences  with  the  various  kinds  of  paper  money 
issued  by  the  clan  governments;  and  in  spite  of  various  at- 
tempts on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  secure 
credit,  differences  in  the  value  of  paper  and  of  specie  became 
unavoidable.  Subsequently,  the  government  issued  the  Mim- 
busho-satsu  to  the  amount  of  7,500,000  yen.  These  were 
notes  issued  by  the  Home  Department,  and  were  in  nature 
the  same  as  the  Dajokan-satsu.  In  October,  1871,  Okurasho 
Dakan  Shoken  (convertible  treasury  bills)  were  issued,  and  in 
January,  1872,  the  convertible  bills  of  the  Kaitakushi  (Colonial 
Government  of  Hokkaido)  were  also  issued,  the  two  together 
amounting  to  9,300,000  yen.  The  aggregate  total  of  the  paper 
notes  now  reached  64,800,000  yen.  The  government,  seeing 
the  inconvenience  of  having  so  many  kinds  of  paper  notes  in 
circulation,  proceeded  to  reduce  them  to  one  uniform  kind  by 
issuing  during  and  after  1875  the  so-called  "new  paper  money" 
in  exchange  for  the  four  kinds  of  paper  notes  above  mentioned. 
This  adjustment  was  completed  by  the  year  1879.  However, 
this  new  paper  money  was  secretly  overissued  in  order  to  sup- 
ply a  large  deficit  in  the  government  revenue,  so  that  before  a 
large  additional  amount  of  the  same  was  issued  as  a  means  of 
providing  funds  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  there  was  already 
being  engendered  a  future  trouble  regarding  the  overissue  of 
paper  notes. 

(b)  Creation  of  the  taxation  system.—- When  the  Meij  i  Govern- 
ment acquired  sovereign  power,  its  right  of  collecting  taxes 
was  yet  hardly  established  and  its  revenue  consisted  solely  of 
the  funds  derived  from  the  confiscation  of  the  feudatory  fiefs. 
Although  the  land  tax  at  that  time  did  not  exceed  that  for  only 


126  ECONOMIC    EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

one-eighth  of  the  total  crop  of  rice  obtained  from  the  fiefs  in  the 
whole  country,  still  the  old  method  of  tax  collection  was  chiefly 
followed.  This  explains  why  the  tax  revenue  in  1868  or  1869 
amounted  to  only  three  or  four  million  yen.  Though  in  June, 
1869,  the  Imperial  sanction  for  the  restoration  of  the  clan  cen- 
sus to  the  government  was  obtained,  it  was  as  yet  impossible 
to  effect  a  unification  of  the  taxation  system  throughout  the 
country.  Each  clan  continued  to  pursue  the  old  usages  in  tax 
collection  and  to  pay  one-tenth  of  its  income  of  rice  into  the 
National  Treasury.  At  last,  in  1871,  the  abolition  of  clans 
and  the  establishment  of  prefectures  rendered  practicable  the 
adoption  of  a  uniform  system  of  taxation  throughout  the  coun- 
try. A  great  reform  in  the  land  tax  was  now  resolutely  carried 
out,  by  which  the  former  standard  of  taxation  based  on  the 
amount  of  rice  crop  was  altered  to  that  based  on  the  value  of 
land,  and  the  method  of  paying  taxes  in  rice  was  abolished  and 
replaced  by  that  of  paying  them  in  money.  An  appraisal  of 
land  for  taxation  was  made  over  the  whole  country,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  rate  of  3  per  cent  on  the  value  of  land 
produced  an  annual  revenue  of  about  50,000,000  yen.  In 
1875  the  sake  taxes  were  reformed  and  classified  into  a  tax  for 
sake  brewing,  a  license  for  sake  brewing,  and  a  tax  on  retail 
sales  of  sake,  yielding  the  government  an  annual  revenue  of 
some  3,000,000  yen.  A  further  annual  revenue  of  about 
4,000,000  yen  was  also  procured  in  the  same  year  by  adjust- 
ing the  sundry  taxes  on  shooting,  vehicles,  vessels,  stamps, 
patent  medicines,  and  mining. 

(c)  Public  loans. — The  Meiji  Government,  besides  issuing 
paper  money,  as  above  stated,  to  make  good  the  deficit  in 
its  revenue,  raised  five  public  loans,  as  follows: 

1 .  Nine  per  cent  foreign  loan. — These  bonds  were  issued  to 
the  amount  of  £1,000,000  in  London  in  April,  1870,  and  the 
net  proceeds,  amounting  to  4,782,400  yen,  were  used  for  the 
building  of  railways. 

2.  Seven  per  cent  foreign  loan. — These  bonds  were  issued  in 
London  in  February,  1872,  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  the 
pensions  given  to  the  Shizoku  (gentry),  after  the  abolition  of 


KKH'X  IS    ON    THE   STATE   FINANCE  127 

feudalism,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  procure  funds  for  engag- 
ing in  business  pursuits.  This  loan  was  to  mature  in  twenty- 
five  years,  and  its  net  proceeds  amounted  to  10,833,600  yen. 

3.  New  and  old  public  loans. — When  feudalism  was  entirely 
swept  away  in  1871,  all  the  debts  of  the  former  clans  were 
transferred  to  the  state.  The  4  per  cent  new  public  loan 
bonds,  redeemable  in  twenty-two  years,  were  allotted  to  the 
debts  contracted  by  each  clan  between  1868  and  1871,  and  the 
non-interest-bearing  old  public  loan  bonds,  redeemable  in  fifty 
years,  to  those  contracted  between  1844  and  1868;  the  former 
amounted  to  10,972,725  yen  and  the  latter  to  12,422,825  yen. 

4.  Paper  money  exchange  loan. — These  bonds  were  issued 
for  the  purpose  of  withdrawing  various  kinds  of  government 
paper  money  temporarily  issued  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration, 
such  as  the  Dajokan-satsu,  Mimbusho-satsu,  etc.,  and  were 
exchangeable  at  par  with  the  new  paper  money  on  the  demand 
of  the  holders.  They  were  redeemable  in  fifteen  years,  but  the 
rate  of  interest  was  so  low  that  there  was  little  demand  for  the 
exchange.  The  actual  issue,  therefore,  amounted  to  only 
6,669,250  yen. 

5.  Voluntarily  capitalized  pension  bonds. — These  bonds 
were  issued  after  the  abolition  of  feudalism  for  granting  some 
relief  to  the  Shizoku  (gentry)  and  Sotsn  (common  soldiers)  who 
had  voluntarily  surrendered  their  pensions,  in  order  to  enable 
them  to  procure  funds  for  engaging  in  business  pursuits.  They 
bore  interest  at  8  per  cent  and  were  redeemable  by  drawings 
for  a  period  of  seven  years  after  the  lapse  of  three  years, 
during  which  they  were  to  remain  unpaid.  The  total  amount 
of  these  bonds  was  16,565,800  yen. 

We  now  see  that  the  total  issue  of  these  public  loans  was 
63,222,600  yen,  and  that  the  net  proceeds  amounted  to  62,241,- 
950  yen.  These  figures  are  by  no  means  large  as  compared 
with  the  total  annual  revenue  of  350,000,000  yen  in  the  epoch 
now  under  review,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  almost  all 
of  these  loans  had  been  occasioned  by  the  reorganization  of 
national  institutions  and  the  adjustment  of  the  state  finances, 
and  that  they  had  no  direct  relations  with  war  and  armament 


[28  ECONOMIC    EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

expenditures.  The  position  of  war  and  armament  expendi- 
tures in  the  state  finance  in  the  early  part  of  the  Meiji  Era  was 
hut  trifling  as  compared  with  that  in  after  years.  Even  the 
largest  of  war  expenditures,  those  for  the  War  of  the  Restora- 
tion, amounted  to  only  8,908,000  yen.  But  in  those  days, 
when  the  national  life  of  Japan  was  undergoing  radical  changes 
and  the  government  was  in  greatly  straitened  circumstances, 
it  was  inevitable  that  even  for  comparatively  small  war  and 
armament  expenditures  debts  were  often  contracted  through 
the  issue  of  inconvertible  notes.  In  after  years  these  notes 
brought  about  unlooked-for  calamities  in  1  he  national  econ<  »my, 
especially  in  the  money  market;  and  though  such  calamities 
were  indeed  unavoidable,  it  is  deplorable  that  the  economic 
development  of  this  country  was  thus  checked  at  the  very 
beginning. 

From  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  to  the  Sino-Japanese  War 

In  the  seventeen  years  from  1877  to  1893  the  finances  of 
Japan  benefited  by  a  process  of  peaceful  adjustment.  In  this 
period  the  national  economy  was  for  the  first  time  systemati- 
cally organized;  where  it  had  formerly  lacked  definite  scheme 
and  order,  it  now  received  more  careful  attention  and  was  put 
on  the  right  track.  After  1873,  when  matters  of  state  finance 
were  for  the  first  time  made  public,  various  rules  and  regula- 
tions concerning  the  Annual  Account  were  gradually  developed. 
In  1878  regulations  for  the  auditing  of  the  annual  accounts 
were  enacted,  and  in  1881  the  regulations  for  the  receipts  and 
disbursements  of  money  and  grain  were  adjusted  and  unified 
by  the  passage  of  a  new  financial  law.  In  1882  the  aforesaid 
auditing  regulations  and  the  financial  law  were  revised  and 
improved,  and  in  1883  the  handling  of  the  National  Treasury 
funds  was  entrusted  to  the  Bank  of  Japan.  In  1889,  with  the 
promulgation  of  the  Constitution,  an  elaborately  revised 
financial  law  was  issued,  and  with  Japan's  becoming  a  constitu- 
tional country  in  that  year  the  mode  of  keeping  the  Annual 
Account  was  made  to  follow  modern  scientific  methods. 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE 


I2C; 


The  financial  measures  taken  by  the  government  during  the 
epoch  under  review  began  with  the  settlement  of  the  expendi- 
tures for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 

The  Satsuma  Rebellion  was  the  greatest  war  after  the  Res- 
toration and  involved  an  expenditure  of  more  than  40,000,000 
yen.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  that  the  finances  of  the  country 
after  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  changed,  as  shown  in  the  follow- 
ing table  comparing  the  annual  expenditures  of  1879  with 
those  of  1876: 

Annual  Expenditures  Before  and  After  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 


Items 

Amount 

expended 

1876 

Amount 

expended 

1879 

Increase 

or 
decrease 

Ordinary  expenditures: 

Redemption  of  national  loans 

Interest  on  national  loans 

Yen 

1,941,638 

3,009,159 

827,500 

17,629,552 

25.771.703 

3.709,339 

2,081,204 

198,261 

1,539,615 

Yen 

5,834.375 

15,915.278 

1,013,726 

584,403 

21,686,700 

167,658 
4,405,676 
2,629,566 

125,480 

1,996,721 

845,958 

Yen 

+  3,892,737 
+  12,906,119 
+      186,226 
-17,045,149 

-  4,085,003 

+      167,658 

+      696,337 

+      548,362 

72,78l 

+      457,106 
+      845,958 

Imperial  household  expenses 

Annuities  and  pensions.  .  .  . 

Various  government  departments, 
Colonial   Government    of    Hok- 
kaido, and  other  administrative 
expenses 

Making    good    the    deficit   in   the 
capital    of    private     enterprises 
(mining,  export  trade,  etc.) 

Prefectural  expenses 

Police  expenses 

Expenses  for  shrines 

Building,  repairing,  and  civil  engi- 
neering expenses  in  the  prefecture 
Subsidies  to  the  Famine  Relief  Fund 

Total 

56,707,971 

55,205,541 

-   1,502,430 

Extraordinary  expenditures: 
Industrial  enterprises 

2,600,986 

1,325,696 
3.786,343 

+   1,325,696 
+   1.185,357 

Sundry  expenditures 

Total 

2,600,986 

5.112,039 

+  2,511,053 

Grand  total 

59,308,957 

60,317,580 

+   1,008,623 

From  the  above  table  we  see  that  the  increase  in  expendi- 
ture after  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  was  not  very  great,  and  this 
is  of  course  due  to  the  fact  that  this  war  did  not  cause  an  im- 
mediate necessity  of  expanding  the  army  and  navy.     Seeing 


in 


v  '  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

that  there  was  a  decrease  of  some  4,000,000  yen  in  the  expenses 
for  government  departments,  Colonial  Government  of  Hok- 
kaido, etc.,  Ave  may  also  note  how  the  administrative  affairs 
were  generally  curtailed.     The  items  in  which  the  figures  were 
considerably  increased  were  those  concerning  national  loans. 
In  their  redemption  there  was  an  increase  of  about  3,900,000 
yen,  which  was  due  to  the  disbursement  of  2,200,000  yen  for 
the  withdrawal  of  paper  money  and  of  1,700,000  yen  for  the 
redemption  of  domestic  loans.     This  withdrawal   of    paper 
money  was  made  in  connection  with  the  notes  issued  for  the 
war  expenditures  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.     The  increase  of 
13,000,000  yen  in  the  interest  on  national  loans  was  owing  to 
the  increase  of  bonds,  such  as  the  Hereditary  Pension  Bonds 
and  other  loans,  and  the  decrease  of  17,000,000  yen  in  the 
annuities  and  pensions  was  a  result  of  their  conversion  into 
such  pension  bonds.     As  the  government  finance  did  not  un- 
dergo any  considerable  change  after  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  it 
may  seem  that  the  war  expenditures  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 
did  not  influence  it  to  any  great  extent.     But  considering  the 
fact  that  these  expenditures  were  met  by  means  of  paper  money 
and  loans,  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that  the  Satsuma  Re- 
bellion expenditures  did  cause  heavy  burdens  in  after  years; 
because,  though  the  redemption  of  paper  money  had  not  yet 
proved  to  be  a  serious  burden  in  1879,  it  gradually  became 
more  and  more  burdensome  as  time  went  on.     We  shall  also 
see  in  the  following  chapter  how  greatly  the  money  market  of 
this  country  was  affected  by  the  burdens  of  the  paper  money 
and  the  loans.     Turning  to  the  administrative  expenditures 
and  to  the  armament  expenditures,  it  is  interesting  to  observe 
that  the  former  did  not  generally  increase  and  the  latter  did 
not  undergo  any  noticeable  expansion,  quite  unlike  what  hap- 
pened in  the  later  years  subsequent  to  the  Sino-Japanese  or 
the  Russo-Japanese  War.     It  will  be  noted  that  the  Imperial 
Government  was  so  sorely  pressed  by  the  need  of  money  to 
defray    its  manifold   expenses  that  its   finances  almost   lost 
elasticity;  and  however  urgent  was  the  increase  of  administra- 
tive expenditures  and  armament  expenditures,  the  govern- 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  131 

ment  lacked  sufficient  power  to  cope  with  it.  In  other  words, 
the  reason  that  there  was  no  post-bellum  expansion  of  finances 
at  the  time  was  because  it  was  impossible  and  not  because  it 
was  unnecessary. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  government  had  first  of  all 
to  settle  a  very  important  question,  namely,  the  adjustment 
of  paper  money.  Prior  to  this,  it  had  seen  the  necessity  of 
unifying  the  paper  currency  and  had  issued  new  paper  money 
for  the  purpose;  and  being  anxious  to  maintain  its  price,  it  had 
established  a  conversion  fund  for  the  notes  issued.  It  was 
thus  able  to  see  its  way  clear  toward  the  redemption  of  the 
paper  money  issued  after  the  War  of  the  Restoration.  But 
the  government,  bewildered  by  the  readiness  of  its  circulation, 
forgot  the  necessity  of  redeeming  it,  and  was  caught  by  the 
erroneous  notion  that  capital  and  currency  were  interchange- 
able terms  and  that  an  abundance  of  paper  money  was  very 
important  to  the  progress  of  industries.  Such  being  the 
condition  at  the  time,  during  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  the 
government  determinedly  carried  out  the  increased  issue  of 
inconvertible  notes  to  the  amount  of  27,000,000  yen,  besides 
borrowing  bank  notes  to  the  enormous  amount  of  25,000,000 
yen.  The  amount  of  government  paper  money  in  circulation 
exceeded  100,000,000  yen  before  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  and 
was  increased  to  165,000,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1878,  was 
164,000,000  yeti  at  the  end  of  1879  and  170,000,000  yen  in 
January,  1880.  Unless  so  large  an  amount  of  paper  money 
was  by  some  means  redeemed,  the  government  could  not,  of 
course,  issue  any  more.  In  view  of  this  fact,  a  plan  for  re- 
deeming the  whole  in  twenty-eight  years  was  made  out  in  1878, 
in  which  year  7,600,000  yen  was  first  redeemed,  and  in  each  of 
the  years  1879  and  1880  2,000,000  yen  was  redeemed.  But 
being  distressed  to  find  financial  resources  for  such  redemption, 
the  government  revised  the  tax  regulations  for  sake  brewing  in 
1880,  diminished  the  expenditures  allotted  to  various  govern- 
ment departments,  caused  the  greater  part  of  local  expenses 
to  be  borne  by  local  taxes,  and  abolished  various  government 
enterprises;  and  by  these  means  it  was  at  last  able  to  redeem 


132  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

7,000,000  yen  in  1881.  But  such  makeshifts  and  slow  meas- 
ures were  quite  inadequate  for  the  quick  attainment  of  the 
object  in  view.  A  decisive  step  was  at  length  taken  in  Octo- 
ber, 1 88 1 ,  when  it  was  determined  to  redeem  at  least  7,000,000 
yen  every  year,  and  a  special  reserve  fund  of  55,790,000  yen  was 
created  to  be  utilized  for  the  purpose  of  accumulating  specie. 
The  execution  of  this  plan  of  adjusting  the  disordered  state  of 
paper  money  was  accompanied  by  extraordinary  difficulties; 
but  by  various  means,  such  as  by  inaugurating  a  stamp  duty 
on  patent  medicines,  taxes  on  stock-exchange  brokers,  or  by 
increasing  the  taxes  on  sake  and  tobacco,  and  by  devoting  all 
the  revenue  obtained  from  these  sources  to  the  redemption  of 
paper  money,  and  also  by  introducing  extreme  economies  in 
the  Annual  Account,  the  government  at  last  succeeded  in  re- 
deeming 13,640,000  yen  of  paper  money  up  to  the  year  1885, 
and  was  also  able  to  carry  forward  26,460,000  yen  into  the 
General  Reserve  Fund.  The  amount  of  specie  on  hand  rose  as 
high  as  42,000,000  yen.  In  January,  1886,  the  government  was 
able  to  commence  the  conversion  of  paper  money  into  silver 
coin  through  the  mediation  of  the  Bank  of  Japan.  In  July, 
1888,  regulations  governing  convertible  notes  were  enacted,, 
and  the  object  of  adjusting  paper  money  was  at  last  attained. 
What  we  have  been  trying  to  point  out  is  that  in  the  strait- 
ened financial  circumstances  at  this  period  every  other  enter- 
prise was  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  attaining  the  object  of 
adjusting  the  paper  money,  and  that  this  great  work  was 
principally  necessitated  and  caused  by  the  war  expenditures  of 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  The  reason  for  this  is  obvious  if  we 
consider  the  fact  that,  when  the  paper  money  in  circulation 
reached  the  most  enormous  amount,  as  much  as  one-third  of 
it  was  the  paper  money  put  into  circulation  on  account  of  the 
war  expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 

In  this  way  the  great  financial  problem  after  the  Satsuma 
Rebellion  was  solved,  and  then  by  gradually  effecting  other 
financial  improvements  in  various  fields  until  the  year  1893, 
or  the  year  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino- Japanese  War,  the 
government  was  able  to  make  its  finances  follow  the  right  path.. 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  133 

Let  us  now  try  to  explain  briefly  some  of  these  improve- 
ments in  connection  with  the  taxation  system  and  with  the 
national  loans.  Among  the  former  we  may  mention  the  special 
revision  of  the  land  tax,  the  creation  of  an  income  tax,  and 
the  enactment  of  a  National  Tax  Collection  Law.  The  so- 
called  special  revision  of  the  land  tax  means  the  revision  of  the 
land  tax  regulations  and  partial  revision  of  land  values  made 
in  the  years  1880,  1885,  1887,  and  1889,  by  which  the  great 
question  of  perfecting  the  land  tax  law  existing  since  1873  was 
settled.  The  creation  of  an  income  tax  in  1887  remedied  the 
defect  in  the  taxation  system  lying  in  the  inequality  of  national 
burdens,  as  there  existed  formerly  no  taxes  of  importance  other 
than  those  on  land  and  sake.  This  income  tax  was  levied  on  a 
graduated  scale  at  the  rate  of  from  1  to  3  per  cent  on  persons 
whose  income  from  property  or  from  earnings  exceeded  300 
yen.  The  annual  revenue  derived  therefrom  was  about  1 ,000,- 
000  yen,  but  it  did  not  exceed  1,230,000  yen  in  the  year  1893. 
By  the  aforesaid  National  Tax  Collection  Law  various  former 
methods  of  tax  collection  were  unified,  and  cities,  towns,  and 
villages  were  made  the  chief  tax-collecting  organs.  With 
regard  to  the  fiscal  improvements  made  in  connection  with  the 
national  loans,  we  may  mention  the  issuance  of  the  Consoli- 
dated Public  Loan  in  and  after  1886.  To  arrive  at  our  ex- 
planation of  this  Consolidated  Loan,  we  must  enumerate  as 
follows  the  loans  that  were  existing  after  the  year  1877: 

1.  Hereditary  Pension  Bonds. — The  government,  being 
convinced  of  the  sluggishness  of  settling  the  capitalized  pen- 
sions with  the  voluntarily  capitalized  pension  bonds,  took  the 
decided  step  of  exchanging  all  at  once  the  hereditary  pensions 
and  the  pensions  for  merit  for  public  loan  bonds  called  the 
Hereditary  Pension  Bonds.  These  were  issued  chiefly  in  1878 
in  four  series  of  5,  6,  7,  and  10  per  cent,  in  conformity  with  the 
amount  and  nature  of  the  pensions,  and  the  total  amounted  to 
174,153,000  yen. 

2.  Pro-rata  Pension  Bonds  for  the  "Shinto"  Priests. — 
These  were  issued  for  the  purpose  of  granting  relief  to  "Shinto" 
priests,  who,  being  deprived  of  their  profession  in  consequence 


134  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

of  the  reforms  of  the  institution  of  "Shinto,  "  found  themselves 
without  means  of  livelihood.  They  were  issued  in  1879  and 
amounted  to  334,500  yen. 

3.  Industrial  Enterprises  Loan. — This  loan  was  raised  at 
home  to  the  amount  of  12,000,000  yen  with  a  view  to  improv- 
ing the  means  of  transportation  and  encouraging  industries, 
agriculture,  etc.,  in  the  whole  country.  This  loan  was  the 
forerunner  of  the  industrial  loans  in  this  country  and  the 
pioneer  of  the  loans  raised  from  the  general  public. 

4.  Xakasendo  Railway  Loan. — As  the  name  indicates,  this 
loan  was  raised  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  the  Nakasendo 
Railway,  and  the  bonds  wrere  issued  in  three  instalments  from 
1884  to  1885,  amounting  in  all  to  20,000,000  yen. 

5.  Unregistered  "Kin-satsu"  Exchange  Loan. — These 
bonds  were  issued  as  a  means  for  withdrawing  paper  money 
and  were  exchangeable  at  par  with  the  paper  on  the  demand 
of  the  holders.  They  bore  6  per  cent  interest  and  totaled 
7,929,900  yen. 

6.  Navy  Loan. — According  to  the  naval  expansion  scheme 
of  1883,  the  government  was  to  spend  26,640,000  yen  in  all 
during  eight  years;  but  when  only  9,900,000  yen  had  been  dis- 
bursed up  to  the  year  1885,  the  financial  sources  for  these 
expenditures  ran  short,  and  it  was  decided  to  raise  this  loan 
for  the  purpose.  They  were  5  per  cent  bonds  amounting  to 
17,000,000  yen  and  were  issued  in  four  instalments.  The  re- 
sult of  the  flotation  was  successful  and  the  proceeds  amounted 
to  more  than  17,200,000  yen.  This  was  the  only  military  loan 
raised  in  this  period,  and  it  was  the  first  time  that  funds  for 
armament  expenditures  were  obtained  by  means  of  public 
loans. 

7.  Supplementary  Railway  Loan. — This  was  raised  in 
January,  1889,  for  supplementing  expenses  for  railway  con- 
struction and  amounted  to  2,000,000  yen. 

8.  Consolidated  Public  Loan. — The  rate  of  interest  of  the 
foregoing  loans  was  mostly  over  6  per  cent,  which  was  much 
above  the  current  market  rate  of  from  3  to  4  per  cent.  More- 
oxer,  as  these  loans  were  not  to  be  redeemed  freely  and  with- 


EFFECTS  ON  THE   STATE  FINANCE  135 

out  restriction,  they  considerably  hampered  our  finance;  and 
also  as  they  were  registered  and  not  made  out  "to  hearer,"  they 
were  unfit  for  the  requirements  of  the  times  when  the  utiliza- 
tion of  securities  was  growing  up.  Stimulated  by  its  success 
in  settling  the  question  of  paper  money  adjustment,  which 
had  been  pending  since  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  the  govern- 
ment now  thought  of  consolidating  these  national  loans. 
Therefore,  a  scheme  was  formed  in  1886  for  issuing  5  per  cent 
loans  to  the  amount  of  120,000,000  yen,  which  were  called  the 
Consolidated  Public  Loan.  There  were  three  modes  of  issuing 
these  bonds,  viz.,  the  ordinary  issue,  the  extraordinary  special 
issue,  and  the  issue  in  exchange  with  other  bonds.  By  the 
ordinary  issue  these  loans  were  floated  on  the  home  market  in 
five  instalments  from  October,  1886,  to  July,  1892,  to  the  total 
amount  of  30,204,000  yen.  By  the  extraordinary  special  issue 
the  conversion  of  the  interna]  debts  was  effected  through  util- 
izing a  surplus  in  the  Treasury,  and  the  conversion  amounted 
to  more  than  19,000,000  yen  by  the  year  1897.  By  the  issue 
in  exchange  with  other  bonds  was  meant  the  delivery  of 
these  Consolidated  Public  Loan  bonds  in  place  of  the  payment 
in  cash  for  the  redeemed  loans,  and  this  kind  of  bonds  reached 
112,858,000  yen.  In  1893  the  exchange  of  the  internal  loans 
with  the  Consolidated  Loans  was  completed.  The  object  of 
consolidating  the  public  loans  was  finally  attained  by  the  re- 
payment in  May,  1897,  of  the  fund  borrowed  on  account  of  the 
expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 

In  summary  we  may  say  that  after  the  year  1886  the  result 
of  adjusting  public  loans  was  conspicuous,  and  side  by  side 
with  the  improvements  made  in  the  taxation  system,  as  al- 
ready mentioned,  the  state  finance  was  gradually  put  on  a 
sound  basis.  But  this  was  twenty  years  after  the  Restoration, 
and  had  it  not  been  for  the  unfortunate  Satsuma  Rebellion 
such  an  amelioration  of  the  financial  condition  of  the  govern- 
ment would  surely  have  taken  place  a  few  years  or  even  a  dec- 
ade earlier.  A  comparison  of  the  Annual  Accounts  during 
seventeen  years  (1 877-1 893)  does  not  show  so  considerable  an 
increase  annually,  both  in  the  revenue  and  in  the  expenditure, 


1 36  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

is  in  recent  years.  The  amount  of  national  loans  underwent 
no  great  increase,  rising  only  from  the  annual  balance  of  226,- 
800,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1877  to  that  of  234,000,000  yen  at  the 
end  of  1892.  The  ratio  between  the  amounts  of  administra- 
tive expenses,  debt  charges,  and  expenses  for  military  affairs 
remained  almost  the  same.  Though  the  national  progress 
seemed  thus  very  slow  during  this  period,  greater  activity  set 
in  after  the  year  1887  in  various  quarters  of  administrative 
affairs,  as  schemes  for  many  new  enterprises  gradually  came 
under  contemplation.  After  the  establishment  of  the  Imperial 
Diet,  however,  there  were  such  frequent  collisions  between  the 
government  and  the  Diet  that  the  expansion  of  the  Annual 
Accounts  was  considerably  hindered  thereby. 

From  the  Sino-Japanese  War  to  the  Russo-Japanese 

War 

The  Sino-Japanese  War  was  an  epoch-making  event  in  the 
history  of  the  Meiji  Era,  affecting  all  phases  of  the  national 
life,  not  excepting  the  government  finance.  A  comparison  of 
the  Settled  Accounts  of  annual  expenditure  before  and  after 
the  war  is  shown  on  the  following  page. 

As  indicated,  the  Settled  Accounts  for  the  year  1897  show 
an  increase  of  two  and  a  half  times  in  the  annual  expenditure, 
■  is  compared  with  the  year  1893.  This  rate  of  increase  was 
unprecedentedly  great,  and  the  expansion  of  expenditure 
may  be  said  to  have  been  of  a  revolutionary  nature.  This 
rapid  rate  of  increase  was  not  limited  to  the  year  1897,  DUt 
continued  for  a  few  years  thereafter.  From  the  figures  given 
it  may  be  noted  that  the  increase  was  greater  in  the  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  than  in  the  ordinary  expenditures,  that 
the  increase  was  most  considerable  in  the  Departments  of 
the  Navy,  the  Army,  Communications,  and  Finance  in  the 
extraordinary  part,  and  in  the  Army  Department  in  the 
ordinary  part ;  and  also  that  there  was  a  large  increase  of  about 
10,000,000  yen  in  the  debt  charges. 

Such  a  sudden  increase  of  the  expenditures  may  be  attrib- 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  137 

Annual  Expenditures  Before  and  After  the  Sino-Japanese  War" 


Items 

Amount 

expended 

1893 

Amount 

expended 

1897 

Increase 

<  )rdinary  expenditures: 

Imperial  household  expenses  . 
Debt  charges 

Yen 
3,000,000 
19,455,918 
1,454,666 

623,982 
7,662,106 
4,004,684 
12,419,829 
5,141,475 
3,45i,9H 

932,562 

928,942 
5,469,524 

Yen 
3,000,000 

29,504,731 
3,661,704 

1,445,849 
8,262,075 
6,006,979 
28,746,263 
9,543,889 
3,543,489 
1,985,729 

1,364,923 
10,629,496 

Yen 

10,048,813 
2,207,038 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Department  of  Home  Affairs 

Finance  Department 

War  Department .  . 
Navy  Department 
Department  of  Justice 

Department  of  Education          

Department    of    Agriculture    and 

Commerce 

Department  of  Communications    .  . 

821,867 

599,969 

2,002,295 

16,326,434 

4,402,414 

91,578 

1,053,167 

435,98i 
5,159,972 

Total 

64.545,599 

107,695,127 

43,149,528 

Extraordinary  expenditures: 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Department  of  Home  Affairs 
Finance  Department . 
War  Department. 
Navy  Department . 
Department  of  Justice 
Department  of  Education 
Department    of    Agriculture    and 
Commerce 

19,265 

11,465,283 

1,185,170 

2,301,397 

2,959,446 

75,56i 

135,240 

493,177 
1,401,734 

1 18,460 
19,556,088 
10,224,769 
31,401,725 
40,850,645 
215,016 
629,870 

1,514,188 
n,475.956 

99,195 
8,090,805 

9.039,599 
29,100,328 
37,891,199 

139,455 
491,630 

1,021,011 

1  Vpartment  of  Communications 

10,074,222 

Total 

20,036,273 

115.983,717 

95,947,444 

Grand  total 

84,581,872 

223,678,844 

139,096,972 

"The  expenditures  of  the  War  and  the  Navy  Departments  do  not  correspond  with  the  figures  of 
the  armament  expenditures  mentioned  in  Part  I  of  this  volume,  because  the  decoration  annuities 
and  other  rewards  do  not  come  under  the  jurisdiction  of  these  departments. 

uted  to  the  post-bellum  administrative  expansion  and  the 
increase  of  national  loans  caused  by  the  war.  The  admin- 
istrative program  made  out  subsequent  to  the  Sino-Japanese 
War  was  unparalleled  in  extent.  Besides  the  enlargement  of 
the  army  and  navy,  numerous  other  schemes  were  set  on 
foot,  such  as  the  establishment  of  metal-refining  works,  the 
construction  and  improvement  of  railways,  the  expansion 
of  telegraphs,  telephones,  and  navigation,  the  establishment 
of  the  Kyoto  Imperial  University,  the  Second  Higher  Normal 


I38         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

School,  the  Second  Higher  Commercial  School,  the  Sixth 
Higher  School,  the  Higher  Industrial  School,  and  the  Higher 
Agricultural  and  Dendrological  School,  the  founding  of  the 
Hypothec  Bank  of  Japan,  the  Bank  of  Formosa,  and  the  Hok- 
kaido Colonization  Bank,  and  various  other  plans  concerning 
the  administration  of  Formosa,  the  encouragement  of  agri- 
culture, industry  and  commerce,  and  river  improvements. 
All  these  schemes  had  as  their  object  the  completion  of  the 
national  power  and  the  development  of  industries,  and  the 
expenditure  involved  in  them  was  enormous.  Let  us  now 
consider  the  importance  of  the  armament  expenditures  in 
this  huge  post-bellum  program  by  enumerating  the  various 
expenditures  required  in  the  new  schemes  by  referring  to  the 
budget  explanations  for  the  various  fiscal  years  concerned : 


I.  Armament  expansion: 

(a)  Army — total  of  the  first,  the  second,  and  the  supplementary  Yen 

expansions 101,51)1,217 

(1 1)  Navy — expansions  decided  upon  in  1896  and  1899,  the  ex- 
pansion scheme  made  in  1903  being  excepted  because  most 
of  the  expenditures  therefor  were  to  be  made  during  and 
after  1904 211,650,1 16 

Total 3i3.24i.333 

_'.  (  onstruction  and  enlargement  of  refineries 19,202,694 

3.  Construction  and  improvement  of  railways 61,469,000 

(The  so-called  First  Period  Railway  Construction  Expenditures, 

amounting  in  all  to  59,92 1,663  yen>  were  mostly  to  be  de- 
frayed after  the  Sino-japanese  War,  or  in  16  years  during  and 
after  i<So3;  but  as  they  can  not  be  included  in  the  post-bellum 
program,  we  have  only  given  the  above  figures,  which  represenl 
the  expenditures  for  the  new  post-bellum  schemes  supple- 
mentary to  the  said  First  Period  Railway  Construction  Ex- 
penditures.) 

4.  Extension  of  telephones  and  telegraphs 13,507,000 

5.  River  improvements i9.357,ooo 

6.  Extension  of  educational  work 2,075,000 

(Annual  subsidy  for  primary  schools) 1,000,000 

7.  Colonization  of  Hokkaido 19,740,000 

(These  are  chiefly  railway  const  ruction  expenses.) 

8.  Harbor- works  subsidies 7,660,000 

9.  Navigation  subsidies. 

(In  i8c6  the  regulations  for  Navigation  Encouragement  Ex- 
pend it  ure,  the  Navigation  Subsidy  Law,  and  the  Shipbuilding 
Encouragement  Expenditure  were  revised,  and  the  amounts 
allowed  according  to  the  new  system  gradually  increased  from 
1 ,200  000  yen  in  [897  to  5  000,000  yen  each  in  1902  and  1903.) 
to.  Annual  subsidy  for  Formosan  railways 175,000 

I I.  Special  Forestry  Working  Expenses       6,000,000 

(Disbursements  from  iK<)<>to  1903.) 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   STATE  FINANCE  139 

Yen 

12.  Aids  to  the  special  account  of  Formosa 50,000,000 

(Disbursements  from  18  7  to  1  05.) 

13.  Assigned  to  the  Imperial  property 20,000,000 

14.  Replenishing  fund  for  warships  and  torpedo  boats  ] 

Natural  calamity  emergency  fund j- 50,000,000 

Educational  work  fund J 

15.  Other  works: 

The  chief  of  these  are  prison  expenses  defrayed  out  of  the  Na- 
tional Treasury  (annual  outlay  estimated  at  not  less  than 
3,000,000  yen),  subsidy  for  water  works  (about  870  000  yen), 
etc.,  the  other  minor  items  being  the  expenses  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  experimental  breeding  farm  for  the  improve- 
ment of  oxen,  etc. 

Heavy  expenditures  were  necessarily  required  for  the  post- 
bellum  program  made  out  on  so  large  a  scale,  and  it  was  but 
natural  that  the  Annual  Account  was  thereby  made  to  expand 
suddenly.  However,  the  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that 
the  rate  of  increase  of  armament  expenditures  was  quite  dis- 
proportionate in  comparison  with  other  items  of  expenditure; 
that  is  to  say,  the  expenditures  for  armament  expansion  rose 
to  313,000,000  yen,  and  if  we  add  to  this  the  expenses  for  the 
establishment  of  the  iron  foundry,  the  total  exceeds  330,000,- 
000  yen.  This  enormous  amount  was  really  more  than  twice 
the  aggregate  total  of  the  expenditures  of  all  the  other  new 
schemes,  including  their  continuing  expenditures,  to  be  dis- 
bursed annually  until  1903. 

Another  thing  which  must  be  noticed  as  an  effect  of  the 
war  and  armament  expenditures  on  the  Annual  Account  is 
the  increase  of  the  debt  charges  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War. 
The  amount  of  the  national  loans,  which  totaled  234,814,000 
yen  at  the  end  of  1893,  suddenly  increased  after  the  war  and 
became  382,953,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1897,  and  further 
increased  to  538,962,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1903.  The  cor- 
responding increases  in  the  debt  charges  during  said  decade 
were  from  19,455,000  yen  to  29,504,000  yen  and  to  36,484,000 
yen.  These  increases  in  the  national  loans  and  debt  charges 
were  principally  caused  by  the  war  loans  raised  on  account 
of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  which  amounted  to  117,000,000 
yen,  their  annual  interest  accruing  to  as  much  as  6,200,000 
yen.  We  have  already  seen,  in  the  comparative  annual 
percentages  of  the  debt  charges  and  administrative  expendi- 


140  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

turcs  appended  to  the  Conclusion  of  Part  I  of  this  volume, 
that  the  debt  charges  increased,  either  absolutely  or  propor- 
tionately, during  and  after  1897;  and  this  may  be  explained 
by  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  considerable  increase  of  the 
administrative  expenditures  generally,  it  was  yet  below  that 
of  the  debt  charges  caused  by  the  increase  of  the  war  loans. 
As  the  result  of  such  financial  expansion  after  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War  and  the  consequent  increase  of  expenditures, 
it  became  urgently  necessary  to  increase  the  annual  revenue 
by  all  possible  means.  Moreover,  although,  generally  speak- 
ing, the  above-mentioned  armament  expansion  schemes  had 
their  special  financial  resources,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
there  were  no  such  special  resources  available  for  increasing 
the  ordinary  expenditures  for  armament  occasioned  by  these 
expansion  schemes,  so  that  the  resources  therefor  had  to  be 
sought  in  the  increase  of  the  ordinary  revenue.  We  shall 
now  see  how  the  sources  of  revenue  were  adjusted  in  the 
decade  ending  with  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War 

!)y  explaining  in  brief  the  increase  of  national  loans,  the  dis- 
>osal   of  the  indemnity  money,   and   the   increase  of   taxes 
during  this  period. 

The  period  beginning  with  1893  and  ending  with  1903  is 
known  as  a  period  of  the  expansion  of  national  loans.  The 
loans  raised  in  this  period  were  the  Public  Works  Loan,  the 
Hokkaido  Railway  Loan,  the  Railway  Construction  Loan,  the 
Feudal  Pensions  Consolidation  Loan,  the  Formosan  Pub- 
lic Works  Loan,  and  the  first  4  per  cent  Sterling  Loan. 

I.  Public  Works  Loan  and  the  Hokkaido  Railway  Loan. — 
For  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  post-bellum  program 
for  the  improvement  of  the  government  railways,  for  the  con- 
struction of  railways  in  Hokkaido,  lor  the  extension  of  the 
telephone  service,  for  the  establishment  of  the  iron  foundry, 
and  for  armament  expansion,  the  government  had  great  need 
of  money  and  undertook  to  raise  168,000,000  yen  by  issuing 
a  Public  Works  Loan  and  a  Hokkaido  Railway  Loan  to  that 
amount.  The  armament  expansion  expenditures  were  origi- 
nally to  be  met  by  the  tise  of  the  indemnity  money,  but  as  a 


k 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  I4I 

part  of  the  indemnity  was  used  for  paying  the  Sino- Japanese 
War  expenditures,  it  was  intended  to  make  good  the  deficit 
by  issuing  the  Public  Works  Loan.  However,  the  issue  of 
this  loan  was  hindered  by  the  post-bellum  financial  pressure 
and  the  economic  weakness  caused  by  the  lack  of  harmony 
in  monetary  circles,  and  the  government  was  able  to  raise 
the  loan  only  by  means  of  a  special  issue  to  the  amount  of 
81,980,000  yen  until  the  year  1905. 

2.  Railway  Construction  Loan. — In  1893  it  was  decided 
that  a  loan  should  be  raised  to  the  amount  of  60,000,000  yen 
for  obtaining  a  fund  for  the  construction  of  railways,  and  in 
each  of  the  two  years  1893  and  1894  this  loan  was  issued  to 
the  amount  of  1,000,000  yen.  According  to  the  alteration 
made  later  in  the  railway  construction  plan,  it  was  determined 
to  raise  this  loan  to  the  total  amount  of  95,000,000  yen; 
but  owing  to  the  same  reason  mentioned  in  the  foregoing 
paragraph  with  regard  to  the  Public  Works  Loan,  it  was 
possible  for  the  government  to  effect  only  a  special  issue  to 
the  amount  of  70,000,000  yen  until  the  year  1905. 

3.  Feudal  Pensions  Consolidation  Loan. — As  a  final  step 
toward  the  consolidation  of  the  feudal  pensions,  this  loan 
was  floated  to  the  amount  of  282,500  yen. 

4.  Formosan  Public  Works  Loan. — These  bonds  were 
issued  with  the  object  of  meeting  the  expenses  connected 
with  various  undertakings  in  Formosa,  such  as  the  construc- 
tion of  railways,  the  surveying  and  reclamation  of  lands, 
harbor  works,  and  the  building  of  government  offices.  This 
loan  was  also  raised  by  means  of  a  special  issue,  and  the 
total  reached  34,508,000  yen. 

5.  First  4  per  cent  Sterling  Loan. — All  the  aforesaid 
loans  could  not  be  raised  to  the  derived  amount,  as  stated 
above,  and  although  at  first  the  government  could  resort  to 
the  so-called  special  issue  by  temporarily  utilizing  the  indem- 
nity money  and  other  funds,  the  time  for  reimbursing  the 
sums  thus  advanced  was  reached  in  the  year  1899,  and  it 
became  absolutely  necessary  to  raise  new  loans  to  the  amount 
of   100,000,000  yen.     At  last  the  government   issued  4  per 


I42  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

cent  Sterling  Loan  Bonds  and  obtained  as  proceeds  97,630,- 
000  yen,  which  was  apportioned  to  78,000,000  yen  for  the  Pub- 
lic Works  Loan,  17,570,000  yen  for  the  Railway  Construction 
Loan,  and  2,000,000  yen  for  the  Hokkaido  Railway  Loan. 

The  national  loans  thus  varied  a  great  deal  both  in  kind 
and  in  amount,  but  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  domestic  funds 
great  difficulties  were  encountered  in  floating  them.  At 
length  the  object  was  attained  by  raising  enormous  sums  by 
means  of  a  foreign  loan,  as  above  stated,  and  this  was  the 
origin  of  sustaining  the  Japanese  finances  through  recourse 
to  foreign  capital. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  reason  the  post-bellum  program 
was  made  out  on  so  extensive  a  scale  lay  in  the  fact  that  the 
amount  of  the  indemnity  obtained  as  the  result  of  the  victory 
was  very  large,  and  in  relation  to  the  poor  finances  of  the 
country  at  the  time  constituted  a  very  large  amount  of  ex- 
traordinary revenue;  and  this  was  reflected  in  an  exaggerated 
manner  upon  the  minds  of  both  the  government  and  the 
people.  Indeed,  the  receipt  of  the  indemnity  was  the  great- 
est cause  of  the  financial  and  economic  shaking  after  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War.  The  indemnity  money,  totaling  231,500,000 
taels,  consisted  of  the  following  three  items:  a  payment  of 
200,000,000  taels  as  indemnity  for  war  expenses,  an  annual 
payment  of  500,000  taels  as  indemnity  for  the  temporary 
occupation  of  Wei-hai-wei,  and  a  compensation  of  30,000,000 
taels  for  the  retrocession  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula.  In  the 
four  years  1 895-1 898  the  government  received  this  indemnity 
to  the  total  amount  of  £38,082,884  in  English  money,  or 
364,070,195  yen  in  Japanese  money.  The  indemnity  and 
its  interest  were  placed  under  separate  management  in  a 
Special  Account,  the  receipts  and  disbursements  of  which 
are  shown  on  the  following  page. 

The  expenditures  needed  for  the  post-bellum  schemes 
after  the  Sino-Japanese  War  were  thus  met  by  means  of  pub- 
lic loans  and  the  indemnity;  but  as  the  consequent  temporary 
expansion  of  revenue  led  to  the  expansion  of  enterprises,  it 
naturally  led  also  to  an  increase  of  ordinary  expenditures,  and 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  1 43 

the  government  was  compelled  to  seek  sources  of  ordinary  rev- 
enue. Under  these  circumstances,  increase  of  taxes  was  twice 
carried  out.  The  first  increase  was  effected  as  early  as  in  the 
year  1896,  because  in  that  year  the  deficit  in  the  Annual 
Account  already  amounted  to  68,000,000  yen,  and  even  the 
deficit  belonging  to  the  ordinary  revenue  was  not  less  than 
30,000,000  yen.  By  this  increased  taxation  an  additional 
annual  revenue  of  33,576,000  yen  was  obtained  by  inaugurat- 
ing a  business  tax  and  a  registration  tax,  by  enforcing  a  leaf- 
tobacco  monopoly,  by  increasing  the  sake  brewing  tax,  and 
by  effecting  a  general  adjustment  of  the  taxation  system, 
also  by  transferring  all  sorts  of  license  fees,  which  formerly 
belonged  to  sundry  taxes,  to  the  use  of  the  local  governments. 
Even  this,  however,  was  not  sufficient  to  make  good  the  defi- 
cit in  the  Annual  Account,  and  as  a  shortage  of  revenue 
became  unavoidable  for  the  fiscal  year  1899,  the  government 
made  out  a  bill  for  an  increased  taxation  on  land  and  sake. 
The  bill  was  submitted  to  the  Diet  but  rejected  by  it.  In 
1899  the  Diet  was  dissolved,  and  in  the  next  session  theobject 
of  increasing  taxes  was  at  last  attained.  In  this  second 
increase  of  taxes  an  additional  revenue  of  42,020,000  yen  was 
gained  by  either  increasing  or  introducing  the  land  tax, 
income  tax,  sake  tax,  tonnage  dues,  registration  tax,  leaf- 
tobacco  monopoly  receipts,  dues  from  the  Bank  of  Japan, 
soy  brewing  tax,  postal  receipts,  and  tobacco-monopoly 
receipts. 

Receipts:  Yen 

Indemnity  and  interest 364,868,586 

Disbursements: 

Army  expansion 56,798,638 

Navy  expansion I39»259.387 

Establishment  of  iron  foundry 579,762 

Assigned  to  the  special  account  of  extraordinary  war  expenditures  78,957,164 
Extraordinary  war  expenditures,  and  transport  and  communica- 
tion section  expenses 3,214,484 

Assigned  to  Imperial  property 20,000,000 

Formosan  administrative  expenses 12,000,000 

Assigned  to  the  three  funds  (cf.  supra) 50,000,000 

Assigned  to  the  Special  Account  for  the  Administration  of  Con- 
cessions Abroad  and  to  the  National  Debts  Consolidation  Fund  4,059,151 

Total 364,070,195 


144  ECONOMIC   EFFFXTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

In  short,  the  increase  of  taxes  at  this  period  was  the  nat- 
ural result  of  the  general  expansion  of  the  state  finances,  and 
the  amount  of  increase  reached  the  annual  sum  of  75,600,000 
yen,  which  was  about  half  of  the  total  156,000,000  yen  of  the 
tax  and  stamp  receipts  and  the  monopoly  profits  in  the  year 
1900,  or  exceeded  by  5,000,000  yen  the  tax  receipts  of  70,000,- 
000  yen  in  1893.  The  national  burden  thus  became  heavier 
and  heavier,  and  the  relation  between  the  armament  expendi- 
tures and  the  increase  of  taxation  may  be  seen  in  the  fact  that 
the  increase  of  the  ordinary  expenditures  at  the  time,  as  com- 
pared with  the  year  1893,  was  84,000,000  yen,  or  130  per  cent, 
/of  which  25,520,000  yen,  or  33  per  cent,  was  that  of  the  ordi- 
nary expenditures  for  armament. 


n 


From  the  Russo-Japanese  War  to  the  Present  Day 


In  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  disbursements  as  war 
expenditures  amounted  to  about  1,860,000,000  yen,  and  the 
amount  required  in  the  expansion  of  the  army  and  navy  in 
the  ten  years  following  the  war  was  about  1,634,000,000  yen. 
These  two  figures  added  together  amount  to  as  much  as  3,494,- 
000,000  yen,  and  although  the  Annual  Account  of  this  country 
is  expanding  year  after  year  and  has  amounted  in  recent 
years  to  some  600,000,000  yen,  such  an  enormous  amount  of 
expenditures  for  war  and  armament  must  have  had  a  great 
effect  on  the  country's  finance  generally.  The  following 
figures  will  show  the  financial  changes  by  comparing  the 
Settled  Accounts  of  1903,  the  year  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  with  those  of  the  year  1908. 

According  to  the  following  table  the  ordinary  expenditures 
of  the  year  1908,  as  compared  with  those  of  1903,  underwent 
an  increase  of  more  than  140  per  cent,  and  the  extraordinary 
expenditures  an  increase  of  more  than  180  per  cent.  A  simi- 
lar increasing  tendency  is  also  to  be  observed  in  the  annual 
revenue,  as  the  ordinary  revenue  increased  by  127  per  cent, 
or  from  224,180,699  yen  in  1903  to  509,862,986  yen  in  1908, 
and  the  grand  total  revenue  increased  by  200  per  cent,  or 


EFFECTS   ON  THE   STATE   FINANCE  1 45 

Annual  Expenditures  Before  and  After  the  Russo-Japanese  War  a 


Items 

Amount 

expended 

1903 

Amount 

expended 

1908 

Increase 

Ordinary  expenditures: 

Imperial  household 

Yen 

3,000,000 
36,484,520 

5,688,561 
39,355,388 
21,530,237 

63,703,208 

Yen 

3,000,000 

183,031,308 

27,535,6o8 

67,665,133 

34,347-700 

93,666,173 

Yen 

146,546,788 
21,847,047 
28,309,745 
12,817,463 

29,962,965 

Army  Department 

Navy  Department 

General  administrative  and  depart- 
mental expenditures 

Total 

169,761,914 

409,245,922 

239,484,008 

Extraordinary  expenditures: 

Army  Department 

7,529,174 
14,587,620 
57,717-423 

74,140,048 

37,230,748 

1 15.744-375 

66,610,874 
22,643,128 
58,026,952 

Navy  Department 

Other  departments 

Total 

79,834,217 

227,115,171 

147,280,954 

Grand  total 

249,596,131 

636,361,093 

386,764,962 

a  In  the  expenditures  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  Departments,  the  annuities  and  pensions  are 
not  included. 

from  260,220,758  yen  to  794,937,260  yen.  The  unusual 
expansion  of  finance  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  is  con- 
spicuously shown  by  the  above  figures,  and  as  may  be  seen 
from  the  foregoing  comparative  list  of  Settled  Accounts,  the 
main  cause  of  the  expansion  lay  in  the  increase  of  debt  charges. 
This  increase,  plus  the  increase  of  annuities  and  pensions, 
accounts  for  about  half  of  the  total  increase  of  the  annual 
expenditures.  While  the  administrative  expenditures  in- 
creased by  about  70  per  cent,  the  expenses  for  military 
affairs  increased  by  about  150  per  cent.  Now,  we  may  con- 
clude that  the  first  cause  (in  the  order  of  importance)  of  the 
expansion  of  the  Annual  Account  after  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  was  the  increase  of  debt  charges  consequent  upon  the 
increase  of  national  loans;  the  second  cause  was  the  expendi- 
tures required  for  armament  and  its  expansion  after  the  war; 
and  the  third  cause  was  the  increase  of  the  general  admin- 
istrative expenditures. 

The  lack  of  a  firm  financial  basis  has  been  the  common 


I46  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

defect  of  the  country's  finance  in  the  last  eight  years,  and  this 
is  evidently  attributable  to  the  three  causes  above  men- 
tioned. We  may  say  that,  generally  speaking,  the  absolute 
as  well  as  proportionate  increases  of  war  and  armament 
expenditures  made  the  government  finance  insecure  or  placed 
it  in  an  almost  precarious  condition. 

To  be  more  explicit  in  our  observation,  we  think  we  may 
distinguish  two  periods  in  the  country's  finance  of  the  last 
ten  years.  The  first  period  ends  with  the  year  1908,  during 
which  disorder  ruled  Japanese  finance.  This  condition 
may  have  been  due  to  the  fact  that  the  post-bellum  enter- 
prises were  all  rough  and  unprepared,  but  this  in  turn  gave 
proof  of  the  urgent  necessity  of  carrying  out  the  great 
post-bellum  program.  In  this  first  period  the  extraordinary 
special  taxes  or  war  taxes  continued  to  be  levied,  and  public 
loans  on  a  very  large  scale  were  raised,  and  yet  the  financial 
condition  was  such  that  the  Annual  Account  could  not  get 
rid  of  deficits.  The  second  period  began  with  (he  year  1909, 
and  in  this  period  all  the  energy  was  used  toward  putting  an 
vm\  to  the  war-time  finance.  Consequently,  the  basis  of  the 
Annual  Account  gradually  gained  firmness,  and  rays  of  hope 
were  perceived  beyond.  In  other  words,  the  first  period  was 
of  a  positive  nature  and  the  second  of  a  negative  nature,  and 
both  were  subject  to  the  conditions  brought  about  by  the 
direct  influence  of  war  and  armament  expenditures.     How- 

iever,  we  may  say  that  beginning  with  the  years  1912  and  1913, 
the  Japanese  finances  began  to  be  restored  to  the  normal 
state,  and  the  first  stage  of  the  post-bellum  financial  adjust- 
ment seemed  to  have  been  passed. 

It  is  now  necessary  for  us  to  see  what  important  position 
the  expenses  for  military  affairs  occupied  as  against  the 
various  other  expenditures  required  for  post-bellum  adminis- 
tration. The  first  of  the  great  works  in  the  post-bellum  pro- 
gram was  the  nationalization  of  the  railways.  From  the 
early  days  of  the  Meiji  Era  it  was  the  policy  of  the  government 
to  put  all  the  railways  under  the  government's  own  control 
and  management;  but  for  financial  reasons  this  policy  had 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   STATE  FINANCE  1 47 

not  been  carried  into  effect,  though  the  plan  therefor  was 
several  times  contemplated.  However,  the  experiences  ob- 
tained during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  troops  and  munitions,  and  the  irregular  conditions  in 
the  working  of  the  various  private  railways,  taught  the  govern- 
ment that  it  was  now  of  paramount  importance  -to  carry  out 
the  nationalization  of  private  railways  as  the  first  step  in  the 
post-bellum  program.  Thus,  railway  nationalization  was 
decided  upon  during  the  war,  and  though  it  was  generally 
believed  that  the  financial  resources  for  carrying  it  out  might 
be  sought  in  a  war  indemnity,  unfortunately  the  war  did  not 
bring  even  a  penny  of  indemnity.  But  as  the  necessity  for 
nationalizing  the  railways  never  diminished  on  that  account, 
it  was  decided  to  carry  it  out  by  means  of  public  loans.  This 
was  indeed  the  first  step  towrard  leading  the  post-bellum 
finance  to  ruin.  In  one  year  (October,  1906-Septembern 
1907)  the  railways  of  seventeen  private  companies,  the  extent 
of  which  was  2,822  miles,  were  purchased  by  the  government. 
The  purchase  price  amounted  to  481,981,000  yen,  for  which 
purpose  the  Railway  Nationalization  Loans  were  raised  to 
the  amount  of  476,310,000  yen.  Side  by  side  with  the  nation- 
alization of  railways,  the  government  formed  a  great  plan 
for  the  construction  and  improvement  of  railways,  and  for 
the  financial  management  a  special  account  was  established 
by  which  it  was  intended  to  accumulate  its  own  profits  in 
order  gradually  to  complete  the  railway  network  all  over  the 
country.  It  was  also  intended  that  by  reason  of  the  burden 
of  this  special  account  ordinary  loans  and  public  loans  should 
be  raised  according  to  necessity  without  interfering  with  the 
General  Account.  However,  the  actual  state  of  things 
proved  to  be  such  that  during  and  after  1909  funds  between 
20,000,000  yen  and  50,000,000  yen  were  annually  borrowed 
from  the  deposit  section  of  the  Department  of  Finance.  This 
fact  revealed  the  straitened  circumstances  of  the  Special 
Account  of  the  Nationalized  Railways,  and  also  brought 
about  bad  results  in  financial  and  economic  circles.  The 
second  important  problem  in  the  post-bellum  program  was 


I48         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

the  administration  of  the  newly  acquired  territories — Man- 
churia, Korea,  and  Saghalien.  The  government,  which  had 
already  disbursed  enormous  amounts  in  the  management  of 
these  places  even  during  the  war,  was  obliged  to  disburse 
85,800*000  yen  in  all  during  and  after  1907  until  1913,  that 
is  to  say,  60,000,000  yen  in  the  form  of  advances  to  the  Ko- 
rean Government,  Korean  Residency-General  Expenditures, 
and  supplements  to  the  general  expenditures  of  the  Korean 
Government,  21,800,000  yen  for  supplements  to  the  general 
expenditures  of  the  Kwantung  Government,  and  3,500,000 
yen  for  supplements  to  the  Saghalien  administrative  expendi- 
tures. Thus,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  colonies  added 
a  great  burden  to  the  finances  of  the  government.  In  the 
third  place,  the  government  established  a  great  scheme  of 
riparian  works  and  made  a  plan  for  disbursing  a  total  of 
193,000,000  yen  in  the  eighteen  years  beginning  with  191 1. 
Besides  the  expenditures  for  the  three  great  works  enumerated 
above,  there  were  innumerable  other  items  of  expenditure 
belonging  to  various  departments  of  the  government  that 
may  be  recognized  as  expenditures  for  post-bellum  undertak- 
ings. However,  the  expenditures  belonging  properly  to  the 
new  post-bellum  schemes  may  be  said  to  have  been  131,401,- 
000  yen,  or  the  total  post-bellum  continuing  expenditures  run- 
ning until  the  year  1913,  and  the  aforesaid  expenditures  for 
the  nationalization  of  railways.  Turning  to  the  post-bellum 
program  for  military  affairs  generally,  we  find  that,  as  narrated 
in  Chapter  V  of  Part  I,  there  were  plans  for  the  creation  of 
-i.\  new  divisions  of  the  army  and  the  adoption  of  the  two- 
year  system  for  foot  soldiers  in  the  army,  and  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  500,000  ton  system  in  the  navy.  The  expendi- 
1 11  res  required  for  these  plans  were  169,000,000  yen  in  the  army 
and  334,000,000  yen  in  the  navy,  the  actual  amounts  dis- 
tanced until  the  year  1913  having  reached  127,000,000  yen 
in  the  army  and  332,000,000  yen  in  the  navy.  Putting 
aside  the  railway  nationalization  expenditures,  the  whole 
of  which  remained  as  capital  stock,  we  may  now  say  that 
the  expenditures  for  military  affairs  were  three  and   a  half 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANi  I  1 49 

times  all  the  other  expenditures.  If  we  add  to  these  the 
130,000,000  yen  disbursed  during  and  after  1907  out  of 
the  General  Account  on  account  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  expenditures  the  said  ratio  will  increase  to  four  and 
a  half  times.  It  is  needless  to  specify  how  greatly  the 
expenditures  for  military  affairs  contributed  to  the  ex- 
treme expansion  and  precarious  condition  of  the  post-bellum 
finances  of  the  country. 

The  general  tendency  of  expanding  the  post-bellum 
Annual  Accounts  is  as  stated  above;  and  let  us  now  see  by 
what  methods  the  financial  resources  therefor  were  obtained. 
The  national  loans,  which  amounted  to  538,000,000  yen  at 
the  end  of  1903,  rose  to  the  highest  amount  of  2,650,000,000 
yen  at  the  end  of  1910.  Meanwhile,  the  annual  interest! 
increased  correspondingly  from  25,700,000  yen  to  119,500,- 
000  yen.  These  great  financial  burdens  were  all  caused 
by  the  war  loans  raised  to  meet  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
expenditures  and  by  the  public  loans  issued  for  railway 
nationalization.  The  government,  recognizing  the  urgency 
of  establishing  a  sound  policy  regarding  national  loans, 
opened  a  special  account  called  the  National  Debts  Consoli- 
dation Fund,  and  by  utilizing  for  it  an  annual  disbursement 
of  110,000,000  yen  from  the  General  Account  opened  the  way 
for  consolidating  the  national  loans  at  the  first  opportunity. 
But  the  majority  of  the  suddenly  increased  national  loans 
were  superabundant  in  the  market  and  their  value  showed  a 
depreciating  tendency  day  by  day.  The  5  per  cent  loans, 
for  instance,  which  were  quoted  at  96.50  yen  in  February, 
1906,  went  down  to  79.00  yen  in  March,  1907.  The  govern- 
ment endeavored  to  devise  methods  for  maintaining  their 
prices,  and  as  a  means  to  that  end  it  abolished  the  Stock 
Exchange  Tax  on  national  loan  transactions,  exempted 
national  loans  from  registration  taxes,  allowed  the  payment 
of  revenue  dues  in  national  loan  bonds  and  interest  coupons, 
and  exempted  from  income  tax  the  interest  accruing  from 
national  loan  bonds.  But  the  object  of  keeping  up  the  prices 
of  national   loans  could   not   be  attained.     At  last,  in  1908, 


150         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

radical  measures  for  consolidating  the  national  loans  were 
undertaken  by  the  Katsura  Cabinet,  and  for  that  purpose 
the  curtailment  of  the  General  Account  and  the  postponement 
of  various  prearranged  undertakings  were  effected.  Thus, 
an  annual  redemption  of  national  loans  to  the  amount  of 
50,000,000  yen  was  fixed  upon,  by  which  the  credit  of  the 
national  loans  was  to  a  certain  extent  restored,  and  the  gov- 
ernment then  proceeded  to  consolidate  the  high-interest 
loans.  Prior  to  this  there  were  already  the  6  per  cent  Ster- 
ling Bonds  floated  to  the  amount  of  £25,000,000  in  November, 
1905,  for  the  purpose  of  redeeming  the  fourth  and  the  fifth 
Exchequer  Bonds,  and  the  5  per  cent  Sterling  Bonds  issued 
to  the  amount  of  £23,000,000  in  March,  1907,  for  the  purpose 
of  converting  the  first  and  the  second  6  per  cent  Sterling 
Bonds.  There  were  still  remaining  some  590,000,000  yen  of 
domestic  and  foreign  loans  bearing  interest  in  excess  of  5  per 
cent,  and  the  consolidation  of  these  high-interest  loans  was 
the  work  of  the  Katsura  Cabinet.  Consequently,  in  Febru- 
ary and  March  of  1910,  4  per  cent  domestic  loans  amounting 
to  100,000,000  yen  were  issued  in  each  of  the  two  months, 
and  in  May  of  the  same  year  French  loans  were  also  issued 
to  the  amount  of  450,000,000  francs  and  English  loans  to 
the  amount  of  £11,000,000.  At  the  same  time  there  was 
also  effected  a  special  issue  of  4  per  cent  domestic  loans  to 
the  amount  of  77,000,000  yen.  In  this  way  the  redemption 
was  effected  of  the  5  per  cent  loans,  such  as  the  Navy  Loans, 
the  Consolidated  Public  Loans,  the  Second  Exchequer  Bonds, 
the  Railway  Nationalization  Bonds,  and  the  Extraordinary 
Military  Expenditures  Loans.  The  aggregate  amount  of 
national  loans  was  thus  to  a  certain  extent  reduced,  that  is, 
to  2,493,900,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1912,  the  annual  interest 
having  also  come  down  to  114,870,000  yen.  The  national 
loans  consolidation  work  was  thus  far  accomplished.  It  re- 
mains to  be  seen,  however,  whether  or  not  such  an  enormous 
amount  of  national  loans  was  too  great  a  burden  on  the 
national  economy;  and  in  particular  it  must  be  noted  that  the 
burden  of  the  national  loans  caused  by  the  Russo-Japanese 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   STATE   FINANCE  I5I 

War  has  remained  until   this  clay  almost  without  decrease 
in  amount. 

We  have  already  seen  in  Chapter  V  of  Part  I  of  this 
volume  that  extraordinary  special  taxes  were  inaugurated  to 
meet  the  expenditures  for  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  In 
spite  of  the  fact  that  these  extraordinary  special  taxes  were 
meant  to  be  levied  only  for  a  certain  limited  time,  the  post- 
bellum  financial  requirements  necessitated  their  continuance, 
and  inequality  and  excess  of  burden  were  the  inevitable 
results.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  could  not  be  allowed  to  con- 
tinue, so  that  during  and  after  1910  a  partial  revision  of  the 
taxation  system  was  effected,  viz.,  an  0.8  per  cent  decrease 
was  effected  in  the  land  tax;  the  mode  of  assessment  and 
the  rates  of  business  taxes  were  revised ;  the  inheritance  taxes 
were  lowered;  the  mode  of  assessment  was  revised  in  the 
sake  tax  and  sugar  excise ;  and  a  decrease  was  effected  in  the 
excise  on  textiles  and  salt-monopoly  prices.  These  revisions 
of  the  taxation  system  brought  about  an  annual  decrease  of 
revenue  amounting  to  15,000,000  yen.  But  these  innovations 
in  the  taxation  system  merely  resulted  in  the  removal  of  two 
or  three  conspicuous  defects  in  taxes,  and  a  sufficient  recti- 
fication in  the  fundamental  lines  of  taxation  was  never  made. 
The  receipts  from  taxation,  which  amounted  to  146,000,000 
yen  in  1903,  rose  to  nearly  twice  that  amount,  or  283,000,000  ' 
yen,  in  1906,  and  thus  the  aforesaid  small  revisions  introduced 
in  the  taxation  system  had  not  produced  any  noteworthy 
effect.  In  191 3  the  revenue  from  taxes  further  came  to 
336,000,000  yen,  and  the  profits  of  the  government  monopolies  ) 
aggregated  65,000,000  yen.  We  do  not  know  when  we  shall 
be  able  to  see  the  alleviation  of  this  burden  of  taxes,  but  at 
any  rate  the  radical  adjustment  of  these  heavy  taxes  is  a 
long-pending  question  with  both  the  government  and  the 
public. 

In  summary  it  may  be  said  that  the  finances  of  Japan  in 
recent  years  have  been  suffering  from  the  scarcity  of  financial 
resources,  notwithstanding  the  extraordinary  expansion  of 
the   Annual    Account,    and    that  great   financial  difficulties 


152  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURE 

were  caused  by  the  increase  of  debts.  It  is  quite  clear  that 
all  this  was  principally  due  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and 
the  post-bellum  military  expansion.  Owing  to  the  insuf- 
ficiency of  funds,  the  expenditures  for  general  administrative 
affairs  have  always  been  curtailed,  and  while  this  tendency 
was  made  so  great  by  the  positive  policy  pursued  in  the  three 
years  after  the  war,  the  negative  policy  adopted  in  the  five 
years  thereafter  could  barely  rescue  the  finances  from  ruin. 


CHAPTER  III 

EFFECTS  ON  THE  MONEY  MARKET 

With  regard  to  the  effects  of  the  war  and  armament  expendi- 
tures  on  the  money  market,  we  regret  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
make  no  exact  statistical  investigation,  but  only  to  draw  con- 
clusions based  on  mere  inference.  This  is  partly  due  to  the 
fact  that  we  can  not  in  this  case  make  any  distinction  between 
the  disbursements  for  war  and  armament  purposes  and  those 
for  general  administrative  purposes  and  debt  charges,  and 
partly  to  the  fact  that,  even  where  similar  amounts  of  money 
were  disbursed,  their  effects  on  the  money  market  differed 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  the  disbursements  were 
made  and  according  to  the  condition  of  the  money  market 
at  the  time.  As  regards  the  comparative  study  of  the  war 
and  armament  expenditures  and  those  of  other  administra- 
tive expenditures,  we  have  already  discussed  it  in  consid- 
erable detail  in  Part  I  of  this  volume,  and  that  must  form  the 
premise  of  our  discussion  in  this  chapter.  We  shall  now  give 
here  by  way  of  introduction  a  brief  outline  of  the  development 
of  the  money  market  of  this  country. 

The  history  of  the  Japanese  money  market  since  the  time  of 
the  Restoration  is  commonly  divided  into  three  periods.  The 
first  period  extends  from  the  first  year  of  Meiji  (1868)  to  1877. 
This  was  the  period  in  which  the  monetary  organs  were  created 
and  the  system  of  the  utilization  of  capital  was  established. 
Though  in  this  period  many  new  institutions  were  started  to 
take  the  place  of  the  old  feudal  systems,  there  was  no  time  to 
exercise  calm  and  careful  discretion  in  the  adoption  of  these 
new  departures.  As  society  was  thrown  open  to  the  agricul- 
tural, industrial  and  mercantile  classes,  who  lost  their  former 
privileges  and  mingled  with  the  Shizoku  or  former  Samurai 
(military  class),  who  in  turn  were  compelled  to  procure  new 
means  of  livelihood,  a  chaotic  condition  came  to  prevail  in  the 

153 


154         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

economic  world.  Though  we  call  it  a  period  of  the  establish- 
ment of  the  utilization  of  capital,  it  was  in  reality  a  period  in 
which  no  regular  order  of  things  was  yet  constituted. 

What  is  called  the  second  period  in  the  history  of  the  money 
market  of  the  Meiji  Era  begins  with  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  in 
1877  and  ends  with  the  year  1886,  in  which  the  convertible  sys- 
tem of  government  paper  money  was  finally  established,  and 
it  may  be  called  the  period  of  reforming  the  monetary  organs 
and  of  developing  the  system  of  capital  investment.  The 
monetary  organs  created  in  the  first  period  were  a  mixture  of 
the  old  and  the  new  ages.  They  were  of  such  crude  and  in- 
ferior nature  that  no  healthy  progress  was  expected  of  them, 
and  the  hard  times  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  revealed  the 
necessity  of  their  radical  reform.  As  for  the  system  of  capital 
investment,  indications  of  the  development  of  which  were  ob- 
servable in  the  first  period,  it  gradually  commenced  to  pro- 
gress with  the  adjustment  of  paper  money.  The  formation  of 
a  national  economy,  in  its  modern  sense,  was  at  last  accom- 
plished toward  the  close  of  this  period,  and  the  correlation  of 
the  monetary  circles  all  over  the  country  could  at  last  be  seen. 

The  third  period  is  the  period  from  the  year  1886  to  the 
present  day.  It  may  be  styled  the  period  of  the  active  work- 
ing of  the  monetary  organs  and  the  smooth  working  of  the 
system  of  capital  investment.  In  this  period  we  recognize  for 
the  first  time  the  proper  development  of  the  money  market 
in  conformity  with  the  national  economy,  and  the  existence 
of  the  monetary  organs  to  cope  with  it.  In  the  last  few  years 
of  this  period  we  also  note  the  international  intercourse  of 
our  monetary  circles. 

The  development  of  monetary  organs  and  of  a  money  mar- 
ket in  this  country  is  as  roughly  stated  above,  and  the  effects 
of  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  on  the  money  market 
are  differently  characterized  according  to  the  said  different 
periods  of  the  history  of  the  money  market.  We  may  say  that 
the  effects  in  the  first  period  were  confusion  with  lack  of  con- 
nection between  them,  the  only  question  being  to  what  extent 
the  establishment  and  creation  of  the  monetary  organs  and 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 55 

money  market  were  made  difficult.  The  same  state  of  affairs 
also  prevailed  in  the  second  period.  In  the  third  period  only 
are  we  able  to  discuss  in  what  manner  the  already  formed  na- 
tional money  market  could  meet  the  requirements  of  war  and 
armament  expenditures.  In  this  chapter,  however,  the  above- 
mentioned  different  periods  are  not  followed,  but  for  conven- 
ience of  reference  the  epochs  as  classified  in  Part  I  of  this  vol- 
ume are  pursued  instead. 

From  the  Restoration  War  to  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 
Disorder  of  Currency  System  and  Issuance  of  New  Paper  Notes 

The  Tokugawa  Government  met  its  expenditures  by  a 
financial  system  peculiar  to  the  feudal  age,  but,  owing  to  grow- 
ing financial  distress  at  the  time  of  its  downfall,  it  frequently 
resorted  to  recoinage  as  its  invariable  relief  measure,  and  in 
every  case,  excepting  the  solitary  case  of  the  Kioho  Era  (1715- 
1734),  it  brought  out  coins  of  lighter  weight  and  lower  quality. 
Thus,  the  coinage  system,  though  nominally  kept  intact,  was 
practically  destroyed  in  the  end  through  continual  debasement. 
Besides,  some  of  the  Daimios  (feudal  princes)  often  took  the 
liberty  of  secretly  coining  money,  while  the  practice  of  issuing 
paper  money  for  circulation  within  their  separate  jurisdictions 
became  well-nigh  universal.  In  a  word,  the  currency  system 
of  the  country  at  the  end  of  the  Shogunate  period  was  in  a 
most  disordered  condition. 

On  entering  Yedo  (now  Tokyo)  the  Imperialist  forces  cap- 
tured the  feudal  mints,  seized  the  coins,  and  grasped  the  power 
of  coinage.  But  they  could  introduce  no  improvements,  hav- 
ing only  followed  the  old  coinage  system,  and,  as  they  even 
issued  inferior  coins,  the  disordered  condition  of  the  currency 
system  was  made  still  greater.  The  outflow  of  specie,  which 
had  been  great  since  the  Ansei  Era  (1 854-1 859),  became  more 
and  more  conspicuous,  and  the  depreciation  of  the  currency 
reached  its  extreme.  In  1870  the  Imperial  Government  drew 
up  a  plan  for  reorganizing  the  existing  coinage  system  on  a 
sound  basis,  and  by  issuing  new  coins  in  1871  on  the  gold 


I56         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

standard  it  endeavored  to  accomplish  in  a  single  effort  the 
great  work  of  unifying  the  coinage  system.  The  gold  stand- 
ard was  of  course  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  examples  of 
the  other  countries,  but  the  issuing  of  new  coins  could  not  be 
carried  out  as  the  government  wished  because  of  the  enormous 
amount  of  the  government  paper  money  and  the  old  currency 
that  was  already  in  circulation.  The  adoption  of  the  gold 
standard  remained  almost  a  mere  plan,  therefore,  and  could 
not  produce  the  desired  effect.  Moreover,  the  new  coinage 
system  was  defective  in  that  the  coins  of  legal  tender  were  to 
be  driven  out  of  the  country  by  the  subsidiary  coins,  owing  to 
fluctuations  of  the  ratio  of  value  between  gold  and  silver.  The 
silver  trade  dollar  (Boyeki  ichi  yen  gin),  which  was  current  at 
the  time,  drove  the  legal  tender  gold  coins  out  of  the  country. 
But  the  government  did  not  have  the  penetration  to  discern 
the  truth  of  the  situation,  and  thinking  that  the  Mexican 
dollars  could  be  driven  out  by  increasing  the  weight  of  the 
trade  dollar,  it  ventured  to  increase  the  weight  of  the  trade 
dollar  in  1875.  The  government  was  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
by  doing  so  the  rampancy  of  the  Mexican  dollars  was  still 
more  increased.  It  could  not  be  helped  that  the  government 
at  that  time  often  committed  blunders  of  this  sort.  The  gov- 
ernment's scheme  of  improving  the  coinage  system  having 
thus  failed,  in  November,  1878,  the  gold  standard  was  given 
up  and  a  gold  and  silver  bimetallic  system  was  adopted.  In 
practice,  however,  as  there  was  no  circulation  of  gold  coins,  it 
may  be  said  that  Japan  had  adopted  from  this  time  on  a  silver 
monometallic  system. 

Though  the  work  undertaken  by  the  Meiji  Government  for 
the  reorganization  of  the  coinage  system  ended  in  a  fiasco,  yet 
it  can  not  be  denied  that  by  these  efforts  the  standard  unit  of 
value  was  fixed  and  a  certain  progress  was  made  in  the  unifica- 
tion of  the  coinage  system. 

What  formed,  then,  an  important  question  of  the  monetary 
system,  in  contradistinction  to  the  unification  of  the  coinage 
system,  was  the  issuance  of  inconvertible  paper  money.  As 
narrated  previously,  the  financial  resources  for  the  expenses 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 57 

of  the  War  of  the  Restoration  were  sought  chiefly  in  the  issue  of 
inconvertible  paper  money,  and  it  must  thus  follow  that  the 
most  important  economic  effects,  or  especially  the  effects  of 
the  expenses  for  military  affairs  of  the  War  of  the  Restoration 
upon  the  money  market,  were  produced  through  the  channels 
of  the  inconvertible  paper  money.  The  issuance  of  paper 
money  by  the  Meiji  Government  began  with  the  Dajokan- 
satsu  (or  the  notes  of  Dajokan)  of  the  19th  of  the  intercalary 
month  of  April,  1868.  The  principal  object  of  the  issuance 
was  to  provide  for  the  expenses  for  military  affairs  for  the  War 
of  the  Restoration,  and  the  old  methods  of  issuing  the  Han 
(clan)  notes  were  pursued.  The  government  had  to  make  a 
loan  of  these  notes  to  the  Han  governments,  at  their  request, 
the  amount  being  proportioned  to  the  revenue  of  each  Han, 
at  the  rate  of  10,000  no  (old  yen)  for  each  10,000  koku  of  rice. 
The  liquidation  of  these  loans  was  to  be  made  by  yearly  instal- 
ments, in  the  same  paper  money,  10  per  cent  of  the  loans  being 
payable  at  the  close  of  each  year.  While  the  object  of  issuing 
these  notes  was  proclaimed  to  be  that  of  supplying  capital  for 
the  development  of  industry,  as  shown  in  the  wording  of  the 
Imperial  Ordinance  concerned,  viz.,  "in  order  to  lay  the  foun- 
dations for  the  wealth  of  the  country,"  and  "as  an  emergency 
measure  for  the  relief  of  universal  distress  among  the  people," 
it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  another  very  urgent  object  was  that 
of  obtaining  war  funds.  The  Dajokan-satsu  issued  in  such 
a  manner  and  with  such  an  object  amounted  to  48,000,000 
rio  during  the  period  from  April,  1868,  to  November,  1869. 

In  1869  another  Imperial  Ordinance  appeared  in  regard  to 
the  issuing  of  the  Mimbusho-satsu,  or  the  notes  issued  by  the 
Home  Department.  The  end  sought  was  to  relieve  the  cur- 
rent distress  due  to  the  lack  of  small  currency.  Hence,  these 
notes  of  the  Home  Department  were  to  be  all  of  smaller  de- 
nominations and  to  be  issued  in  exchange  for  the  Dajokan- 
satsu  of  denominations  above  one  rio.  Yet  the  annual  deficit 
of  revenue  continued  to  be  so  great  that  the  government  most 
unfortunately  did  not  keep  its  promise  of  canceling  the  ex- 
changed notes,  which  were  again  placed  in  circulation.     The 


I58  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

result  was  that  the  Mimbusho-satsu  of  7,500,000  rio  was  put 
on  the  market  in  the  term  from  September,  1869,  to  October, 
1870.  It  was  now  evident  that  the  paper  money  issued  in 
such  a  great  amount  could  not  maintain  its  own  credit.  The 
sphere  of  the  paper  money  circulation  was  very  limited  at  the 
time,  and  the  independent  state  of  each  of  the  three  principal 
prefectures — Tokyo,  Kyoto,  and  Osaka — added  further  to  the 
overflow  of  paper  money.  The  extreme  loss  of  credit  of  paper 
notes  was  due  partly  to  the  lack  of  confidence  in  the  Imperial 
Government  itself,  but  also  to  the  fact  that  the  people  could 
not  free  their  minds  of  the  sad  experience  of  the  losses  they 
had  incurred  on  account  of  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  by 
the  various  clan  governments.  It  was  thus  unavoidable  that 
the  value  of  papei  money  in  1868  could  not  rise  above  70  per 
cent  of  the  value  of  the  Mexican  dollars.  Therefore,  the  gov- 
ernment, being  confronted  with  great  difficulty  in  maintaining 
the  value  of  paper  money,  resorted  to  every  makeshift  for  the 
purpose.  For  instance,  the  government  prohibited  the  quot- 
ing of  the  value  of  paper  money  and  arrested  and  then  released 
the  offenders;  established  a  standard  quotation  at  the  ratio  of 
120  rio  of  paper  money  to  100  rio  of  specie;  announced  that 
the  time  of  converting  paper  money  into  specie  was  at  no  dis- 
tant date,  or,  again,  made  clear  that  such  conversion  could  not 
easily  be  realized.  After  various  attempts  to  secure  credit, 
in  which  expostulations  and  threats  were  used  alternately,  the 
government  saw  the  impossibility  of  keeping  the  price  of  paper 
and  of  specie  on  a  par.  In  the  summer  of  the  year  1869,  how- 
ever, the  value  of  inconvertible  notes  suddenly  rose,  so  that 
they  came  to  circulate  at  par  with  specie;  but  this  was  quite 
accidental  because  of  the  lact  that  the  appearance  of  bad  coins, 
which  the  various  clans  took  the  liberty  of  issuing  at  the  time 
of  the  War  of  the  Restoration,  together  with  the  worthless 
plated  coins,  resulted  in  the  complete  disappearance  of  the 
coins  of  proper  quality.  When  in  this  way  all  the  coins  be- 
came bad  and  lost  national  credit  entirely,  the  government 
began  to  withdraw  specie  as  a  preparatory  step  to  the  unifica- 
tion of  the  coinage  system;  and  the  result  was  that  the  credit 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 59 

of  paper  money  suddenly  increased,  because  it  became  better 
than  counterfeited  hard  money  or  coins  of  the  worst  kind. 

Although  the  disordered  state  of  the  coinage  system  was  of 
course  a  problem  that  should  have  been  solved  in  the  early 
days  of  the  Meiji  Era,  no  efforts  to  that  end  were  of  any  avail 
because  there  was  no  adequate  power  for  it  on  the  part  of  the 
government.  This  must  be  regarded  as  one  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  our  monetary  system.  The  inconvertible  notes 
were  issued  solely  because  of  the  requirements  created  by  the 
War  of  the  Restoration.  The  advisability  or  inadvisability  of 
the  issue  can  not  be  discussed  easily  and  simply;  but  in  this 
connection  we  must  always  consider  the  two  important  facts, 
viz.,  that  the  Restoration  was  a  great  turning-point  in  the  his- 
tory of  Japan,  and  that  no  other  means  were  available  than  to 
resort  to  the  issue  of  inconvertible  notes  for  raising  the  funds 
needed  for  that  war.  Though,  as  already  mentioned,  the 
issuing  of  inconvertible  notes  once  caused  a  great  rise  in  the 
price  of  commodities  and  increased  the  disordered  condition 
of  the  coinage  system,  with  many  disastrous  results,  it  may  be 
said  that  the  evils  of  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  for  the 
needs  of  the  War  of  the  Restoration  were  comparatively 
limited,  because  the  value  of  the  notes  was  restored  to  a  normal 
state  within  a  comparatively  short  period.  It  was  also  fortu- 
nate that  by  the  issue  of  paper  money  the  people  and  the  gov- 
ernment were  brought  into  closer  touch,  as  the  people,  long 
accustomed  to  the  feudal  system,  came  to  understand  what 
the  Imperial  Government  could  do  and  learned  something 
about  the  value  and  use  of  creditable  paper  money.  Thus, 
there  were  good  results  in  this  direction.  Much  more  fortu- 
nate was  the  case  when,  a  few  years  thereafter,  the  random 
issue  of  paper  money  was  stopped  and  that  money  came 
to  circulate  freely  at  par  with  specie.  Therefore,  while  on  one 
hand  we  see  the  evil  effects  of  the  paper  money  issued  on  ac- 
count of  the  War  of  the  Restoration,  on  the  other  hand  we 
must  consider  that  such  evils  were  inevitable  and  be  some- 
what lenient  in  our  criticism  of  the  government's  policy  at  the 
time.     We  must  likewise  bear  in  mind  that  the  economic  dis- 


160  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

asters  connected  with  the  issue  of  inconvertible  notes  after  the 
Satsuma  Rebellion  were  brought  about  chiefly  by  the  paper 
money  issued  at  random  to  meet  the  expenditures  of  that 
war.  We  do  not  say  that  the  bad  effects  of  the  paper  money 
issued  at  the  time  of  the  War  of  the  Restoration  did  not  last 
until  after  the  Satsuma  Rebellion;  but  we  mean  to  say  that,  if 
there  had  been  no  irregular  issue  of  paper  money  at  the  time  of 
the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  it  might  have  been  possible  to  prevent 
the  occurrence  of  a  calamity. 

The  government,  which  experienced  great  difficulty  in  cir- 
culating the  so-called  ktnsatsu,  or  the  Dajokan  and  the  Mim- 
busho  notes,  was  again  obliged  to  issue  paper  money  under 
straitened  circumstances  which  now  reached  an  extreme. 
Thus,  on  October  12,  1871,  an  Imperial  Ordinance  appeared 
relating  to  the  convertible  treasury  bills  (Okurasho  Dakan 
Shoken),  which  were  issued  through  the  banking  department 
of  Mitsui  &  Co.  The  object  of  issuing  these  bills  was  twofold : 
first,  to  make  up  a  yearly  deficit  of  revenue;  secondly,  to  call 
forth  hoarded  old  coins  in  order  to  have  them  recoined  into 
new  coins.  The  amount  of  these  bills  issued  up  to  February, 
1872,  rose  to  6,800,000  yen.  Again,  on  January  14,  1872,  an- 
other Imperial  Ordinance  appeared  in  regard  to  the  issuing  of 
Kaitakushi  bills  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses  of 
the  Colonial  Government  of  Hokkaido.  These  were  also 
issued  through  the  banking  department  of  Mitsui  &  Co.,  and 
the  amount  issued  reached  2,500,000  yen. 

All  the  convertible  and  inconvertible  paper  notes  issued  up 
to  this  time  showed  very  inferior  workmanship,  so  that  several 
attempts  had  been  made  to  counterfeit  them.  The  govern- 
ment therefore  detei mined  to  exchange  all  these  notes  for 
paper  money  of  more  skilful  workmanship,  and  entrusted  the 
manufacture  of  the  new  paper  money,  amounting  to  100,000,- 
000  yen,  to  a  certain  manufacturing  firm  established  in  Frank- 
furt, Germany.  On  December  27,  1871,  an  Imperial  Ordi- 
nance was  issued  relating  to  the  circulation  of  this  new  paper 
money,  which  was  of  excellent  workmanship  and  welcomed 
by  the  people.     The  government  now  earnestly  adopted  the 


EFFECTS  ON   TIIK  MONEY   MARKET  l6l 

policy  of  circulating  this  new  paper  money  and  of  with- 
drawing the  old  paper  notes  in  exchange  for  it.  If  the  issuing 
of  the  new  paper  money  had  been  limited  to  the  purpose  of 
exchange,  it  would  have  been  all  right;  but  as  the  government, 
in  order  to  gloss  over  for  a  time  the  straitened  circumstances  of 
its  finance,  issued  this  new  paper  money  beyond  this  limit, 
injurious  effects  resulted  therefrom.  Here  the  progress  of  the 
national  economy  was  sacrificed  for  the  financial  convenience 
of  the  government.  The  amount  of  the  new  paper  money 
issued  in  excess  was  not  small,  and  one  such  issue  was  openly 
made  on  a  large  scale  to  meet  the  war  expenditures  of  the 
Satsuma  Rebellion.  Besides,  as  the  government  took  over 
the  old  Han  notes  of  the  feudal  days,  it  contracted  a  liability 
of  24,959,350  yen  and  for  the  purpose  of  conversion  issued  new 
paper  money  to  the  amount  of  22,908,430  yen. 

Table  A  at  the  end  of  this  chapter l  shows  the  amounts  of 
paper  money  in  circulation  at  the  end  of  each  year  from  1868. 

Inauguration  of  the  Banking  System 

When  the  work  of  the  Meiji  Restoration  was  accomplished, 
the  sweeping  change  that  was  effected  in  the  national  institu- 
tions caused  a  chaotic  condition  in  every  branch  of  society. 
How  to  make  relief  measures  for  this  was  the  question  that 
most  worried  the  government  authorities.  In  financial 
affairs  the  government  early  adopted  the  policy  of  protection, 
established  the  Shohoshi  (Business  Bureau),  later  renamed 
Tsushoshi  (Commercial  Bureau),  which  guided  business 
enterprises,  and  created  a  Money  Exchange  Company  in 
order  to  supply  capital  to  the  trade  generally.  The  exchange 
company  was  a  monetary  organ  established  under  the  gov- 
ernment's protection  and  enjoyed  the  privileges  of  issuing 
paper  money,  receiving  deposits,  making  loans,  and  trans- 
acting exchange  business,  and  was  the  origin  of  the  banking 
system  of  Japan.  Though  this  company  was  no  more  than 
a  medium  for  utilizing  the  funds  borrowed  from  the  govern- 
ment, and  its  business  finally  ended  in  failure,  we  can  not  but 

1  Post,  p.  213. 

12 


1 62  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

recognize  the  distinguished  services  rendered  by  it  in  the 
midst  of  the  extremely  disordered  state  of  the  monetary  cir- 
cles at  a  time  when  there  was  no  way  of  accommodating  capital 
to  trade.  The  creation  of  the  Money  Exchange  Company 
was  the  germ  of  the  monetary  organ  in  its  developed  sense, 
and  it  contributed  in  a  certain  degree  to  the  adjustment  of 
monetary  affairs  generally.  It  was  established  in  each  of  the 
eight  principal  cities  in  the  country,  and  though  its  busi- 
ness failed  in  the  end,  it  can  not  be  denied  that  it  gave  a 
stimulus  to  the  rise  of  the  monetary  organs  in  the  country, 
as  people  then  began  to  plan  the  establishment  of  banks. 
But  the  government  would  not  allow  the  people  to  carry 
out  such  plans  easily,  because  it  was  just  then  contemplating 
the  inauguration  of  a  banking  system  by  which  to  solve  the 
urgent  question  of  the  adjustment  of  inconvertible  notes. 
In  1872  there  were  promulgated  the  National  Bank  Regula- 
tions, which  were  based  mainly  upon  the  National  Bank  Act 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  all  the  banks  were  made 
to  abide  by  these  regulations.  In  this  way  it  was  expected 
that  proper  monetary  organs  would  be  created  and  that  the 
adjustment  of  inconvertible  notes  would  be  effected.  Accord- 
ing to  the  said  National  Bank  Regulations  the  banks  were 
required  to  deposit  with  the  government  paper  money  cor- 
responding to  60  per  cent  of  their  capital,  which  was  to  be 
not  less  than  50,000  yen,  and  the  government  in  turn  was  to 
give  to  the  banks  6  per  cent  Kinsatsu  Exchange  Bonds, 
whereupon  the  banks  again  deposited  these  bonds  with  the 
government  as  security  for  the  bank  notes  to  be  received 
from  the  government.  In  this  way  the  banks  were  enabled 
to  make  loans  to  the  public  out  of  the  fund  consisting  of  the 
bank  notes  delivered  by  the  government.  The  banks  were 
liable  to  convert  these  bank  notes  into  specie,  and  so  were  to 
hold  a  specie  reserve  for  the  purpose  to  an  amount  equaling 
40  per  cent  of  their  capital.  By  enforcing  these  regulations 
the  government  aimed  at  a  speedy  conclusion  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  inconvertible  notes  and  expected  the  successful  cir- 
culation of  the  convertible  bank   notes,  and  in  order  to  pre- 


EFFECTS  ON  THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 63 

pare  for  this  it  manufactured  bank  notes  to  the  amount  of 
100,000,000  yen.  But  at  that  time  there  was  a  large  amount 
of  government  paper  money  in  circulation,  the  value  of  which 
was  depreciating  a  great  deal,  and  as  there  was  consequently 
a  great  outflow  of  specie  abroad,  the  bank  notes  convertible 
with  specie  were  continuously  returning  to  the  banks  after 
being  issued  for  circulation.  Such  being  the  case,  the  banks 
had  no  means  of  making  profit,  and  only  four  banks  were 
established  under  these  regulations,  so  that  the  government 
was  disappointed.  Neither  the  Kinsatsu  Exchange  Bonds 
nor  the  convertible  bank  notes  were  issued  in  any  great 
amount,  and  the  business  of  the  national  banks  became  more 
and  more  difficult.  The  government  now  decided  to  give 
to  the  national  banks  the  privilege  of  issuing  bank  notes 
exchangeable  for  currency  and  made  liberal  conditions  for 
such  issue.  Another  reason  for  making  such  a  revision  in 
the  regulations  was  that,  owing  to  the  issue  of  government 
loan  bonds  amounting  to  174,000,000  yen  for  the  capitaliza- 
tion of  the  Hereditary  Pension  Bonds,  it  was  necessary  to 
devise  methods  to  expedite  their  operation  and  to  prevent 
a  decline  in  the  value  of  public  loan  bonds;  and  by  facilitat- 
ing the  issue  of  bank  notes  in  making  them  issuable  on  the 
security  of  government  loan  bonds  it  was  hoped  to  increase 
the  demand  for  the  loan  bonds.  The  object  of  this  revision 
was  successfully  attained,  as  in  December,  1879,  the  number 
of  established  banks  reached  one  hundred  fifty-one,  with  an 
aggregate  capital  of  46,000,000  yen.  The  bank  notes  issued 
by  them  amounted  to  as  much  as  34,000,000  yen,  and  the 
bank  business  other  than  the  issuing  of  bank  notes  also  began 
to  develop. 

In  summary  we  may  say  that  the  historical  development 
of  monetary  organs  in  the  Meiji  Era  was  always  closely 
bound  up  with  the  adjustment  of  inconvertible  notes,  and 
that  its  progress  was  always  made  difficult  by  all  sorts  of 
failures.  In  this  connection  we  are  also  reminded  of  how 
lasting  were  the  effects  of  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  on 
account  of  the  expenditures  for  the  War  of  the  Restoration. 


164  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Though  the  failure  in  the  National  Bank  system  made  diffi- 
cult the  work  of  paper  money  adjustment,  yet  the  birth  of 
the  new  system  gave  opportunity  for  the  progress  of  the  bank- 
ing business,  and  we  must  recognize  that  it  formed  a  guide 
to  the  development  of  the  necessary  organs  of  the  national 
economy  in  a  real  sense. 

From   the   Satsuma   Rebellion   to   the   Sino-Japanese 

War 

Defrayal  of  War  Expenditures  arid  Increase  of 
Inconvertible  Notes 

In  Chapter  III  of  Part  I  of  this  volume  we  saw  that  the 
expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  were  met  by  15,000,- 
000  yen  loaned  by  the  Fifteenth  Bank  and  by  the  increased 
issue  of  27,000,000  yen  of  government  inconvertible  notes. 
This  fund  borrowed  from  the  Fifteenth  Bank  consisted  of 
National  Bank  Notes,  which  were  in  nature  inconvertible, 
because,  as  stated  already,  they  were  only  convertible  with  the 
inconvertible  government  paper  money.  As  this  loan  bore 
interest  at  5  per  cent  and  was  redeemable  in  twenty  years, 
it  was  more  disadvantageous  for  the  government  than  the 
issuing  of  inconvertible  notes;  but  the  reasons  for  the  con- 
traction of  this  loan,  in  spite  of  these  unfavorable  conditions, 
were,  first,  that  there  was  need  of  employing  the  spare  money 
of  the  Fifteenth  Bank,  which  was  established  with  the  capital 
composed  of  public  loan  bonds,  by  way  of  putting  into  use 
the  capitalized  pension  bonds  issued  by  the  government  at 
the  time;  and,  second,  that  the  manufacture  of  paper  money 
by  the  government  could  not  satisfy  the  immediate  require- 
ments of  the  time. 

In  the  preceding  section  and  in  Table  A  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter '  we  have  noted  the  increasing  rate  of  the  amounts 
of  circulation  of  government  paper  money  and  bank  notes. 
Table  B,  immediately  following  Table  A,2  will  show  how 
the  rate  of  increase  was  accelerated  by  the  addition  of  the- 

1  See  post,  p.  213.  2  Post,  p.  214. 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 65 

paper  currency  used   in   the  expenditures  of   the   Satsuma 

Rebellion. 

We  see  from  these  figures  that  the  highest  amount  of 
government  paper  money  was  reached  at  the  end  of  1878  and 
the  highest  amount  of  bank  notes  at  the  end  of  1880.  The 
total  sum  of  the  government  paper  money  and  the  bank  notes 
reached  its  maximum  at  the  end  of  1878.  Referring,  how- 
ever, to  the  monthly  statistics  of  the  amounts  in  circulation 
of  these  two  kinds  of  paper  currency  for  these  years,  we  find 
that  their  highest  figures  were  reached  at  the  end  of  January, 
1880.  Considering  now  the  relation  between  the  increase 
of  paper  money  and  the  expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebel- 
lion, we  see  that  the  only  increase  of  the  government  paper 
money  in  that  connection  was  the  27,000,000  yen  of  Febru- 
ary, 1878,  and  that  the  increase  of  the  bank  notes  was  15,000,- 
000  yen  during  the  term  February,  1877-July,  1878,  the 
latter  amount  corresponding  to  the  amount  of  bank  notes 
borrowed  in  thirteen  instalments  from  the  Fifteenth  Bank 
during  the  same  term.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that 
the  increase  of  inconvertible  notes  and  bank  notes  during  the 
term  1877-January,  1880,  was  due  solely  to  the  needs  of  the 
expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  We  must  also  say 
that  the  effect  of  the  overflow  of  inconvertible  notes  on  the 
money  market  was  due  almost  entirely  to  the  expenditures 
for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  If  the  inconvertible  notes  issued 
after  the  Restoration  had  not  been  remaining  at  that  time 
the  injurious  effect  of  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  largely 
on  account  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  would  not,  of  course, 
have  been  so  great  as  it  was.  But  it  was  due  to  this  increased 
issue  of  inconvertible  notes  at  the  time  of  the  Satsuma  Rebel- 
lion that  the  evils  of  the  inconvertible  notes  were  again 
brought  to  light. 

Depreciation  of  Paper  Money  and  its  Effects 

The  increased  issue  of  paper  money  resulted  in  a  deprecia- 
tion of  the  value  of  paper  money  and  in  a  rise  in  the  price  of 
commodities,  and  produced  without  exception  the  economic 


1 66 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 


evils  that  invariably  result  from  the  inflation  of  paper  money. 
If  the  paper  money,  however  overissued,  had  been  convertible 
and  had  had  the  quality  of  elasticity,  it  would  have  naturally 
decreased  in  amount  and  would  not  have  caused  such  disas- 
trous effects ;  but  as  it  was  inconvertible  and  lacked  elasticity, 
the  effects  were  detrimental. 

For  a  long  time  after  the  failure  of  the  new  coinage  system 
in  this  country,  the  coins  actually  used  in  international 
transactions  were  trade  dollars  and  Mexican  dollars.  Before 
the  year  1877  the  difference  of  value  between  these  silver 
dollars  and  the  paper  money  was  very  small,  the  value  of  the 
latter  only  ranging  from  0.95  yen  to  1.05  yen  against  one 
silver  yen,  according  to  the  conditions  of  foreign  trade;  but 
with  the  overissue  of  paper  money  the  difference  became 
more  and  more  conspicuous,  and  was  followed  by  a  rise  in 
the  price  of  commodities,  an  excess  of  imports  over  exports, 
and  an  outflow  of  specie  abroad.  The  following  table, 
giving  the  average  exchange  rates  of  paper  money  for  silver 
yen  and  the  quotations  of  silver  bullion  in  London  shows 
that  the  depreciation  of  paper  was  not  due  to  the  appreciation 
of  silver  but  to  the  overissue  of  paper  money:1 

Exchange  Rates  of  Paper  Money  and  Quotations  of  Silver  Bullion 


Year 


Exchange  rate  of 

paper  money  for 

one  silver  yen 


Quotation  of  silver 

bullion 

in   London 

54 

13/16 

52 

9/16 

51 

i/4 

52 

1/4 

51 

15/16 

51 

13/16 

1877 

1878 
1879 

1880 
1881 
1882 


The  premium  in  the  exchange  of  paper  with  silver  reached 
as  much  as  about  70  sen  per  yen  in  the  year  1881.  The  effects 
of  the  fall  in  value  of  the  paper  money  were  also  manifested 

1  The  exchange  rate  of  paper  for  silver  is  the  yearly  average  of  the  monthly  rates, 
and  the  silver  quotation  in  London  is  the  average  of  the  highest  and  lowest  quota- 
tions in  the  year. 


EFFKCTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET 


167 


in  the  purchasing  power  of  the  paper  money,  as  shown  in 
the  following  table  of  the  prices  of  rice,  the  most  important 
staple  product  of  the  country: 

Wholesale  Prick  and  Production  of  Unhusked  Rice  (1877-1882)  :i 


Wholesale  price 

>f  unhusked 

rice 

Annual  production 

of  rice 

Index  number 

for  prices  of 

commodities 

Year 

specially 
reported  bv 

Price  per 

Index 

\  alue  in 

Index 

Amount 

Index 

the  Bank 

koku1' 

number 

silver 

number 

number 

of  Japan 

Yen 

Yen 

Koku 

1877. 

5   34 

100 

5-17 

100 

26,599,181 

100 

99 

1878. 

6.38 

I  IQ 

S-8I 

1 12 

25,282,540 

95 

106 

1879 

7- 95 

I48 

6.56 

154 

32,418,924 

120 

119 

1880. 

IO.S7 

196 

7. 16 

138 

31.359,326 

117 

143 

1881 . 

10.59 

197 

6.25 

120 

29,971,383 

113 

163 

1882 

8.81 

164 

561 

108 

30,692,327 

US 

146 

»  The  price  of  rice  is  the  average  of  that  in  Tokyo  of  the  middle  grade  quality.     For  the  index 
number  of  the  prices  of  commodities  reported  by  the  Bank  of  Japan,  cf.  Chapter  V. 
''  Koku  =  s.i3  bushels. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  there  was  not  much  decrease  in  the 
production  of  rice  in  the  years  1879,  1880,  and  1881,  we  see 
that  its  prices  were  considerably  increased,  thus  proving 
that  the  purchasing  power  of  paper  money  was  decreased. 
This  will  be  more  clearly  understood  if  we  compare  the  prices 
in  paper  money  with  those  reduced  to  silver  valuation. 
Thus,  the  changes  in  the  prices  of  rice  most  clearly  exhibit 
this  state  of  things,  but  the  prices  of  other  commodities  at 
the  time  point  to  the  same  general  tendency,  as  shown  by 
the  index  numbers  of  the  prices  of  commodities  as  reported 
by  the  Bank  of  Japan. 

The  depreciation  of  currency  and  the  appreciation  of  prices 
were  as  stated  above,  and  these  bad  conditions,  which  were 
continuing  from  the  time  of  the  Restoration,  were  made  much 
worse  by  the  effects  of  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  at  the 
time  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  An  abnormal  state  in  eco- 
nomic circles  ensued.  From  the  year  1877  an  excess  of  imports 
over  exports  was  seen  every  year,  amounting  to  4,000,000  yen 
in  that  year,  6,900,000  yen  in  1878,  4,770,000  yen  in  1879, 


1 68         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

;iiid  to  as  much  as  8,250,000  yen  in  1880.  Accordingly,  gold 
and  silver  rapidly  left  the  country,  with  the  yearly  balance 
of  exports  over  imports  of  7,260,000  yen  in  1877,  6,130,000 
yen  in  1878,  9,640,000  yen  in  1879,  9,580,000  yen  in  1880,  and 
5,630,000  yen  in  1881. 

The  disordered  state  in  the  debit  and  credit  relations, 
the  inflation  of  currency,  and  the  rise  in  the  price  of  commodi- 
ties, and  the  consequent  demand  of  capital,  gradually  led 
to  the  raising  of  the  rate  of  interest.  The  rate  in  Tokyo  (for 
amounts  between  100  and  1,000  yen),  which  was  under  10 
per  cent  in  1877,  gradually  rose  in  1878  and  1879  to  12.5  per 
cent.  During  and  after  1880  the  rate  of  over  15  per  cent 
became  common.  The  value  of  securities  also  depreciated. 
The  7  per  cent  capitalized  pension  bonds,  for  instance,  which 
were  quoted  at  83.49  yen  in  1878,  fell  to  a  monthly  average 
of  71.89  yen  in  1880,  finally  falling  to  65.27  yen  in  January, 
1 88 1.  With  these  changes  in  economic  circles,  the  people 
ran  wild  in  extravagances,  the  industrial  classes  became 
greatly  excited  with  vain  hopes  of  speculation,  and  the 
derangement  of  the  economic  and  financial  condition  of  the 
country  became  most  deplorable.  The  government  now 
became  fully  aware  of  the  danger  the  country  was  in,  and 
one  after  another  it  adopted  the  necessary  measures  for  the 
regeneration  of  the  economic  and  financial  condition  of  the 
country.  That  disastrous  results  would  inevitably  follow 
if  inconvertible  paper  money  were  made  the  standard  of 
value  might  have  easily  been  foreseen  by  anybody  possessed 
of  mere  common  sense,  but  the  measures  adopted  by  the 
government  at  this  crisis  seemed  to  show  that  the  authorities 
did  not  grasp  this  simple  truth.  They  regarded  the  difference 
in  price  between  silver  and  paper  as  an  indication  not  of  the 
depreciation  of  paper  but  of  the  appreciation  of  silver.  They 
attempted,  therefore,  to  stop  the  rise  of  the  price  of  silver  by 
increasing  the  amount  of  its  circulation.  The  government 
sold  silver  coins  reserved  for  the  resumption  of  specie  pay- 
ments, opened  places  for  the  exchange  of  silver  coins,  so  as 
to  balance  speculations  in  Mexican  dollars  and  other  coins, 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   MONEY    MARKET  1 69 

and  then  established  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  in  order  to 
call  forth  the  coins  hoarded  by  the  people.  This  bank, 
which  was  established  with  the  government's  careful  support, 
was  to  supply  the  merchants  engaged  in  foreign  trade  with 
the  silver  coins  kept  as  the  government's  reserve  and  also  to 
transact  foreign  exchange  business.  But  the  more  these 
measures  were  resorted  to  the  higher  the  price  of  silver  rose, 
and  no  one  knew  how  far  the  paper  currency  would  go  down 
in  the  scale  of  depreciation.  The  evil  effects  on  the  money 
market  caused  by  the  expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebel- 
lion reached  their  height  at  this  time. 

Withdrawal  of  Paper  Notes  and  the  Establishment  of  a 
Conversion  System 
As  the  emergency  measures  taken  against  the  depreciation 
of  inconvertible  notes  had  all  proved  ineffective,  there  was 
pressing  need  for  further  radical  measures.  Until  this  time 
the  government  had  a  reserve  fund  for  the  redemption  of 
paper  money,  but  whenever  it  accumulated  it  was  always 
diverted  to  other  purposes.  In  September,  1880,  the 
government  gave  up  the  plan  of  selling  the  silver  coins  and 
began  to  take  steps  to  redeem  a  part  of  the  paper  money 
in  circulation  by  means  of  7,000,000  yen,  the  annual  revenue 
obtained  by  doubling  the  rate  of  the  tax  on  sake  brewing. 
In  November  of  the  same  year  the  Kinsatsu  Exchange  Bond 
Regulations  were  revised,  as  a  result  of  which  the  6  per  cent 
bonds  were  made  exchangeable  with  paper  money.  The 
undertakings  hitherto  carried  on  by  the  central  government 
were  transferred  to  the  local  governments,  and  the  fund 
saved  thereby  was  utilized  for  the  redemption  of  paper  money. 
Though  these  improvements  were  introduced  in  the  method 
of  redeeming  paper  money,  the  depreciation  still  continued 
without  a  sign  of  abatement.  In  April,  1881,  the  average 
quotation  of  paper  money  for  one  yen  of  silver  became  1.79 
yen  (the  highest  in  the  month  being  1.81  yen),  and  the  fall 
in  the  value  of  paper  money  reached  its  extreme.  It  was  at 
this  crisis  that  Count  Matsukata   (now  Marquis)   received 


I/O 


ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 


the  portfolio  of  finance  and  was  called  upon  to  rectify  the 
system  of  paper  money.  He  was  able  to  solve  the  question 
successfully  by  exercising  sound  judgment  and  exact  cal- 
culation, and  finally  established  the  coinage  system  on  a  firm 
foundation  and  did  much  to  further  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  country.  His  plan  was  not  confined  to  the 
redemption  of  paper  money,  but  at  the  same  time  aimed  to 
establish  a  powerful  central  bank  and  to  complete  the  cir- 
culation of  the  convertible  bank  notes  issued  by  such  a  cen- 
tral bank.  At  the  time  of  his  appointment  as  Minister  of 
Finance,  the  amount  of  government  paper  money  in  cir- 
culation was  120,405,000  yen,  that  of  bank  notes  34,398,000 
yen,  the  total  being  154,803,000  yen.  Of  course,  the  adjust- 
ment of  so  large  an  amount  of  paper  money  was  a  great  event 
in  the  history  of  the  money  market.  The  following  table 
gives  the  figures  concerning  the  gradual  redemption  of  paper 
money,  and  shows  how  the  value  of  paper  money  was  gradu- 
ally restored  with  the  progress  of  its  redemption: 


Gradual  Redemption  of  Paper  Money 


Government  paper  money 

Bank  notes 

Total  amount 
of    govern- 
ment paper 
money  and 
bank   notes 
circulating 
at    end    of 
year 

Valueof  paper 
money    for 
one  yen  sil- 
ver coin 

Year 

Redeemed 
during  year 

Circulating  at 
end  of  year 

Redeemed 
during  year 

Circulating  at 
end  of  year 

1880.    . . 

1881 

1882 

1883 

1884 

1885 

1886 

1887 

1888.      . 

1889. 

Yen 
5.778,436 
2,507.174 
536,180 
7.369.737 
4,619,044 
5.035.137 
20,544,258 

11,985,794 

9,080,31 1 
5.543.803 

Yen 

124,940,486 

118,905,195 

109,369,014 

97.999.277 

93.380,234 

88,345.096 

67,800,839 

55.815,044 

46,734.733 

41,190,931 

Yen 

778,654 
820,940 
638,303 
889.031 
920,046 
935.503 

Yen 

34,426,351 
34.396,818 
34,212,805 
34,092,802 
30,914,148 
30,093,208 
29,454.905 
28,565,829 
27.645,771 
26,710,268 

Yen 

159.366,837 

153.302,013 

143.581,819 

132,092,079 

124,294,382 

118,438,304 

97.255.744 

84.380,873 

74,380,504 

67,901,199 

1 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Yen 

477 
696 
S7I 
264 
089 
OSS 
000 

As  shown  by  the  above  figures,  the  redemption  of  govern- 
ment paper  money  began  in  1880  and  that  of  bank  notes  began 
in  1884.  The  annual  redemption  of  both  kinds  of  paper  money 
amounted  to  a  great  deal,  and  their  circulating  amounts  yearly 
decreased,  so  that  by  the  end  of  1887  their  total  diminished 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  171 

to  84,000,000  yen,  or  about  one-half  of  that  at  the  end  of  1880. 
The  result  was  that  the  value  of  the  paper  money  gradually 
approached  that  of  specie,  and  by  the  year  1886  the  difference 
between  the  value  of  silver  and  that  of  paper  almost  disap- 
peared. 

The  government's  endeavors  to  redeem  the  paper  money 
and  bank  notes  were  very  great,  because  in  this  effort  a  large 
reserve  fund  was  needed.  Accordingly,  the  most  rigorous 
economy  was  practised  in  all  the  ministerial  departments,  and 
by  June,  1885,  the  specie  reserve  thus  gained  reached  40,000,- 
000  yen,  equaling  about  one-half  of  the  amount  of  the  govern- 
ment paper  money  in  circulation.  Therefore,  in  January, 
1886,  the  exchanging  of  paper  money  with  silver  coins  was 
commenced.  From  that  year  a  plan  for  the  annual  redemp- 
tion of  7,000,000  yen  was  carried  into  effect,  and  thus  the  re- 
demption of  the  government  paper  money  was  finally  com- 
pleted in  1902.  As  regards  the  adjustment  of  the  bank  notes, 
it  was  planned  to  establish  a  large  central  bank,  by  which  to 
effect  the  much-needed  adjustment  of  the  National  Banks, 
which  were  the  source  of  all  troubles,  and  to  replace  the 
inconvertible  bank  notes  with  real  convertible  bank  notes. 
The  memorandum  respecting  the  scheme  for  the  establish- 
ment of  the  central  bank,  or  the  Bank  of  Japan,  stated  its 
objects  as  follows:  (1)  to  act  as  the  supreme  monetary  organ, 
in  order  to  concentrate  in  the  hands  of  numerous  National 
Banks  the  capital  scattered  in  different  localities;  (2)  to  serve 
thus  as  a  source  of  capital  supply,  according  to  the  circum- 
stances in  monetary  circles;  (3)  to  lower  the  current  rate  of 
interest  throughout  the  country;  (4)  to  perform  certain  serv- 
ices in  the  Treasury,  so  as  to  simplify  the  business  of  the 
Exchequer;  etc.  In  short,  the  Central  Bank  was  to  act  as  the 
highest  and  most  powerful  monetary  organ  in  the  country. 
Thus,  the  Bank  of  Japan  was  established  after  the  pattern  of 
the  banks  of  the  same  kind  in  European  countries,  notably  that 
of  Belgium;  and  with  a  capital  of  10,000,000  yen,  half  of  which 
was  subscribed  by  the  government,  the  bank  opened  its  busi- 
ness in  October,  1882. 


172  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

The  time  had  now  arrived  for  the  government  to  effect  the 
adjustment  of  the  existing  National  Banks.  In  May,  1883,  the 
National  Bank  regulations  were  revised,  as  a  result  of  which 
the  National  Banks  were  deprived  of  their  right  of  issue,  and 
the  Bank  of  Japan  was  granted  the  sole  privilege  of  issuing 
convertible  bank  notes.  The  Bank  of  Japan  was  now  bur- 
dened with  the  duty  of  adjusting  the  paper  money  hitherto 
issued  by  the  National  Banks,  and  for  that  purpose  each  Na- 
tional Bank  was  required  to  deposit  with  the  Bank  of  Japan 
its  reserve  fund  devoted  to  the  purpose  of  redeeming  its  notes. 
Each  National  Bank  was  also  required  to  set  apart  every  year 
a  portion  of  its  profit,  equal  to  2.5  per  cent  of  the  amount  of 
the  notes  issued  by  that  bank,  and  to  deposit  this  sum  with  the 
Bank  of  Japan  to  form  part  of  the  redemption  fund.  Though 
there  was  more  or  less  difficulty  in  carrying  out  these  redemp- 
tion measures,  they  were  smoothly  carried  out  in  general  as 
prearranged.  Besides,  after  the  year  1896,  the  fund  obtained 
by  selling  the  national  loan  bonds  deposited  at  the  Bank  of 
Japan  was  used  directly  for  the  redemption  of  paper  money. 
This  being  so,  the  amount  of  the  notes  in  circulation,  which 
stood  at  29,500,000  yen  at  the  end  of  1886,  was  totally  re- 
deemed by  the  year  1899.  Now  that  the  arduous  task  of 
redeeming  the  government  paper  money  and  the  bank  notes 
was  successfully  accomplished,  the  government  proceeded  to 
make  the  Bank  of  Japan  perform  the  duty  of  issuing  converti- 
ble bank  notes.  As  a  first  step,  a  trial  issue  by  the  bank  of 
convertible  bank  notes  to  the  limit  of  the  reserve  fund  was 
cftected  by  making  the  Bank  of  Japan  owner  of  a  sufficient 
reserve  fund  for  the  purpose.  The  result  having  proved  good, 
the  government  seized  this  opportunity  for  introducing  amend- 
ments into  the  Convertible  Bank  Note  regulations,  in  order  to 
establish  solidly  the  so-called  elastic  currency  system. 

From  all  that  we  have  stated  above  regarding  the  history 
<>t  paper  money  redemption  and  the  establishment  of  the  con- 
version system,  one  may  imagine  that  the  sudden  changes 
produced  in  the  national  economy  during  this  period  brought 
about  chaotic  conditions  in  economic  circles,   and   that   the 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 73 

economic  development  of  the  country  was  hindered  thereby. 
The  mere  fact  that  the  difference  in  value  between  specie  and 
paper,  which  was  as  much  as  70  sen  in  the  year  1881,  dis- 
appeared in  1886  may  convince  us  of  the  importance  of  these 
economic  effects  especially  on  monetary  circles  and  the  prices 
of  commodities. 

Table  C  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  shows  the  effects  of  the 
restoration  of  the  value  of  paper  money  on  the  prices  of  com- 
modities, and  it  will  be  observed  that  these  effects  are  just 
.  the  reverse  of  those  noted  in  the  foregoing  table  showing  the 
effects  of  the  excessive  issue  of  paper  money  on  the  prices  of 
commodities. 

As  regards  the  index  numbers  for  the  prices  of  commodities 
reported  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  in  the  foregoing  table,  the 
reader  is  referred  to  Chapter  V. 

The  changes  in  the  purchasing  power  of  currency  as  mani- 
fested in  the  prices  of  commodities  became  greater  in  and  after 
1 88 1,  the  year  in  which  the  redemption  of  paper  money  was 
begun,  as  shown  in  the  foregoing  table;  that  is  to  say,  the 
value  of  paper  money  rose  with  the  progress  of  its  redemption. 
We  may  say  that  in  the  year  1886,  when  the  difference  in  value 
between  specie  and  paper  disappeared,  the  value  of  paper 
money  came  to  be  fixed  and  the  prices  of  commodities  entered 
a  normal  state.  These  changes  in  the  value  of  currency 
brought  about  economic  effects  in  all  directions,  but  these 
effects  were  of  course  the  reverse  of  those  caused  by  the  over- 
issue of  paper  money.  With  regard  to  imports  and  exports, 
there  was  an  annual  excess  of  exports  over  imports  after  1882, 
ranging  from  4,000,000  yen  to  8,000,000  yen;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  was  an  annual  excess  of  imports  over  exports  of 
gold  and  silver,  amounting  to  1,700,000  yen  in  1882,  2,290,000 
yen  in  1883,  600,000  yen  in  1884,  and  3,290,000  yen  in  1885. 
The  rate  of  interest  was  meanwhile  lowered  throughout  the 
country.  The  rate  of  interest  on  loans  of  from  100  to  1,000 
yen  in  Tokyo,  which  was  at  least  15  per  cent  in  1881,  was 
already  lowered  to  1 1  per  cent  in  May,  1882,  and  to  9.5  per 
cent   in  January,    1883,  and  to  7.5  per  cent  in  June,   1883. 


174         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

Though  there  was  later  more  or  less  rise,  the  rate  was  rarely 
above  II  or  12  per  cent.  With  the  lowering  of  the  rate  of 
interest,  the  prices  of  securities  were  gradually  restored;  the  7 
per  cent  bonds,  for  instance,  which  were  quoted  at  65  yen  in 
1 88 1,  rose  to  an  average  price  of  73.40  yen  in  1882.  The 
average  in  the  two  following  years  reached  83.90  and  93.40 
yen,  respectively,  and  the  quotation  in  December  of  1885  at 
last  exceeded  the  face  value. 

The  economic  changes  in  the  money  market  were  as  great  as 
stated,  and  their  extraordinary  effects  in  all  lines  of  the  eco- 
nomic circle  were  indescribable.  What  were  advantages  to 
the  creditors  proved  to  be  disadvantages  to  the  debtors,  and 
this  led  to  successive  bankruptcies.  While  living  was  made 
easier  for  the  people  who  lived  on  salaries  or  wages,  the  fall  in 
the  prices  of  commodities  caused  disadvantages  to  the  pro- 
ducers, and  this  resulted  in  industrial  inactivity.  Trade  sank 
to  a  very  low  ebb,  hard  times  prevailed  throughout  the  coun- 
try, and  the  people  began  to  express  their  dissatisfaction  with 
the  administrative  policies  of  the  government.  The  economic 
circles,  which  by  the  ample  issue  of  inconvertible  notes  once 
dreamed  of  prosperity  and  ran  wild  in  extravagance  and  be- 
came prone  to  speculation,  now  suddenly  sank  into  the  deep- 
est gloom,  and  this  sad  condition  continued  for  a  considerable 
time. 

It  took  thirty-two  years  to  complete  the  adjustment  of  the 
inconvertible  notes,  the  first  of  which  were  issued  in  the  days 
of  the  Restoration.  Of  these  thirty-two  years,  the  nine  years 
beginning  with  1877  and  ending  with  1885  were  the  term 
during  which  the  economic  effects  of  the  overissue  of  inconvert- 
ible paper  money  were  most  extraordinary.  It  may  be  noted 
that  those  effects  before  the  year  1881  and  those  after  that 
year  were  just  the  opposite.  Until  the  year  1881  the  natural 
effects  of  the  overissue  of  inconvertible  notes  were  shown 
gradually,  and  after  that  year  the  natural  effects  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  inconvertible  notes  were  exhibited.  However,  it 
must  be  noticed  that  it  was  no  other  than  the  result  of  this 
unnatural  coinage  system  that  the  economic  world,  which 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 75 

should  have  been  peaceful,  was  thrown  into  utter  disorder  and 
many  failures  took  place.  By  availing  themselves  of  the  op- 
portunity of  these  economic  changes,  some  people  could 
benefit  themselves,  and  though  these  changes  also  seemed  to 
have  done  good  to  society  in  certain  respects,  yet  it  can  not  be 
denied  that,  generally  speaking,  the  economic  development 
was  obstructed  by  this  state  of  affairs  to  a  degree  unparalleled 
in  the  economic  history  of  Japan.  In  thus  dealing  with  the 
economic  effects  caused  by  war  expenditures,  and  in  seeing 
such  grave  effects  on  the  money  market,  we  can  not  but 
wonder  at  the  seriousness  of  the  question  and  the  great  mag- 
nitude of  these  effects. 

Development  of  Monetary  Organs  and  Spread  of  Credit  Systems 

We  have  already  dwelt  on  the  effects  of  the  war  expenditures 
of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  on  the  money  market,  and  inciden- 
tally we  have  explained  the  completion  of  a  great  reform  in  the 
monetary  system  of  the  country.  We  shall  now  see  how  this 
reform  resulted  in  the  development  of  various  monetary 
organs.  To  determine  to  what  extent  the  progress  of  these 
monetary  organs  was  caused  must  mean  in  one  way  an  investi- 
gation into  the  economic  effects — especially  the  effects  on  the 
money  market — of  the  war  and  armament  expenditures. 

As  the  work  of  adjusting  the  paper  money  was  carried  on 
gradually  and  the  hard  times  were  continuing  so  long,  the 
people's  minds,  which  were  prone  to  speculation,  now  at  last 
came  to  maintain  a  cautious  attitude  generally.  Want  of 
business  prosperity  naturally  made  room  for  saving  power, 
which  then  gave  rise  to  good  habits  of  thrift  and  economy. 
Looking  into  the  business  conditions  of  the  National  Banks 
after  the  year  1882,  we  find  that,  notwithstanding  the  gradual 
falling  of  the  rate  of  interest,  there  was  considerable  increase 
in  the  amount  of  deposits.  With  the  resumption  of  specie 
payments  for  government  paper  money  in  1886  there  took 
place  an  industrial  revival ;  a  mania  for  railway  undertakings 
also  began,  followed  by  a  general  recovery  of  business  activity. 
In  1888  there  was  already  a  fear  of  a  panic  likely  to  be  brought 


I76         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

on  by  this  mania  for  new  enterprises.  But  the  potential 
energy  of  the  nation,  nourished  for  a  long  time,  was  powerful 
enough  to  cope  with  these  circumstances,  and  after  that  time 
the  bank  deposits  continued  to  increase,  and  the  subscription 
for  naval  loans  met  with  splendid  success  on  three  separate 
occasions.  As  the  healthy  development  of  the  economic 
circles  was  in  such  an  excellent  condition,  the  imports  and 
exports  of  the  country  were  also  in  a  satisfactory  state,  every 
year  showing  excess  of  exports  over  imports.  Though  this 
was  due  to  the  very  advantageous  position  in  which  the  coun- 
try was  placed  in  the  exchange  relations  with  the  gold  stand- 
ard countries  as  a  result  of  the  great  fall  in  the  price  of  silver  at 
the  time,  yet  it  is  clear  that  this  was  attributable  to  the  con- 
traction in  the  amount  of  the  currency,  which  made  the  situa- 
tion suitable  and  perfectly  ready  for  standing  in  a  favorable 
condition  with  regard  to  foreign  trade.  In  1890,  however,  the 
various  enterprises  started  before  began  urgently  to  require  a 
large  amount  of  capital  on  account  of  the  rise  in  the  prices  of 
commodities  and  for  other  reasons,  and  this  condition  made 
money  circulation  very  active  and  further  led  to  a  temporarily 
disordered  state  of  the  money  market.  The  Bank  of  Japan 
then  decided  to  raise  the  rate  of  interest,  and  the  prices  of 
stocks  showed  sudden  falls,  so  that  it  was  then  feared  that  a 
panic  was  imminent.  But  the  fear  was  fortunately  removed 
before  it  became  serious.  In  July,  1890,  the  rate  of  interest 
was  lowered  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  other  banks,  and  the 
money  market  could  resume  its  normal  state.  From  that 
time  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  steady  and 
quiet  progress  was  made  in  the  money  market. 

As  may  be  seen  from  what  we  have  said  regarding  the  gen- 
eral effect  of  the  completion  of  the  adjustment  of  paper  money, 
on  the  money  market  the  first  signs  of  the  development  of  real 
national  economy  were  in  this  epoch,  since  it  may  be  said  that 
during  this  epoch  all  of  the  monetary  organs  in  the  country 
created  prior  to  the  year  1877  were  completely  reconstructed. 
We  may  also  say  that  it  was  during  this  epoch  that  the  ordi- 
nary banks,  as  well  as  the  savings  banks,  were  brought  up  and 


EFFECTS   ON  THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 77 

developed,  and  that  the  extension  of  the  uses  of  credit  notes 
and  negotiable  instruments  was  effected. 

All  the  National  Banks  were  now  changed  to  ordinary  pri- 
vate banks,  since  they  were  deprived  of  the  privilege  of  issuing 
paper  money.     Prior  to  this  there  was  already  a  tendency  for 
the  private  banks  to  come  into  prosperity.     After  the  year 
1876  many  banking  concerns  were  started  under  various  com- 
pany organizations,  and  by  1892  as  many  as  four  hundred  and 
ten  banks  were  either  started  or  closed  up.     Especially  in  1 88 1 
and  1882,  when  speculation  was  rampant,  the  establishment 
of  new  private  banks  was  rife;  but  as  they  were  all  of  little 
means,  they  could  not  compete  with  the  National  Banks. 
In  1890  the  government  enacted  a  number  of  bank  regulations, 
simultaneously  with   the   promulgation   of   the   Commercial 
Code,  by  which  it  was  fixed  that  the  banks  should  be  such 
establishments  as  receive  deposits  from  the  public  and  employ 
the  fund  in  making  loans  and  discounting  bills.     By  the  en- 
actment of  these  bank  regulations  it  was  aimed  to  bring  all 
the  banks  under  a  uniform  and  more  efficient  control,  and  the 
National  Banks  and  the  private  banks  were  subjected  to  one 
and  the  same  regulations.     This  unification  of  the  banking 
system  was  the  beginning  of  the  successful  development  of  the 
monetary  organs  of  the  country  in  after  years.     The  number 
of  ordinary  banks  at  the  end  of  1892  was  two  hundred  seventy, 
with  an  aggregate  paid-up  capital  of  22,000,000  yen  and  having 
27,000,000  yen  as  outstanding  loans.     With  the  enactment  of 
the  regulations  for  ordinary  banks,  those  for  the  Savings  Bank 
were  also  enacted  and  put  into  force  during  and  after  1893. 
These  Savings  Bank  regulations  were  issued  because  it  was 
necessary  to  exercise  reasonable  control  and  put  suitable  re- 
strictions on  the  numerous  bank-like  companies  which  had 
sprung  up  since  1882  and  1883,  when  thrift  and  economy  came 
into  vogue,  making  it  their  business  to  get  money  as  bank  de- 
posits through  various  means  and  methods.     At  the  end  of 
1893  the  number  of  Savings  Banks  was  twenty-four,  with  a 
nominal  capital  of  1,100,000  yen  in  all  and  savings  deposits 
totaling  6,000,000  yen. 
13 


I78         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

It  is  obvious  that  the  development  of  banks  of  all  kinds  is 
connected  with  the  extension  of  the  uses  of  security  paper  and 
the  development  of  credit  notes.  The  object  of  amending  the 
National  Bank  regulations  in  1876  was  to  open  up  the  methods 
of  operating  and  utilizing  the  national  loans,  which  had  at 
that  time  reached  already  huge  amounts.  From  that  time  the 
national  loans  continued  to  increase  in  amount  year  by  year, 
and  the  uses  of  the  loan  bonds  were  also  much  extended. 
After  1886  the  domestic  market  was  so  developed  as  to  be  able 
to  digest  an  enormous  amount  of  the  5  per  cent  Consolida- 
tion Loan  bonds.  With  the  progress  of  maritime  and  railway 
transportation,  people  came  to  adopt  more  and  more  the  busi- 
ness organizations  of  the  modern  system,  and  joint  stock  com- 
panies came  into  vogue,  with  the  result  that  the  stock  market 
began  to  prosper.  At  last,  the  Stock  Exchange  was  established, 
and  at  the  same  time  further  improvements  in  the  issues  of 
commercial,  bills  and  cheques  were  effected.  Prior  to  1877 
there  was  almost  no  circulation  of  bills,  and  the  scholars  were 
insisting  upon  the  introduction  of  the  western  system  of  credit 
notes.  After  December,  1882,  in  which  month  the  regulations 
for  commercial  bills  were  issued,  a  system  of  clearing  bills  was 
opened  between  the  banks  in  Tokyo  and  in  Osaka,  and  the 
circulation  of  bills  came  gradually  into  practice.  However, 
it  was  only  after  the  creation  of  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  the 
opening  of  bill  transactions  that  the  system  of  clearing  bills 
was  completed  and  commercial  bills  came  to  be  circulated 
generally. 

Thus,  it  was  not  until  1889  that  the  Tokyo  Clearing  House 
was  established  and  its  clearing  balances  were  settled  by  the 
Bank  of  Japan.  The  number  of  bills  exchanged  in  1893  be- 
tween Tokyo  and  Osaka  was  300,000,  and  they  were  valued  at 
210,000,000  yen. 

Thus,  we  may  say  that  about  the  year  1893  the  monetary 
organs  in  their  real  sense  of  national  economy  were  practically 
completed.  The  Bank  of  Japan  now  began  to  discharge  its 
functions  by  appearing  in  the  market  like  the  great  sun,  hav- 
ing an  enormous  capital  and  the  privilege  of  issuing  bank  notes, 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 79 

followed  by  numerous  stars,  and  the  blood  of  capital  flowing 
freely  through  the  veins  of  credit  notes.  Thus,  the  monetary 
circulation  was  generally  made  smooth  throughout  the  coun- 
try. Indeed,  the  foundation  of  the  present  economic" organs 
of  the  country  was  laid  in  the  days  after  the  year  1886,  when 
many  business  enterprises  sprang  up  and  the  monetary  organs 
were  put  in  order.  Generally  speaking,  the  developments 
prior  to  1877  were  only  the  preparations  or  experiments  for  the 
developments  in  this  epoch.  These  preparations  or  experi- 
ments as  viewed  from  the  present  day  are  all  a  history  of 
failures,  and  they  were  no  doubt  useless  for  vigorous  economi- 
cal development.  What  taught  us  that  these  preparations 
and  experiments  were  in  vain  were  the  economic  changes  or 
accidents  attendant  on  the  Satsuma  Rebellion.  The  economic 
changes  caused  by  the  inconvertible  notes  issued  at  that 
time  proved  that  such  preparations  and  experiments  should 
naturally  be  done  away  with.  Such  being  the  case,  new  foun- 
dations were  laid  afresh  and  a  new  system  was  begun.  We 
may  now  say  that  the  expenditures  for  the  Satsuma  Rebellion 
and  the  consequent  economic  disorder  were  of  great  signifi- 
cance in  the  country's  economic  history.  While  we  must 
recognize  that  the  economic  disorder  during  the  decade  begin- 
ning with  1877  and  ending  with  1886  had  wholly  arrested  our 
economic  growth,  and  while  we  must  wonder  at  the  disastrous 
effects  caused  by  the  enormous  expenditures  for  war,  we  must 
rejoice  in  the  fact  that  our  economic  condition  could  follow 
the  right  path  of  progress  after  we  had  gone  through  such  mis- 
fortune. Though  the  criticism  is  made  by  some  that  the  policy 
taken  by  the  government  for  the  adjustment  of  paper  money 
was  too  radical  and  sudden,  since  the  dulness  of  the  market 
and  the  general  economic  changes  caused  thereby  were  so  se- 
rious, yet  in  our  opinion  the  government  of  that  time  should 
not  be  too  severely  judged.  The  evil  effects  which  one  has 
brought  upon  himself  must  be  removed  by  himself,  and  if  sur- 
gical operations  are  necessary  for  that  purpose  he  can  not  be 
blamed  for  having  gladly  received  severe  treatment  with  the 
sharpness  of  the  surgeon's  knives.     We  should  rather  say  that 


l8o  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

by  utilizing  the  painful  experience,  improved  economic  organi- 
zations were  developed,  and  thus  we  could  convert  a  misfor- 
tune into  a  blessing.  The  economic  changes  caused  by  the 
Sino- Japanese  War  were  the  touchstones  in  testing  for  the 
first  time  the  stability  of  the  economic  organizations  thus 
formed.  We  shall  find  it  interesting  to  look  into  the  question 
whether  these  new  organizations  gave  evidence  of  having  suffi- 
cient resisting  power  against  the  events  of  the  Sino- Japanese 
War. 

From   the   Sino-Japanese  War  to  the  Russo-Japanese: 

War 

Payment  of  War  Expenditures  and  the  Money  Market 
in  War  Time 

The  grand  total  of  the  war  expenditures  for  the  Sino- 
Japanese  Wrar  was  233,000,000  yen.  The  main  part  of  this 
was  the  200,475,000  yen  paid  on  the  Special  Account  of 
Extraordinary  War  Expenditures,  of  which  the  disbursements- 
amounted  to  5,200,000  yen  each  in  June  and  July  of  1893, 
gradually  increasing  to  7,600,000  yen  and  9,700,000  yen 
in  August  and  September,  respectively,  and  further  increas- 
ing to  monthly  amounts  of  not  less  than  10,000,000  yen  from 
October,  1894,  to  March,  1895,  the  greatest  amount  of  19,- 
000,000  yen  having  been  reached  in  November,  1894.  From 
April,  1895,  these  disbursements  gradually  diminished  to 
about  7,000,000  or  8,000,000  yen.  The  items  of  receipts  to 
meet  these  defrayals  were  the  proceeds  from  public  loans, 
voluntary  contributions  to  army  and  navy  relief  funds,, 
voluntary  contributions  to  war  fund,  treasury  surplus,, 
transfers  from  the  Special  Account  of  the  War  Indemnity, 
etc.  Though  at  first  we  could  make  both  ends  meet  by  trans- 
ferring 26,000,000  yen  from  the  treasury  surplus,  the  receipts- 
fell  short  of  the  disbursements  after  September,  1894,  m 
spite  of  the  first  flotation  of  loans.  The  subsequent  proceeds 
from  loans  of  10,000,000  yen  each  in  the  months  of  April, 
May,  and  June  of   1895  were  still  insufficient  to  meet  the- 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


181 


expenditures,  and  straitened  circumstances  were  being 
experienced.  However,  the  third  flotation  of  loans  and  the 
transfer  from  the  indemnity,  effected  after  March,  1895, 
gradually  made  our  receipts  equal  our  expenses.  Of  the 
above  receipts,  the  funds  absorbed  from  among  the  people 
were  116,000,000  yen  of  the  proceeds  from  loans  and  2,940,- 
000  yen  of  the  voluntary  contributions  to  war  funds  and  those 
to  army  and  navy  relief  funds;  and  the  rest  were,  as  shown 
in  the  following  table,  the  transfer  from  the  National  Treasury, 
loans  from  the  Bank  of  Japan,  and  the  war  notes  issued,  the 
economic  effects  of  all  these  on  the  money  market  having  been 
very  great : 

Details  of  Accommodations  Made  to  the  War  Fund* 


Year  and  month 


Total  amount 

to  date  of  the 

war  fund 

deficit 


Amounts 

transferred 

from  National 

Treasury 


Loans  from 

the  Bank  of 

Japan 


War  notes 


1894 

October 

November .  .  . 
December .  .  .  . 

1895 

January 

February .... 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September .  .  . 

October 

November.  .  . 
December.  .  .  . 

1896 

January 

February .... 

March 

April 

May 


Yen 

553.377 
3H,o25 
500,644 

144.797 
578,648 
648,991 

357,222 

975.419 
941.036 
531,860 

001,498 

357.546 
705.799 
496,265 

030,541 
.835.238 

.043.164 
610,565 
.347,883 
.102,137 


Yen 

2,553,377 
8,814,025 
7,970,644 

16,724,797 
16,048,648 
22,368,991 
25,077,223 
24,195.419 
22,661,036 
20,727,591 
26,748,676 
29,080,730 
32,412,194 
31,534,497 
28,710,373 

34,930,525 
41,773,061 
26,710,462 
16,107,780 
3,102,035 


Yen 
6,000,000 
12,500,000 
19,530,000 


18,420 
22,530 
20,500 
17,500 
14,000 
12,500 
12,500 
12,500 
18,390 
25,000 
33,ioo 
41,500 


,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 


42,500,000 
41,270,000 
37,900,000 
41,240,000 


Yen 


3,780,000 
3,780,000 
3,780,000 
3,780,000 
3,304,268 
2,752,821 
1,886,816 
1,293,605 
861,768 
820,167 

404,713 
103 
103 
103 
103 


'  Since  there  were  no  deficits  prior  to  October,  1894,  and  after  May,  1896,  no  figures  are  given. 

As  the  deficits  in  the  war  expenditures  of  the  Sino-Japanese 
War  came  to  large  amounts,  the  sums  transferred  from  the 
National  Treasury  and  borrowed  from  the  Bank  of  Japan 


1 82  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

also  reached  a  large  figure;  the  former  often  exceeded  20,000,- 
000  yen  and  sometimes  reaching  as  much  as  40,000,000  yen, 
and  the  latter,  which  rarely  exceeded  20,000,000  yen  before 
the  first  half  of  1895,  often  exceeded  40,000,000  yen  in  the 
latter  half  of  1895  and  the  first  half  of  1896. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  the  economic  effects  of 
these  receipts  and  disbursements  of  the  war  expenditures  for 
the  Sino-Japanese  War.  In  doing  so,  let  us  deal  with  those 
effects  of  the  receipts  derived  principally  from  public  loans 
and  from  the  makeshift  means  of  borrowing  from  the  Bank 
of  Japan  and  transferring  from  the  National  Treasury,  and 
then  with  those  effects  of  the  disbursements  or  the  scattering 
of  funds  among  the  people. 

We  shall  not  here  state  in  detail  the  particulars  about  the 
conditions  of  the  flotation  of  the  war  loans,  but  we  may  say 
that  when,  with  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  raising  of  war 
loans  was  under  contemplation,  it  was  generally  anticipated 
in  monetary  circles  that  the  flotation  would  surely  be  at  a 
high  rate  of  interest  and  that  pressure  would  be  brought  upon 
private  undertakings.  As  a  result  of  this,  the  public  became 
very  cautious;  the  rate  of  interest  was  raised  accordingly  and 
the  quotations  of  securities  were  lowered.  Therefore,  as  soon 
as  the  first  war  loan  of  30,000,000  yen  began  to  be  raised  on 
August  17,  1894,  there  occurred  a  wholesale  decline  in  the 
stock  market.  Fortunately,  however,  the  subscriptions  to 
the  loan  proved  to  be  extremely  encouraging,  and  the  applica- 
tions for  subscription  reached  two  and  a  half  times  the  amount 
asked.  The  second  flotation  of  the  war  loan,  in  November, 
1894,  was  equally  successful.  Looking  into  the  changes  in 
the  prices  of  loan  bonds  and  the  rate  of  interest  during  the 
war,  we  find  that,  whereas  the  prices  of  the  Consolidation 
Loan  bonds  on  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  ruled  between 
109  and  no  from  January,  1894,  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
they  fell  down  to  100  after  the  raising  of  the  first  war  loan, 
and  further  to  97  or  96  after  the  issue  of  the  second  war  loan; 
after  that,  however,  they  gradually  recovered  and  were  main- 
tained at  about  100.     As  for  the  rate  of  interest  in  Tokyo, 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET 


183 


it  rose  from  2.4  sen  in  January,  1894,  to  2.8  sen  in  June, 
July,  and  August  of  the  same  year,  after  which  the  same  rate 
continued  without  any  change  until  July,  1895,  when  it 
returned  to  the  pre-war  rate.  We  may  conclude  from  this 
that,  though  during  the  Sino-Japanese  War  the  amount  of 
funds  absorbed  from  among  the  people  by  means  of  public 
loans  reached  the  enormous  figure  of  80,000,000  yen,  the 
effect  was  not  so  great  as  had  been  anticipated.  The  rate  of 
interest  and  the  prices  of  securities  were  not  much  changed, 
and  the  condition  of  the  money  market  seemed  to  be  free  and 
unconstrained. 

In  order  to  see  the  effect  on  the  money  market  of  the  loans 
from  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  the  accommodations  made  to  the 
war  fund,  we  give  the  following  tables,  showing  the  amount 
of  convertible  notes  issued  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  the 
amount  of  currencies  actually  circulated: 

As  shown  in  the  first  of  the  two  foregoing  tables,  the  amount 
of  convertible  notes  issued  from  just  before  the  war  until  the 
end  of  the  war  remained  generally  at  about  140,000,000  yen, 
but  during  and  after  September,  1895,  it  increased  greatly 
until  it  reached  180,000,000  yen  in  December  of  the  same 
year.  Meanwhile,  the  specie  reserve  gradually  decreased, 
and  during  and  after  June,  1895,  the  amount  issued  beyond 
limit  greatly  increased.     During  the  war  the  government's 


Amount  of  Convertible  Notes  and  Currencies 


Amount  of 
convertible 
notes  issued 

Specie  reserve 

Security 
reserve 

Balance  of 

note-issuing 

capacity 

Year  and 
month 

Amount 

existing 

Increase  or 
decrease  as 
compared 
with  June, 
1894 

Issued 

beyond 

limit 

1894 

March 

June 

September. .  . 
December  . . . 

1895 

March 

June 

September.  . . 
December  .  .  . 

Yen 
141,270,549 
141.736,358 
I37.795.i66 
149,813,700 

135.224,654 
143,083,663 
156.897,783 
180,336,815 

Yen 
82,649,964 
79.632,988 
77.291.508 
81,718,291 

72,367.888 
64,885,149 
68,250,119 
60,370,797 

Yen 

—  2,341.480 
+  2,085.303 

—  7,265,100 
-14,747.839 
-11,382,869 

—  19,262,191 

Yen 
58,620,585 
62,103,370 
60,503,658 
68,095,409 

62,856,766 

78,198,514 

85.647.664 

119,966,018 

Yen 
4.773.333 
1,302,091 
3,389,191 

1,522,516 

Yen 

4. 197.549 

13,811,497 
20,767,606 
55.083.148 

1 84 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 
Amount  of  Currencies  Circulating 


Year  and 
month 

Specie 

Paper 
money 

Total 

Balance  in 
Treasury 

Amount 

actually 

circulating 

Index    num- 
ber for  prices 
of  commodi- 
ties, as  re- 
ported by 
the  Bank  of 
Japan 

1894 
March 

Yen 
51,610,221 
52,252,649 
56,173,152 
62,711,242 

66,146,112 
67,358,072 
67.568,497 
69.739.986 

Yen 
179,261,061 
178,621,176 
173.390,774 
185,000,044 

169.545,546 
176.361,325 
186,167,042 
213,262,825 

Yen 

230,871,282 
230,873,825 
229,563.926 
247,711,286 

235.691,658 
243.7i9.397 
253.735.539 
282,000,811 

Yen 

47,043,622 
44,019,370 
30,895.834 
16,624,102 

19.315,256 
15,834.918 
10.355.133 
11.521,794 

Yen 
183,827,660 
186,854.455 
198,668,092 
231,087,184 

216,376,402 
227.884,479 
243,380,406 
270,479.107 

125 

September. .  .  . 

December.  .  .  . 

1 89S 

March 

June 

September.  .  .  . 
December.  .  .  . 

131 
133 

135 
132 
135 

140 

energy  was  specially  turned  toward  preventing  the  outflow 
of  specie  by  making  the  convertible  notes  of  the  Bank  of 
Japan  chiefly  circulate  at  the  front,  thus  restricting  the 
specie  payment  abroad.  The  result  was  that,  out  of  the  rough 
total  of  200,000,000  yen  disbursed  as  war  expenditures,  no  less 
than  183,900,000  yen  was  disbursed  in  convertible  notes,  and 
hard  money  was  very  little  used.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
foreign  trade,  which  showed  an  excess  of  imports  over  exports 
to  the  amount  of  4,000,000  yen  in  1894,  showed,  on  the  con- 
trary, an  excess  of  exports  over  imports  of  6,000,000  yen  in 
1895,  so  that  our  balance  of  trade  was  favorable.  At  that 
time  the  attitude  of  the  Bank  of  Japan  was  comparatively 
calm  in  the  discharge  of  its  important  duties.  As  soon  as 
the  war  opened,  it  raised  the  daily  rate  of  interest  on  loans 
on  June  8  from  1.9  sen  to  2  sen,  and  further  to  2.2  sen  on  July 
26.  This  was  purely  a  precautionary  war-time  measure  taken 
by  the  bank  to  warn  the  public  against  making  immoderate 
loans,  and  was  never  an  ambitious  policy  for  absorbing  specie 
by  availing  itself  of  the  exchange  operations.  The  aim  of 
this  raising  of  interest  was  attained,  as  it  directly  affected 
the  rates  of  interest  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  the  rate  in 
Tokyo  having  risen  by  0.3  sen  from  May  to  September. 
The  Bank  of  Japan,  which  in  this  manner  became  cautious 
with  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  never  altered  the  rate  of  in- 
terest until  the  restoration  of  peace,  and  consequently  the  gen- 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 85 

eral  market  rate  of  interest  also  remained  almost  unchanged. 
What  with  this  self-possessed  action  of  the  Bank  of  Japan, 
and  with  the  favorable  balance  of  foreign  trade,  the  sup- 
ply of  specie  during  the  war  was  generally  ample  and  the 
issue  of  the  convertible  notes  did  not  run  to  an  extreme. 
But  as  stated  previously,  large  amounts  of  loans  were  made 
from  the  Bank  of  Japan  owing  to  the  necessity  of  meeting  the 
war  expenditures,  and  at  last,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year 
1895,  there  came  the  inflation  of  the  convertible  notes  and  the 
diminution  of  the  specie  reserve.  By  referring  to  the  three 
foregoing  tables,  therefore,  we  find  that  as  the  war  fund 
deficit  became  larger  the  loans  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  or  the 
amounts  transferred  from  National  Treasury  also  increased. 
It  was  only  natural  that  with  the  large  increase  of  the  loans 
from  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  of  the  amounts  transferred  from 
the  National  Treasury  there  was  accordingly  an  inflation  of 
the  currency.  In  the  foregoing  table  giving  the  amount  of 
currency  actually  circulating  in  the  market,  we  find  that  this 
amount,  which  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  June,  1894,  was 
about  180,000,000  yen,  increased  gradually  after  the  restora- 
tion of  peace  in  1895,  reaching  over  243,000,000  yen  in  Sep- 
tember, 1895,  and  270,000,000  yen  in  December.  That  these 
increases  were  caused  by  the  said  increased  issue  of  converti- 
ble notes,  also  by  the  abundant  flowing  of  the  currency  in 
the  National  Treasury  into  the  circulating  market,  is  clearly 
shown  by  the  foregoing  table.  Such  an  inflation  of  the  cur- 
rency gradually  affected  the  prices  of  commodities,  as  is 
shown  by  the  index  numbers  for  the  prices  of  commodities  in 
the  foregoing  table.  This  in  turn  resulted  in  the  gradual 
outflow  of  gold  and  silver  abroad  in  the  relations  with  foreign 
countries,  as  there  was  an  excess  of  exports  of  specie  to  the 
amount  of  7,000,000  yen  in   1894  and  of  21,000,000  yen  in 

1895. 

To  sum  up,  we  may  say  that,  though  the  expenditures 
for  the  Sino- Japanese  War,  as  they  amounted  to  large  figures, 
seemed  to  cause  sudden  changes  in  economic  circles  at  the 
time,  the  fact  is  that  during  the  continuance  of  the  war  com- 


1 86  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

parative  calmness  ruled  in  the  money  market,  except  for 
slight  changes  at  the  time  of  its  outbreak.  It  was  only  after 
the  war  that  various  phenomena  consequent  upon  the  infla- 
tion of  currency  began  to  be  experienced,  the  results  of 
which  will  be  explained  in  the  following  pages. 

Preparations  were  quite  thorough  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment, the  Bank  of  Japan,  and  economic  circles  generally, 
during  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  in  order  to  preserve  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  money  market;  and  added  to  this  the  loyalty 
of  the  nation,  stimulated  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  brought 
about  successful  results  in  the  raising  of  war  loans,  besides 
producing  good  effects  in  preventing  the  starting  of  unhealthy 
business  undertakings.  However,  no  one  will  deny  that  the 
successful  development  of  the  economic  organizations  of  the 
country,  accomplished  by  the  adoption  of  drastic  measures 
in  the  adjustment  of  paper  money  and  the  establishment  of 
the  real  convertible  system,  was  the  chief  factor  in  produc- 
ing the  comparatively  free  and  unconstrained  condition  of 
the  money  market  when  it  faced  affairs  of  grave  national  con- 
cern. We  should  say  that  the  foundations  of  the  national 
economy  laid  in  the  decade  following  the  year  1882  proved  to 
be  sufficiently  strong  in  the  first  test  to  which  they  were 
exposed  during  the  Sino-Japanese  War. 

Post-Bellum  Economic  Inflation  and  its  Causes 

A  great  economic  expansion  of  an  unprecedented  nature 
took  place  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  which  ended  in  a 
glorious  victory  for  Japan.  Let  us  now  dwell  upon  this 
expansion  and  its  causes. 

The  signs  of  this  post-bellum  economic  inflation  first  mani- 
fested themselves  in  the  bond  and  stock  market,  as  may  be 
seen  from  the  following  quotations  of  the  Consolidated  Loan 
bonds  and  some  principal  shares  at  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange 
for  "direct  delivery." 

As  may  be  observed  from  the  following  table,  activity  in  the 
stock  market  had  already  begun  before  the  war  ended.  But 
it  was  after  July,  1895,  that  the  real  activity  set  in,  as  from 


EFFECTS  ON   THE  MONEY  MARKET 


I87 


July  to  December,  1895,  a^  the  shares  rose  steadily  without 
any  fall,  the  rise  in  the  least  case  having  been  over  10  yen  and 
in  the  largest  case  nearly  400  yen  per  share.  Though  the  ac- 
tivity slackened  in  1896  to  some  extent,  the  highest  quotations 
of  many  of  the  stocks  were  recorded  in  May  or  June  of  the 
same  year,  and  the  general  tendency  was  not  at  all  weak. 
However,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year  1896,  a  gradual  fall  at 
last  commenced.  The  rising  tendency  in  the  stock  market, 
which  lasted  so  long  and  went  to  such  high  degree,  was  accom- 
panied by  a  mania  for  speculation.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
transactions  for  "time  bargains"  at  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange, 
which  never  exceeded  in  amount  200,000  shares  per  month 
from  the  year  1894  to  the  first  half  of  1895,  often  exceeded 
300,000  shares  per  month  from  the  second  half  of  1895  to  the 
first  half  of  1896,  sometimes  even  reaching  500,000  shares  per 

month. 

Quotations  of  Stocks  and  Bonds  at  Tokyo 


Items 

Paid-up 
amount 
per  share 

January 
189S 

June 
1895 

December 
1895 

June 
1896 

December 
1896 

Consolidated  Loan  bonds 

Yen 

100 

30 

47 

50 
50 

50 
50 

Yen 
96.93 
28.96 

47.14 

79-68 
74-51 

42.82 
225.52 

Yen 
98.15 
34-99 

56.08 

84-45 
75-94 

57-44 
273-13 

Yen 

101.73 

61.13 

75-38 

101.85 
102 .44 

73-78 
621.43 

Yen 
100. 21 

56.00 
(50  yen 
paid  up) 

77-08 

109.70 
108.40 

68.54 
819.64 

Yen 
98.18 
43  -39 

Kansai  Railway 

Hokkaido  Colliery  Rail- 
way   

Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha .  .  . 
Kanegafuchi  Cotton 

Tokyo  Stock  Exchange.  . 

5962 

86.27 
73-73 

62.44 
350.32 

The  continued  animation  in  the  stock  market,  of  course, 
caused  a  mania  for  industrial  enterprises,  and  was  followed  by 
various  projects  for  new  undertakings  and  for  increasing  the 
capital  of  the  existing  concerns.  Statistics  concerning  these 
schemes  for  starting  new  concerns  in  those  days  are  lacking; 
but  we  have  the  following  figures,  which  compare  the  actual 
number  of  the  companies  and  the  amount  of  their  capital  at 
the  end  of  1894  with  those  at  the  end  of  1895  and  at  the  end 
of  1896,  showing  the  real  increase  of  the  newly  established 
firms: 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Statistics  of  Industrial  Enterprises 


Year 


1894 

1895 

1896 

Increase  at  the  end  of  1896,  as  com- 
pared with  the  end  of  1894 


Number  of 
companies 


2,792 
3,222 
4.595 


1,803 


Nominal 
capital 


Yen 
323,915,492 
410,661,41 1 
619,223,949 


295.308,457 


Paid-up 
capital 


Yen 
249,762,899 
289,002,341 
397.564.341 


147,801,633 


While  the  actual  increase  during  1895  and  1896  in  the  num- 
ber of  companies  was  thus  over  50  per  cent,  as  compared  with 
that  at  the  end  of  1894,  it  was  calculated  at  the  time  that  the 
total  capital  involved  in  all  of  the  new  schemes  contemplated 
in  1895  and  1896  would  come  up  to  the  immense  sum  of  about 
1,200,000,000  yen.  The  lines  of  these  new  enterprises  were 
chiefly  in  the  railway,  the  banking,  and  the  insurance  business. 
The  number  of  life  insurance  companies,  which  was  only  ten 
at  the  end  of  1893,  increased  to  twenty-nine  by  the  end  of  1896. 
The  number  of  fire  insurance  companies  increased  to  ten  by 
the  end  of  1896,  as  compared  with  five  at  the  end  of  1893. 
The  number  of  banks  at  the  end  of  1894  was  seven  hundred, 
with  an  aggregate  capital  of  52,770,000  yen,  but  it  increased 
to  one  thousand  and  fifty- four,  with  an  aggregate  capital  of 
146,950,000  yen,  by  the  end  of  1896. 

Loans  Made  by  Banks 


Period  ending 


1  >ecember,  1894 

June,   [895 

December,  1895 

June,  1896 

December,  1 896 

Increase  at  the  end  of  December,  1896,  as 
compared  with  the  end  of  I  >ecember,|i894 


Loans  made  by 
the  Bank  of 

Japan 


Yen 
36,601,797 
44,057,254 
64,018,141 
58,024,573 
91,300,947 


54,699.150 


Loans  made  by 

ordinary  banks 

i  fixed  loans  and 

overdrafts) 


Yen 

59,178,194 

69,099,085 

89,165,458 

112,967,873 

157,200,254 


98,042,060 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


I89 


This  mania  for  new  enterprises  caused  a  press  of  business  in 
monetary  circles.  The  preceding  table  shows  the  increases 
at  the  time  in  the  general  loans  made  by  the  Bank  of  Japan 
and  the  loans  by  the  ordinary  banks. 

Such  an  enlivened  state  of  the  money  market  led  to  over- 
issue of  convertible  notes  and  inflation  of  currency,  which,  as 
already  stated,  began  to  take  place  shortly  after  the  war. 
The  following  comparative  figures  will  show  this  increasing 

tendency : 

Inflation  of  Currency 


Amount  of 

specie  and  paper 

money   actually- 

circulating  in 

Average  at 

the  market,  ob- 
tained by  de- 
ducting the 
balance  in  the 

Increase  as 

Amount  of  con- 

Increase as 

end  of  each 

compared  with 

vertible  notes 

compared  with 

month  during 

the  year  1895 

issued 

the  year  1895 

National  Treas- 

ury from  the 

gross  amount  in 

circulation 

Yen 

Yen 

Yen 

Yen 

1895 

235.i89.oi3 

147,918,518 

1896 

260,684,986 

25,495,973 

172,192,370 

23,357,188 

1897 

280,562,237 

45.373,224 

186,412,207 

38,493,689 

With  the  inflation  of  the  currency  and  the  increase  of  the 
amount  of  issue  of  convertible  notes,  as  shown  above,  there 
was  a  gradual  rise  in  the  prices  of  commodities.  The  index 
numbers  of  the  prices  of  commodities  based  on  the  year  1887,. 
as  reported  by  the  Bank  of  Japan,  averaged  126  in  1894,  be- 
came 135  in  1895,  145  in  1896,  and  went  up  to  161  in  1897, 
with  a  still  further  upward  trend. 

From  all  that  has  been  stated  above,  a  general  idea  of  the 
post-bellum  economic  inflation  may  be  had,  and  the  animated 
state  of  monetary  circles  may  be  imagined.  We  shall  now 
proceed  to  discuss  the  causes  that  brought  about  this  state  of 
affairs,  touching  upon  their  relations  with  the  war  expendi- 
tures and  the  post-bellum  armament  expansion  expenditures. 

The  causes  of  the  economic  inflation  after  the  Sino-Japanese 


190 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 


War  are  various  and  complicated.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  awakening  of  the  nation  in  consequence  of  victory  in  the 
war  was  the  greatest  motive  power  in  causing  this  economic 
expansion;  and  it  is  quite  true  that  the  expectation  that  the 
Chinese  indemnity  would  soon  be  transported  home,  thus 
supplying  plentiful  capital  to  our  money  market,  brought 
about  a  reaction  from  a  state  of  temporary  cessation  of  all 
undertakings  during  the  war  to  that  of  great  industrial  expan- 
sion immediately  after  the  war.  We  must  also  take  into 
account,  as  a  chief  contributor  to  this  post-bellum  economic 
inflation,  the  improved  economic  foundation  of  the  country, 
as  well  as  the  fact  that  during  the  war  every  precaution  was 
exercised  by  the  people  in  general,  so  that  the  national  re- 
sources were  amply  fostered  and  the  economic  development 
was  carried  through,  enabling  the  country  to  make  this  post- 
bellum  expansion.  In  order  to  show,  for  instance,  how  capital 
was  being  hoarded  during  the  war,  we  give  the  following  figures 
showing  the  increases  of  bank  deposits  and  postal  savings: 

Increases  of  Bank  Deposits  and  Postal  Savings 


Period  ending 


December,  1893 

June,  1894 

December,  1894 
June,  1895 


Deposits  at  the 

cooperating 
banks  in  Tokyo 


Yen 
36,965,752 
39,259,690 
40,374,640 
45,017,866 


Deposits  at  the 

cooperating 
banks  in  Osaka 


Yen 
io,5I4,534 
io,453,4I5 
10,294,162 
12,387,187 


Postal 
savings 


Yen 
24,815,986 
26,569,325 
24,962,459 
26,275,675 


The  economic  inflation  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War  hap- 
pened on  such  foundation  and  in  high  national  spirits  as  above 
described,  but  it  was  characterized  by  a  sickly  nature;  the 
symptoms  were  not  reassuring  and  the  reactionary  effects 
were  disastrous.  It  was  apparent  that  it  was  beyond  the 
economic  resources  of  the  nation  to  meet  such  an  extravagant 
and  sudden  demand  for  capital.  The  aforesaid  activity  in  the 
stock  market,  the  sudden  increase  of  bank  loans,  the  craze  for 
speculation,  the  inflation  of  currency,  and  the  mania  for  new 


EFFECTS   ON  THE   MONEY   MARKET  191 

enterprises  were  all  of  an  unhealthy  nature.  The  anomalous 
conditions  in  financial  circles,  which  will  be  dealt  with  farther 
on,  were  the  natural  results  of  this  unhealthy  economic  expan- 
sion. 

Our  historical  investigation  must  now  go  into  the  causes 
that  gave  rise  to  such  an  unhealthy  economic  expansion. 
Some  attribute  it  to  the  lowering  of  the  rate  of  interest,  which 
was  effected  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  immediately  after  the  war 
and  which  gave  an  impulse  to  the  mania  for  new  enterprises; 
others  ascribe  it  to  the  increase  of  convertible  notes  consequent 
upon  the  expansion  of  the  security  reserve  of  the  Bank  of 
Japan;  and  still  others  say  it  was  due  to  the  system  of  keep- 
ing specie  reserve  abroad,  which  system  was  inaugurated  at 
this  time  by  the  government's  allowing  the  Bank  of  Japan  to 
issue  convertible  notes  against  the  reserve  of  a  part  of  the 
Chinese  indemnity  deposited  with  the  bank.  All  three  of 
these  opinions  are  correct,  but  none  of  them  can  adequately 
explain  all  of  the  causes  in  question.  The  supporters  of  these 
opinions  take  up  and  explain  the  single  fact  of  the  unreason- 
able inflation  of  the  currency,  and  they  attach  too  much  im- 
portance to  one  particular  cause  and  are  therefore  unable  to 
make  a  sufficient  explanation.  Of  course,  we  are  at  one  with 
them  in  recognizing  that  the  inflation  of  the  currency  brought 
about  this  unhealthy  economic  expansion,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  believe  that  in  addition  to  the  question  of  the  single 
matter  of  the  convertible  notes  policy  there  is  much  to  be  in- 
vestigated thoroughly  in  this  connection. 

The  loose  policy  pursued  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  after  the 
war  was  a  reflection  of  the  government's  economic  policy,  and 
the  bank  can  not  be  held  solely  responsible  for  it.  We  may 
say  that  the  expansion  of  the  security  reserve  for  the  convert- 
ible notes  was  made  in  compliance  with  the  demand  of  eco- 
nomic circles,  and  that  it  must  rather  be  regarded  as  an  effect 
of  the  unhealthy  rise  of  new  enterprises.  Moreover,  the  in- 
auguration of  the  system  of  keeping  specie  reserve  abroad  was 
due  to  the  government's  own  convenience,  and  was  more  prop- 
erly a  measure  rendered  necessary  by  the  pressure  of  finan- 


I92  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 

cial  needs.  We  may  conclude  that  there  were  other  causes 
for  such  a  state  of  affairs,  because  of  the  fact  that,  since  the 
premature  growth  of  the  economic  circles  was  unable  to  cope 
with  the  expansion  of  the  financial  administration,  the  mone- 
tary circles  received  too  great  a  pressure,  and  the  money  mar- 
ket was  thrown  into  a  chaotic  condition  by  the  overflow  of 
unproductive  capital. 

The  amount  of  the  public  loans  raised  to  meet  the  expendi- 
tures for  the  Sino-Japanese  War  reached  120,000,000  yen. 
Moreover,  in  accordance  with  the  various  great  post-bellum 
financial  schemes,  a  considerable  increase  of  taxation  was 
effected  and  many  public  loans  were  raised.  All  these  im- 
mense funds  absorbed  from  the  people  were  first  centralized 
in  the  National  Treasury;  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  that, 
when  these  funds  were  again  going  out  into  the  market,  great 
difficulties  were  encountered  in  maintaining  an  equilibrium  of 
receipts  and  disbursements.  In  order  to  suit  financial  con- 
venience, therefore,  the  policy  of  the  Central  Bank  had  always 
been  to  change  without  reference  to  the  overflow  of  currency, 
with  the  result  that,  as  shown  in  the  foregoing  table,  the  infla- 
tion of  currency  was  brought  about.  In  view  of  all  this,  we 
may  reasonably  conclude  that  the  original  cause  of  the  policy 
adopted  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  was  in  the  pressure  of  govern- 
ment finance  brought  to  bear  upon  the  monetary  circles. 
Almost  all  of  the  funds  disbursed  as  war  expenditures  and  post- 
bellum  administrative  expenditures  were  spent  unproductively ; 
that  is  to  say,  this  immense  capital  was  consumed  mostly  in 
building  barracks,  warships,  and  schools,  in  the  administrative 
expenses  of  Formosa,  and  in  the  organization  expenses  of  the 
iron  foundry,  and  only  a  small  part  was  invested  in  railways 
and  other  productive  works.  Moreover,  the  huge  sum  of 
indemnity  money,  the  coming  of  which  had  been  so  enthu- 
siastically expected  in  economic  circles,  was  almost  wholly 
converted  into  warships,  fortresses,  and  batteries.  It  was  not 
strange  that  all  these  funds  spent  for  unproductive  purposes, 
so  to  speak,  overflowed  into  every  quarter  of  society,  together 
with  funds  of  the  same  nature,  such  as  rewards,  interest  on 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  1 93 

national  loans,  etc.,  and  it  was  but  natural  that  these  moneys 
in  turn  should  be  consumed  in  an  unproductive  manner. 
Moreover,  inasmuch  as  funds  of  such  a  floating  nature  had  no 
proper  place  to  settle  down  during  the  two  years  of  the  war, 
it  was  inevitable  that,  as  soon  as  the  war  ended,  they  should 
be  directed  into  all  sorts  of  speculative  undertakings;  and  it 
may  be  said  that  various  post-bellum  industrial  enterprises 
arose  with  a  view  to  the  settlement  of  all  this  floating  capital. 
It  is  now  clear  that  this  post-bellum  economic  inflation  was 
quite  weak  and  irresolute  in  its  character  and  was  conducive 
to  useless  expenditure  of  capital,  and  that  this  led  to  future 
straitened  circumstances. 

Anomalous  Conditions  in  Financial  Circles 

As  narrated  in  the  preceding  pages,  the  post-bellum  economic 
inflation  was  of  a  very  unhealthy  character.  Its  serious  effects 
came  to  light  during  and  after  the  year  1897,  and  were  made 
more  serious  by  the  outbreak  of  the  North  China  Disturbance. 
The  capital  which  had  long  been  floating  was  thus  settled  by 
the  post-bellum  industrial  expansion,  with  the  result  that  a 
still  greater  need  of  capital  was  caused.  Moreover,  as  the 
prices  of  commodities,  which  had  risen  by  the  inflation  of  cur- 
rency, continued  to  be  high,  imports  exceeded  exports  year 
after  year,  and  there  was  a  continual  outflow  of  specie  abroad. 
At  length,  an  unprecedented  stringency  of  the  money  market 
was  produced.  The  following  figures  may  serve  to  illustrate 
these  circumstances. 

The  annual  amount  of  paid-up  capital  invested  in  various 
companies  was  as  follows: 

Year  Yen 

1896 95.664,559 

1897 135,002,845 

1898 89,154,081 

Total 319,821,485 

The  annual  increase  of  loans  made  by  various  banks  (amount 
of  loans  outstanding  at  end  of  year)  was  as  follows: 

14 


194 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 


Year 

Bank  of  Japan 

<  Ordinary  banks 

Sa\  ings  banks 

1896 

Yen 

91,300,947 

104,973,122 

84.375.651 

Yen 
157,200,254 

241,899,875 
294,192,883 

Yen 

8,088,206 
16,569,899 
23.576,480 

1897. . 

1898 

Thus,  the  amount  of  paid-up  capital  aggregated  more  than 
300,000,000  yen  for  the  three  years,  and  the  demand  for  capital, 
as  indicated  by  the  annually  increasing  loans  of  the  banks,  be- 
came very  great. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  balance  of  foreign  trade  and  the  rela- 
tion of  the  amount  of  convertible  notes  to  the  prices  of  com- 
modities was  as  follows: 


Year 


Excess  of  imports 

over  exports  of 

commodities 


Excess  of  exports 

over  imports  of 

specie 


1896 
1897 

1898 


Yen 

531.714 
56,16= 

111.748,404 


Yen 

27.543,323 
62,247,550 

44,423,699' 


Excess  of  imports. 


Year 

Average  al  end  of 

month  of  Bank  of 

Jap, m  convertible 

note- 

Average  at  end  of 

month  of  Bank 

of  Japan  specie 

reserve 

Index  number  of 
the  prices  of  com- 
modities, as  re- 

1"  »rted  by  the 
Bank  of  Japan 

(1887  =  100) 

1896 

Yen 

172,192,370 
186,412,207 

185,578,742 

Yen 
93,474,894 
106,953,073 

80,474,376 

J45 

1897 

161 

1898 

170 

The  excess  of  imports  over  exports  of  specie  in  the  year  1898 
dots  not  correspond  with  the  balance  of  trade  in  the  same  year, 
and  this  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  that  year  some  of  the 
indemnity  money  was  received. 

The  need  for  capital  was  thus  pressing,  specie  became  scarce, 
and  the  supply  of  capital  was  gradually  obstructed.     This 


EFFECTS  OX  THE   MONEY    MARKET 


195 


caused  a  great  contraction  in  the  money  market  and  a  sudden 
rise  of  the  rate  of  interest.  At  the  same  time,  falls  in  the 
quotations  of  securities,  especially  of  stocks,  were  observed. 
The  following  tables  will  demonstrate  this  state  of  affairs: 


Rates  of  Interest  on  Loans  and  Discount 


Half-year  ending 


Bank  of  Japan 

interest  rate 

on  loans 


Lowest  interest 

rate  on  loans  in 

Tokyo 


Lowest  discount 

rate  in  all  parts 

of  country 


June,  1896.  .  .  . 
December,  1896 
June,  1897 
December,  1897 
June,  1898. .  .  . 
December,  1898 


Sen 
2.00 
2 .  10 
2.30 
2.50 
2  .70 
2.50 


Sen 

2.28 


■58 
59 
.86 
.  06 


Sen 
2.76 


Quotations  for  "Immediate  Delivery"  of  Some  Principal  Stocks  on 
the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange 


Month  and  year 


June,  1896 

June,  1897 

December,  1897 . 

June,  1898 

December,  1898 . 


Sanyo 
Railway" 

Kansai 
Railwayb 

Hokkaido 
Colliery 
Railway11 

Nippon 
Yusen 
Kaisha1' 

Kanegafu- 
chi  Cotton 
Spinningb 

56.00 
45-7-' 
45-55 
45. 95° 

52.85 

77.08 
57.13 
53-30 

4'J.74 
51.15 

109.70 
85.72 

93-95 
80.96 
8981 

108.40 
56.13 
52.89 
45-98 
5569 

68.54 
56.78 

42 .  21 
41.58 
41.42 

Tokyo 

Stock 

Exchange11 


S19.64 
313-88 
167.04 
119-64 
184.66 


30  yen  paid  up. 


b  50  yen  paid  up. 


40  yen  paid  up. 


We  may  judge  from  the  foregoing  figures  that  the  money 
market  during  the  period  from  June,  1896,  to  June,  1898,  ex- 
perienced gradual  tightening  to  a  serious  extent. 

In  1898  matters  became  so  much  worse  that  a  panic  seemed 
imminent.  At  last,  the  government  bought  up  from  the 
market  government  loan  bonds  to  the  nominal  amount  of 
about  38,000,000  yen  to  relieve  the  prevailing  distress,  and  also 
subscribed  for  the  debentures  of  the  Hypothec  Bank  of  Japan 
and  instructed  the  bank  to  make  loans  to  industrial  companies. 
Moreover,  by  raising  foreign  loans  to  the  amount  of  100,000,- 
000  yen  it  aimed  to  secure  a  large  supply  of  capital  for  the 
market.     The  fact  that  such  further  steps  for  replenishing 


I96         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

capital  were  taken  by  the  government,  in  spite  of  the  receipt 
of  the  indemnity  money  to  the  amount  of  59,000,000  yen  in 

1898  and  34,000,000  yen  in  1899,  which  made  an  ample  supply 
of  capital,  may  show  how  extremely  stringent  the  money 
market  was  at  the  time.  The  importation  of  foreign  capital 
was  then  much  welcomed  by  the  public  as  a  fit  relief  measure 
for  the  economic  distress.  It  is  our  opinion,  however,  that, 
though  by  the  importation  of  this  unproductive  capital  the 
economic  community  was  barely  saved  from  an  impending 
catastrophe,  a  superfluity  of  floating  capital  was  again  caused 
thereby,  and  that  it  led,  as  usual,  to  a  vain  boom  in  industrial 
circles.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  money  market,  which  became  easier  in  the  year  1899, 
when  there  were  indications  of  an  industrial  revival,  was  again 
thrown  into  a  state  of  depression  in  1901. 

The  post-bellum  financial  anomaly  became  most  serious  in 
1900  and  1 90 1.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that,  when  the 
financial  circles  seemed  to  recover  a  little  in  1899,  there  arose 
the  North  China  Disturbance  in  1900,  and  that,  in  order  to 
raise  the  funds  needed  in  this  affair,  large  loans  were  obtained 
from  the  Bank  of  Japan,  and,  besides,  increases  of  taxation 
were  effected.  To  enumerate  some  of  the  symptoms  of  this 
anomalous  condition,  we  may  mention  that  in  1900  and  until 
September  of  the  next  year,  excepting  November,  1900,  and 
May,  1 901,  there  were  monthly  excesses  of  imports  over  ex- 
ports, amounting  to  more  than  10,000,000  yen  in  many  mont  hs. 
This  was  followed  by  a  great  outflow  of  specie,  as  in  1900  the 
excess  o\  exports  over  imports  of  specie  amounted  to  45,000,- 
000  yen.  Then,  there  was,  of  course,  a  sudden  decrease  in  the 
supply  of  specie,  as  the  specie  reserve,  which  at  the  end  of 

1899  amounted  to  100,000,000  yen,  came  down  to  66,000,000 
yen  in  January,  1901.  We  have  seen  the  issue  beyond  limit 
of  the  convertible  notes  in  every  month  of  1900  and  1901,  that 
in  January,  1900,  being  24,000,000  yen  and  that  in  December 
of  the  same  year  41,000,000  yen;  and  even  in  1901  this  excess 
issue  was  about  20,000,000  yen.  Prices  of  commodities,  whose 
index  numbers,  based  on  the  year  1887,  as  reported  by  the 


EFFECTS  ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


197 


Bank  of  Japan,  were  then  from  170  to  190,  steadily  continued 
to  rise.  These  things  led  the  Bank  of  Japan  to  resort  to 
severe  measures  of  raising  the  interest  as  many  as  six  times 
during  and  after  July,  1899,  the  rate  on  loans  at  1.7  sen  having 
been  raised  to  2.7  sen  by  July  of  the  year  1900. 

In  the  midst  of  these  straitened  circumstances,  the  North 
China  Disturbance  arose,  and  the  economic  world  was  terrified 
in  the  extreme.  The  following  stock  market  quotations  after 
the  year  1899  are  the  reflection  of  this  panic-stricken  state  of 

affairs : 

Stock  Exchange  Quotations,  December,  1899-JuNE,  1901 


Month  and  year 

Sanyo 
Railway  a 

Kansai 
Railway1' 

Hokkaido 
Colliery 
Railway* 

Nippon 

Yusen 
Kaishaa 

Kanegafu- 
chi  Cotton 
Spinning" 

Tokyo 

Stock 

Exchange1 

December,  1899 

Yen 
53-85 
Si.  10 

52.40 
51.60 

Yen 

4530 
36.97 
37-79 

34-89 

Yen 
97-04 
81.26 
76.51 
68.42 

Yen 

64  41 

58.84 
64.27 
64.55 

Yen 
54-07 
40.92 
37   99 
29.82 

Yen 
204.86 
162.28 

143.21 
114.87 

8  50  yen  paid  up. 


■  47  yen  paid  up. 


As  the  hard  times  due  to  the  scarcity  of  capital  in  economic 
circles  were  nearing  an  end,  after  1900  many  banks  suspended 
payment,  and  the  generally  cautious  attitude  of  the  money 
market  continued  to  exist.  At  length,  when  on  April  16,  1901 , 
there  was  a  fearful  run  on  the  banks  at  Osaka,  the  money 
market  was  utterly  ruined.  This  was  the  greatest  disaster 
ever  recorded  in  the  monetary  history  of  the  country.  This 
run  was  made  on  almost  all  of  the  principal  banks  in  Osaka, 
and  deposits  were  drawn  out  to  the  amount  of  21,500,000  yen 
in  twenty  days.  All  the  Kansai  districts,  the  Shikoku,  as  well 
as  Kyoto  and  places  eastward  up  to  the  Province  of  Mikawa, 
were  thrown  into  the  same  troubled  condition.  Hereupon, 
commercial  and  industrial  calamities  became  very  serious,  and 
many  bankruptcies  occurred  among  the  import  and  export 
merchants,  dealers  in  coal,  foreign  piece  goods,  matches,  etc. 
The  destruction  of  the  credit  system  at  this  time  could  be  seen 
from  the  increase  in  dishonored  cheques  and  bills.  The  an- 
nual number  of  these  bad  cheques  and  bills,  which  was  35  111 


I98         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

1896,  101  in  [897,  and  146  in  1898,  increased  to  1,305  in  1900 
and  to  606  in  the  first  four  months  of  1901.  Though  in  May, 
1901,  the  crisis  was  almost  over,  economic  stagnancy  then  set 
in,  both  consumption  and  production  declined,  and  economic 
circles  could  do  nothing  else  than  await  the  healing  of  the 
wounds  they  had  received.  This  was  the  two-year  economic 
depression  experienced  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  Thus,  t  he  vicissitudes  of  monetary  circles  con- 
sequent upon  expenditures  for  the  Sino-Japanese  War  were 
generally  determined,  and  beginning  with  the  year  1903  the 
market  in  general  resumed  its  normal  state.  Nine  years  elapsed 
before  the  economic  effects  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  were 
passed,  and  we  wonder  at  their  persistence,  even  though  it  was 
partly  due  to  the  outbreak  of  the  North  China  Disturbance. 

Adoption  of  the  Gold  Standard  and  Increase  of  Monetary  Organs 

We  shall  now  say  a  few  words  regarding  the  great  coinage 
reform  in  this  country  and  the  new  organization  in  our  mone- 
tary system.  The  former  was  accomplished  by  the  utilization  of 
the  indemnity  money  received  from  China,  and  the  latter  was 
one  of  the  post-bellum  administrative  measures.  They  may 
be  said  to  have  been  the  by-products  of  the  war  expenditures, 
and  are  facts  which  must  be  noted  by  those  who  study  the 
history  of  the  money  market  of  the  country. 

The  adoption  of  the  gold  standard  was  a  long-pendilg 
question,  which  was  left  unaccomplished  owing  to  the  lack 
of  means  of  absorbing  the  gold  reserve.  The  unexpected 
receipt  of  the  Chinese  indemnity  seemed  to  offer  the  desired 
opportunity,  and  the  system  was  at  last  adopted.  The  new 
system  went  into  effed  in  March,  1897,  and  from  that  time  the 
country  enjoyed  considerable  convenience  in  its  international 
monetary  relations,  among  which  the  facility  of  inviting  capital 
from  other  countries  after  the  year  [899  may  be  counted  as 
the  most  important.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  benefit  con- 
ferred upon  the  country  by  this  coinage  reform  was  very  great. 

The  government  also  carried  into  practice,  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war,  its  long-cherished  desire  of  founding  real 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  1 99 

estate  banks;  and  at  last  came  the  establishment  of  the 
Hypothec  Bank  of  Japan  and  of  one  agricultural  and  industrial 
bank  in  each  of  the  prefectures  throughout  the  country.  By 
these  new  monetary  organs  the  immovable  properties  of  the 
country  were  now  able  to  be  converted  into  negotiable  instru- 
ments in  the  money  market.  Next  to  the  above-mentioned 
banks,  the  establishment  of  a  kind  of  movable  properties 
bank  in  1901  demands  our  attention.  It  was  called  the 
Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  and  its  object  was  to  serve  as  an 
intermediary  in  subscribing  to  the  national  loans  and  indus- 
trial stocks  and  bonds.  The  Bank  of  Formosa  was  established 
in  1900  as  a  central  financial  organ  in  the  newly  acquired  in- 
sular territory.  Thus,  three  new  and  significant  institutions 
were  added  to  the  financial  organization  of  the  country. 

From   the   Russo-Japanese   War  to  the  Present  Time 

Payment  of  War  Expenditures  and  the  Money  Market  in 

War  Time 

The  expenditures  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  aggregated 
1,860,840,000  yen,  of  which  the  amount  properly  belonging  to 
the  Special  Account  of  Extraordinary  Military  Expenditures 
was  1,508,470,000  yen.  In  order  to  see  the  effects  of  these  ex- 
penditures on  the  money  market,  let  us  first  of  all  refer  to 
Tables  D  and  E  on  pages  216-17  ancl  218-19. 

According  to  these  tables,  we  find  that,  though  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  purchases  of 
munitions  amounted  to  a  great  deal,  the  monthly  disburse- 
ments as  military  expenditures  were  limited  to  20,000,000 
yen,  or  at  the  most  to  40,000,000  yen,  owing  to  the  yet  small 
number  of  troops  sent  to  the  front.  After  August,  1904,  the 
monthly  expenditures  increased  to  50,000,000  yen,  or  at  the 
most  to  70,000,000  yen,  gradually  to  decrease  after  the  res- 
toration of  peace.  The  average  daily  expenditure  was  about 
1,000,000  yen  in  May,  1904,  and  reached  2,305,000  yen  in 
August  of  the  same  year,  after  which  it  ranged  between 
2,000,000  and  2,700,000  yen,  until  in  1906  it  began  to  decrease 


200  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

largely.     The  receipts,  even  after  the  commencement  of  the 

war,  were  not  large  until  October,  1904,  and  when  the  receipts 
of  over  100,000,000  yen  came  to  be  obtained  in  each  of  the 
four  months  from  May  to  August,  1906,  we  could  at  length 
make  both  ends  meet.  Though  in  the  special  Aecount  of 
Extraordinary  Military  Expenditures  we  see  an  excess  of  more 
than  200,000,000  yen  of  receipts  over  expenditures,  we  must 
note  that  during  the  war  we  weiv  always  very  short  of  war 
funds.  Thus,  the  accommodations  made  to  the  war  fund  were 
necessary,  as  shown  in  Table  E  at  the  end  of  this  chapter, J  in 
which  we  see  that  at  first  the  accommodations  were  chiefly 
in  the  nature  of  transfers  from  the  National  Treasury  and 
loans  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  later  in  war  notes  and 
treasury  bills.  The  treasury  bills  ranked  first,  amounting  to 
more  than  100,000,000  yen  from  the  end  of  1905  to  July,  1906; 
the  war  notes  ranked  second,  amounting  to  96,000,000  yen; 
and  the  loans  from  the  Bank  of  Japan  ranked  third,  amount- 
ing to  92,000,000  yen  in  February,  1904. 

In  order  to  see  the  effects  of  the  special  account  of  Ex- 
traordinary Military  Expenditures  on  the  money  market,  we 
must  consider  the  amounts  that  were  absorbed  directly  from 
the  money  market.  To  these  amounts  belong  434,880,000 
yen  of  the  receipts  from  the  Exchequer  Bonds  raised  five  times 
in  all,  the  proceeds  of  189,060,000  yen  from  war  loans,  the 
receipts  of  399,490,000  yen  from  twice-increased  taxation,  and 
2,331,076  yen  of  voluntary  contributions  to  the  war  fund,  or 
1,025,780,648  yen  in  all.  To  the  above  must  also  belong  the 
treasury  bills  issued  and  the  loans  made  from  the  Bank  of 
Japan.  Thus,  the  monthly  amounts  absorbed  from  the 
money  market  were  at  least  38,000,000  yen  or  at  the  most 
210,000,000  yen.  Now,  as  regards  the  items  of  expenditure, 
they  were  very  numerous,  as  explained  in  Part  I  of  this  volume; 
and  as  their  monthly  amounts  exceeded  60,000,000  yen,  as  al- 
ready seen  in  the  beginning  of  this  section,  it  may  easily  In- 
supposed  that  their  receipts  and  disbursements  caused  no 
little  disturbance  in  the  money  market. 

1  Post,  pp.  218    I    . 


EFFECTS   OX   THE   MONEY  MARKET  201 

We  shall  not  here  go  into  the  details  of  the  loans  raised  on 
account  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  but  an  idea  of  the 
general  condition  of  the  market  at  the  time  may  be  gathered 
from  Table  F,1  which  shows  the  results  of  the  issue  of  Ex- 
chequer Bonds,  which  were  the  principal  loans  raised  in  the 
home  market  on  five  occasions. 

We  may  note  from  the  above  that  as  the  issue  of  Ex- 
chequer Bonds  was  repeated  the  conditions  were  such  as  to  be 
disadvantageous  to  the  government,  and  the  proportion  of  the 
net  proceeds  to  the  amount  raised  became  smaller  and  smaller. 
Generally  speaking,  however,  the  result  of  the  flotation  was 
successful  throughout  the  five  issues,  although  the  number  of 
applications  above  issue  price  gradually  decreased.  This 
may  seem  to  prove  that  the  national  wealth  was  ample  beyond 
expectation,  but  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  the  whole 
nation  was  at  that  time  imbued  with  such  intense  feelings  of 
loyalty  and  patriotism  that  upon  announcement  of  the  issue  of 
Exchequer  Bonds  it  came  forward  in  response  and,  aided  by 
the  strenuous  efforts  of  the  central  and  other  banks,  made  the 
issue  a  brilliant  success.  Thus,  patriotism  contributed  largely 
to  the  success  of  the  issue  of  the  Exchequer,  Bonds.  But  it 
was  not  only  in  this  direction  that  the  nation's  preparedness 
was  exhibited,  for  it  was  seen  also  in  the  increase  in  the 
amount  of  national  savings.  During  the  war  the  general  de- 
posits at  the  Bank  of  Japan  were  increased  by  millions  of  yen, 
and  the  deposits  at  the  banks  in  the  chief  localities  of  the 
country  underwent  an  increase  of  85  per  cent,  or  370,000,000 
yen,  from  October,  1903,  to  December,  1906.  In  the  same 
period  the  postal  savings  showed  an  increase  of  115  per  cent, 
or  35,000,000  yen.  Table  G2  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  sets 
forth  these  increases. 

That  such  increases  took  place  in  bank  deposits  and  postal 
savings  was  mainly  due  to  the  efforts  made  during  the  war, 
both  by  the  government  and  by  certain  sections  of  the  public, 
especially  those  in  educational  circles,  to  encourage  thrift  and 
economy,  and  also  to  the  efforts  of  the  postal  authorities,  who 

1  Post,  p.  220.  2  Post,  p.   221  . 


202  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

by  raising  the  rate  of  interest  on  the  postal  savings  aimed  to 
accumulate  whatever  moneys  were  scattered  over  the  country. 
A  o  >nsiderable  pari  of  the  funds,  which  were  once  disbursed  as 
war  expenditure-,  was  in  this  way  converted  into  such  de- 
posits and  savings,  and  it  is  admirable  that  the  nation  could 
show  such  extraordinary  economic  power  at  the  time.  This 
state  of  affairs  produced  a  good  effect  on  the  security  market 
and  the  bank  interest  rates.  Though  the  Bank  of  Japan  raised 
the  rate  of  interest  on  loans  by  0.2  sen  in  July,  1903,  owing  to 
the  stringency  and  disquietude  of  the  money  market  ex- 
perienced from  the  beginning  of  the  same  year,  and  raised  it  by 
another  0.2  sen  in  December  of  1904,  in  which  year  the  war 
broke  out,  by  way  of  warning  the  monetary  circles  the  rate 
was  left  unchanged  for  the  following  six  months;  and  on  June 
16,  1905,  as  the  termination  of  the  war  was  almost  certain  and 
business  activity  began  again,  a  third  raising  of  interest  by  0.2 
sen  was  effected,  yet  the  rate  then  stood  at  2.3  sen,  which  was 
indeed  the  lowest  in  the  four  years  since  March,  1900.  The 
rates  of  interest  throughout  the  country  were  nearly  in  the 
same  condition.  Thus,  the  daily  rate  on  loans,  which  was  be- 
fore the  war  2.2  sen  in  Tokyo  and  2  sen  in  Osaka,  was  raised 
only  to  2.3  sen  and  2.2  sen,  respectively,  with  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  These  rates  remained  unchanged  until  July,  1905, 
when  they  were  raised  by  0.2  sen,  or,  at  the  most,  0.4  sen,  but 
this  was  done  in  response  to  the  aforesaid  third  raising  of  inter- 
est by  the  Bank  of  Japan  and  was  intended  rather  as  a  warning 
against  the  post-bellum  industrial  mania.  Turning  to  the 
stock  market,  we  find  that  comparative  calm,  ruled  through- 
out the  war  time,  and  no  serious  depression  was  observed.  Of 
course,  the  nervousness  of  the  stock  market  was  shown  in  its 
fluctuations  every  time  a  war  report  arrived  or  a  war  loan  was 
floated,  but  no  abnormally  high  or  low  prices  were  recorded. 
Even  the  stocks  of  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange,  which  may  be 
called  the  barometer  of  the  stock  market,  were  quoted  during 
the  war  at  monthly  average  prices  ranging  between  1X2  yen  in 
June,  1904,  and  148  yen  in  January,  1905. 

We  have  seen  that  the  demand  and  supply  of  capital  during 


EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


203 


the  war  were  regulated  in  a  comparatively  smooth  manner, 
and  we  must  now  see  whether  the  currency  system  was  seri- 
ously affected  by  this  unprecedented  event  in  the  history  of 
the  Empire,  since  this  is  an  important  question  to  be  con- 
sidered, especially  in  the  case  of  a  debtor  country  like  Japan. 
Let  us  first  of  all  glance  at  the  figures  indicating  the  balance 
of  foreign  trade : 

Balance  of  Foreign  Trade 


Year 


1903 
1904 

1905 
1906 


Exports 


Yen 
289,502,442 
319,260,894 
321,533,610 
423,754,892 


Imports 


Yen 

317,135.517 
371,360,739 
488,538,017 
418,784,108 


Excess  of  im- 
ports over 
exports 


Yen 

27,633,075 

52,099,845 

167,004,407 

4,970,784= 


a  Excess  of  exports. 

We  see  that  during  the  war  the  increases  in  imports  were 
great,  a  decrease  of  70,000,000  yen  having  occurred  only  in  the 
year  1906.  It  was  fortunate  for  our  economic  community 
that  trade  remained  active,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  navigation 
was  rendered  dangerous  by  the  appearance  of  the  Vladivostok 
Squadron  and  the  Baltic  Fleet.  But  the  considerable  excess 
of  imports  over  exports,  which  amounted  to  some  246,000,000 
yen  for  the  first  three  years  in  the  foregoing  table,  was  due  to 
the  necessity  of  getting  from  abroad  the  various  materials 
urgently  required  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Indeed, 
the  expenditures  which  belonged  to  the  payments  abroad 
reached  233,000,000  yen,  viz.,  177,000,000  yen  for  the  army 
and  56,000,000  yen  for  the  navy. 

The  balance  of  foreign  trade  being  as  stated  above,  the  next 
thing  to  consider  must  naturally  be  the  difficulty  of  maintain- 
ing the  specie  reserve.  At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the 
government  gave  the  most  careful  attention  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  specie  reserve  by  economizing  the  use  of  foreign 
goods,  by  restricting  the  treasury  payments  abroad,  and  by 
causing  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  to  effect  an  extensive  pur- 


204  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

chase  of  drafts  in  the  export  trade  and  to  limit  the  exchange 
transactions  in  the  import  trade.  The  government,  moreover, 
undertook  to  raise  funds  by  means  of  large  foreign  loans.  In 
the  expenditures  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  some  500,000,000 
yen  were  met  by  foreign  loans.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  funds  raised  by  these  foreign  loans  formed  in  reality  an 
important  factor  in  the  maintenance  of  the  specie  reserve. 
The  repayment  of  the  loans-  made  by  the  Bank  of  Japan,  ef- 
fected by  means  of  these  foreign  loans,  reached  304,000,000 
yen  at  the  end  of  June,  1905,  and  the  amount  of  the  specie  sold 
to  the  Bank  of  Japan  came  up  to  329,000,000  yen. 

Further,  the  government  endeavored  to  keep  the  foreign 
exchange  favorable  to  this  country  by  a  cautious  handling  of 
the  funds  obtained  through  foreign  loans.  The  government 
also  issued  war  notes  at  the  seat  of  war  and  made  them  tem- 
porary currency  by  economizing  in  the  use  of  hard  specie 
money.  These  war  notes  rose  in  credit  at  the  theater  of  war, 
and  the  amount  of  circulation  at  the  end  of  each  month  ex- 
ceeded 90,000,000  yen. 

The  government's  endeavors  to  maintain  the  specie  reserve, 
in  spite  of  the  enormous  war  expenditures,  thus  proved  suc- 
cessful, and  our  convertible  note  system  was  fortunately  kept 
intact.  Consequently,  no  destruction  of  our  currency  system 
resulted  from  the  expenditures  for  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
which  were  the  gravest  economic  burden  ever  borne  by  the 
nation.  The  economic  effects  of  these  war  expenditures, 
therefore,  are  not  to  be  sought  in  a  direction  such  as  the  is- 
suance  of  inconvertible  notes,  but  in  the  effects  caused  by 
foreign  loan-. 

Thus,  the  maintenance  of  the  specie  reserve  was  successful, 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  payment  of  the  war  expen- 
ditures brought  about  an  inflation  of  the  currency.  Though 
there  was  general  facility  in  the  accommodation  of  funds,  and 
the  importation  of  foreign  capital  was  successful,  yet  the  loans 
made  l>y  the  Bank  of  Japan  amounted  to  a  great  deal.  As  an 
abundance  of  capital  may  generally  mean  a  phenomenon  ap- 
pearing in  tlie  market  through  the  channel  of  the  Bank  of 


EFFECTS  ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


205 


Japan,  it  itaturally  follows  that  the  amount  of  the  bank's  notes 
was  inflated.  The  following  table  gives  the  amounts  of  Bank 
of  Japan  convertible  notes  and  specie  reserve : 

Convertible  Notes  and  Specie  Reserve  of  Bank  of  Japan 


Date 


December  31,  1903 
March  31,  1904.  .  . 

June  30,  1904 

September  30,  1904 
December  31,  1904 
March  31,  1905.  .  . 

June  30, 1905 

September  30,  1905 
December  31,  1905 
March  31,  1906 


Convertible 
notes 


Yen 
232,920,563 
213,149,185 
232,072,757 
239,964,281 
286,625,752 
251,202,479 
265,514,474 
262,690,683 
312,790,819 
269,091,983 
274,576,279 
277,502,732 
341,766,164 


Increase  or 
decrease  com- 
pared with 
amount  on 
Oct.  1,  1903 


Yen 
27.430,530 
7,659,152 
26,582,724 
34474,24« 
8i,i35,7i9 
45.712,446 
60,024,441 
57,200,650 

107,300,786 
63,601,950 
69,086,246 
72,012,699 

156,276,131 


Specie 
reserve 


Yen 

116,962,184 
92,127,709 

92,793,834 
110,002,094 

83,581,226 
102,163,093 
107,732,010 
104,049,186 
H5,595,026 
122,732,662 
143,621,797 
146,117,315 
147,202,125 


Increase  or 
decrease  com- 
pared with 
amount  on 
Oct.  I,  1903 


Yen 

882,389 
23,952,084s 
23,285,959a 
6,077,699s 
32,498,567s 
13,916,700s 

8,346,783* 

12,030,607s 

484,767a 

6,652,867 

27,542,002 

30,037,521 

31,122,331 


Decrease. 


According  to  the  above  table,  the  inflation  of  convertible 
notes  is  found  to  be  very  remarkable;  the  notes,  which 
amounted  to  less  than  210,000,000  yen  in  October,  1903, 
averaged  more  than  230,000,000  yen  through  the  year  1904, 
more  than  250,000,000  yen  through  the  year  1905,  and  went 
up  to  more  than  270,000,000  yen  in  1906,  showing  an  average 
increase  of  20,000,000  yen  per  annum  in  these  three  years.  In 
the  meantime,  the  specie  reserve  gradually  decreased  up  to 
the  close  of  the  year  1905,  but  it  increased  again  in  the  ensu- 
ing year.  This,  as  before  mentioned,  was  due  to  various 
measures  taken  for  the  maintenance  of  the  specie  reserve, 
and  more  particularly  to  the  importation  of  foreign  capital 
on  a  gigantic  scale  by  means  of  foreign  loans. 

The  inflation  of  currency  should  cause  prices  to  advance; 
but  as  the  effects  can  not  appear  immediately,  no  extreme  rise 
in  prices  seems  to  have  taken  place  during  the  war.  If  we 
consider  the  advance  of  prices  on  the  basis  calculated  from 


206         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

October,  1903,  on,  according  to  the  index  number  of  prices 
reported  by  the  Bank  of  Japan,  we  find  that  in  February,  1904, 
the  number  stood  at  104.47  and  in  March  at  105.07,  while 
afterward  it  declined  somewhat  and  stood  at  100.78  in  June 
of  the  same  year.  The  highest  point  was  115.66  in  August, 
1905,  and  116.76  in  March,  1906,  which  could  not,  as  yet,  be 
looked  upon  as  an  abnormal  rise. 

The  war  expenditures  and  their  effects  upon  financial 
circles,  as  already  stated,  may  be  considered  to  have  been 
calm  and  to  have  had  no  bad  consequences.  However,  our 
attention  must  now  be  called  to  the  direction  in  which  all  the 
funds  disbursed  as  war  expenses  flowed  out.  The  enormous 
amounts  of  foreign  capital  imported  and  the  private  productive 
capital  specially  absorbed  by  the  National  Treasury  were  all 
lavishly  distributed  throughout  the  country;  and,  in  conse- 
quence, though  some  of  the  funds  thus  spent  returned  two 
or  three  times  to  the  Treasury,  most  of  them  enjoyed  a  large 
circulation  at  any  rate,  finding  their  way  to  various  parts  of 
the  Empire.  Yet  no  new  enterprises  were  undertaken  with 
the  funds  distributed,  and  there  prevailed  a  great  general  con- 
servation in  the  enterprising  circle,  which  was  then  in  a  rather 
quiescent  state.  Therefore,  in  1906,  an  enormous  amount  of 
capita]  was  floating  among  the  people,  as  evidenced  by  the 
increasing  bank  deposits  and  postal  savings  during  the  war. 
Now,  let  us  see  in  which  direction  the  enormous  amount  of  idle 
capital  made  its  way. 

Post-helium  Mania  jor  New  Enterprises 

Along  with  the  victory  in  the  war,  the  enterprising  spirit  of 
the  public,  so  long  kept  down,  was  roused  to  full  action.  By 
dint  of  the  extreme  thrift  and  perseverance  which  the  nation 
had  doggedly  maintained  during  the  war,  the  funds  for  in- 
dustrial enterprises  were  now  abundant,  and  prices  had  risen 
in  -nine  extent,  while  the  foreign  loans  of  500,000,000  yen 
contracted  after  the  war  added  to  the  available  funds.  Many 
enterprising  people  or  men  of  business  ability  were  trying 
their  fortune  in  various  undertakings,  now  that  the  govern- 


EFFECTS  ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET  207 

ment  had  carried  out  the  nationalization  of  private  railways, 
and  conditions  in  general  were  favorable.  The  war  having 
closed  with  honorable  victory,  the  fresh  self-consciousness  felt 
by  the  nation  as  one  of  the  first-class  Powers  in  the  world  did 
much  to  make  action  more  energetic  and  vigorous  in  all 
quarters.  At  this  juncture,  the  enterprising  circles  could  not 
stop  without  engaging  in  brilliant  activities,  and  general  views 
of  these  activities  will  now  be  related  in  order  to  elucidate  the 
effects  of  the  enormous  expenditures  for  war  and  armament. 
The  first  symptom  of  the  post-bellum  activity  appeared  in  the 
stock  market,  where  the  boom  was  most  significant  in  rail- 
way shares,  due  to  the  government's  plan  to  effect  railway 
nationalization  immediately  after  the  war.  This  activity  was 
also  seen  in  the  stock  of  various  industrial  companies  interested 
in  such  military  supplies  as  woolen  fabrics,  flour,  etc.,  because 
these  companies,  on  account  of  the  war,  had  gained  increased 
profits  in  their  lines  of  industry.  We  have  no  space  here  for 
dealing  in  detail  with  the  conditions  of  the  stock  market  at  the 
time,  but  Table  H1  is  given  to  show  the  quotations  of  a  few 
principal  stocks  for  "immediate  delivery"  on  the  Tokyo 
Stock  Exchange. 

In  September,  1905,  when  peace  was  restored  and  the  na- 
tional dissatisfaction  with  the  conditions  of  peace  reached  its 
climax,  the  market  became  exceedingly  dull.  However,  it 
showed  a  gradual  recovery,  and  the  highest  quotations  were 
recorded  from  the  close  of  the  year  1906  to  January  of  1907. 
Table  I2  gives  a  comparison  of  the  quotations  on  September  4, 
1905,  when  the  peace  treaty  was  concluded,  with  those  on 
January  18,  1907,  when  the  stock  market  arrived  at  the 
zenith  of  activity. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  less  than  half  a  year  there  was  an 
enormous  advance  of  221  yen  in  the  Kanegafuchi  Spinning 
stock  and  of  603  yen  in  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  stock  and 
the  profit  basis,  or  actually  reckoned  rate  of  gain,  on  the  vari- 
ous shares  was,  with  a  few  exceptions,  far  below  5.5  per  cent, 
which  was  the  rate  of  interest  on  fixed  deposits  in  Tokyo  in 

1  Post,  p.  222.  Post,  p.  223. 


208  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

January,  1907.  The  stock  market  was  then  at  the  height  of 
it-  excitement. 

Activity  in  the  stork  market  naturally  leads  to  a  fervent 
desire  for  new  enterprises.  For  a  few  months  after  the  war 
the  bankers  were  -till  cautious,  and  the  people,  taking  warning 
from  the  bitter  experiences  they  had  had  after  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  acted  with  deliberation.  Consequently,  com- 
plaints of  industrial  dulness  began  to  be  heard.  In  June, 
1906,  however,  when  the  boom  in  the  stock  market  showed  no 
signs  of  abatement,  the  mania  for  new  enterprises  increased 
suddenly,  beginning  with  the  subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  Co.  For  the  99,000  shares,  for 
which  the  company  invited  public  subscriptions,  there  were 
106,730,000  applications,  or  1,078  times  the  number  invited. 
The  flotation  of  stock  for  numerous  new  concerns  proved  to  be 
very  successful  in  almost  every  case,  the  subscriptions  having 
always  reached  more  than  one  hundred  times  the  amount 
issued.  Capital  could  be  instantly  gathered,  no  matter  what 
the  business  was,  if  the  shares  were  issued  in  the  name  of  per- 
sons  looked  upon  as  able  business  men.  To  illustrate  this 
wild  trend,  we  give  Table  J1,  showing  the  numbers  of  com- 
panies started,  with  amounts  of  capital  paid  up,  for  three 
years,  [905  -1907. 

In  the  above-mentioned  table  the  amount  of  capital  in  the 
transportation  business  is  seen  to  have  decreased  (hiring  the 
three  years,  due  to  the  carrying  out  of  railway  nationalizati<  >n. 
In  all  other  activities  we  note  a  considerable  increase,  and  it 
specially  evident  in  the  case  of  industrial  and  commercial 
companies.  The  kinds  of  enterprises  started  after  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  were  electric  light  and  power  supplying,  flour  and 
fertilizer  making,  etc.,  which  were  quite  different  from  those 
in  banking,  insurance,  and  transportation,  that  prospered  after 
the  Sino-Japanese  War.  These  were  characterized  by  being 
gradually  planned  on  a  larger  scale,  obviously  tending  toward 
centralization  in  each  particular  branch  of  industry. 

The  activities  in  the  stock  market,  as  well  as  in  new  enter- 

1  Post,  p.  224. 


EFFECTS  ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  209 

prises,  were  so  keen  and  flippant  as  to  cause  the  people  in 
general  to  turn  toward  speculation.  Many  "irregular  cus- 
tomers" appeared  among  those  frequenting  the  stock  market, 
and  some  who  succeeded  in  making  enormous  fortunes  at  a 
stroke  took  to  sumptuous  living  and  bore  themselves  haughtily 
in  the  world.  There  even  appeared  many  simple  farmers  who 
deserted  their  hereditary  occupations  and  invested  their  funds 
in  speculation.  At  last,  however,  the  time  came  when  the 
temporary  and  unstable  activity  caused  a  reaction.  On 
January  19,  1907,  an  ominous  sign  of  darkness  had  scarcely  ap- 
peared in  the  stock  market  when  the  values  of  all  stocks 
abruptly  plunged  down  with  alarming  rapidity,  resulting  in 
the  ridiculous  failure  of  those  interested  in  the  stock  market, 
and  in  less  than  three  months  the  stocks  all  depreciated  below 
their  values  quoted  in  1904.  This  abnormal  depreciation 
naturally  produced  an  effect  upon  industrial  enterprises,  and 
the  vanishing  of  bubble  companies  caused  many  bankruptcies 
and  nation-wide  distress. 

The  post-bellum  economic  action  and  high-spiritedness  of 
the  people  were  significant  and  wonderful,  and  this,  as  al- 
ready explained,  could  not  be  regarded  as  without  reason. 
But  it  is  obvious  that  this  economic  expansion,  which  was  so 
sudden  and  unstable,  must  have  been  principally  attributable 
to  the  superabundance  of  floating  capital  scattered  during  the 
war.  When  the  large  sums  of  money  found  their  way  to  every 
part  of  the  country,  they  ought  properly  to  have  been  turned 
to  account  in  the  most  suitable  or  productive  manner.  Un- 
fortunately, however,  the  people  did  not  care  to  rely  upon  such 
a  measure  and  finally  gave  themselves  over  to  unsound 
speculations  and  risky  enterprises.  The  same  economic 
phenomenon  was  experienced  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
as  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War;  the  activity  and  the  reaction 
after  the  latter  were  due  to  the  plethora  of  funds  obtained 
through  the  large  indemnity  from  China,  while  the  same  re- 
sults in  the  former  case  were  due  to  the  large  foreign  loans  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  war  expenditures.  And  the  reason 
why  the  two  great  sums  of  money  equally  gave  rise  to  an 

15 


210         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

unsound  condition  of  the  market  was  that  in  both  cases 
they  were  spent  unproductively.  Their  unproductive  ex- 
penditure was  the  direct  and  indirect  cause  of  the  inflation  of 
the  currency,  as  well  as  of  the  advance  of  prices,  and  went  far 
toward  the  easy  materialization  of  the  spirit  of  enterprise  and 
speculation  called  forth  by  the  superabundance  of  floating 
money.  Here  the  reader  can  see  the  effects  of  the  war  ex- 
penditures, as  well  as  of  the  expenditures  for  armament  ex- 
pansion after  the  war,  on  the  post-bellum  monetary  circles, 
and  he  may  further  be  able  to  infer  the  effects  of  the  same  in 
the  period  of  reaction  after  the  year  1907. 

Anomaly  in  Financial  Circles  and  Industrial  Inactivity 

As  was  to  be  expected,  there  came  a  reaction,  or  a  time  of 
economic  inactivity  caused  by  the  pecuniary  distress  and  dif- 
ficulty arising  from  the  rough  financial  policy  after  the  war, 
from  the  sudden  growth  of  unsound  post-bellum  enterprises, 
and  from  the  widespread  speculation  incited  through  the 
superabundance  of  funds.  This  period  of  inactivity,  which 
began  in  1907,  has  continued  up  to  the  present  day.  Some  of 
the  most  important  events  in  this  period  will  be  given 
below,  and  their  causes,  as  we  have  seen,  lay  in  the 
methods  of  meeting  the  expenditures  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War. 

The  reaction  in  question  appeared  in  monetary  circles  in 
1907.  To  begin  with,  in  January  of  that  year  there  was  an 
abnormal  depreciation  of  shares  in  the  stock  market,  and  there 
was  a  run  on  the  banks  at  Nagoya  at  the  end  of  February. 
Afterward,  bank  after  bank  in  various  parts  of  the  country 
met  with  a  run  or  was  closed  for  business;  the  banks  pressed 
for  payment  numbered  58  up  to  October  of  the  same  year,  and 
those  closed  for  business  numbered  24.  And  it  so  happened 
that  a  great  panic  arose  in  New  York  at  the  end  of  October, 
resulting  in  a  considerable  decrease  in  the  export  of  raw  silk, 
cotton  yarn,  and  copper,  Japan's  most  important  export 
articles.  This  made  the  financial  panic  in  this  country  more 
serious  and  the  money  market  more  stringent.     In  1908  the 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET  211 

tightness  did  not  slacken,  and  ceaseless  runs  on  banks  or  sus- 
pensions of  their  business  continued.  A  succession  of  bank- 
ruptcies took  place  among  iron  merchants,  paper  dealers, 
drapers,  and  exporters  at  Kyoto  and  Osaka.  This  money 
stringency  made  the  bankers  more  cautious,  so  that  the  rate  of 
interest  advanced  and  the  value  of  securities  went  down.  In 
June,  1908,  the  rate  of  interest  at  Tokyo  stood  at  2.6  sen  and 
the  average  rate  throughout  the  country  at  3.1  sen,  which  was 
the  highest  that  had  been  experienced  since  the  year  1903. 
Meanwhile,  the  Imperial  5  per  cent  bonds  dropped  to  80  yen, 
and  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  shares  to  104  yen.  In  the 
latter  half  of  1908  and  in  1909,  the  government  redeemed 
public  loans  amounting  to  96,500,000  yen,  with  a  view  to 
helping  the  public  in  the  supply  of  capital.  The  foreign  capi- 
tal imported  for  the  debentures  of  the  Industrial  Bank,  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  Co.,  and  the  Tokyo  Gas  Co.,  in- 
cluding the  municipal  loans  of  Yokohama,  Osaka,  Nagoya, 
and  Kyoto,  reached  99,000,000  yen.  Such  being  the  case, 
not  only  was  the  specie  reserve  of  the  Bank  of  Japan  greatly 
increased,  but  the  capital  in  the  market  became  so  abundant 
that  the  people  felt  that  they  had  found  a  spring  which  would 
restore  everything  to  life.  The  faults  of  the  new  enterprises 
rashly  undertaken  or  expanded  at  the  height  of  the  mania 
were  now  revealed.  Sugar  factories,  insurance  companies, 
aquatic  products  companies,  steamship  companies,  etc., 
brought  all  sorts  of  ignominy  upon  themselves,  so  that  at 
length  business  men  began  to  find  it  difficult  to  carry  on  enter- 
prises. Bank  deposits,  which  had  shown  a  considerable  de- 
crease at  the  time  of  the  depression,  now  began  to  increase 
enormously,  and  money  slackness  gradually  followed.  De- 
spite the  fact  that  the  gilt-edged  securities  showed  a  steady  ad- 
vance in  value,  enterprises  remained  completely  inactive,  and 
economic  circles  still  seemed  to  be  suffering  from  weakness 
caused  by  a  long  sickness.  Properly  speaking,  the  increase  of 
deposits  or  the  appreciation  of  securities  was  merely  a  symptom 
of  the  anomaly  in  the  money  market,  which  came  of  such 
unnatural  measures  of  relief  as  the  aforesaid  importation  of 


212 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDIT1  RES 


foreign  capital,  etc.     Tables  K1  and  L2  throw  some  light  on 

the  point-  referred  to  above. 

In  1 910  the  Imperial  Government  set  about  to  adjust  the 
national  loans  and  made  a  great  effort  to  increase  the  value  of 
bonds.  As  t  he  result  of  these  efforts,  the  5  per  cent  loan  bonds 
were  kept  above  par,  and  the  government,  availing  itself  of 
this  opportunity,  issued  the  first  and  second  4  per  cent  loan 
bonds  with  good  results;  but  as  the  third  was  somewhat  un- 
satisfactory, the  government  raised  new  foreign  loans  amount- 
ing to  enormous  sums,  a  measure  which  was  then  looked  upon 
as  a  revolutionary  work  against  interest  rates,  and  caused 
banks  in  general  to  lower  the  rate  of  interest  by  0.3  sen. 
Here,  again,  we  note  a  tendency  toward  industrial  activity, 
and  in  19 10  the  capital  for  starting  new  companies  and  banks 
and  for  expanding  old  enterprises  amounted  to  487,000,000 
yen.  This,  however,  was  a  mere  momentary  impulse,  as 
afterward  the  rate  of  interest  was  often  raised,  but  never 
lowered,  until  the  close  of  the  year  1913.  The  securities  gener- 
ally kept  a  downward  tendency,  many  banks  and  business 
concerns  failed,  dulness  reigned  in  the  market,  prices  gradu- 
ally dropped,  and  the  balance  of  foreign  trade  continued  to  be 
unfavorable.  The  table  immediately  following,  and  also 
Tables  M3  and  X4  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  will  serve  to 
confirm  what  has  been  said  above. 

Amount  of  Capital  Subscribed  for  Industrial  Kntkri'risks 


Year 


[907 

,,,,  ,- 

[909 
[910 
191  1 

i'ii  • 
1913 


For  establish- 
ment of  new 
enterprises 


Yen 

458,091,000 

75.343.ooo 
63,393,000 

27  1  ,<>  10,000 
276,207,500 
333  485.000 
1 83,31  "■"' '" 


For  expansion 

of  old 

enterprises 


Yen 

216,686,160 
59,889, 1  20 
64,864,535 
215,390.650 
1  1  ).<  132,000 
187,623,600 
196,983,250 


Total 


Yen 

674,777,160 
135,232,120 
[28,257,535 
4*7,000,650 
421,139,500 
521,108,600 
380,373,250 


1  Post,  p.  225. 


1  Ibid.,  p.  226. 


'Ibid.,  p.  227. 


1  Ibid.,  p.  228. 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY   MARKET 


213 


U 


Total 
amount  of 
circulation 

xoooopioox  -t-  r~ 

fOX   O   O   O    PI    tOX   1000   10 

a  t^o  0"  pi  O  to  r^  *<  m  c^r-^ 

^    0_  O^  lO  Pl_  +vO    I-;  +0C    "O 

-t  0  0"  0  00"  ^  to  6"  0'  C"  lc 
pi  10  100  0  00  0  0  C  —  C 

■^  ?! 

~  a 

0  0  0  0  «  vo 

1-  c  0  c  "o  0 

, PlOOOt^O 

3    !                '  n  it,  0  -f  n  ? 

O    C^   PI    -fON 

H    M    M    m    roO 
M     PI 

Temporary 
issue  Ironi 
the  stock  of 
new  paper 
money  re- 
served for 
exchanging 
with  old 
notes 

OOOOO  l^vo 
0  0  0  c  PI  PI  l-1 

O   O    C    O    -1-  tO  « 

§   ;   ;       ;  0  0  c  x ■  -f  -  x 

S-                            OOCXPlO" 

;  0  0  0  t^x  c-o 

0 
r- 

ONt^O  O   C   -*  •+  C*  vC    -no 
OOO'O   0   C    «   C  O   lO-C    1^ 
fOOO   0_  0_^  0_  0_  CO00   w  t>.  rj 

8  1^0  o"  pi  O  i->  pi  fO^>oo 
./"toOOt^OXCXPItoO 
^OCIOPIXPIXPI   to  00  X_ 

-f  O"  1^  O"   "f  N  d  ->"  t^  tO  ^ 

pi  10  i/}\o  vo  n  c?  c>  c~  r  - 

0 

nioo  r»  O  pi  "0 
0  pi  r^o  CNtot-. 

.          .          .          .HflMCOOll1 

8                          4u",»a   Nifio 

►*>     .    .     '     '  t  -  to  0  o>  x  Tt-  0 

i-*i                            t>.  -f  «   t^O   PI  X 

4  4o"  rOM  d  'd 
PI    ir,x  X  X   i-i 

Convertible 
notes  of 
the  Colo- 
nial (  rOV- 

ernment   ol 
Hokkaido 

0  0  c 
s----oo-i----- 

K0          .                                     O    X      PI          ...          . 
^         ....     O     M     O        ...        . 

IflM      t 

Op  Pi" 

( Convertible 
notes  of  the 
Depart- 
ment of 
Finance 

0  0  11  1-1 

0  c  -1-  - 
g     •     •     •  0  O   "-•  >o    •     •     •     • 

^>  :  :  :  cT  0  vo  0  .  .  .  . 

^    .    .    .  >■"-  0  1 — 1-   .    .    .    . 

l^X  \C    to 

TpVO   O     M 

0 
g  0 

t—  O   O   tO  '■fO  vO    -f\0 
O   O   C   to  PI    >t»    -J-X 
g      •XOOXXvCX>-'0      • 

.^     '  0  O  O  ■<?  t>»  t-^  r-^  0   c£ 
►^     'ooor^-i-i^to-t-'-'     . 

■    O    lO  IO  ^-  M    to  tO  IO  IO 

pf  r-Cr-Cj^t^o  pi  m  — 

■11 

o-  0   O   O  X   PI  t-  C    —   10 
XOOOW2PIOPIPI-1" 
tOOOCOI^'O'-'O    m 

£r^OOO^tOto««0     '. 

s"  to  0  0  0  100  i^x  c  t^    . 

0  0  0  c  pi  x  m  "i  'i  z 

-t-  x  x  x  to  -c  c  c  rr:  to 

cs  -1-  -1-  -1-  -1-  to  t| 

00   O^  O   i-1   pi   to -t- IOC    I^X 
C   £    i-~  1-^  I  —  1  —  I—  t  —  t^  t  —  1  — 

xxxxxxxxxxx 

214 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS  OF   EXPENDITURES 


Increase  or 
decrease  as 
compared 
with  preced- 
ing year 

-    \n  reoC    -T 

■  \r>  r^vo  O  oc 

I    N   I^  NOO   t 

*         \r.  -T  -5-00  >0 

"        N  d  -  ^O 

++I  1  1 

a 

o 
H 

m  n  r-  -to  « 
oo  -T  c  ~".  n  — 

fN  X   ^  C  X    c 

*>  Oi  t  o>  m*o  o 

.—    Ov  *-  sO   re  ^  PO 

C  -   »e  +  o>  re 

Increase  or 

decrease  as 

compared  with 

preceding 

year 

-  xr.  00   i~  -e 

•  t;  w  o  «e  in 

~    ■  00*  d  I  -  c"  c 

«      .   O    NOX   N 

++-r+l 

o  >-  o  ^  .-  x 
C  >e  O  «  «->  - 

§  +  m'  6  d  d  d 

K     ■*  "".  i-  t  <n  Ov 

"  t»  n  n  o  ■»  m 

-'  re  d  -r  —  — 

Increase  or 
decrease  as 

compared 
with  preced- 
ing year 

0C  "-"  "  ">  2 

a    ■  c"  .  -"  n  oo  "^ 
>i      so  o  ~  ~c  o 

re  Oi  ic*0 

re 

++ 1  1  1 

4J     >■ 

B   " 

°s° 

-  5  S 
12  »«  t. 
o  «j  S 
H  >  c. 

M  P, 

►h  o  -  c  ><-.  -r 
X  c>  o*  w  x  o 

a  -e  i^x  x  o  >e 

>    >r.  C   -    I    T  C 

Ifl  ir.  oid  'tOO 
c  0  «re  «  ih 

Temporary 
issue  from 
the  stock  of 
new  paper 
money  re- 
served for 
exchanging 
with  old 
notes 

p|    N    M    M    11    O 

__  -r  re  -  -_  - 1  q 
£  -f  -  si  '  s:  x  o" 

K      NvC    -    -    Cl    O 

x  c\o  *-  m  o 

c  c  c  -e 

e.  ^ 

I- 

y. 

88.687.000 
89,245.932 
1  19,800,475 
1  14.100.S04 
[ 08,41  2,369 
105.905.194 

Dajokan 

notes  and 

Mimbusho 

notes 

0  fe 

~   l-X                 ■      • 

•>*  "  0   !        1    '. 

"--•    ^foc       .... 

1  -  \r. 

-?  4 

r. 
> 

c   1  -  /:   O  C  ~ 
i~  i-  t-  1-  x  x 

EFFECTS  ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


215 


U 


u>«  01   1  ji  a 

x  numbe 
prices    0 
moditie 
ially      re 
ed  by  th< 
kof  Japai 

*r>\0  n  mo  ic 

vO  ^-ih  o>o\^ 

M    M    M 

Inde 

for 

com 

spec 

port 

Baa 

'o 

u 

c 

0  ,—- 

0 

-^  S 

62 

i  11 

CJ 

ro  >0  lO  O^OO   O 

3 

_   _   _   on  n   t^- 

-a 

c 

l-H     l-H     1-1             >-     ~ 

0 

£  t- 

u 

a 

■82 

__ 

C   v_, 

03 

l~_l 

3 
C 

c 

< 

ro  r^  M   mvO   *+ 

c 

00    N    O^OO    CT*  N 

^    rO  rc  r)-00   w   tJ- 

3 

,£    m   pf  w   C?00   1-1 

O 

O    NCM^'l-'O^ 

E 

< 

N    fOtON    mm 

u 

<L)  -— . 

J2    O 

gl 

OOivO  *>-     • 

(V)   0   O  C^  N      • 

0) 

C  w 

0 

u 

T3 

c 

CI 

0   > 

£  <s  >o  000  ^    • 

"  KO   >0  •*  t1-v£) 

3 

<-)  r3 

-C 

-n   J" 

C 

Oh 

3 

*-*H 

O 
O 

DC' 

°u 

.£2  O 

a 

5  0 

0 

2  1 

t-»  rJ-OO  00    ►-    t^ 

O^vO    1-1    O  (S    >-i 

"5 

C    " 

en 

*£ 

_o 

0 

•S<2 

J3 

C  w 

£ 

1—1 

aj  - 

O     _      _,      O    M      O 

O,  _ 

g   ir;oo   «NO   <? 

0  0 

^    O  00  vO    ""SO    T3 

"C.K 

Oh 

U 

n) 

0 

> 

1-  0  <r>  ■*  irno 

00  00  00  00  00  00 

00  00  00  00  00  00 

H    H    M    l-l    IH    M 

2l6 


ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 


o  5 

...   s. 

- 

< 


_ 


X    Z  IO  u-.ir.~-x.    -t  -t  -tO    —    CO 

CO  CS  -X   iron  i-";n  ?o»o 

-t  —  c  'i  ".  4  c  u".  >:  -  co  r^  c?n  co 

c:  tT--t-MKOO?ooo 


—  CN    "tv 


o 

CM 

O 

-t« 

■+    (M 

IO 

1^  1^ 

<N 

K 

00 

•*t  (N  X 

CO   t^    Tj" 

mo 

H 

c 

t^O 

O 

M 

O 

'O 

Tt 

o 

CO  (S 

— 

m 

lO 

— 

cm 

in 

r) 

O 

-i- 1  - 

" 

n> 

— 

_ 

X 

x 

sj 

in 

— 

- 


- 


t  < 

*,  6 

-  i 

—  i. 


=  !•& 


n    C    'i 

m  r-  z  c  c 

C    01    "000    — 

—  00 

c  i-x 

0    C    1^  co  CO 

3\NO«    i  - 

O  00 

r^X  O 

N   m   M00VC 

•  00    (O  -t  N    C 

•  m  r-. 

^ 

—   01  O 

j«   Ohio     . 

CS    N    CO  01    -t 

.    C    -t 

o 

r  1^.  -t  -t  1^    . 

.  M  O  ►"•  O  0> 

.  *-tx 

c 

CO  C   C    c<5\C 

N    OfO    «    N 

-    X 

o 

-1-  Z    CO  W    ri 

co  c  >o  x:  m 

-t  IO 

— 

N    PI          — 

01    CO  co  — 

—    01 

£   — 


.-- 


_ 


O  O  -+  01  -+ 
01  r-  in  -t  CO 
CO  TtO    (N    CM 


-+  c~  c  o  t- 
io  -t-  <o  m  m 
in  O   -too   O 


- 

w 

X 

_ 

z 

— 

_ 

•.< 

- 

< 

i: 

£ 

< 

= 

^ 

««! 

Z 

Z 

Q 

- 

^ 

~ 

a 

«f 

< 
- 

- 

X 

w 

P    3    0> 


"NO 

C 

c 


ir.-tN:c  co  —  rex  n  c 

-J\  IO  —  O  io  ^i  rj  —  COOO  —  X 
'i    t  -    N   £    -f-O    -t-tC    CO  Th 

~  c  n  x'  -t  -  6  ~  &  cox"  — 
r  co  <oo  x  -r-x  r^ri^ro 
co  -  x  o  rc^-t:   r  co  i  - 


IO    IO  O    CO'tH    O    H 

t^  io  —  o  c-i  c~  'O  r 

ri    -tX  O    'O  ■+  CO  -t 

X    —   \r.  C    rO  —    N    IC 

I  ^  C  co  <r.  r,    -t  -   C 
cOCN    —    OcO-tr-t 


•o  c  -t  C  1^  —  c  c  "-.  -t  ~ 

oo   -t  cm   —   t^  co  N   IO00   CM   O 

CN  X_  +  C    +K    IO  q_  M_^  C_  00_ 

/    —   C    ~  C  1  ^  O  1^  o  o"  o 

.   >r.  r  c-i   O   C  X)   u">  r  O   cOO 

—    rO  CO  CO  co  Ai    0    —    rJ    3* 


IO    "tX    X     C     ><".    r-\     IO 

x  :  ri  -i-  'i  -i-  -  '■i 
cox ■  c  c-  z  —  io  i  - 

O  O  -'  z'  CO  c-foo'  m" 
—  IO  iO  —  I  -  I  ~0  CI 
O  co  01   io  COX    i  -  >o 


s  ^  s 

U    O    01 

0ZQ 


U  — 


Tj      0>  — .       — . 

— .u.  2  <  g 


>,  u 


iiJga 


.    = 

3  =  o,  u  .^  ^ 


■&8I 


EFFECTS  ON  THE  MONEY  MARKET 


217 


O   01   bh   O  O^"   ^"O   O    O    "-1   —   N-  01   to 

O   ►-■   -^  O  00   NM   COOOvC    ^M   too^f^ 

tJ-O   bh   On  OO^O   O   10*  -+00  00VO   O^O^M 

to  oi~  o~  o  rCro>-3Cf;c>oo-t--t->ooo 

_  ,_  o  bh  10  "t  ^  *  c^  o  too  o  icm-t 

_      —  _,,_|_B*B*ClPlPIPIO|ClCl 


1-1  N  01  to  01  NOO 
1-  N0C  flON" 
NO   O   N  On  On  N 

00  to  1-  lO  CI  00  O 
■>*■  01  O  >->  i-1  <o  to 
p-i    to  tOO   01   N  N 

n  o"  n  of  o"  of  of 

to  rO  01  CI  01  >->  1-1 
01  01  CI  CI  CI  CI  CI 


O   rO 

00  10 

O.  CO 


O  00  O   «iO^ 

O    On  N00    "■*■  "0 

\0  fl CO  "+O  0_ 

'  vo"  "- 00   ci*  irioo" 

iO<t O    to  01    bh 

CI    IO  N»D    O   N 

*tf  CI* 


1-  -t-  iO  O  I-  10 
CI  i^o-t-t" 
C  0_  O;  to  N  0_ 
00"  IO  I-"  10  ci  ■<*■ 
N  N  N  00  O  N 
O  00    OO    -*■  ■+ 


00  >o  n      o  o  to  -t  ci  n 


o>  o>  00  ON  +0  o 

Clio  00  b   NmX   rO 

00  O  N  ■       •    tO  1-  IO  O   N 

h  ©  n  !     ;  -f  n  «  iri  co 

b-  n  co.  .  n  o  O  b«  bh 

ION  ON  "+  O  C   ■<+  0> 

no"  6"  n  -f  o~  o  10 

CO      M  -3-  M      -fB      N      « 


10NC7-0  m   Nm    «    -flOMOO    +(>HO    « 

-i-cicoO  VO   O^'tNW  "t(M  to  too   ci   10 

"OCITl-O  tOO   O   O   "   O30V0   -+00   •=*■  to 

uit>NO  C?  4  O*o0  vo"  NO  iCj  ui  O  10  Pi 

CO  NO  ")  01   O    + 10  01   -t  CI  X   "  V0   noc 

cooo  vo  rt-  ^t-00  m  too  "ovc  it;  pi  00  vo  c? 


O  lO  >-  vD   "O  01 

■too*  *mn 

tOO  OO  b  Pi 
IC  to  00  to  CI  O 
boo  o>  O  to  O 
O    OO   N-J-N 


N  bh    to  •+  01    N 


On  -+00  CI 

\r,  1  -,  o  -C 

ITjX    CI  CI 

BH*    ON    O  O" 

O   M   b  to 

C     bh     M  C* 

CO    NX*  bh 


C    N  to  i^vO    O«00    -t-  O  bh   to 

LOCO    -t  tO  IT,  IT,  0    C  O    N  OC     on 

bh  <tNtovO  1/5  ON  to  O  to  N  O 
NN«*P1  cOOC  —  -t-NX  of  fO 
O  -t  O  to  to  -t  -t-  C  C  01  <*o 
CO  lO  O   C    "".  if.  C    "".  Z    t|  O    Ci 

o  —  ro  x  x  c  "".  ro  1 »  ro  ri  -f 

iTj        b   to  10  fO  to  to 


N  b-  io/jo  -hO  b- 
CN  "0  O  to  b-  tO"t 
tO-tCN-tPI    1^ 


n  no 

N 

00 

CO  10  N 

PI    CI 

O-  CI  O 

CI 

o 

; 


bh     —     E    rj 
o7  O    O    <U 


*»T3   4) 


S-3   IU 


218 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 


c  — 


c  o  m  x  o  o  mt^r^r^r^. 
c   o  iO  M  O  t^  iO  lOX  ro  m 

•  OOK  sifi  "*o^«^-t»  <s X_ 
\  r-»  O  IO  O*  <0  x"  rf  r-»  O*  0~  O 
.  O   lOX   OO   fO  O    rO  r>.  1^  O 


POO   O   *1"X   O 

m  o  «  t^- «  o 

t>.  -^0_  M_  t-;  0__ 
OCN  »0  i-t  00  00 
O    fO  M    l^.  LOX 

\2   O  ~  MOO 


o^1 


cccoocco 

OQQOOOQO 

coooocco 


o  o  c  o  c  o 
o  o  o  o  o  o 
o  o  o  o  o  o 


■^ 


cccoocococco 
ccooocooocoo 

C      O      IC  lO  »C   lO   ID  IT,   O     IT;1/)Q 


o  o  o  o  o  o 
o  c  o  o  o  o 

O   lOiOiOO   o 


o  o  o  o  o 

o  o  o  o  o 

ooooo 

8  :  :  :      :::::::;:;;;      '.  d  d  d  d  d 

& ooooo 

-^  o_  q  o_  o_  o_ 

o"  o"  >o  iO  iO 


«£_ 


5  fe^-H 


ir.iCir,  o  CX  O  C  O .  -+  M  to 
—  00  lO  "St-  O  O  >ONrc«  lOtC 
Lfi  i  -  -1-  O  x   cr  x  looo  h  q  w 

O*  IC  r^  C~  fC  -'   CO    UOO    PO  *i- 

>-  —  \C  r^Tt-«  mx  icfcoio 

-i-x    —   lOCX—  X    -t  IO  O    M 


N  iC  O   «   O  ^ 

>-"    O  LOO  O  O 

O*  ro  >0  lOX  m 

lOf^N    MX  co 

o  Mn^^M 


w 


- 


o  E 


i« 

~ 
o 
H 


- 


N  00  O 

O   pO  M 
I^O   <T) 


iO  iO  >0  i-  X  ■**••+  -to  n  3\0 
—  X  LOOM  Nt^lM  O  C  X  O 
O    t^.  C  X    LO  -+■  tf)  M    iO  C__  M    O 

C"  M*  r0  t?  O  'O  K  m  tON^fi 
i-X  NC  -*f  t^O  O  O  O  O  O 
-t-  -h  ~   Tf-i-XX   O   O    OCX 


O    M    O   'i-X   P0 
IO  —    O    1^  t^-  M 

X   "i"  <N  X__  PO  0_ 

LOO  **  o  r^  o 

MO    lOJ-t" 
PO  M   !-•   IO  iO  iO 


u 
o  g 


u   O   01 


b!3  - 

-    —  —    3    3 

<  is; 


= 8  p 

^3  9» 


u 
2D 


U    rt    r- 

2  Ef 


"    3    U_       • 

c^  rt  h  rt  c 
— .—  2  <  2  — . 


EFFECTS  ON  THE  MONEY  MARKET 


219 


tJ-vO   <N   co  <OnO 
lO  cooO   On  Tf  CN 

O"  "O  to  Cni   m*  <o 

•tOOOvON 
M  \C    O   •*00   co 


N  «tO"  M  NOO  O  OMOO  ID 
OcO"+mOcO"0OOOOO 
N00  cO  OnnO  CM  CO  N  t>.  N  I-;,  w 
•-FnO  ION  "lO"  cOno'nO  m  m  <t 
i/OnO  vo  O  <0"2  1000  00  N  N  N 
OnnO  cooO  O  cO  0»  f)  fO  O^  0_  N 
N    ION    to  NOO*  ION    (H    m    m    O 

ifllO'trtfl      MH      MMM      MM 


IO  1/5  IO  l/O  lO  CO 

O  O  O  O  n  o 

M      M     M_    M      O      IO 
■<*•  "<f  ■*   T?  VO"   N 

N  t-  r-»  t>»  -t-  rf 

r-~  t--- 1"~  r>-  o_  no__ 

MM*    MM*    Mm"    mm"    <3\   tZ 


OOOO  OOOOO 

OOOO  ooooc 

o_  o  q  o_  q.  o_  o_  q_  q 

o"  o'  o"  o~  o"  o"  o"  o"  o" 

OOOO  OOOOO 

0000  o  m  in  in  in 

d    ■*    "+    MMM  -M-p-   r-I-   I  ^.    — f"    — f" 

m    t^tOtO  tOtONtON 


ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 

000000000000 
000000000000 
000000000000 
000000000000 
000000000000 

OOONNNNNnffMN 

ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 
ooo'ooo 

mminm  0  O 

CO  CO  cOnO   t>.  O 

O  O  inmmmm  0  O  "ooo  00 

O      M      OlO      »      M      O      OMO+'t't 

«*3  co  co  CO  O 
CO  cO  co  cO  CO 

tJ-00    CN    On  mm    m 
iOh   On  "0  m  cN 

rl-00   ■tNN   0\ 

d  cn"  o"  o  o  co 

mm   O   co  co  O  00 

N   mm  vo   mm  vO  00 


COO 
NO   O 

•ooo 


m 


0_  in 
co  <o 


00       CO    CO    01      Tf    MM 

O  in  t*~  m  on  m 

00      M     IO    MM      <NJ_    M^ 

O-00*  tOt^H   K 

in  o  co  cono  o 

Tj"   NnO      1^-tN 

o"  O  co  t-»  co  cn 
\0   "0  00   On  On  CNI 

MM      MM      MM 


00    m    fOOO  M    N  cOmU0-+t1-m 

On  uo  "0  N  On  •>*■  I/O  Cni  00   m   on  m 

O   conO  00  On oo_oo   ■tK'tio 

d  d  06  in  d^o  '.    '.    '.    '.    '.    '.      vo  m  ""in  ton 

NnO   rooo  iO   N mO'-m'+Oco 

cO  co  O  nC   •+  On  n  01   10  10  m   n 

rOOO    rf  co  -f  On 

00  no  m^o  oj 

M      M      fN|      M 


00  m   on  VD   CO  o 

01  O-00    t)-  On  O 

O  O  NO    On  co  l~-» 

m  OnnO   NnO  no 

,    "  NO    COnO    CM    m 

l~»  tN   OnnO   'Mf  On 


4J 


1) 


CJ 


>>  too,"  >  <j 


u  rt  r 

C-9   C3   fe    cS   C 


3    fe    C  -C    >>  °    >   rTr  +J    °    >    tj  "tMr>.4' 

«  -^  ^  3^     3     3J2     <"     U     "^  cj     OJm-.  J~-m     3 

M-,MH  f<<<<  M-vM-><   [/j   O  *£  Q  M-,(l,   ^  <   <"   M-> 


c  — 

3T3 


0 

tu 

CJ 

it 

rt 

■a 

H 

0 

-3 

a 

It) 

-1 

U 

0 
S 

CJ 

3 
-J 

■a 

CJ 

-Ml 

3 

MM 

S 

M 

[\ 

0 

c 

u 

? 

fl 

~1 

r) 

•n 

i3 
> 

ct] 

x: 

S 

*J 

0 

c 

0 

1) 

u 

SJ 

tf 

c 

FS 

3 

0 

H 

ID 

mx! 

^ 

.'/> 

(J 

'j 

-n 

ai 

T3 

3 

Ml 

CJ 

c 

cfl 

-0 

c 

> 

>-* 

ex  a 

D 

3 

-a 

3 

cd 

S 

it 

eg 

-Tl 

0 

T) 

■0 

0 

' 

0 

a  j 

I-. 

c-a 

".J 

OJ   O 
JST3 

Ml 

id 

03 

H 

V 

:- 

* 

xi 

■c 

0 

220 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF    EXPENDITURES 


a 

V 

O 
- 

H 
= 

- 


S,    S-TD    3 

j  i  a  in 

O—    u  .2 

=  $  §■  o 

o-9  o  ti 

>   *IO^                  ■+ 

rt   rj    C 

^   too   to             t^  O 

tagc 
for 
as  i 

mou 

>>. 

."   tOO   N               r-»  01 

-"Tort 

U   4)   O   _ 

O  •  -  •  -  -C 

"     —       ? 

rt 

lO  0  0             0  >o 

-w . 

t^  10  O              10  n 

c  ~ 
3.    CU 

s    ^h  C>  (N_                 CN    (S 

3  .—    u 

a  O  O  O            C   — 

°"c.  ° 

>i  tOON                1  -  £ 

—    —   /I               00   01 

<  «j 

N   P)  lO              1O00' 

"O  (N    *f               00    O 

<*  to  01                 -+  -+■ 

-  •/. 

^    O    CJ 

■m 

C    tONN                 I/O  00 

3    u    w 

<o   rOvO  O              >-•   01 

SS2 

*>  O  VO  O                   1^70 

ft, 

^ 

3  <u  « 

p  30 

IO  IN    0)                  OO 

'3.2  a 

-T   C"   O               C^  0^ 

r^. 

-t-  £  >/;           oii-i 

to 

0)    O  t^.             vO  00 

TD 

_^    -    t-;VO                  O  O 

+j    1) 

U    I) 

?  0  -<"  00"          -+  4 

•  "   1  -  y.    x              1000 

Z  5 

"    to  O  0)                  0)    £■ 

of  O"  w                 0~  rf 

~    ~    l~»                 ~  -T- 

000           00 

000            CO 

c 

^   0_  0_  0_              CD   CD 

3 

?  c  0"  0"         0"  6 

0 

•~coc 

C    O 

3 

*-'  c  0  c 

c  c 

<^ 

0"  0"  z 

c"  0 

C    £  'X 

c  0 

cu 

3 

10 

(/) 

"- 

-r 

ir. 

0 

0 

c 

'ON 

0 

'_ 

-, 

O 

_ 

Q 

""   £ 

"-. 

*Mb 

_3  >r> 

U      (11 

CJ    . 

U      °      > 

u     ^. 

~    3    C 

rt  rt 

<~ 

,/ 

P- 

^ 

EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


221 


O 


t/>  a       -s 


JiO 


CO 


- 


U 


pq 


CM  IT;  O  «  "  M 
01  M  vD  (OCtOO 
01  CO  01  >-"  0_vD  0_ 
O  O00  00   i-  SO   « 

*co  «  •+  «  o 

O  m  -t  C   -+  O    •+ 


00    OW    N«    -t1 

■    CI    -+  i-c    tOO_  "0  I 

M   tOsc"  oo"  -f  i-i    ' 

NOW   tOOO  00    i 


to  t^so   O    C"jM 

Cn  i-i  00  so   *+  t  ^  Os 

•   Os  1^  i- ^  01_  I";  0_  t-~ 

0"t»    "OO    lOPI    P-c 

M      MlCOO")    -t-00 

q.  os  t^  -t  q;  t<2  n 

rf  i_T  rf  ro  ir;  i^  m 


►h  01  CssO  m  tN  N  to 
SO  toco  N  CM*/  OssO 
01  O  O  ""5  to  tOOO  CI 
ds  O   C?  .  t~~  ^  O   iC  O 

o>o  O"  M  ^"'n 

i    t^.  t^  to  i-H   t—  i—i    tO  i-i 


01  -+N^-OS'ONSO 
ro„  tO"  O  ^t-t^to 
00    w    N    0_^  01_  "+■  tO  >0 

S  (>h  to  so  oo"  -t"  i-T  -f 

►51  SO    ONIOO    lO  IO00 

i^i  ioooso  "tnn  ■+ 
w  n  o  ""-  n  4  Os  O 

to  tO  -t"0    i-i    tOsO    i-i 


go  !-•  "o  -foo  t^  too 
t-i  >-i  to  o  r^so  os  ci 
uoiotsi  r^  t  ^  m  uo  r>. 

8  o^o'oo-f-O'toi-rir-C 

.^  so  00  00    CI    -+■  0|    m  00 
>>i   o    O.  Os  't  ^  O    -+ci 

oo"  cT  ds  ci  —  -f  iflio 


to  o 
O    Os 


o  fa 


CU.1 


>s  o  o  o  o  o  oj 

-.O   Osj3   ^J 


.  c    _  c    .  c 

d  <u  4J  o  <y  OJ 
e  u  c  o  n  u 
5  o  5  o  5  v 
^Q  ,£>£  AO 


222 


FCONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 


-a  o  J2 


£J> 


<y  .a 
c  a. 
.1  ■/• 


k  §  c 


(-,     l-     TO 


M  Z  c 

~  w  > 


■  p/ 


00   ir;  M   O    r*}vO  00  00   t-~00 
rc   C  X    iO  iO  tO  Tt  ? 


cooooooo 

00    ?  N    h    lO  N    tO  « 


oocooooooo 

gM   O    rO^O   CT*00   <->   O  1^-00 


x   r-  €  >r. 


£*  on 

M     H     S 

i_*    -  2.  r~»  i-* 


2,  o 


1/2 

C   g> 

a  H  £  c  a  g  rt  c  a  g 
•x  ^  g  i—//.  Q  <--.  —>(/:'  u 


°  K  5 


EFFECTS   ON   THE   MONEY  MARKET 


223 


o 

H 
< 
H 
O 
£> 

3'' 


D    3    C    O  °° 

c  ~  °  ~    . 

0)   _    <«         C  t" 

too  0  0 

g     M      flNfl 

tc  <u.2    .^m 

K          t^    1-1      W      fi 

"    N    NN    O 

<n  0 

C/3 

en 

.0 

£    N-ttON 

(j       •       ■       •       • 

«3 

O 

Ih 

ft, 

Ph 

r^ 

cc        0 

C          C7\ 

.2          M 

0000 

3  §» 

gN   JO   O 

^  00  tJ-  0^00 

O 

3            • 

"   «   W 

a    g 

•— 1 

c 

8 

0 

<u 

12 

■J  O   N   O  O 

^.HMfllfl 

> 

■^ 

5 

ft. 

in 

(n 

S    NO   1^00 

^       ■       •       •      • 

<£ 

5U                        1-1 

O 

u 

ft, 

C- 

"^ 

to       O 

C             CN 

0        " 

m  0  0  0 

«  0  ^ 

g   O  O   C5  t>» 

£  IO20   tJ-vo 
"    ICNNN 

0 

3       a. 

a    8* 

" 

cr. 

c 

CJ 

73 

ux  mo  r>- 

■> 

,__                   M      —      — 

5 

ft. 

2    be  Qfi 

r.  .  -    S 

cd  5  .c 

0 

s^  5  <-> 
a      a* 

0 

-—    ^    —    i^i 
.—    x    3  — s 

C/5 

3  c  rt 

£  0  wo 

r*->._      C3     O 

k/ 

Z^H 

224 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EMM- MUTURES 


- 

= 
- 

a 
K 
H 

O 

g 

- 
P 

o 

- 

- 


"(3 
o 

"->  G 

1/10C    — 

in  o  oo 

o"o  *^ 

o  q  m 

iq 

°J 

N 

00 

o      ■- 

-0     5 

COG 

=      E 

A       O 

u 

-o  o  r- 

O  fOOO 

°.  "3  °. 

c".  o"  o" 

•* 

c 

o 

a 

c 

U 

H 

—  a 

ca  3 

Is 

00  Tf  o\ 

O  O  00 

q  r^  m 

8  rf  no  -' 

>•  -q  "i  oo 

o  t-  o" 

t*5  ro  « 

in 

oo" 

Eo  G 
3      S 
2     § 

On  On  rO 
>0  vO  r^ 

IO 

a) 

01 

E 
o 
O 

■"3  a 

2  3 

c-a 
«'3 

U  G 

00  00  00 

On  On  ts 
Tf  l/l  ro 

K   4oO  vo" 
.*  ooooo 

-o*  o"  On 
-o  c  o 
■3- in  in 

10 

nO 

«q 

i-          4> 
0)       "3 

E'c   G 

=     E 
Z      o 

o 

o  o  r- 

ro  ■*Oi 
"°.  "°-  ". 

00 

00 

u 

3 

•a 
c 

■a  a 

'GT3 

«'3 

U  G 

On  "t  On 

q  -t  h 
s  4  »  in 

^  "t M.  °°. 

MOW 

o 
q 

00* 

q 
oo" 
w 

l-          41 
4)       -3 

■S-S 

E   O  G 

<?"      o 

CO  I- 

Tf  1^00 
M  M   N 

1-0 

NO 

a; 

- 

"3 

_o 
'C 

< 

25" 

^G 

O  1^  N 

O,  m  On 

OfOH 

5  oo"  o"  »"■ 

Hi  P000  C 

«4" 

<~o 
to 

00 

oo" 

i-         "J 

5    'E 

els  rt 

tea 

•5      = 
Z,      o 

u 

m  O  On 
f^lOO 

t^ 

u 

."3   4) 

•0.0 

c  s 

i-   u 

- 
c 

- 
: 

c 
c 

\ 

O   4)      ' 
-GO 

,Eca 

41  §  " 

4)       M 

o   ^    ^ 
3 

EFFECTS   ON   THE  MONEY   MARKET 


22- 


W 


12      °  .ti 


rfi    V 

•■S    C  to   e 

r    ^  «   S 

—  o 


c 

go° 
"3  rt 


S-S 


ci 


.2  rt 


«=  c  g. 


Q 


NO     ON   ON   O- 

N    MNN 
t£  M    M_  Cl_ 

[    ON  On  rf  NO 

,  lO  CI  NNO 
00  On  N  0_ 
I-C  c£vO  no" 
r<5  -J-  U0O0 

NO  NO   NO   NO 


_      _      O      O 

lO  Tt"  1^.  1^ 

9.  "I00.  ^1 

no"  t?  CnTno" 

NO  O  NM 
NO  ON  t^NO 
M~  rf  -?F  ** 
ON  NO  On  O 
NO    I^X   X 


O   N   h   O   NVOW  r)-i^O   NO 

lONO    Nm^J   N   O  Tj-00    tJ-  -1-  r}- 

0_  0_  >-<_  ^t;  i-i  CO  NO  M  NO   01   c  00 

S  NO   w   t^rooT^N  CO  t^  i-Too"  r-f 

k~   ■*  "3- t-»  O    rO>ONO  OnO   iO  *+■  ro 

►^   iO  ro  O   O   *+  On. NO  OncO   1-h   r>-N0 

no   i-*   fCoO  00~ oo"  t-^  l~^  O    On  o"  lO 


>-. 


NM    N    N    N    (IN    N    CI    CI    01    CI 


-»   CNX   ON00   OnOnO    01  00   mnO   CO 

5  o  h  h  ro  n-NO  min?\  o  coo 

J    fl    M    «    M    M    «    M    M    fl    N   m    m 


-aOOOOOOCOOOOO 
J00COC0  o  o  o  o  o  o»oo 
Co 

'      H      M      M      M      fl      N      fl      f|      p|      h      M      H 


o    ■ 

ON  t*» 


SI 


to 


On  q^ 


•  "  i-i  oo    ;  "  i-i  on 

On-^  JO  On^  _q         On^3  j-j 

"    C    £  J5*  "   S    d 


oo  i-*  .  -  2.  o>  i_"  ,  - 

On-O  _q         on^  £ 
4)    £J    o      -  <" 


jc  ~  E  c 


0> 


*-  71 


_  a  «  £  c  a  « 


1(5 


226 


ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 


o 
- 
■s. 

Q 

y 
< 

- 

z 
- 

Z 
fa 
/ 
V 

0 

H 
■a! 
H 

C 

'- 
c 

< 

w 
> 


0  ^; 


tr>  *t  -rt-  oi  m  r^x  i^  -t-  -t  <c  t^ 

g  h  an  in*  i^  cs  -  co  ■*•  "*■  cm 


-  3. 


£ 


• 

C 

- 

,fl 

u 

;_ 

u 

— 

^    ci  cooo  o  ?  m  «  n  fo  c  —  3- 

I  ^  ir.  c    i<~.  \r.  \r.  \r.  \r.  C   C  C   X 


"  m  oo  oo  »  nx  x  k  crc-c-c- 


Z.  0 


-     3 


=  o 

2  ^ 


_2-S.S   -2 
rs  fe  y  «  s  S  y  u 

-  /.  —  g  — ,v.  -J  <=  — 


O   2^ 

2§ 

Eg 
■J.  — 


EFFECTS  ON  THE  MONEY   MARKET 


22' 


w 
Q 

O 

< 

w 

W 
H 

<; 
Pi 

H 
Z 
& 

o 
o 


w 
B, 
ffl 
<! 


m 

MOfMO«CO-*'*1-   1^00      Mtf)H     (<)N      B 

■^  !I3  "5 

NrociX    IO  ONV0    0    I  -  ~  X    0    ON  CO  **-00 

N00   lO  3^00   •+  rO  1^  O   hb   b<   |^  r^  t^  C  — 

ri  1^    SJ 

1/5  CO00   N-tO^O   t^  N   N   bO   iOtOJ.O 

«l   U  O  i. 

£ 

CN  O   'J-  0s  >-<   IO  On  ro  l^vO   "3"  O   lOiONO 

Deposit 
hanks  in 
ocalities 
Empi 

N    NH    NX    flB/i-N    fl    b    O    M  t^OO    t^ 

lOO    O    lO  "3"n0    IC  bb  vO    M    COX)  »    bO    N 

O   ^  cO  >-   O   "3-1-1   O   tOiflffNC"   Obh 

0000    GnOnOnOnQnOnOnOnOnCnOnO    ON  O 

BH                H 

c 

jj  rt 

C   'C  O   IC  Pi   N   co-O  >0   01   -3-0   rO00   M   r-~ 

—  o3  9- 

VD  00   "*■  "3-00   m   pO   h   iOO»?  iO00   1^  O 

"1    rn    rt 

N   CO  0)  00   i/}  CO  "3"  O   t-i    C>M3   O  00  t^O   m 

iObb   o   t^"3""3-0   r^.  tj-  t^^O   *i"  lOvO   rO  ■*• 

£ 

C-00  NO   CO  "3-  ""5  CT  00   »T>  O   i-i   IO00   1^  t^  bb 

S  o  ° 

COM   to  CO  bb  00  00   bboOO   OM-i    On  Cn  0s  O 

t^  O   0)    C\  "-J00  00   O    CO00  MD^OvO   O  NO   lO 

MM                M                           M      f|                                                BB 

— 

C  O  'n_ 
3-=  P" 
O   M  C 

y  5W 


Qx 


rt  O 


4-> 

(3 

bW 

o 

o 

- 

u 

7. 

rt 

Q 

0) 

c  c  o 
qpQ  rt 

C/)    "-B" 


Q 


>. 


N«NM««NflNNNN«NNN 


C] 


N    N    N    N    W 


b0 


Cn 


ON 


01 


BB        N 

2> 


>2  fefe^d  &  £2*2  5 

on-Q  ja  a-Q  ja  ON-Q  j5 
iMcpi'HcsiHE  - 
P  «  S  «  "  «J  E  i; 


C3 


2  fe  u  on  « 

H   S:    in  h  H 

:  o  ii  o  "  „-«  5  y  o£  8  u 


BB        O        h 

q7S  " 


5  P  sTS  S 


,c/n  a  S  — .r.  — 


228 


ECONOMIC    FFFECTS  OF    EXPENDITURES 


PQ 


< 
- 
z 
- 

z- 

■ 
< 

a 
> 


2 


-^ 

'-J-?, 

£  S 

N    MOO    Tj-C^OO    O    10N1D«00»0    OOO    >+ 

x  S 

«   co  —    r  C  IC  fO  N  O   t^OO   O   t^NO  NO  n£>   <N 

ojS 

■  ~   cc:  cm  r^co-3-O  O  mn  m?.  h  h  •*  cn 

CO  *N    0     ~  C    co  1  -  "".  -C    ""-  lC  CO  -t"  ■+  CO  -1- 

^i  u 

-ir   * 

(_i  ~ 

1% 

m  11  r^NC  oi<ooo<sc>coOiOi^-r^ 

if  5 

~or^^ii\oO"-ooc<NiiO'-ifOOi-i 
•  ~  -t-r^-t-r^-n  r<  nmx  iocoO  cn  «  inoo 

l-,wOCOOOCCO«-'N««00 

c  a 

en 

M   m  •)■  Pi  -t  iO  O-oc   co  ii   cO  ii  iOnO  O  00 

g    ~  ii   co  uo  >C00  00   l^  t^OO   On  CO  f>|   uo  C-nO 

1    in 

•  ~    -tlOOMJ    CN    CO00    t^OO    ■"+•  «    NCItOr  -t 
"  On  On  C    rC    ~  Z    O   ~   n  oi   o   «   n  O   i 

5'rt 

Z-_£ 

y. 

'1  « 

-  <C    -1-vO  OOCnicn-^-OOCtJ-O    On»C 

~   ■<*■  t^.  \f>  rJ-vO   O  NO   iO"i"COO   co  On  On  i  nO 

'■""    tj-00  VO    NOMOH    CO  CN    «    ID  Tj-  0)  00    CN1    CO 

C ■    O   t^-  t^  t^NC  nC   lONC   lO  co  O   M   O   On  O 

PQ»-> 

\3  \Q   U0i/^"^'O'O"0"01'0lO,/2lOl/^TJ'u^ 

-~ 

">§ 

COOOOMOOOOOOiOlO  rONO   t~» 

«   M   N  lOvO   u")  01   UZ  C   iOIOm   O   co  t^  l^»  ■**■ 

rt^3 

'  ~    ^O   O    COOOO   if,M   fl   O   O   h   mN^ 

'C  jj 

C  C   C   C    C-  Z    3\  On  On  On  On  On  On  CnoO  00 

1)      1 

^       _        ^H                     H 

£  o 

1—1 

bo 

C 

-a 

c 

V 

-o 

o 

u 

o 

C 

2  o 
£  3 

'  o 

*"'   w   c\ 

2ri 

"we 

3 

cn  o  £  u-  o  "-'  b  u  on  ^  h  u  on  r?  h  u 

H  --*  M  oJ=i.n  M  o»£.q  w  O-CJa 

£M  6  gj3"H  6  gjs"H  c  gjfH  c  g 

P 

£ 

a 

-.  / 

2 

% 

£ 

/ 

(f 

H 

►1 

1 
-  / 

c 

% 

-^ 

C 

CHAPTER  IV 

EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND 
COMMERCE 

We  can  not  here  attempt,  for  want  of  space,  to  enter  upon 
thorough  inquiries  into  all  the  relations  between  war  and 
armament  expenditures,  on  the  one  hand,  and  industries, 
transportation,  and  commerce,  on  the  other,  or  to  deal  with 
them  conclusively  by  giving  detailed  statistical  facts  for  all 
the  different  branches  of  industry.  In  this  chapter,  there- 
fore, we  will  briefly  outline  the  development  of  industries, 
transportation,  and  commerce,  proceeding  no  further  than 
to  conclude  roughly  what  relation  they  bore  to  the  expendi- 
tures for  war  and  armament. 

Since  the  effects  wrought  on  industries  by  the  raising 
and  disbursing  of  funds  for  war  and  armament  expenditures 
were  revealed  in  various  ways,  our  observations  made  on  two 
or  three  phases  thereof  can  by  no  means  cover  the  whole 
field,  inasmuch  as  we  should,  in  accordance  with  the  theoreti- 
cal principles  of  economy,  look  into  the  improving  conditions 
of  industries,  transportation,  and  commerce,  and  try  to  make 
historical  observations  on  these  state  expenditures  in  connec- 
tion with  these  conditions.  We  will  leave  out  of  account, 
however,  the  effects  arising  from  taxes  or  the  national  loans 
belonging  to  the  receipts,  as  these  are  dealt  with  by  other 
investigators,  and  likewise  we  will  not  consider  here  the  remote 
effects  on  labor,  capital  and  nature.  Thus,  with  the  scope 
of  our  questions  shortened,  we  have  to  state,  first,  what 
effects  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  had  upon  the 
circulation  of  money,  as  well  as  upon  the  accommodation  of 
capital;  and,  secondly,  what  effects  these  expenditures  had 
upon  the  demand  and  supply  of  commodities  and  in  conse- 
quence on  industries,  transportation,  and  commerce.  But 
as  the  former  question  has  been  already  treated,  in  this  chap- 
ter we  will  devote  our  attention  exclusively  to  the  latter. 

229 


230 


ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 


Effects  on  Industries 

Primitive  Industries 

Japan  lias  remained  an  agricultural  country  for  thousands 
of  years.  Even  in  the  early  part  of  the  Meiji  Era,  agricul- 
ture was  looked  upon  as  the  most  important  basis  of  the 
national  prosperity;  and  of  all  the  agricultural  products, 
rice  had  the  largest  output  and  barley  was  next.  Raw  silk 
and  tea  were  gradually  improving  with  the  increasing  demand 
for  them  in  foreign  trade.  Besides  the  above  industries, 
fishery  and  forestry  have  also  made  great  strides  in  the  last 
forty-six  years. 

We  give  lure  a  condensed  table  showing  the  chief  produc- 
tions in  the  years  1877,  1893,  1903,  and  1913,  in  order  that 
the  improvement  of  these  primitive  industries  may  be  seen: 

Production  of  Primitive  Industries 


Articles 


Rice  (koku) 

Barley,  rye  and  wheat 

(koku)  

Beans  (koku) 

Cattle  (head) 

Horses  (head) 

Tea  (kwan) 

Raw  silk  (kin) 

Fisheries  (yen) 


1877 


116,599,181 

9,620,490 
1,642,183" 
1,080,414" 
1.540,588 
2,761,523" 


1893 


37. 1  99, 663 

[( ..1.36,588 

3,052,337' 
1,105,201 

i,56i,373 
7,640,368 

7.709,713 
[9.950,451 


1903 


46,473,298 

15.545,105 
3,647,830 
1,286,116 

1,523,745 

6,711,112 

1 1,478,700 

42,145,602 


1913 


50,255,267 


,050,454 
,511,000 

,399,498° 

,581,743° 
,679,810° 
,410,563° 
,731,407° 


1878 


1894. 


1912. 


Though  the  above  statistics  give  only  a  general  idea  of  the 
primitive  industries,  yet  they  show  a  considerable  progress 
in  the  period  covered.  The  progress,  however,  is  far  inferior 
to  that  of  commerce  and  industry,  as  will  be  shown  further 
on,  due  to  the  fad  thai  the  natural  conditions  of  the  country 
and  its  relations  with  foreign  countries  did  not  allow  it  to 
remain  solely  agricultural.  And  this  situation  may  be 
expected  to  develop  much  more  in  the  future.  That  raw 
silk  and  tea  products  show  a  more  remarkable  increase  than 
any  other  articles  in  the  above  table  is  entirely  attributable 
to  the    growing  foreign  trade    of  Japan.     We  may  be   sure 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE     231 


that  there  existed  some  facts  showing  that  the  expenditures  for 
war  and  armament  increased  the  demand  for  these  products, 
raised  their  prices,  and  improved  production  in  consequence 
— the  direct  relations  of  cause  and  effect  to  war  and  armament 
expenditures  and  the  primitive  industries.  No  data,  however, 
are  now  obtainable  to  illustrate  statistically  the  existence  of 
these  relations. 

Modern  Industries 

According  to  investigations  made  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1912,  the  number  of  factories  in  Japan  was  15,119,  the  num- 
ber of  artisans  was  863,447,  the  number  of  common  laborers 
was  164,718,  and  the  consumption  of  coal  exceeded  9,100,001,- 
700  kin.  Of  all  the  industries,  4,403  were  carried  on  under 
a  company  system  with  paid-up  capital  exceeding  677,794,- 
000  yen,  while  thirteen  enterprises  were  carried  on  with  a 
paid-up  capital  of  more  than  10,000,000  yen,  viz.,  brewing, 
sugar  making,  cotton  and  other  spinning,  shipbuilding, 
mining  and  refining,  coal  mining,  petroleum  mining  and 
refining,  electric  light,  gas,  paper  and  pulp  making,  cement, 
and  fertilizer  making.  The  progress  of  industries  in  Japan,  if 
compared  with  that  in  Europe  and  America,  is  very  trifling, 
yet  no  one  can  deny  that  Japanese  industry  is  in  process  of  im- 
provement. Her  rapid  industrial  progress  is  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing statistics: 


Industrial  Progress  of 

Japan 

Items 

1877 

1893 

1903 

1912 

Total    number    of 

factories 

5,985 

8,274 

I5,H9 

Factories  using 

motive  power 

(included  in  the 

above) 

2,409 

3.74i 

8,7IO 

Working  hands.  .  . 

a 

483,839 

863,447 

Laborers 

a 

a 

164,718 

Coal  consumed  in 

factories  {kin)  .  . 

a 

.  .  .  .a 

9,117,638,891 

Industrial       com- 

i,367b 

2,441 

4,403 

panies  

Paid-up  capital  of 

industrial    com- 

panies (yen) .... 

89,<,oo,900b 

170,346,340 

677,794.564 

No  returns 


b  At  the  end  of  1896. 


232 


IX'ONOMIC    I  I  I  It    IS   OF    EXPENDITURES 


The  following  table,  showing  some  principal  products  of 
the  industries,  reveals  the  progress  still  more  clearly: 


Principal  Produ<  rs 

of  Industries  of  Japan 

Items 

1877 

1893 

1903   • 

[912 

499,000 

".570,748 

9,542 

2,862,416 

3,346,158 

30,025,201 

4.535-305 

83-644 

228,544,320 

10,666,744 

80,718,507 

3.842,973 
2,188,171s 

3,931.384 
51,275,587 

3,627,322s 

[0,088,845 

55.312,343 
9,016,383 

1,065,116 
388,712,866 
39,120,772 
85,075.275b 

3,836,750 
6,855.525 

6-975.542 
134,006,795 

8,508,704 

"».  "38,755 

104,037,499 

18,497,265 

1,458,290 

634,142,780 

67,912,083 

104,123,812 

4,486,823 

Copper  {kin) 

Iron  (kwari) 

Petroleum  (crude  oil) . . 
{koku) 

Matches  (dozen) 

Cotton  yarn  (kwan) .  .  . 
Home-made  sugar  {kin) 
Sake  and  other  liquors 

{koku) 

P^uropean  paper  {yen) .  . 
Porcelain  and  earthen 

wares  {yen) 

Textiles  (yen) 

Mats  and  mattings  for 

floor {yen) 

20,092,463 

16,545.545 
337.230,152 

10,703,738 

1894- 


b  1901. 


In  the  above  table  so  many  figures  are  wanting  in  1877 
that  no  conclusions  can  be  drawn  therefrom.  But  those 
industries  which  had  begun  to  improve  from  the  year  1877 
and  returned  a  fair  output  in  the  year  1893  showed  in  1903 
quantities  nearly  twice  as  great  as  those  produced  ten  years 
before,  that  is,  the  production  of  coal,  iron,  petroleum,  cotton 
yarn,  European  paper,  textiles,  and  mats,  at  least,  increased 
to  double  former  amounts.  For  the  nine  years  following  1903 
the  progress  was  not  so  remarkable  as  before.  Though  at  the 
close  of  the  year  1912  no  industries  but  foreign  paper,  por- 
celain and  earthern  wares,  and  textiles  had  more  than  doubled 
their  previous  production,  yet  it  is  past  question  that  all  the 
industries,  continuously  improving,  indicated  steady  increases 
in  output.  In  the  last  ten  years  the  most  wonderful  progress 
has  been  made  in  both  the  electric  supply  and  electric  rail- 
ways, and  the  paid-up  capital  of  companies  interested  in  these 
lines  of  business,  amounting  to  over  87,000,000  yen  at  the  end 
of  1907,  is  over  250,000,000  yen  at  present. 

So  far  we  have  outlined  the  development  of  industry  in 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE      233 

Japan  and  found  that  it  advanced  with  great  rapidity.  Now, 
leaving  out  our  study  of  the  relations  between  the  above- 
stated  industrial  progress  and  war  and  armament,  we  will 
try  to  treat  of  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  as  the 
direct  cause  of  the  industrial  improvement.  It  may  be 
noted  that  there  were  different  effects  of  the  expenditures 
upon  different  industries,  as  military  demands  varied  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  products.  It  may  also  be  said,  there* 
fore,  that  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  had  more 
direct  effect  on  industrial  products  than  on  agricultural  prod- 
ucts. As  most  of  the  agricultural  products  are,  as  said 
above,  the  necessities  of  the  whole  nation,  it  is  difficult  to 
affirm  that  they  were  conspicuously  affected  by  the  increased 
military  demands. 

Now,  by  turning  to  the  production  of  coal,  which  is  regarded 
as  the  most  important  of  all  the  industrial  products  in  time 
of  war  and  is  affected  directly  by  the  expenditures  for  war 
and  armament,  we  may  determine  the  relation  between  the 
expenditures  and  general  industries.  This  relation  can  be 
known  only  in  the  years  1904  and  1905,  when  the  war  expendi- 
tures reached  an  enormous  amount  all  at  once,  as  it  is  very 
hard  to  illustrate  statistically  such  an  economic  process  as 
that  the  payments  of  expenditures  caused  demand  to  increase, 
prices  to  rise,  and  production  to  grow.  With  little  or  no  statis- 
tical data  at  hand,  we  will  not  dwell  further  upon  this  subject. 

Table  A  at  the  end  of  this  chapter1  shows  the  domestic 
consumption  of  coal  from  1903  to  1906. 

The  consumption  of  coal  used  for  ships  in  1904  and  1905 
was  larger  than  in  the  previous  year,  and  this  increase  was,  as 
anyone  can  see,  due  to  the  war.  The  average  price  of  coal 
was  5.81  yen  per  ton  in  1903,  6.53  yen  in  1904,  and  8.35  yen 
in  1905;  this  gradual  appreciation  in  price  was  due  to  the 
increasing  demand.  Accordingly,  as  seen  in  the  following 
table,  the  output  of  coal,  as  compared  with  that  of  1903, 
also  increased  gradually  by  more  than  634,000  tons  in  1904, 
by  more  than   1,453,000   tons  in   1905,  and   by  more  than 

1  Post,  p.  242. 


234 


ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF    EXPENDITURES 


2,891,000  tons  in   1906,  increases  which  were  chiefly  due  to 
the  advance  of  the  price  of  coal. 

Amount  and  Value  of  Coal  Production,  1903-1906 


Year 


1903 
1904 

1905 
1906 


Production 


Tons 
10,088,845 
10,72 

11,542,397 
12,980,103 


I  net' 
as  compared 
with  i«m.;, 


Tons 

634.951 
1,453.642 
2,891,258 


Value 


Yen 
28,978,829 
29,218,134 
40,196,695 
(.5.144,000 


Incre.  i-r 

as  compared 

with  1903 


Yen 

239,305 
11,217,866 

34,165.171 


Effects  on  Transportation 
Land  Transportation 
There  were  no  railways  in  Japan  prior  to  the  construction 
of  the  Tokyo- Yokohama  line,  which  was  completed  in  Sep- 
tember, 1872,  and  horses  or  cattle  were  the  sole  means  of  con- 
veyance. In  the  War  of  the  Restoration  and  in  the  Satsuma 
Rebellion  so  great  a  number  of  cattle,  horse-,  and  coolies 
were  collected  that  the  expenses  therefor  constituted  the 
largest  part  of  the  war  expenditures.  The  government 
having  learned  by  experience  the  convenience  of  having 
railway  traffic  between  Tokyo  and  Yokohama,  and  the  great 
trouble  caused  by  deficient  means  of  transport,  exerted  itself 
to  the  utmost  in  the  construction  of  railways.  At  last, 
accordingly,  the  government  caused  the  Nippon  Railway 
to  be  laid  by  private  hands  in  1882,  and  further  planned  to 
lay  the  Nakasen-do  Railway  by  itself.  The  mania  for  rail- 
wax-  enterprises  was  most  intensified  for  some  years  after 
1887,  and  the  aggregate  railway  mileage  in  this  country 
already  extended  to  2,000  miles  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
Sino-Japanese  War.  Though  the  transport  of  troops  and 
war  materials  led  to  a  temporary  interruption  in  the  trans- 
portation of  general  merchandise  during  the  war,  yet  immedi- 
ately after  the  war  it  was  restored  to  its  former  condition,  with 
more  favorable  return  for  goods  and  passengers  carried  in 
1894-95.     The  result    was  that   various  railway  companies 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE     235 

were  financially  successful.  Just  at  that  time,  the  govern- 
ment, disinclined  to  have  new  railway  companies  started, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  fixation  of  capital,  refused  to  give 
license  for  their  construction.  The  mania  for  railway  ('in- 
struction again  appeared  after  the  war,  and  the  government 
itself  attempted  to  carry  out  the  extension  of  railways  on  a 
larger  scale.  The  railways  were  of  so  much  greater  use  in 
carrying  troops  and  munitions  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
than  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War  that  97  locomotives,  36  pas- 
senger cars,  and  1,835  freight  cars  were  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  use  of  the  field  railways.  Such  being  the  case,  the  domes- 
tic railways  found  themselves  in  so  great  want  of  cars  that 
traffic  was  inevitably  held  up  and  goods  became  congested 
at  various  points.  The  railway  statistics  during  the  war 
indicate  a  slight  increase  in  goods  and  a  slight  decrease  in 
passengers  carried  in  1904-5,  as  compared  with  former  years, 
while  the  average  mileage  of  goods  and  passengers  trans- 
ported shows  a  considerable  increase.  This  was  all  due  to 
the  busy  conveyance  of  troops  and  munitions,  and  the  fact 
that  this  phenomenon  is  more  particularly  recognizable  in 
February  and  March  of  1904  confirms  our  explanation. 
The  railways  were  so  busily  occupied  in  transporting  troops 
and  munitions  during  the  war  that  the  general  traffic  com- 
munication was  greatly  interfered  with.  The  balance-sheets 
of  the  railway  companies,  however,  showed  the  best  profits 
that  had  ever  been  obtained,  because  the  transportation  of 
troops  and  munitions  could  be  carried  on  with  comparatively 
little  expense.  After  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  mania 
for  railway  enterprises  showed  signs  of  beginning  again,  but 
prior  to  its  reappearance  railway  nationalization  was  finally 
carried  out.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  government's 
policy  the  nationalization  of  railways  had  been  expected  from  „ 
the  beginning  of  the  Meiji  Era,  and  it  was  realized,  as  already 
stated,  just  after  the  war.  Government  ownership  of  rail- 
ways was  then  insisted  upon  principally  on  the  ground  that 
it  possessed  an  important  military  value.  The  Meiji  Gov- 
ernment was  guided  in  its  railway  policy  at  all  times  by  mil- 
itary considerations. 


236  ECONOMIC     EFFECTS  OF    EXPENDITURES 

Water  Transportation 

In  considering  the  matter  of  water  transportation  in  a 
limited  sense,  namely,  as  regards  the  improvement  of  the 
mercantile  marine,  we  note  that  there  always  exists,  as  in 
the  ease  of  land  transportation,  a  elose  relation  between 
the  shipping  business  and  military  affairs.  At  the  time  of 
the  Restoration,  vessels  of  foreign  style  had  been  already 
imported,  but  they  were  of  little  importance  as  means  of 
conveyance  in  the  War  of  the  Restoration.  In  the  Saga 
Insurrection  of  1894,  the  military  transport  was  effeeted  ex- 
clusively by  the  Mitsubishi  Steamship  Co.,  successors  to  Tsu- 
kumo  Co.,  and  in  the  Formosan  Expedition  that  company 
was  again  held  for  the  service,  as  the  American  Government 
was  disinclined  to  have  the  vessels  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Steam- 
ship Co.  engaged  in  transporting  armies.  The  Government 
accordingly  purchased  fifteen  steamships  from  abroad  for 
the  purpose,  all  of  which  the  government  turned  over  to  the 
Mitsubishi  Steamship  Co.  after  the  war,  and  ordered  it  to 
occupy  itself  with  coastwise  navigation  and  mail  service. 
At  the  outbreak  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion,  the  company  was 
thrice  called  tipon  to  render  important  service  of  military 
transport,  getting  ten  steamships  purchased  with  a  subsidy 

-700,000  granted  by  the  government  and  its  own  capital 
of  ^380,000  in  addition.  These  ships  all  came  into  the  com- 
pany's possession  again  after  the  war,  when  its  ships  numbered 
fifty-six  in  all,  or  80  per  cent  of  the  entire  mercantile  marine. 
Thus,  the  company  was  apparently  monopolizing  the  carry- 
ing trade  of  Japan.  Since  then,  competing  with  the  Kyodo- 
I  nyu  Kaisha  or  driving  out  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Co., 
the  Mitsubishi  Co.  has  at  last  grown  to  the  present  Nippon 
Yusen  Kaisha  (Japan  Mail  Steamship  Co.). 

In  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  fifty-seven  ships  (130,000  tons) 
owned  by  the  Nippon  Yusen  Jvaisha,  thirty  ships  (10,500  tons) 
of  the  Osaka  Shosen  Kaisha,  and  a  few  other  small  vessels 
were  collected  for  military  use,  and  in  addition  to  them  the 
government  purchased  thirteen  ships  (20,000  tons)  for  the 
same  purpose.     Such  a  large  requisition  of  ships  by  the  gov- 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE     237 

ernment  led  to  a  deficiency  in  general  means  of  water  trans- 
portation, and  though  that  was  shortly  replenished  there 
ensued  a  great  post-bellum  excess  in  the  number  of  ships. 
The  shipping  world,  which  was  in  possession  of  400  ships, 
with  167,000  tons  capacity,  at  the  close  of  1893,  had  528 
ships  in  all,  with  an  aggregate  capacity  of  321,000  tons,  at 
the  close  of  1895.  New  services  were  then  opened,  and  the 
government  also  adopted  a  policy  of  protection  and  encourage- 
ment. Availing  themselves  of  this  opportunity,  the  Nippon 
Yusen  Kaisha  inaugurated  new  services  to  Europe,  America, 
and  Australia,  and  the  Osaka  Shosen  Kaisha  to  Formosa, 
America,  and  the  Yangtze-Kiang,  and  the  Toyo  Kisen 
Kaisha  was  started  also  at  this  opportune  time.  It  was  from 
this  time  that  the  Japanese  commercial  flags  began  to  fly  at 
the  various  chief  seaports  in  Europe  and  America. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  government  chartered 
a  large  number  of  merchant  ships  for  military  use,  viz.,  108 
ships  of  400,000  tons  from  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha  and  73 
ships  of  78,000  tons  from  the  Osaka  Shosen  Kaisha.  The  col- 
lection of  these  ships  by  the  government  dealt  a  severe  blow 
to  the  conveyance  of  general  goods,  no  commercial  ships  of 
over  500  tons  plying  for  general  transport,  so  that  for  a  time 
the  foreign  service  came  to  a  complete  standstill.  In  this 
connection  the  government  encouraged  the  chartering  of 
foreign  ships  to  replenish  the  deficiency  in  the  shipping  trade, 
intending  thereby  to  remove  difficulties  in  foreign  trade. 
The  chartered  ships  sometimes  reached  an  aggregate  of  90 
ships  with  a  capacity  of  180,000  tons.  Besides,  the  purchase 
of  foreign  ships  and  home  shipbuilding  were  also  greatly 
encouraged  by  the  government,  and  therefore  it  came  about 
that  the  purchases  from  abroad  amounted  to  172  ships  of 
315,000  tons  in  1904-5,  or  more  than  ten  times  the  number 
of  ships  purchased  in  1903.  A  great  deal  of  trouble  and 
difficulty  was  felt  in  the  carrying  trade  until  this  replenish- 
ment had  been  completed,  but  after  the  war  ships  were  found 
again  in  great  abundance.  The  shipping  fleet  with  1,570 
vessels  of  662,000  tons  in  all  at  the  close  of  the  year  1903 


238  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

came  to  own  2,103  vessels  of  1,045,000  tons  at  the  close  of 
the  year  1907.  The  result  was  that  new  lines  were  again 
inaugurated  and  new  shipping  companies  were  started, 
namely,  the  American  and  Saghalien  services  opened  by  the 
(  >saka  Shosen  Kaisha,  the  South  American  service  opened 
by  the  Toyo  Kisen  Kaisha,  and  the  Siamese  sen  ice  opened 
by  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha;  and  the  Sino-Japanese  Steam- 
ship Co.  was  newly  established. 

Although  the  general  transportation  and  communication 
of  the  country  was  dealt  a  heavy  blow  during  the  wars  on 
account  of  the  large  requisitions  of  railway  cars  and  ships 
for  military  use,  the  post-bellum  development  was  successful, 
and  it  is  therefore  beyond  doubt  that  the  progress  of  trans- 
portation business  was  largely  due  to  the  wars.  At  the  same 
time  it.  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  Japanese  Government's 
policy  of  communication  was  dependent  from  beginning  to 
end  upon  a  unique  and  unparalleled  principle  of  protection. 
The  railways  were  allowed  enormous  subsidies  by  the  govern- 
ment before  they  were  nationalized,  and  shipbuilding  and 
navigation  were  placed  much  more  under  the  government's 
financial  egis.  It  is  said  that  90  per  cent  of  the  total  dividends 
of  various  shipping  companies  were  the  protection  and  encour- 
agement funds  granted  to  them  by  the  government,  and  it 
was  due  to  this  policy  that  the  means  of  communication  in 
Japan  underwent  such  splendid  growth  and  improvement. 
Since  this  policy  originated  in  the  tendency  to  regard  com- 
munication as  most  valuable  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
the  national  funds  used  for  the  purposes  of  protection  must 
be,  in  a  certain  sense,  called  expenditures  for  military  affairs. 
When  those  who  discourse  upon  the  development  of  com- 
munication in  Japan  take  these  matters  into  account,  they 
may  find  themselves  unable  to  agree  readily  with  the  assertion 
that  the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  had  a  good 
effect  upon  communication,  for  the  truth  is  that  the  effects 
produced  by  these  expenditures  are  too  complicated  to  be 
distinguished  as  to  whether  they  were  favorable  or  unfavor- 
able. 

The  means  of  communication  outside  of  railways  and  steam- 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE     239 

ship  lines  are  not  treated  here  in  detail,  but  it  may  be  added 
that  not  only  highways,  telegraph  and  telephone  service,  but 
also  wireless  telegraphy  and  telephony,  made  progress  with 
the  protection  and  assistance  of  the  government,  as  these 
means  were  also  considered  valuable  from  the  military  point 
of  view;  and  on  the  whole  the  effects  produced  upon  them 
were  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  the  railways  and  steamships. 


Effects  on  Commerce 
Domestic  Commerce 
The  domestic  commerce  of  a  country  is  a  reflection  of  its 
economic  life.  Commercial  prosperity  naturally  follows  the 
commencement  of  agricultural  and  industrial  activity,  the 
smooth  circulation  of  money,  and  an  increasing  consumption 
of  commodities  by  the  people.  In  the  early  part  of  the  Meiji 
Era,  the  government  relied  upon  the  policy  of  protection  to 
improve  commerce,  and  it  resorted  to  various  measures,  most 
of  which  were  unsuccessful,  in  order  to  get  goods  more  widely 
distributed.  Through  the  development  of  the  national 
economy  since  the  years  1885  and  1886  there  have  come  into 
existence  the  modern  enterprises  which  at  last  have  developed 
to  the  present  system  on  a  large  scale.  The  following  table  is 
given  to  illustrate  the  general  trend  of  economic  progress: 

Number  of  Companies  and  Paid-up  Capital 


Year 


1893 
1903 
1912 


Number  of 
companies 


871 

5.855 
8,004 


Capital  paid 
up 


Yen 

40,309,194 

451,680,028 

864,439,783 


Average  capital 
paid  up 


Yen 

46,278 

77J44 
108,000 


As  the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  amounted  to 
enormous  sums,  the  commerce  in  military  supplies  gradually 
became  active  and  prosperous,  and  the  districts  of  military 
importance  became  more  and  more  flourishing.  This  becomes 
clearer  when  we  mention  the  fact  that  at  present  great  quan- 
tities of  goods  are  transported  to  and  from  the  localities  where 


24O         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

army  divisions  or  naval  stations  are  situated,  and  that  those 
who  are  engaged  in  the  supply  of  military  requisites  are  hold- 
ing the  most  prominent  positions  in  those  localities  as  "gov- 
ernment contractors." 

Foreign  Commerce 

Prior  to  the  year  1877  the  imports  and  exports  of  Japan 
were  annually  valued  at  less  than  50,000,000  yen,  but  they 
reached  more  than  100,000,000  yen  in  1887  and  more  than 
200,000,000  yen  in  1894.  In  1903  the  values  were  put  at 
600,000,000  yen,  in  1905  at  800,000,000  yen,  and  in  late  years 
at  more  than  1,000,000,000  yen.  These  figures  show  that 
the  international  trade  of  Japan  has  gradually  come  to 
occupy  an  important  position  in  the  economic  life  of  the 
country.  To  be  more  explicit,  we  may  state  that  there 
appeared  a  tendency  for  comestibles  and  raw  materials  to 
grow  less  important  in  the  export  trade  and  to  be  supplanted 
by  half-manufactured  and  finished  articles.  In  1893-94  the 
ratio  of  the  values  of  exported  articles  was  put  at  19  per  cent 
for  comestibles,  10  per  cent  for  raw  materials,  42  per  cent  for 
half-manufactured  articles,  25  per  cent  for  finished  articles, 
and  4  per  cent  for  other  articles,  while  at  present  the  ratio 
stands  at  10,  8,  52,  29,  and  1  per  cent,  respectively.  As 
regards  imports,  the  contrary  was  the  case,  as  finished  articles 
gradually  diminished  and  raw  materials  became  more  im- 
portant. In  1893-94  the  ratio  of  values  of  imported  articles 
was  put  at  24  per  cent  for  comestibles,  21  per  cent  for  raw 
materials,  19  per  cent  for  half-manufactured  articles,  34  per 
cent  for  finished  articles,  and  4  per  cent  for  other  articles, 
but  the  latest  ratio  stands  at  17,  48,  17,  17,  and  1  per  cent, 
resped  ively. 

Such  being  the  general  condition  of  Japan's  imports  and 
exports,  many  of  the  military  requisites  at  first  had  to  rely 
entirely  upon  foreign  makes.  The  progress,  however,  of 
industries  at  home  and  the  autonomy  of  the  government's 
arsenal  gradually  made  foreign  manufactured  articles  less  im- 
portant. Therefore,  the  payments  to  foreign  countries  as  war 
and   armament   expenditures  should   have  gradually   dimin- 


EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE      24I 

ished;  but,  in  reality,  the  imports  of  foreign-made  war  req- 
uisites never  decreased  in  value  and  quantity  on  account  of 
the  wonderful  increase  of  demand  for  them.  Although  no 
conclusion  can  be  reached  on  these  points  in  the  absence  of 
proper  statistics  of  the  imports  and  exports  of  war  requisites, 
Tables  B l  and  C 2  will  show  the  increase  and  decrease  in  the 
imports  and  exports  in  war  time  of  some  articles  that  may  be 
classed  as  military  stores. 

According  to  the  first  table,  exports  of  munitions  decreased 
very  slightly  even  in  war  times.  Excepting  the  excess  of 
exports  for  the  year  1877  over  those  for  the  year  1876,  exports 
for  the  years  1894-95  decreased  very  slightly  as  compared 
with  those  for  the  year  1893.  Moreover,  the  decrease  of 
exports  for  1904-5,  though  it  seems  comparatively  large  on 
account  of  the  increased  exports  of  copper  in  1 903,  due  to  special 
causes,  can  not  be  regarded  as  so  large  in  reality.  This  state 
of  affairs  was  brought  about  by  the  fact  that,  as  these  materials 
for  munitions  were  at  the  same  time  the  daily  necessities  of 
the  nation,  the  general  demand  for  them  decreased  along  with 
the  increase  of  the  military  demand. 

According  to  the  second  table,  the  imports  of  munitions 
increased  in  some  degree  in  consequence  of  the  wars.  The 
value  of  the  imports  in  1877  was  over  five  times  as  great  as 
that  in  1876.  The  imports  in  1894-95  increased  by  50  or  70 
per  cent  of  those  in  1893,  and  in  1904-05  by  38  or  150  per  cent 
of  those  in  1903.  This  means  the  abrupt  increase  of  demand 
for  munitions  during  the  wars;  in  other  words,  the  effects  pro- 
duced directly  by  war  expenditures. 

Other  matters  indicative  of  the  manner  in  which  war  or 
armament  was  related  to  the  vicissitudes  in  foreign  trade  do 
not  come  within  the  scope  of  this  study.  We  have,  however, 
to  state  that,  in  spite  of  several  contests  with  foreign  countries, 
Japan  was  able  to  maintain  her  sea  power  at  all  times  during 
the  wars,  and  to  keep  herself  free  from  any  lasting  disastrous 
effects  on  her  foreign  trade.  This  was  of  the  greatest  advan- 
tage to  her  economic  development. 

1  Post,  p.  243.  2  Post,  p.  244. 


242 


fOMIC    EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 


o 
U 

- 
w 
W 

- 
: 


0 

SI 

•-  0 

- 

roo  ,00 

mo    00 
mo  .00 

05 

n 
0 

1-t^oo  -r 

q  «  <tiq 
Ttoo  0  1/5 
0000 

- 
0 

a 
E 

H 

u 

0 

to 

'"c 

<u  2 
0  0 

u 

to 

O  m  -*0 
r~-  r-  m  0 

c 
0 
H 

"5  0\0  »«3 

O  O  00  0 
w  00  O  m 

00  r-  tto 

0 

X. 
a 

0 
to 

'0 
=  ~. 
u  £ 
1 
to 

c  a  moo 

N9>9ih 
in  <a-*rin 

c 

0 
H 

000  1 1- 
moo  moo 

W^O    *»• 
\£3  O"  rf  -rf 
—  «3"N   — 

ro  "0  rn  ro 

'5 

0 
to 

0 

a,  «-, 
0  O 

V 

to 

"-  -n  n  — 
in  m  r-»  m 

OOtut 

c 
0 
H 

OsO  moo 
N  1-  O  r» 

Tf r-»  rn  P0 

-  O  00  in 
i~  c-  00  q 

0 
to 

0 

C"e3 

•-  — 

0  0 

u 
to 

-moo 
O  O  N  1^ 

m  0  O  •* 

c 
0 
H 

O««00 
00  q  m  n 
0  ^  ino" 

2 
>< 

0  Tf  m<> 

0  0  g  0 
00^0 

EFFECTS  ON  INDUSTRIES,  TRANSPORTATION,  AND  COMMERCE      243 


o 

H 


t^.«^ 

1^00 

ON 

r^oo  *    0  «*3 

0 

q.  o_      p-i  o_ 

<N 

0 

0 

S  -+oo"       0"  rC 

O" 

^    0\0           -t(N 

1^ 

"    C5nO          O    "5 

ID 

~~         -f 

no" 

t<5 

rO 

OH           O  00 

M 

-t-  0  a    toin 

CO 

-1- 

^   rO  ^          M   "~ 

<S 

0 

§  od"  rF        ro  re 

ON 

ON 

"     t^  t^.      0  00 

rO 

— 

ci  m      on  ■* 

0__ 

«       -f 

t^l 

to 

<~r> 

00    ^        >C    N 

ON 

O  O   a    O    O 

rr> 

<~0 

1-^  CO        On00_ 

« 

c 

t;  o>  <*■>     -;f  t^ 

in 

ON 

"™ 

t^~ 

<3 

t-C 

-t 

■*■ 

O         t--  O 

t^ 

cj    •  "d-r~»    ■ 

-t- 

10 

^  O     ■  t->.  t^    • 

1/5 

0 

£  '"-    '.  00"  0"    ! 

of 

00 

■      in      0  oc 

*- 

■*" 

t^ 

-f 

-f 

<N 

N 

On       >0   N 

l~ 

H          •      <\|      Q\        • 

ro 

■* 

ON      •  NO     O        • 

NO 

t  -f    !  *r>  •+    '. 

-f 

X 

^,  00        <r>  0 

(N 

I-1 

m       ■*■  •*■ 

M 

10 

no" 

CN 

(N 

10        On  On 

m 

no     •  10  0 

n 

C2 

N     -\D   N 

§  vo"  :  0"  0" 

nO_ 

ON 

t^ 

00 

£   <*5        >->   C5 

1^ 

►-1 

^  ci        ^10 

« 

•0 

NO 

N 

O 

m          M    On 

<N 

t^    ■  ■*■  r» 

-1- 

1^ 

g  nO_     •   ^  ■— _ 

CN|_ 

00 

^  m    ;  no"  on 

tC 

IO 

VO 

t^ 

CN| 

m" 

On       NO   <*5 

00 

vO 

£    O        ■    On  (N 

0) 

t^ 

5u    ^O      •    (N|   NO 

M 

00 

^        ;  10  0* 

^3 

►H    00 

On 

i-c  00 

On 

•   tn 

•J2 

•    e3 

.    f- 

en 

•  — 

(_ 

•0 

aj  c 

2  a 

<r.    c3    (/ 

L- 

0  ii  3  ..  1- 

O 

a 

X 

W 

piece  g 
blanke 
r  ships' 
(ingots 

U 

tton 
tton 
alfo 
pper 

O 

H 

O   O   O   O   r 

UL 

uu» 

244 


ECONOMIC    EFFECTS   OF    EXPENDITURES 


_ 


- 


1-  c   -o  - 

—  - 

r»  »r  o>  c 

r 

O  ~:oc 

r  r  —  - 

— 

-: 

r*)Ul  1     T 

cc  ri--  ;>  ~i  -  c  —  -  i-o  c  -o  ~  *o  ^o  o  x 

t-  M    -0  O    O  O    1     "J 

:  r  ^  -  -i  *i  c  *i  *i  c  :  ^  -  :  c  x  c  c  ".  ^  :  ?  t  ?  n  a  |   »o 

g  n  -  i~ x  x   -i  C  -  C  --to*  oo'sOO  —  n  too"  c£  —  o  o>o  o  oo 

10 

E  —  ici-c   z  -  looo^o  -r  -o  •>  c ■  O  i^  -r  -t  O  ■>  t-  <n  r-  o  r*-o  oo 

^ 

r    D   z    po r- C    -   POOC   *rir, c   -OC-OXO«OOi~~  o  ^o  - 

<> 

•TC  "iX N00  iflOM  t^M  OO        O  N  fO              NTtt^ 

1  ~> 

00 

* 

fOOO  O   --    Dt  W  OC    —    —   0    i^.O   r-O>-oD00  O  O^O 

C  C*  10  0  *i-  c 

•* 

h  c  ^i  :  c  z  "-•  r  x  m  c  c  "■•  -t  i-  c  -  -oo  ~ 

r^  O  l/^  —   ^  O 

MONO    f>  t-  O  ■>  CS   Ifl  N  r-  w  0>0  O  0>«  «   030  o  o  *<to   - 

t 
c 

R  >C   ir  ?  'i  ir  -  C    C  <C  x  x    cs   O   C  "".  i  -  C  x  —  r—  O  r-  O  >o  O-  0 

Ov 

f-  iv)nm  n  c  n  r»oc  -or--r-ox  —  c*~  o  c  -r  r-  -o  ~  00—  0 

.—    Ifl  C    fO  C    C    "i    —    T  C  X    "J    PO  "i  X    —    O^O  O   r-  l>  in  <-"   o^»   ^N 

ID 

t-   C\  N   N   —   ~               —   in  r*  GO   -t        c  ^h   0  h   -o              ~   -0  C* 

»         , 

O              rO  *>       w 

1^ 

™ 

N 

oo-tcx  -T  0  c  c  "  z  ioot-ocio<No~o 

O-O  "*N  t~  " 

M 

-ON   •-  O    O^N    f^NfO-   r*-  0  —  OX   h«OC 

f*)^0H   N  1/ 

ID 

x  -tec  -0  ~)  ^;  *r  —  xx  e  —  to  —  x  c  Ovi/>r-oc 

^-  n  Q\  00  ^t-  r* 

•* 

o 

K    1  -  -i-  ir,  -    -J-  x    "-.O    N    -t  C  X  O   C  ZC  O    —  O  00  <N 

fOIN    0>  M    ^  >- 

-  C  n  n  ~  r-  0  *J-  —  po  r*  10  O  C  t-  fO  <s  10  n  <n  w 

*3-sO  O  t^  fOvC 

rO 

>4  t*  -OX  C          —    —          lOHNOjOoO^N^^C 

—        in^r^H 

*tc                              n       Hoo-t      o'r-noo       fc           ►hwm 

ID 

-                                           00-10 

O 

ro  10  \n  *fr>C  n  it  -t  t  n  c  -re-  c  t  — 1  -0  -  h 

TtsO     >0    I^OC 

O 

CO  to  CO  r~  —  i-r-C   ■^■^■Oi^JTOiO'^'C)   --o  -   rO  O 

■  00  »^nO  >ooc 

■* 

moc  ?i —  c  1  -  ~r  -0  10  1  -  w  t  -  —  0  r  u~-  ~  0^  -0    •  c>q»ioc 

a 

=   ^OWt^OOOCN^WM  fOCHO^O  N  t^lOWfOP 

00  00  0  O  -^ 

d 

/"                   OCO>0-Hlf,HMhfOH«)H£>nOM' 

O  1^  O   O   r* 

t~ 

* 

Pi         "3-0   t-  in  —   r^   c   C  O  O  OO   C   ^£  0>  "0  »oO 

m    N   0\  1^ 

•^ 

m*  ^        poo"        10  1^-        10       h 

-.'  m    ■* 

r-                 n 

ro 

fOO   N    'i   t-  0  t-  C  O    PO  CO  <0  0»h  O  N  W5  CO  CO^C 

T  y:   1/:  ^  c 

»tc  0>  00  10  O  Z  i-tor^ioNCr-po  —  c  w>«  — 

•  «  ««:  ^r  <n 

so 

OOxr-r^iocOroioiONOXONNN<-«Tt-    •  OO  00  to  i- 

1^ 

00 

S  -  i  4 m  4  n"  «  w  h  ui  ^  ri  ir,\c  n  rfcooo  C>    '  hi  n  0"  M*  c 

r- 

'-    -0—    CX    C    l-   -f   -     C    m  -t  "OX    1-  tO  O    C    <N  O    O         COfOOO    <N 

Ov 

—       0  ro  n        —              i/i  r*  *^ao  O  »o  "0  n  n  t--  -r  1 

"?  '7  ^1 

O"  ^t          IO  (N*  M    Ol 

►."  ^*oO 

O* 

^t                        M 

O 

—  x  t--i  -0  -r  -t  -t  -0  c  i-*tx  t^-o  tJ->-i  r-—  1/ 

)       r>  O  OOC  C 

O  10O  C  ro  O  *+  -rt  <»o  10  1-  m  r-  n  to  »o  r-  0  ^a 

\D 

ro 

00 

a. 

C  n  e  *)  10  "".  -r  -0  x  d   po  O  -^o"  10  to  «  t-  pn  10  x 

00  r~  N  id  ■- 

6. 

00 

K               HHHn\OHMO»V5,tNOOr-OOvO^TO« 

OX  NO    - 

0 

— 

OCO  00 

t^ 

M            i>->0                     —            N            - 

1^ 

-O                           H 

-0 

Tl-iON              OC   C?.X   r*-t        O       O               —(--£>       00               OoC 

<* 

Zr  —  -r    ■     -  C  ~r  —  -0  -i  -o    ■  ro    ■  r»    ■       -irrio    •  »    ■    -ox 

0 

r- 

r^ 

00 

x  -r          ^ifloo'd      m      x*         x"  10 1>      n    .    .0  f 

)       •* 

—      -r              t-'OC  t      mo          ot^o 

0          n 

vO 

M    Tj"  O                     O            O                     OC     H\C 

c 

M 

0 

r  *r  r            r-  i^  "o       —  'o      »o      c            10  0  - 

~5               ID  " 

r     00 

'O'O-t-         C—I^-'C—      --TX      ■         -O'OTN      •      -i-C 

00 

O 

£   -t  to  O     -      ■  O  ro  Oi     ■   1-  O      -   -t     •  ro     ■         0  O   "■ 

■  -r   ■    ■  0  " 

oo 

C    -                OCOC          t-x"        O      .    C>     .      .OODOC 

'"-          "-■ 

—       to  -f           **       ir       -r  -        r>       0           10  ro  x 

•t 

N             -        t            -o  -  -0 

5 

^ 

!C 

£ 

T3 

3! 

> 

., 

0 

— 

B 

0 

X 

rt 

a 

z 

■  5 

i 

~ 

.5 

■0 

•c 

?  ai 

•  5 

2 

j 

u 

£2 

|-g 

■  & 

c3 

g 

a 

c 

E 

■ox 

E   E 

:  z 

j 
j 

I 

'w 

c 

-5 
0 

r  S 

C 

"Si 

03 1  c 

r:  £  - 

si 

'J2 

c  ns'5 
3  g  B 

u 

>  I 
S| 

Be 

0 
0 

3 

1 

- 

■Si 

I 

U 

e 

CJ 

9 

1 

Z 
Z 

E 
- 

5 

C 
E 

c 
c 

V 

1 
a 

X 

H 

E 
C 

'5 

T 
ffi 

0 
-J 

c 

f: 
R 

C  a 

at 

E 
C 

c 

J 
1 

Cr. 

c 

: 

'£ 

CHAPTER  V 

SOCIAL  EFFECTS 

It  is  impossible  to  make  any  detailed  demonstration  as  to 
how  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  were  connected  with 
the  economic  life  of  society,  especially  with  every  class  of  so- 
ciety and  its  living  conditions,  or  with  the  static  or  dynamic 
condition  of  the  population.  In  order  to  bring  these  social 
phenomena  to  light,  it  is  fundamentally  necessary  to  avoid  a 
partial  and  fragmentary  inquiry  into  the  causes,  as  the  expla- 
nation of  a  phenomenon  can  never  be  considered  as  perfect 
until  it  has  been  made  by  assiduously  consulting  various 
causes  concerned  with  the  phenomenon.  The  arguments  on 
these  points,  however,  do  not  admit  of  being  conveniently 
grouped  within  the  scope  of  our  investigation.  It  is  no  useless 
work,  however,  to  touch  here  on  the  effects  on  prices  and  wages 
alone,  because  the  sudden  disbursement  of  such  large  amounts 
as  the  war  expenditures  are  likely  to  produce  great  effects 
upon  both.  The  effects  in  question  present  themselves  chiefly 
through  the  medium  of  monetary  circulation,  and  those  com- 
ing along  such  a  course  may  be  inferred  by  what  has  been 
described  in  Chapter  III.  In  this  chapter,  therefore,  the  gen- 
eral trend  of  prices  and  wages  will  be  epitomized,  as  covering  a 
feature  different  from  the  remarks  given  in  Chapter  III. 

Effects  on  Prices 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Meiji  Era,  prices  varied  throughout 
the  country  to  such  an  extent  that  no  standard  prices  for  those 
days  can  now  be  ascertained.  Several  index  numbers  are 
published,  of  which  the  numbers  reported  by  the  Investiga- 
tion Committee  of  the  Monetary  System  and  two  kinds  of  the 
numbers  used  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  are  the  most  trustworthy. 
The  diagram  and  table  given  at  the  end  of  this  section  have 
been  worked  out  for  the  prices  of  twenty-three  different  arti- 
cles in  Tokyo  by  the  Investigation  Bureau  of  the  Bank  of 

245 


246         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

Japan,  and  are  based  on  the  figures  of  the  Investigation  Com- 
mittee of  the  Monetary  System,  with  those  of  the  bank  itself 
taken  into  consideration.  They  constitute  the  most  conven- 
ient and  reliable  information  regarding  the  history  of  prices  in 
the  Meiji  Era.  In  looking  into  the  trend  of  prices  according 
to  these  index  numbers,  it  is  observed  that  no  great  fluctuations 
in  prices  took  place  from  1872  to  1877,  but  that  there  was  a 
great  advance  in  the  years  1878,  1879,  and  1880,  and  that  the 
highest  point  was  reached  in  1881.  Commencing  a  down- 
ward trend  from  the  year  1882,  they  reached  their  lowest 
point  in  1884,  and  then  continued  to  show  an  upward  tendency 
up  to  1893.  During  the  decade  from  1894  to  1903,  they  again 
fluctuated  and  went  highest  in  1898  and  1900  and  lowest  in 
1900  and  1 90 1.  They  kept  to  the  third  appreciation  for 
years  afterward,  until  at  last  they  reached  their  height  in  1907 
and  have  not  shown  a  downward  tendency  since  that  time. 
In  short,  prices  in  Japan  tended  to  rise  at  the  ratio  of  thirty- 
two  years  of  appreciation  to  fifteen  years  of  depreciation,  and 
made  far  greater  advances  than  prices  in  London.  Further 
explanation  in  reference  to  this  state  of  prices  is  here  imprac- 
ticable; but  the  reader  should  not  fail  to  direct  his  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  advance  of  prices  regularly  continued  for 
some  years  after  the  wars.  This  phenomenon  was  principally 
attributable  to  the  relation  of  prices  to  the  amount  of  cur- 
rency in  circulation,  which  was  much  affected  by  the  war 
expenditures,  as  previously  mentioned,  and  may  be  considered 
after  all  as  having  been  due  to  the  very  payments  of  war  ex- 
penditures. Generally  speaking,  the  prices  of  daily  necessities 
rose  higher  than  those  of  luxuries.  The  prices  of  rice,  soja 
beans,  red  beans,  mi  so,  etc.,  went  up  considerably  after  the 
Satsuma  Rebellion,  as  compared  with  other  commodities. 
After  the  Sino-Japanese  War  there  was  a  great  advance  in  the 
prices  of  rice,  table  salt,  miso,  pickled  radishes,  sake,  etc.,  and 
a  fall  in  the  prices  of  dyestuffs,  raw  lacquer,  copper,  lead,  soda, 
ginned  cotton,  etc.  After  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  salt, 
sugar,  miso,  rye,  barley,  wheat,  red  beans,  tobacco,  hemp,  etc., 
rose  in  price,  while  soy,  habidaye,  foreign  iron,  copper,  tile,  silk 


SOCIAL  EFFECTS 
Fluctuation  in  Prices  and  Wages  in  Tokyo1 


247 


n^iocr-coao  —  wco^iocor-cooio  —  c*eo^io©r-coa>o—  c*co^^<d  r-  co  ffi  o  —  an 

^  r-  r-  r»r-r-r*-oooooDODCOcocDODcocDa>a>a>a)0)a>aia>oio>00  ocooo  o  00—  —  —  — 

CO  CD  CO   CO  CD  CO  CO  CO  CO  X   COCDCOCDCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCDO)   CD   CO   CO  Oi  CO    CD    0)  CD  Q  CD  Cft  C> 


220 


m'tiocor-cooo  —  wn^unohcooo-  c*n^io<Dr~eoo»o—  ctco^ioof^ooooo  —  e*eo 
i-t-c-r~r-r~i--cDeooococococDa3cocoa>a>c>a>c»a>c>a>o>a>oooooooooc 

COCOCOCOCOCOGOCOCOGOCOCOOOCOCOCDCOGOCOGOCOCOCOGOCOCOCOOOOBQQOOOGbOQQOa) 


1  Prices  of  commodities  are  the  averages  taken  of  rice  and  twenty-two  other 
articles  of  necessity.  Wages  are  calculated  upon  the  averages  for  twenty-four 
principal  kinds  of  labor,  as  carpentry,  etc. 


24*  ECONOMIC   EFFECTS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

Index  Numbers  for  Price  and  Wage  Fluctuations  in  Tokyo8 


Year 


1873 

'*74 
1875 
1876 
1877 

1N7S 

1879 

iNSo 
I88l 
1882 

I883 
1884 
1885 

ISM, 
I887 

IKS* 

1889 

1890 

1891 
1892 

1893 


Prices 

Wages 

94 

100 

96 

103 

100 

11)2 

94 

I  OI 

99 

K.4 

100 

I  IO 

119 

Il6 

143 

126 

163 

128 

.46 

I3O 

1 12 

I30 

91 

126 

96 

'-7 

95 

127 

103 

126 

106 

127 

105 

126 

119 

123 

"3 

121 

116 

124 

119 

124 

Year 


1894 

1896 

1897 
1898 

1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 

1903 
1904 

1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
191 1 
1912 
1913 


Prices 


129 
139 
152 
177 
188 
178 
190 
186 
184 
205 
219 
227 
233 
254 
252 
239 
241 

254 

278 
283 


Wages 


135 
152 
158 
167 
180 

185 
194 
203 
201 
205 
201 
210 
220 
225 
238 

234 
225 
241 
247 
245 


a  Specially  reported  by  the  Bank  of  Japan. 

fabrics,  etc.,  went  down.  Desirable  as  it  is  to  arrive  at  some 
conclusion  in  respect  to  how  directly  such  a  phenomenon  as 
noted  above  was  connected  with  the  war  and  armament  expen- 
ditures, in  other  words,  to  trace  to  what  extent  the  prices  of 
commodities  advanced  because  of  increasing  military  demand, 
the  conclusion  will  be  left  ultimately  to  the  reader.  Concern- 
ing the  phenomenon  under  review,  however,  it  is  believed  that 
comparatively  explicit  causes  and  effects  are  obtainable  by 
making  inquiries  into  the  changes  in  monetary  circulation  and 
the  national  burden  of  taxes,  particularly  of  indirect  taxes. 


Effects  on  Wages 

As  shown  by  the  foregoing  table,  the  rise  and  fall  of  wages 
followed  that  of  prices  at  all  times  in  the  Meiji  Era,  and  wages 
always  fluctuated  somewhat  less  than  prices.  Although 
it  is  evident  that  the  effects  of  the  war  and  armament 
expenditures  on  wages  were  as  wide  and  substantial  as  on 
prices,  we  believe  that  they  came  about  chiefly  through  the 


SOCIAL   EFFECTS  249 

monetary  circulation,  as  in  the  case  of  prices.  We  have 
sought  to  elucidate  this  fact  in  detail,  namely,  that  the  war 
and  armament  expenditures  directly  created  a  demand  for 
labor,  causing  wages  to  rise, and,  when  such  demand  decreased, 
to  fall  again.  The  interpretation,  however,  is  found  very 
difficult  so  far  as  the  statistical  references  at  hand  are  con- 
cerned; and  it  is  specially  unattainable  considering  that  it 
was  common,  in  every  war  under  notice,  that  wage  earners 
connected  with  the  wars,  as  blacksmiths  or  ship  carpenters, 
for  instance,  were  no  better  paid  than  tile  layers,  roofers,  etc., 
who  had  no  relation  to  the  wars. 


CHAPTER  VI 
CONCLUSION 

There  remain  numerous  points  of  discussion  which  should  be 
touched  upon,  but  which  can  not  possibly  be  enumerated  in 
the  present  historical  investigation  of  the  relations  that  exist 
between  wars  and  economy.  The  observations  made  in  the 
foregoing  pages  concerning  the  raising  and  disbursement  of 
funds  for  war  and  armament  cover  but  a  small  part  of  these 
numerous  subjects  and  by  no  means  complete  the  historical 
study  of  the  relations  between  economy  and  wars  or  arma- 
ments. It  may  be  recognized,  in  some  sense,  that  the  effects 
of  war  and  armament  expenditures  on  economy  are  thoroughly 
comprehensive  of  all  of  those  on  economy  arising  from  wars 
and  armaments,  because  no  wars  and  armaments  could  exist 
without  necessary  expenditures  for  carrying  them  on.  As 
stated  in  the  introduction,  however,  a  study  covering  so  wide  a 
scope  as  the  above  has  neither  been  the  purport  of  this  part 
of  our  work  nor  intended  by  us  from  the  commencement. 

All  the  war  and  armament  expenditures  during  the  last 
forty-six  years  amounted  to  more  than  5,000,000,000  yen, 
and  they  have  had  influences  on  all  phases  of  activity  in  Japan. 
It  is  interesting  to  look  back  into  the  past  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  country  under  such  heavy  burdens  of  expense. 
The  statistics  in  the  table  on  the  following  page  give  a  general 
idea  of  the  economic  development  of  the  nation. 

In  the  following  table,  the  numbers  of  companies,  factories, 
and  workmen  in  1876  are  left  blank;  the  industries  then  carried 
on  under  a  factory  system  in  the  modern  sense  belonged  to  the 
infant  stage  of  organization  and  were  too  insignificant  to  be 
numbered;  and  the  exports,  imports,  railways,  and  steamships 
were  also  in  a  very  young  and  rudimentary  condition  as  com- 
pared with  those  at  present.  In  1893,  seventeen  years  later, 
industries,  carrying  trades,  etc.,  had  gradually  improved. 
During  the  decade  after  1893  such  great  progress  was  made  in 
250 


CONCLUSION 


251 


ro  rO 

~  o 

On  ON 


E  o 

5  2s 


"O   u  ' 

3  ai 

—  02 


•   conO 

COvN 

g  00  00 


N    'tOvC    N  000)00    rOOO  O 

h    M    f^  K  N  O00    NOnO  C"» 

«    N    N    *  fl  —    —    —    —    —  ,-. 


"*•  cooc  o 
to  to  1-  to 
«   m   M   M 


00        CI        O  too  O 

J^        00  -tNN    0< 

i-h  1-1  04    04  NO    04 


10  to  o  to  ci       — 

h    0>tON    M  CI 

i-h    04    01    01    01  -t 


r^  ■* 

00 

O  «   O 

M 

ON  CI 

-r 

•   "*  ci  nO 

01 

to  i-> 

w 

•     C|     CO  CO 

"■* 

NOX    ,rj 

M        -,        m  o   -  8 


0   ci        10       ti 

tO  Ol  -f         NO 

CO  co        p-i         « 


o  -*  ox  r^ 

o  no  o  oi  00 

°.  °.  °.  °icc- 

00*  o"  tO  m   CO 

on  o  to  01  i-> 

tONO_vO_  tJ- 
04    04  vO    OI 

UOnO   OnnO 

>o  uo  in 


—  gn  t--  r-  i>» 

«     ►"     <*   O    NO 

CO 

NO 

10 

vO   uo  co  -sf 

ON00     -h     Tf 
h-     ON  01  NO 

O   lOr^NiO 
1-    —  NO  00    UO 
NO           00     ^  01 

0 

vo  10  0   ►"" 
IO        NO    to 

ON             **   **" 

nO               co  O 
uo              —   10 

01 

04    On 
co  01 

no  i>» 

•OvO  CO  to 
00  00  On  1-1 
VO    ^-  t^  !>. 

1-1   to  to  •<? 

1^  to  t^  CO 

04_  10  NO_  0I_ 

t^NO~  "0  M 

"OnO   On  O 

CO«    ■_     T+- 


mhOO    ON 
"*  to  IO  01    ■* 

00  <->  i~~  uo  oi 

04  NO    O    04    O^ 

to  a-  oi  no 

NW}«    ON 

no"  on  p"  00" 

"*  ^nO   to 
04    04   uo 


O   if  On  "000 

ON  t^  CO  ■<*■  ON 
M    M»    1-.    04^ 

no"  00"  to  rf  to 
O  OO    NN 

NO         •*  On  rh 


NO  NO  l-l 


OnO    N   N 

ON  On  tJ-  i-h 

°i  ^t  't  "5 

00'  -*  oi"  uo 

c      o  to 

rf        uo  m 

00    i-i 
01    tO 


00  Nm  N 
tO  O  11  ON 
NO_  0I_  04_  Tf 

t-^  oT  i-T  t-C 

04    On  N  rj- 

oi  no  -3-  oi 


to  01  «  —  co 
i-h  t^oo  uo  rO 
tOOO    CO00    nh 

00"  >-<"  On  "sf  rf 
00  OO  NO    i-H 

to  uo  r^.00 

TJ-OO    "H    PO 

►H      0) 


00  to 
01   to 

nO__nO_ 
uo  ON 

NO     ON 


OnnO   01 
cOnO   N 

ONOO      l-H 


O  UOnO  h- 
i-c  U0O0  to 
04   rt-  On  uo 

no"  uo  uo  On 

N  tOHH 
-*  O  00   NO 


tJ-nO  nO  ^f 
O  uo  co  rh 
Tf  ON  0_  to 

00"  00"  <-T  tC 

to  O  00  01 
to  to  tJ-  On 


c  - 

O  00 

t^.    I-H 

no"  On 
UO  On 
to  uo 


00  nO  00   On 

•*■  01  oi  r-» 

o»       uono 

O"         M   rf 

■*         1-1  NO 

t-~  ON 


04  i-h  >-i 


*u: 


3    O 

o 

Oh 


s 

50 

~ 

- 

^ 

0 
0 

0 

u 

R 

^J 

"n 

^-" 

e* 

~ 

"5 

0) 

R 

en 

c 

rt 

O 

cfl 

_ 

n 

- 

(/J 

cS 

0 

- 

rr 

<J 

rt 

Rl 

c 
0 

3 

g 

- 

c 

c 

c 

CO 

0 

< 

<^ 

s^ 

Ch 

O   c 


u 


s  2 

?N    C3 


8  J*n  efl 
3 


-, 


oj    (U    0    C. 

.£■=  aE.S 


Uh 


-6i    3 

.£  c  2 

■w  o  a. 

E  y 

!«     c     P     S 

C    O    rv       ■ 

t.C--«otnnJa!aJ3 
'  icy>  (%>       fs>       p/  >>U 


_   rj  •  — 


^  3 

M 

~~^  3 


S    8   ?N8   g 
oj  ?\  tn  ^n-J 

"°  ^•—   ,n   oc 
,>  i_  <f>  5"  oc 

3   ?   P,   e   C 

n--   ^   nj   jj 

•-   O   »   »- 
gg_   o£_   o 

-g  S's  tf  3 

o 


Sort 


>.   "° 


C^    !S    -H 

o  O'Jj  On 
oi  °  aj  M 

^  y  0.0 


rt  c  2 

«1~H     C 


o>  =0 


to  2'c 

OJ    1)   °. 

•S  c  - 

u  O   I- 

,2  c"" 

»  O  o 

Ji^3  o 

IC'O   01 

•oJ2  t. 

C  3^ 

rt  G  w 

.  O   2 

0>  G  aJ 

2t3  ^ 

S  5  « 
>  rt  o 

u  to  •*-     " 

0)  -^  t* 
C  O  01  00 

01^ -J"2 

•■3-1 

£°1 
G273 
x  c  c 

=  rto 

«c"b 

oj.2.5 

o  o  * 
—  .=  ■0 
•a  o  <u 

«  c  ^ 
2.=  o 

U.    C    In 

Si  3. a 

-ut; 

g8-S 

*  rt  o  » 

H  cj  (fl  c 


.  as; 


252         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

every  phase  of  activity — railways,  steamships,  factories,  com- 
panies, capital  of  companies,  exports  and  imports,  etc. — that 
all  lines  showed  an  increase  of  two  or  three  times  over  the 
previous  figures.  During  the  last  decade  additional  progress 
was  made,  but  it  was  slightly  less  than  in  the  former  decade. 
In  short,  the  economic  phenomena  in  Japan  have  progressed 
by  great  strides  in  all  quarters  of  business,  and  the  national 
economy  could  afford  to  make  tremendous  war  and  arma- 
ment expenditures  from  its  own  resources,  still  showing  itself 
good  enough  for  further  charges. 

Let  us  now  consider  these  improvements  through  every 
decade.  The  first  decade  witnessed  the  destruction  of  feudal- 
ism and  the  introduction  of  the  modern  economic  system  in  its 
place;  the  second  decade  was  the  period  in  which  the  new  sys- 
tem that  had  been  created  in  the  former  decade  was  strenuously 
perfected  and  finally  completed.  Great  difficulties  were  sur- 
mounted ;  and  for  twenty  years  after  that  the  national  economy 
was  most  active  and  progressive,  making  two  conspicuous 
developments,  respectively  after  the  Sino-Japanese  and  the 
Russo-Japanese  Wars.  The  economic  changes  have  been 
dealt  with  in  the  foregoing  chapters.  In  general,  however, 
scarcely  any  economic  change  occurred  with  little  or  no  direct 
or  indirect  relation  to  wars  and  armaments. 

War  and  armament  expenditures  contributed,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  to  the  increase  of  the  government's  annual  expenses 
and  to  terrible  difficulties  in  finance,  and  made  it  extremely 
hard  to  keep  finance  in  harmony  with  the  national  economy. 
Even  in  the  above  table,  containing  only  a  few  figures,  the 
increasing  rates  in  the  various  items  of  public  finance  are  ob- 
served to  be  much  greater  than  those  in  the  items  belonging 
to  the  national  economy.  This  goes  to  prove  that  the  eco- 
nomic phenomenon  common  to  all  the  modern  states  has  also 
come  into  existence  in  Japan. 

The  effects  on  finance  created  by  war  and  armament  expen- 
ditures  may  be  grouped  under  the  following  categories:  the 
first  on  taxes,  the  second  on  public  loans,  and  the  third  on  the 
meeting  of  receipts  and  outlays.     As  to  the  first,  in  the  em- 


CONCLUSION  253 

ployment  of  taxation,  the  government  pressed  the  people  to 
pay  extraordinary  expenditures  outof  their  income  or  property, 
so  that  its  enforcement  tended  to  produce  the  most  important 
effects  upon  the  production  and  distribution  of  the  national 
economy.  With  regard  to  the  second  effect,  the  public  loans 
were  the  cause  of  the  serious  expansion  of  finance,  which  ef- 
fects can  not  be  said  to  have  been  smaller  than  those  on  taxes. 
With  regard  to  the  third  effect,  on  the  meeting  of  receipts  and 
outlays  of  the  state,  it  may  be  remarked  that  there  appeared 
great  disturbances  in  the  monetary  world  several  times,  bring- 
ing about  activity  and  dulness  alternately  over  the  whole 
economic  circle;  that  is,  the  increased  issues  of  inconvertible 
notes  in  the  early  days  of  the  Meiji  Era  and  the  Satsuma  Rebel- 
lion, the  imports  of  foreign  capital  in  the  Sino-Japanese  and 
the  Russo-Japanese  Wars,  and  the  inflation  of  currency  in 
circulation  may  be  recognized  as  the  most  remarkable  of  the 
effects.  At  the  time  of  the  anomaly  in  the  money  market,  if 
the  prevalent  excitement  had  been  properly  controlled  or  the 
government  authorities  and  the  bankers  had  entertained  a 
better  foresight,  from  the  point  of  view  of  national  economy, 
the  effects  might  have  been  limited  to  a  less  extent;  or  if  more 
dexterous  hands  had  been  employed  in  the  administration  of 
finance,  the  pressure  of  finance  on  the  money  market  would 
have  been  less  extensive.  It  is  admitted,  however,  that  the 
widespread  effects  were  inevitable,  as  war  and  armament 
expenditures  amounted  to  huge  sums  in  the  receipts  and  out- 
lays. Looking  generally  at  the  effects  on  the  monetary  circu- 
lation, it  is  noticeable  that  the  military  expenditures  tended  to 
absorb  the  productive  capital  out  of  the  people's  purses  and  to 
dissipate  it  unproductively,  whereby  there  naturally  appeared, 
on  the  one  hand,  a  tendency  toward  growing  floating  capital 
in  abundance,  and,  as  it  was  difficult  to  get  an  equilibrium  of 
receipts  and  expenditures  by  the  National  Treasury,  the  cur- 
rency in  circulation  met  with  irregular  demands,  according  to 
the  needs  of  financial  administration,  so  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  sometimes  arose  a  tendency  toward  unnatural 
inflation.     The  general  survey  of  these  points  has  been  at- 


254         ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  EXPENDITURES 

tempted  already,  but  by  considering  the  sum  per  capita  of 
currency  in  proportion  to  the  whole  population  of  this  country, 
the  above-mentioned  remarkable  inflation  will  be  brought 
more  thoroughly  to  the  reader's  understanding.  The  sum 
per  capita  of  currency  was  below  5.00  yen  until  the  year  1877, 
but  went  over  6.00  yen  in  1878  and  1879.  After  that,  until 
1893,  it  was  less  than  5.50  yen  and  gradually  increased  to  7.52 
yen  in  1897;  and  no  further  increase  appeared  until  1903.  It 
was  put  at  8.34  yen  in  1904,  at  9.00  yen  in  1906,  at  9.90  yen  in 
1907,  and  at  10.00  yen  in  1908,  and  has  not  gone  down  below 
1 1 .00  yen  since  then.  This  condition  of  currency  can  not  be 
recognized  as  true,  though,  of  course,  due  to  the  increased  out- 
put of  gold  and  silver  and  other  causes  in  general,  without 
regard  to  the  profound  connection  with  the  war  expenditures. 
We  have  already  seen  that  war  expenditures  had  much  to  do 
directly  with  every  post-bellum  appreciation  of  prices  and 
wages,  and  that  laborers  found  themselves  under  utterly 
unfavorable  circumstances  owing  to  the  slow  advance  of  wages 
in  proportion  to  that  of  prices.  And  the  rise  of  prices,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  contributed  to  the  excessive  imports.  In  the 
last  forty-six  years  the  import  trade  exceeded  the  export  trade 
for  thirty-one  years  by  more  than  1,000,000,000  yen,  in  round 
numbers,  while  the  export  trade  exceeded  the  import  trade  for 
only  fifteen  years  by  more  than  134,281,000  yen  in  all;  the 
balance,  the  net  excess  of  imports,  exceeded  869,237,000  yen. 
There  is  no  doubt  that,  though  the  cause  of  the  above  situa- 
tion in  foreign  commerce  does  not  permit  of  hasty  treatment, 
the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  had  not  a  little  to  do 
with  it.  The  balance  of  foreign  trade,  favorable  or  unfavor- 
able, seems  unworthy  of  much  notice,  for  such  changes  must 
come  naturally  one  after  the  other;  and  yet  it  is  evident  that  a 
country  such  as  Japan,  which  has  run  into  debt  so  long,  can 
not  keep  abreast  of  foreign  countries  in  her  trade  relations  un- 
less her  exports  exceed  her  imports.  From  this  point  of  view, 
therefore,  we  may  say  that  the  national  economy  naturally 
met  with  anomaly  in  various  quarters  in  consequence  of  the 
past  heavy  excess  of  imports.     Its  fitful  activity  and  its  re- 


CONCLUSION  255 

action  in  the  market,  as  seen  in  the  foregoing  consideration, 
coming  subsequent  to  the  excessive  influx  of  foreign  capital, 
may  be  cited  as  one  of  the  best  instances. 

It  can  not  escape  our  notice  that  not  only  the  armament 
expansion  and  the  wars  were  conducive  to  the  development  of 
commerce  and  industry  interested  in  military  requisites,  but 
these  developments  also  militated  in  favor  of  general  improve- 
ment in  the  economic  world.  The  influences,  however,  upon 
any  branch  of  business  outside  of  the  industry  and  commerce 
directly  related  to  military  affairs  can  not  but  be  considered  as 
immaterial;  for  it  can  not  escape  our  attention  that  the  im- 
provement of  military  commerce  and  industry,  in  some  cases, 
involved  some  particular  obstacles  to  the  growth  of  these  other 
lines  of  business.  But  as  regards  transportation  and  commu- 
nication, it  may  be  admitted  that  their  improvement  was  splen- 
didly attained  owing  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  expenditures 
for  war  and  armament,  on  account  of  the  imperative  utiliza- 
tion of  railways,  ships,  telegraph,  telephone,  etc.,  for  military 
purposes;  that  is,  owing  to  the  government's  protective  policy 
for  the  shipping  trade,  the  munificent  bounties  allowed  to  rail- 
way constructions,  and  the  nationalization  of  private  railway 
lines.  If  these  national  expenses  be  classified  in  a  strict  sense, 
should  the  expenditures  for  such  a  policy  of  communication  be 
transferred  to  some  extent  to  the  armament  expenditures? 
There  may  be  some  who  stand  on  the  affirmative  side  of  the 
question,  judging  from  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  policy.  If 
so,  it  seems  to  us  somewhat  too  bold  to  reach  the  conclusion 
that  the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  were  the  sole 
mainstay  in  the  betterment  of  the  communication  system. 

In  short,  while  dealing  with  the  economic  advancement  in 
this  country,  as  well  as  its  relation  with  war  and  armament 
expenditures,  we  have  observed  that  the  relation  is  one  of  so 
great  complexity  that  we  can  by  no  means  reach  an  accurate 
conclusion;  but  as  the  expenditures  for  war  and  armament  were 
the  heaviest  and  constant  burden  of  the  state,  and  the  raising 
and  disbursement  of  the  expenditures  played  the  most  impor- 
tant part  in  the  state  finance,  likewise  conspicuous  were  their 


256  ECONOMIC   II MX  IS   OF   EXPENDITURES 

effects  presented  in  all  phases.  Of  the  four  epochs  specified 
for  the  sake  of  convenience  in  studying  the  expenditures,  the 
last  three  have  seen  economic  progress  peculiar  to  each.  Con- 
cisely stated,  great  development  arose  in  economic  circles 
regularly  subsequent  to  each  of  the  great  wars;  and  while  it  is 
impossible  for  us,  from  the  nature  of  the  question,  to  fathom 
exactly  the  deep  direct  connection  existing  between  such  great 
economic  developments  and  war  and  armament  expenditures, 
it  is  beyond  doubt  that  they  at  least  had  their  bearings  upon 
war  and  at  the  same  time  upon  armament  so  far  as  the  wars 
can  claim  connection  with  the  armament  planned  previously 
to  the  wars.  Admitting  these  remarks,  it  may  be  logically 
inferred  that  the  post-bellum  improvements  in  economy  have 
been  derived  from  war  and  armament  expenditures  in  view  of 
the  existence  of  a  close  relation  between  wars  or  armament  and 
expenditures  for  war  or  armament. 

We  have  already  considered  that  the  post-bellum  economic 
improvements  were  sure  to  be  followed  by  reactionary  dul- 
ness  in  the  economic  world,  which  may  be,  in  other  words, 
called  the  "result  of  results,"  the  secondary  or  indirect  effect 
brought  about  by  the  expenditures. 

War  puts  the  nation  in  a  strained  condition,  and  the  burden 
of  armament  expenditures  stimulates  the  people  to  the  self- 
consciousness  of  an  effort  on  a  firmer  basis  of  nationalism. 
Such  a  state  of  the  national  spirit  gives  the  best  opportunity 
for  improvement  in  national  economy,  and  how  much  more 
should  it  be  the  case  with  the  high-spiritedness  of  the  nation 
elevated  through  a  victory  in  war?  Our  history  of  these 
forty-six  years  never  fails  to  account  for  these  conditions. 
We  do  not  hesitate,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  congratulate 
ourselves  upon  a  war  and  particularly  upon  a  victory  in  war 
as  efficient  causes  of  improvement  in  national  economy.  The 
healthy  progress  of  economy,  however,  distinguishes  itself  in 
its  slow  but  steady  presence,  while  a  too  sudden  and  abrupt 
activity  sometimes  involves  a  setback  in  the  progress,  which 
reactionary  prostration  makes  itself  much  more  effective  upon 
economic  circles.     Often  we  have  met  with  such  cases  in  the 


CONCLUSION  257 

foregoing  consideration  of  the  relation  between  our  economy 
and  the  expenditures  for  military  affairs,  as  where  there  ap- 
peared activities  in  the  market,  after  the  Satsuma  Rebellion, 
the  Sino-Japanese  War,  and  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  rise 
of  a  speculative  fever  and  spirit,  a  boom  in  the  stock  market, 
the  production  of  luxuries,  the  heavy  increase  of  imports,  the 
prodigality  of  capital  and  its  following  dearth,  the  failure  of 
enterprises,  excessive  precaution  among  enterprising  people, 
the  decrease  of  general  consumption,  and  at  length  extreme 
inactivity  in  the  economic  world.  Is  it  not,  then,  sufficient  to 
state  that  on  the  whole  war  and  armament  expenditures  would 
be  found  rather  productive  of  unfavorable  effects  on  these 
points  if  careful  investigation  were  made  broadly  in  the  field 
of  our  study?  Although,  in  illustrating  the  post-bellum  eco- 
nomic developments,  some  investigators  are  prone  to  harbor 
the  opinion  that  the  past  economic  improvements  are  exclu- 
sively attributable  to  the  wars,  we  have  an  opinion  quite  to  the 
contrary;  the  economic  progress  is,  so  to  speak,  like  the  growth 
of  a  plant.  To  give  light  to  it  or  to  expose  it  to  heat  and  cold 
is  essential  for  its  growth  in  giving  stimulus  to  it,  but  to  break 
off  its  bark  or  branches  promises  no  good  to  its  growth.  Any- 
one who  attempts  to  decide  the  growth  of  a  plant  by  simply 
looking  at  its  thriving  young  shoots  after  a  heavy  damage  has 
been  suffered  can  never  be  said  to  be  well  acquainted  with 
botany. 


18 


APPENDIX 

STATISTICAL  TABLES  OF 

EXPENDITURES  FOR  WAR  AND 

ARMAMENT 


Note.  —  In  the  tables  throughout  this  appendix,  as  in  the 
rest  of  the  volume,  fractions  of  yen  greater  than  one  half  have 
been  counted  as  a  whole  yen  and  the  other  fractions  have 
been  disregarded.  Other  apparent  discrepancies  between  fig- 
ures for  the  same  items  appearing  in  different  tables  are  due 
to  the  use  of  different  sources  in  the  compilation  of  the  tables. 


STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


26l 


(* 


< 


_    X 


R] 


W 


m 

CJ 

n 

in 

C 

u 

r 

X 

0 

U 

M-* 


.  — 

-1 

3 

Q 

pa 

n 

rt 

r 

J3 

u 

0 

I* 

rt 

3 

Oh 

U 

**T^O  lONNiftvO  00  on 
cO^O  Tf^O  "tiON^rON 
N  •*  U0  on  rO  N  i->   ""5  NOO 

lOfOTfrTc^rCfoo)  on  *f 
n  rf  cm  iflo^o^  cono  10  O 

iO  •<£  tJ-  CM  v£5    ^J-N  CM    On  On 

m  i-T  m  co  noo'oo"  nno""^o 


*J-  tJ-  co  «  00   <+N  CO 

i-iO'-,,"-'ON,-*NOtO 

\D_  On  t^-00  NO  nO  •<*•  >o 

S  n  1000  n  D  on  on  O 

0>  no  onno  10  mo  10  <n 

w  ifl  cO  co      no__ 

CO 


00  NO   <0 

O  00   10 

5» O  N00 

-*•    !  '  00  rC  w 


to 


00      TJ-COI-HOOVO      1-      >*• 

SOh   mo>O00m 

g  no  "^  t^oo  no  no  no  r>» 
,*>  w  rooo"  n  oT  i-T  w  ^f 

^■i    CN    IOnO   "">  IO00    lO  •<*• 


no  o 
CO  O 

ON   IO 


O   N   N>0   CT>m   OnnO  NO   On 
Cni  NO   co  10  -ri-  -j-  O  NO   CO  fN 

—  1000  m^m  no  r^oo 

ax"NiOiOo"»fON    On  "£ 

,*>   O   •<+  W)  On  *i-  cN   NtiOO 

O^  rO  co  "-_  CO  i-<_  vO_  vO_  On  On 

11   1-1   11   CO  N  00  00   CO  no"  nO~ 


}*"  ^£f°'r-*--  <u;-oooo 


o 

H 


262 


APPENDIX 


bb 

rt  rt  ui 

e  c  2 

O   O   <N      ■    C-  *~   rO  &  ■*>■  O 

00 

2  —    Im 

v        O 

U     U     T» 

o_  o_  M     ■  On  W  N  W  00_  q 

;        0°. 

o  c~ 

8  O  f^  **     '  oo"  o  *n  <n  io  t 

in 

„    tfl-U 

k~    »*3  -3"  O          \D    "00    N    N    N 

o 

5  £  c 

3  S  g- 

►■"<         "-   ro       00   i-  vO   »C00   ^ 

ON 

f.  k  h  ^  ri  f 

)            Tf 

M 

o"°  « 

O  O   ■*        Tf  Cv       NC 

rO 

O    O    N       •    "*  fS       -00       • 

00 

_ 

o  o  m    •  iond    •  in   ■ 

00 

rt 

8o"nm    ;  «  w    •  oo*   ; 

On 

1 

»**  rO-*0         O             00 

vO 

o_ 

in 

lO 

•    •  o 

0^ 

l»       w           :      : 

xt 

in 

<->   §5 

N 

CS 

C 

o 

o 

-o  o 

00       ■ 

00 

c*a 

CN       • 

N 

«:::::::  -*  : 

■* 

o_ 

a 

.5 

<  6 

•3 

n) 

o 

a 

L 

<n        «i 

X 

W 

ship 
dry 
:nse; 

g    .    .  no    •    •  \o_   ■    •    • 

00 

m 

War: 

sun 
expe 

9- 

o  o          ■*         no 
o  o    •    •■«*■•    •  c    • 

o 
m 

<ulc 

O   O      •      ■  lO    ■      •   ro     • 

00 

2  <« 

s  o" «-"  ;  ;  •""  !  !  •*  ! 

cT 

o> 

nO_ 

9W 

O   *NfO  COOC 

lO 

>, 

.      .      •      ■   moo    to  w   ■*  0 

N          M 

u 

.    .         .  tj-^o  c<  t^oo  a 

N        On 

c 

8     '              *  r^oo"  in  tri  in  ■*■ 

"         IO 

<0       •                     '»O0O00    tOM    « 
Ps                             t-,  i«  NO_  0_  00_  t! 

(N 

'-3 

;    ^ 

O 

_T   M    M    M    pf  f 

3        w 

u 

s 

>» 

(d 

cj 

CO 

0) 

-a 

JZ 

O 

17 
b 

(I 

c 
F 
I 

— 

I 

t 

c 

X 
(X, 

:7 

C 

S 

b 

>NC 

-  1 

E- 

STATISTICAL   TAHLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


263 


U  O 
go  O 
£    C 

2.3 


e^ 


hz 


0.3 

HH     O 


OiO^oO  i/>  ro  0*^0  »0  W   fO  " 

00  (n  in  00  m  a  *t  t^  rf  o  tJ-i 


i-->C  O  r^O  noo  O-^CO 


ir-O  0>  ■-  O  ^COCOOCO  w   O   O   iOOif*)0^w)0 


IN  CO*  O* 


O  t-  <n  "-  >0  OO  mo  ro  r-  0>  »*>  • 


C>  r-  n  fO  i/i 


10  ro  ► 


0r-t-ooi/)0»-<o  inr^'tOv'^t  00 

i/>  r^O  r-  t-<  10  m  i-«  •  •-  o  t-  m  f}  ■  O 

uirorofji/ir-O^tO  ■^t^O>*y5  -DO 

rfo  "*  O        t*       'j  '  h  »ooifl  !  PC 


0>  CX  ^  ro        10 


mtno 

R ^  o_  O} 

.v    '  '.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.  t>  ^  fo 


jjOi-tvO     •      •OrONiOCOr^MfOro     ■  O  O 


TfO  moo  >-  •-•  • 
•CO  O  lON'tO' 
■fOO         O   **        f 


>  rJ-O  m  ^  O   PO  Tj-a 


OiO   r-t^O   rorOO  rj"  <: 


«00  'tN  fO^t 


264 


APPENDIX 


O 


: 

-r 

- 

R 

- 

a 

w 

CO 

to 

a 

Pi 

■5. 

< 

J 

P. 

- 

= 

- 
< 

s 

J. 

^ 

- 

- 

^. 

- 

-.. 

H     Q 


g  - 

g  3 

-  5 

ft.  * 


< 
- 


~5  o>o 

0 

•*  ^  0 

a>  i«30  m  ^ 

000     0 

~~.  " 

(N 

c 

0 

0*Or~Mro<Nmi/>r~'*3inoO>*t       O 

Ntlf  O           M 

g  i^^aon  iflnoa-  n-  -*roo      «- 

O  i^O  to       w 

2 
0 

~  C    ?  -^-X    Tf  N  ^  f)sO  O   ^f  —   to         f 

I-  rr  tN  IN       0 

1^ 

^.   r   "*  —  m  m  ui      -Ntfi-o'fOH 

■3--0  0       1 

•a 

"0                      fOO                      «   01          f*5 

>-    N    O  CH         O 

"i 

0"                                 O 

r*> 

t 

1     0) 

f>0O  M                   M  t             —                   O 

<N    OO    <* 

„ 

"3  2 
0  0 

5  = 

•-»}Xm---<N©---o-*        O 

W)  m  1^0  30 

"*"           !N                                              _                  tJ- 

10  rtsO   O 

0 

00 

—  ,/■ 

•OOO 

O  0>  0>  rf       v 

0 

=  9 

_ Of 

o«»»      ^ 

0 

.n  e 

B rooO 

M  <fri(>      O 

1-  a. 

*      '                        ■                                            ""m 

CH  rf  d  ■*       t 

«       O       -O 

00 

U  ~ 

V 

3  c 

O^fOifl       O 

00 

N    tt^O         00 

0 

C      ' 

—    O    f  IO 

—  0 

-      

trtrolAO 

4 

HlflHTf 

N 

■OOO 

« 

O-o 

M 

■a 

^          0 
_>0    •    ■  O 

O 

rt 

00 

? 

■    x       .  d 

t^ 

1> 

"**    f                   H 

O 

« 

W 

N 

01 

M>O0O^               O   LO  ~          fO 

00 

c 

O. 

BlOCOd^      ■      ■   N    hM      •   *t     ■      ■      • 

O 

"1 

s_»       «Oi..e»MO.t»... 

0 

a 

BO 

eU.S 

00 

00 

CO     •      ■      •      • 

ro 

'£  3 

J.    .    .    .           ...... 

a  3 

> 0  .  .  :  : 

0" 
in 

e.2 

M 

04 

1-1  ? 

&t 

t                        IN                  PI           (N 

ooo         00 

n 

c 

...«)••••*••  0    "O    • 

00    O    Tf      •            Tl 

N 

•5 

-j      .      .      ->0      •      ■      '00      •      •  M      •  M      • 

«  vO   «      •         (* 

w 

.'!!!«!!!«!!"'!«! 

d  0  «o  ;     t 

00 

ri 

»*.                                                             14         ro 

0  00           00 

r^ 

3 

» 

M                            T) 

0 

O 

-' 

c 

t                    -      0 

«    -t  ~5               t- 

O 

•    •    •    •  0 10   ■  00    • 

OOI-     ■         1 

R      •      ■      •      •  00 ro     •  l/>     ■ 

OO  00      ■         n 

n 

'3 

.*>     .     .     .     .0 "i    .  "i    . 

r*  ei    .       r- 

•0 

-4                     -                          i-       ■* 

O 

Tf 

y 

M                                                            M 

* 

OS 

- 

" 

0  a.                 a      <n 

00   O    CN 

O 

bfl 

•     •     •     •  ro  CN     •     •     •     -00     •  10    • 

OiOO   O      • 

00 

c 

.      .    r*}  ifl     .      .      .      .    rt     •    ro     • 

fltin     ■ 

10 

'£ 

5  :  :  !  :-•*-*:         :  0  :  «  : 

1^  CN    CN       | 

in 

.3 

BO 

*^                                (NO                                «           <N 

n  m  m 

a 

fc 

d                              »t 

10 

fo 

f> 

5  n 

E  i 

3S 

01 

5  E 

>.  D 

i 

-- 
O 

0.  * 

WO 
c 

a 

E 

'u 

c 

3 

c 

c  c 

E  E.H     O 

4J     (J 

3   t. 
OO 

!3.2 

ft, 

3  3 

"o 

u 

c 

2 

PQ 

O 

u 

V 

5  £ 

ME 

1 

- 

c  c  c  «  «  3*0 15 

E  fc  £  aa^i;'; 

- 
I 

3 

--  : 
51 

P   °   a) 
V-    Lh    3 

&<&•  0 

O   C    " 

E^aa 

7 

0 

<s  S  o.S  t  rt-a  c  v  c  0  0  0  u  k1- 

H 

3 .-  3  rt  i  ^ 

Q 

tc 

K 

u. 

< 

'X 

w 

fc 

G 

iXa. 

d, 

HW 

ta 

0 

M 

U 

O 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


265 


> 

- 

« 

<f 

>«. 

w 

'  — 

PC 

"« 

fH 

s 

rx 

^ 

O 

X 

^ 

H 

^ 

V. 

a 

0 

x 

a 

w 

a. 

H 

X 

^ 

w 

■W 

z 

8 

w 

^ 

- 

<! 

s 

" 

PS 

■^ 

< 

c 

r^ 

n 

00  &  w 

0 

*t 

90 

r* 

00  1-    • 

00 

n  •    •    •    •  0    • 

O      ■                         ■   •-      ■ 

TJ" 

Z  0 

»M  «      ■ 

0    •    ■    •    ■  00    • 

O 

00 

00 

O*  0"  in    : 

— 

0"  .  .  .  .  w  .      :      ; 

00    .                  .  r^    . 

"} 

1O 

00 

(*«. 

& 

r-  m  «© 

1-                            rO 

rO 

00 

^f 

l« 

•* 

: 

O* 

Ci 

t^  Tf  ro 

0 

t                               IN 

O 

., 

00 

N  OO     • 

c 

r»   ■    ■    •    -<o    • 

c 

■* 

s^ 

1-  ro  in    ■ 

f 

IN       •       ■       •       ■  00       ■ 

o_ 

IO 

00 

Coo 

r«5oo"  m  ; 

"  i  !  '.  '.  00  !     ;      : 

0'  :      ;      ;  ;  ; 

0* 

<N 

00 

K>.  - 

t  i<5  Oi 

0 

■i- 

0 

O 

0" 

0 

s 

LO 

* 

rn  0 

O                     0 

0 

0 

r^ 

MOO     •     ■ 

10    •     •    •     -  0     • 

0 

r*3 

e? 

-O  10    ■     ■ 

-0 

nj    ■    •    ■    •  «    ■ 

10 

N 

00 

00 

10  *t    . 

0 

ro           .               N 

m 

a 

0. 

00 

•*   N 

*r«3 

O 

<M 

•* 

r^ 

00 

0* 

0 

O 

H 

M 

H 

r~ 

N    Tf 

f» 

OO                     >A 

00                         0 

0 

N 

00   M      -      ■ 

OI>     •      ■        00      ■ 

Tf      •                               ■        ■    Ol 

3 

5«- 

t-  o_  •    ■ 

c 

0  n    ■    •    ■  r*   • 

O      •                               .       •    M 

1/ 

in 

00 

r~ 

0"  in   ;   ;   ;  <j  '      ;      ; 

■o  ;      ;      ;  ; 

<s 

0" 

00 

^i00 

rJ-Tf 

t^ 

rt  ro                    t^ 

t^ 

'1 

O 

00" 

00 
00 

M                     n 

1  - 

o> 

\r>  in 

O 

OO                        O    N 

00 

C 

>n 

0 

00   P- 

c 

0  0    •    -     ■  *n  0 

* 

3 

vO 

8* 
woo 

tl  fO    ■     ■ 

°.  °.    ■    '    '  N.  "t 

00 

in 

00 

00 

00 10  ;  \ 

d  0    '.'.'."  ~>       '. 

6\  '.       '.       '.'.'. 

4      O 

00 

tN  ° 

"*•*  .  . 

0 

•&0                       N   O 

ro 

O 

0 

00" 

00 

CS                                                           M 

-r 

00" 

O 

O   "5 

r* 

a  ** 

—                                   u- 

O 

~5 

^h     ■      • 

O 

r^    •                   ■     ■  m 

0 

§5 

IO  ■**"     •      ■ 

w 

iO     .          •           ■     ■  l» 

-r 

o_ 

00 

0"  00"  ;  ; 

" 

'.'.'.'.'.  "O* 

e»    !         '.         '.    '.  t 

0 

00 

^? 

irj  r^ 

0 

>h  ro 

t* 

fn 

Oj 

00" 

00 

00" 

Ol 

in  r- 

_, 

ro  0       r^ 

0 

D 

rv;  r^    .     . 

0  t-      0 

-o 

"■ 

O 

Ol 

*5 

Tfin    •     • 

0 

rooo_        -+■ 

00 

t*. 

■>fo  :  : 

O"   LO         \0" 

0"  ;      ;         : 

"t 

00 

10  0 

in  ro       (N 

Oi 

r~ 

Oi 

0 

O 

O 

r- 

00 

d 

ui 

0\  r- 

M 

0 

IN 

O 

000     ■     • 

c 

*t  •      0 

" 

Oi 

00 

awi   ■    ■ 

I' 

.     ■  in    •        o_ 

-O 

t^ 

"**  '. 

oc 

;  w    !       0" 

0" 

00 

*? 

•G-tr- 

c 

0 

1-1    CN 

oc 

00 

X 

0 

«o 

0 

t^ 

- 

• 

0 

r-  l~ 

rf 

<t 

rouj    .    . 

0 

fO 

t~ 

8=5 

MM        ■        • 

r- 

e> 

1^ 

C  m 

00"  ri   ;    ; 

oc 

r^ 

00 

u  "> 

r*5  1-1 

c 

00 

0 

O 

"c3 

a 

n 

:  0    :  js 

2 

M 

3 

Cd 

>< 

a 
0 
0 

•-  c 

c  0 
.2K 

> 

In 

rmes. . 
:tion 
ory. 
gunpo 

(A 

s 

i>  0 

0 

'3 

c 

'2 

of  batte 
repairs . 
of  arms 
f  epidem 
djustme 

0^ 

O  n  1- 

O 

"I 
1 

terprises 
if  genda 
construe 
len  Fact 
ction  of 

5 

9 

rdinary: 
Army  Depar 
Expenditures 

v  c 
-C  2 

E  3  4 
uX>  c 

-0  St 

00 

cd 
c 
0  0 

2! 
Is 

1 

£ 

U 

% 

1 

ctraordinary: 
Construction 
Building  and 
Manufacture 
Prevention  0: 
Postbellum  a 

Temporary  c 

Special  expei 

Colonial  T 

Special    expe 

Industrial  en 
Dispatching  1 
Additional 

Senju  Woo 
New  constru 

der  factory 
Business  capi 

"5 

0 

•a 

c 

03 
O 

O 

W 

^1 


~  s    2 

Km       (4 
-1  »        *- 


; 

c 

> 

0 

rt 

Z 

c 

— 
C 

=1 

r. 

cJ 

a 

>.  cd 

E 

T) 

< 

C 

a 

CO 

B 

XI 

S 

0 

■a 

cd 

bi 

z 

5 

0  c 
a" 


■°  N 
,rt  Ol 
(-1  00 


> 
E 

E 

0 
3 

< 

r> 

C 

-a 

V 

M 

E 

3 

a 

1/ 

IT. 

as 
00 

a 
a 

r. 

M 

0 

> 

3 

a 

a 

y 
3 

'J 

0 

a 

C 

, , 

0 

q 

fl 

0 

PL. 

c 

0 

D 

O* 

* 

V 

C 

• 

M 

266 


APPENDIX 


a 

H 

^ 

X 

U3 

oi 

»>. 

" 

a 

lb 

~ 

-= 

i 

OS 

a 

- 

5 

&3 

w 
r_ 

8 

a 

W 

>% 

w 

s 


m 

Too 

c 

-* 

C  K 

n 

H 

— i 

-J 

moo     x      o 

m  -«t      t~      <n 

r<50 

C4 

M 

N         O-         C   ■<*  N  I~  ~ 

c 

-^^mx        n—       oo        ^OO       oo       T  roo 

n        Or-        N  O  m  r^  C 

D 

O  iri  n-  M     .  «  o        o        t~  ^  O        m       roo  m 

o 

<o 

5 

=  ~      r-^o"       o'  f*)  «  <5  oo 

X 

^ONr^    1  uiifl       t-^       iO(N-t       r^       C4O0 

«i 

v  r-       C   T       ~0  ~5X  1/5  m 

K 

n  qo           ^  r-      tj-      *-vO»-.       O,      Or^o 

c 

•-    X        "5'*;             r*  O-  —  X 

i  - 

C    1_-T               f;  —                             M                                   .I   « 

q 

« 

H 

rC        —"  *T              m*  «*        mT 

6- 

m  t  -o           ~*                         - 

t^ 

o" 

r-       C\ 

r^ 

o. 

ro       —  c       c  ri^      m 

? 

t^  o  **t                      fi             oo     «o 

DC 

o 

n       r~  ^      m  moo    ■  -3- 

C 

Oi  ro  t»    .     •     •     -        -          ■•-       o          ... 

0 

q 

»      c  -_      mo  -    •  ^ 
£  -r      x*  m      r-  t^  "o    '  rf 

C 

oo  oo  q    ■    •    •     ■       ~<         •    ■  n       -         ... 

m 

cT 

Ol 

6 

o  Tf  c*  *    '.    '.                         i"     ^       '.    '.    ! 

i^ 

00 

•^  t-     oo  oo          n  n      o 

i^ 

00    «     M                                                                                            t^ 

z 

■* 

H 

— 

■0  t  T 

m 

m 

~- 

ci 

~ 

M 

r^ 

C        -D  -O        OoOI»       >» 

ON—                             00                                                  m 

c 

O 

U5         O    —         WOf     •   - 

? 

irt  o  w    ■    •    •    ■       »- o 

1^- 

M  —       ~.  x       bj  ro  m     ■  -1- 

o 

-*5mo-'--       "^        ...        .        ..r~ 

c 

T 

» 

C  ■":      c~i      r~oc>|rc 

i  - 

f^o  m    !    '.    !                    !    !    !        !        !    !  d 

1/5 

00 

v    oo        moo             rooo        r- 

X    -O  **5                                                                                                 00 

m 

H 

^_ 

-r  m  O 

m_ 

m 

-*5 

n 

- 

" 

r*5         Ml/5         C    f*3  —          "1 

o 

J-rr-                                                 O 

o 

N 

O        o  ■*       moo  t    •  OC 

c 

»  <n  *T x        ■        ... 

X 

m 

^  m       C>C        t»  NIO     \  C 

c 

»q«    ■                    •        •    •  r;       ■        .    .    . 

c 

t^ 

Oi 

•<t 

w  oo  *o        !    !    !        !        !    '  o        !        '    '.    '. 

•' 

i^ 

00 

K.  oo       -  oc           ■*:  c      c 

00 

o  c  o 

o 

T 

"I  —  c 

-t 

o 

M 

r» 

H 

■* 

~ 

M 

M 

00       i-  T       O  O  >"-       m 

,. 

moo  m                                         -              i* 

Q 

r~ 

O      x  x       m  roo    •  t~ 

/■- 

xm-x M         ••<*» 

0 

r^ 

^  ^      rr-^-      m  m  n    -c 

r- 

-    "•.  t-  - T           •      •   M 

c 

X 

Ov 

C  ~:      O'*:      t^o  —    *  T 

\r 

fodior*   1    1    1         ^         ...       ^        .    . 

m 

O 

00 

X 

o  ~:  m                                                    m 

Oi 

OC 

"  ~;  "' 

q 

q 

— " 

N 

N 

~- 

m 

H 

™ 

w 

*s        -o  r-            r-  r- 

c 

n»l*                                    ON                           O  O 

H 

t^ 

O       ~  m        ■  r*>  O.    •    • 

3 

OOfO .-.  p>    •         •         .ot^ 

- 

ro 

o 

-  °.     ^  t     ■  pofo  •  ■ 

r 

Dico t^ ««  •      ■      "q°; 

i* 

•* 

00 

5  n      d  <"c       !  oo  n 

X 

ox  d    '    '    '    '         |       m-*5]         |         idm 

d 

oc 

s.  n      oc  o          i«a  - 

w 

mx  o>                                m  t*                      x 

t^ 

1-3  !«5  O. 

q 

•* 

— * 

cs 

N 

Tf 

"" 

_ 

1-1 

m  -n            -.  o 

-*                                                                                                  N          N 

DC 

m 

o      "i?        ■  in  c 

I  - 

X TfU" 

m 

■*     e>  i-       ■  o  o   •    ■ 
<*  —      no        .  c*  —    .    . 

I- 

-r m  •  *> 

q 

00 

O    '.'.'.'.'.    ',          '.         '.'.'.          '.        ri    '.  6 

■* 

00 

^   tJ-        1^  c               T*)r*l 

S 

rr-,                                                                                          O 

f 

_. '            . 

"i 

X 

e 

»0 

-       o-  o.          C  T 

o 

o>                                       n                    n 

U" 

•* 

t       CO          ■   —  s. 

m nO-            •            -r<5 

w 

r~ 

f^ 

_  O        ■*  ■"          •  ~".  c 

c 

m —      ■           •           •  ro 

c 

o 

OC 

m       .    .    .    :    .       .       .  -    .       .       .6 

r* 

« 

00 

^_  c       r~  c           -r  r    ' 

S- 

O                                                                   ~3                                  T 

t> 

m 

"  fj       m  r<j            

I 

m 

U" 

t~ 

t          —    "•:                'S.    w. 

„ 

to 

r* 

o 

|^          00    —                'f^H       '       ' 

X 

X 

o 

o 

£  *0        ^t  "*          ■  —  O     •     • 

" 

.  in 

u 

q 

00 

»>  rC    t*  «      ;  ~~,  c   : 

* 

'.    '.         '.         1  oo" 

o" 

00 

•-,  r-       -^  O             -TOO 

" 

M 

d 

0 

q 



on  office 
Eiokkaido 

r    travels 

■*~-   ■  i 

3 

- 
a 

cS 

>■ 

e 
c 

.—   r- 

rmes. .  .  . 
:tion      o 

ory 

gunpow 

05 

E 

c 

-. 
E 

i 
1 

- 

- 

'E 

: 

^f  hatte 
repairs. 
3f  arms' 
epidem 
Ijustmei 

nstructi 
ses  of  1 
oops. . , 
rises    fo 

erprises 
f  genda 
;onstruc 
en  Fact 
tion  of 

0 

w 

inary  i 

rniy  Depart 

xpenditures 

fairab         .     . 

u  c 
'E  o 

4)  o17 

B 

(fl 

B 
c  - 

W 

is 

1 
1 

E 
L 

4 
1 
1 

e 

f- 

raordinary: 
onstruction  i 
uilding  and  i 
lanufacture  i 
revention  of 
ostbellum  ad 

eniporary  co 
pecial   expen 
Colonial  Tr 
pecial     expei 

idustrial  ent 
•  ispatching  o 
dditional      < 

Senju  Wool 
'ew  construe 

der  factory 
usiness  capit 

3 

o 

1 

•c<W     OU     QClCK 

-ooQS50L,ft.OHw    tn    ~u<    v.    «<- 

0 

w 

>,  o     ^ 

^.    W         O 

>_E     ^ 


?8 

o 

■C! 

nnfj 

?;  o 

0 

"SS" 

4) 

i 

rt  o 

I 

Hi 

3 

a 

<E 

• 

rE 

■r 

-T: 

J3T3 

C 

2  rt 

"* 

a  E 


«  E     " 


f  3     -2 


5"       Cm 


3T3 


^  ° 
o  g 
>>E 

<  o 

t-.  -u 

o  <J 
m"3 


rt"5 

-S 

N 

oo  .S 


m8 

c 
•ria 

>  « 

3     - 


J5  u  o" 

c •£  ex 

rt  o  <3&> 

%*  E~ 


x  a"C  ex 


2"^  e  Z  c 


o 


B  '? 


o 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


267 


a 

Id 
Q 

55 

p 

Id 
» 

H 

s 

y. 

Id 

0- 

W 
>< 

OS 

< 

5 
S 
Q 


MOM 

0  c  0 

m  0  e 

1    ID 

00         IDvO   'toe  O   O  CO 

P) 

t^ 

O  >-  *- 

M    O    >^ 

NOO   -t  *t       O      ■ -O  O  f*5  ^  OM~-  ^ 

c 

Tf   OOC 

o*  <n  ^  "-"      m   • «  ^  ") w.  N. '":  H. 

c 

*t 

"c3 

S   wi^iA 

NO   O 

O    «    f-^vO         O      '   >^0C*  <N    ^O  CO   •"• 

4 

00 

^OQC 

O     *tr^m            P*       '     M     M     M     Qlt^fOH 

00 

0 

H 

^i  «<>  o_ 

ID  «    *t 

r*r^sO"1"        ^        r^O'-'-^'-'OOiO 

c 

O 

,0  M  « 

-f  id 

N      Oh                                f 

1^ 

»d 

O  «  id 

oo>o 

Tf  Tj-sO    O           O        O    M         >0   »0        vO 

r~ 

t. 

01   -rf  r~ 

CO  IDO 

Or-O^-       O      -CO  t    ■   rco      -lO 

(O 

H[*)« 

MNh 

Onooo        Tf-rto_-0,(*'-r^ 

00 

5  O  f^xd 

O  IDO 

^lOrO'O        ►-*      !  ^Oi     |Of^     .  t- 

■* 

vO 

00 

K      CO  <*N 

OOO 
IO  CO 

0»           TfM                                              M                  M 

M 

<q 

N 

■* 

M 

0 

0. 

Ti-  01  ID 

r*)M  f*5 

00  ti  0>  O        *n       rft*       *r>\0       m 

re 

H 

CO  "-■  O 

CO  CO    1—    <*0         Tf-iOOO      ■I'OOO      -O 

O 

tt 

»D  --3-  co 

rO  <>  - 

Niflai"     *t  '  ■*?  ^  '  °.  "?  "  *T 

\r. 

^ 

^  t^  (N*  00 

■-T  IN   0 

tCo  ^to"     00"    '00  Oi   I  »-<  w   '.  »o 

•i 

00 

v      QC    O  00 

O0  sO   t^ 

0>  fO>C  »o      O*      "^O       on       r-* 

O 

"*    r<j  ^t  P) 

ID  00 

Pl    -  OC    <N                                              N                  -* 

W 

■* 

- 

O 

O    ID  M 

NfON 

>0  r^  O  *-*       O       t>  +*       Tto       m 

*t 

CO 

Tt    —     O 

row  rt 

lO-O  0\  t—       M    •  fO«0     •  o>  0     •  0* 

m 

«"ftl 

O    <*)  M 

00  O  fCO         O      •  CO  C\     ■  "tO      •  t-- 

<* 

00 

s:    -    -    - 

M    «     ID 

f»:ON  10      t^       ^t^D    '.  r-  O    .  t- 

m 

0" 

00 

v"   «  00  >D 

•*"  q.  ~5  d 

00   ID  <N 

-<too  r*  r^.      »o      'to       •-•  n      co 

0 

-tfO 

cs        ro  m                                >-< 

0 

M 

■* 

H 

a. 

0 

r^  w  r~ 

rOsO  ID 

i/JOC  O  CO         Ov        "-"   O   ro%ONO         »0 

■* 

-0 

t-  «   O 

i^-  t-4  so  O        10    ■  n  r-O  Or-    •  rj- 

-t 

S  °.  °.  T 

sO  ^t  id 

u^i^'-'O        "^    -sOr--C£OjC>    -^t 

00 

so  fo4 

N*  ro  C*  !"■        Oi     iOO^Ovt-     '.  O 

so 

00 

00 

>iO  ^fo 

t-  t-  Tf 

00   1-r^Tj-         M          P0t*         >-i(-(          10 

r* 

00 

UIPON 

■*■* 

» 

•* 

00 

00 

M   O   ^f 

TfOO 

N    N   a'O        CO          O  Ot^CO  fO         rj- 

N 

00 

H00O 

m  hor*       f*)    -O  OiiflfOr*    -O 

0 

j-    rt  l^  <N 

N    ID  CI 

»t  Otrfro        00      ■OCO^O^NO^     •"} 

r^ 

0 

00 

*s  cl  1000 

t^OO    Tt 

■rfoo"'-^       r*    [>Or-'-<o>t>-    !0» 

s 

00" 

00 

, —     /,     CN     - 

[,  ^t» 

CO     t-O     N              HI              f^lflN     N    H              H4 

0 

O  co 

*tO\ 

W                   Tf     HI 

« 

to 

00 

00 

-H 

MOf) 

TfOC  CO    Tf         O            ^"00    N    O    HI 

Ov 

a 

"TO   CO 

r-o-^tfN        N     ■  ION00-O  fO    •     • 

0 

c   H  coo 

ID00   ID 

OiOOt-        hi      •  00  W  rf-  h  00      •      ■ 

Ifl 

10 

00 

*»  Mflt^ 

»ioV 

l^t^"^^f         f^      1   hO   N    N00       \      \ 

4 

■* 

CO 

Pi   O     M     Tf 

c-  Tf  id 

roco  on        10       r^i  in  a  rr>  ^ 

m 

CO 

O     "* 

■*a 

(NO-                                              "-• 

■* 

^ 

W 

CO 

00" 

00 

r*-  ■«*• 

ro^N 

m  O  ^00       r-       O      00  io^-h 

a 

a 

r-  0     • 

cooo  Tt 

O  r-  0  «        Tf    •  m    ■  poo  O  O     ■ 

a 

g    0>0_     • 

t  "  °- 

O\f*5io  h       \n    -o    *oh.no    • 

0 

Ot 

t- 

<^    ^fO     " 

00  r~  n 

n"  di  -  t-^    o»  ;  0*  iNo'foio  ; 

0 

0 

00 

>ilOTt       ' 

id  «  « 

r-00    "*r0         Tf         O         N    «N   d   m 

0 

0 

00  o* 

■**: 

m  ,-.  m  h.                              hi 

1- 

M 

CO 

1  - 

r^ 

Tf  Oi 

^■NUl 

t-       0  r*       «             hi  rooo  hi  tj- 

-r 

■3- 

Tt  ID  00 

in      000        n     ■     ■  woo  'tOiO     • 

0 

O 

00 

j*    O  ^      * 

UJO  ifl 

0    ■  h.  m      0    •    ■  0  mb  fO  h  q    • 

o_ 

CD 

O"      '    >-*    O          M       !      loo'nit-OOPO      ) 

9 

61 

00 

kH    O    <N 

N  sO  -O 

Tj-'rJ-ro        O              ONOHtoo 

O 

O 

O  M 

N           tj-  h.                                                             -sj- 

-r 

Tj* 

H" 

1" 

■O 

O 

rtO» 

CO  *-< 

PO          OTf         M                 00    h-OCO   ifl 

O 

O 

.   H  (^        «o      •  O   ^         ID     •      -OOmnwo 

^t 

tt 

s  o^o 

•  r;0C 

O     "(^JO       O     •     ■  ^r-hiOn 

? 

C» 

'    N00 

IO      '    Tf-sO           O      '       '    O00    OCO    O 

ITi 

ID 

CO 

HN    t-00 

CO  « 

O'O**        <*>              ^fH  q\h   rj- 

r<: 

CO 

rf  t^         r*^         -rt  ~                             ** 

0 

O^ 

" 

" 

0 

O 

c  ■  0  ■ 

3 

U 

C 

B  :|  : 

rt 

< 

u 

id 

O 

01 

a 

c 

•—     ■  u     . 

0 
0 

•> 

u 

Cfl 

"o 

y 

(0 
b 

pa 

0 

M 

a 

c 
<u 
E 

Q 

c 
_o 

u 

a 

•0 

■g  - 

c 
0 

■S3  " 

f 

c 

1 

T 

Toyama     Gakko     (Mil 
Gymnastics  School). 
Military  Preparatory  S 
Medical  Department. 

Hr>sr>ital        

1 
- 

CI 

/ 

3 

n 
>. 

5 

< 

■3 
0 
H 

•a 

E  c 

a 

I 

a 
T 
C 

j  a 
>C 

a 

— . 

s 

a  ■/ 
pq-5 

ji 

! 

.  3  - 
SI 

t 
•< 

0 

■>  ( 

I 
\ 

0  (. 

< 

j 

IS 

•j 

< 

t- 

: 

< 

! 

L 
c 

- 

c 
c7 

_ 

< 

X 

^0 

■I 

0 
0 

0 

~a 
3 

0 

< 

3  C 

• 

CO 

■0 

M 

<u 

= 

A 

0 

m 

X 

E 

a 

". 

2 

-3 

-1 

a 

r 

u 

0 

^  m 


E8 

*J  'J 


s  3 

r  to 

00  ^ 
*  "- 

°« 

E5 


-5  5 
30 

o  c^ 

£!  <u  *" 
OJ   5   ^ 

*"*  "^  "o 

c^  c 

•a  S  5 
_  oj  > 


.2  fc  " 


(*«.£ 


268 


APPENDIX 


Pi 
< 

- 


a 

V, 

w 

- 

- 


r- 

w 

Q 


- 
- 

- 


rOC  J>=0    ^O    M    5-OO00N    WM^NM    &lflC 

t f*  m  i/"j  C*  X  X  O  "ir*^N  —  r-'Ot-oc  i/i-O 

-j    -^  i o   —   0   (N   i/l  -C  r-  ^  X  O   —   I-  *T  CO  ^f 


0<tH  WJ'T/.   - 


t*  'O  -o     ■ 

O  i^X      ■ 

^  OsO  00 


•    IOX    -  00    N    t-  IO   -    f" 


fOO-O   C»"^ 


CO  O  'tO  i^  —  O  -tO  r-COt^t 
•  fN  O  —  i^oo  —  sO  Ot^'fl-Tt-r^r-'t 
•■ri-t^r-—0'1p'00  rj-  u^X  O  <"0 
'  x~  m  r-  G>  »^  u^  r^O        rf  ^  n        r* 

-t  "O  **}  —  >^.  -~,  ro  *o      «       o 


on")         oawt-aoO'Oo&ooo^ 

<"0X  -«  •      'hfOO   ^-O   ifliflMfl'td   "tfO 

^    fOI^M  -       ■    f*)»0  3C    O    !N    't-    "1  fOlOlOCOC 

V    fOO>»  Ot"iNNOhro         N  O 

^   O   ")m  «    POX   t^  **?  i-  *0  N 


»OaO  00   »0  0 


O  "^  O  "^  »o       ox 


O  *t  if  OO  i-"0  O  t"-  o  o  o 
moo  iO'*0  n  r*  to 


P-*    f<)  (>  N  Ct^  PO 


iflN  ifl        »/)  0*        O-^^tCOMOO'^l-'-'O1 


I-  t-  O    N    0*0 

■  *1"  **  O  r-  ws  rf 

-co  n-G0«ac 
4o  c  "^  O*  ifl 
■x  O  O  <N  tJ-  PO 
■<t  l-  O   *t  PO 


°.  °.  1 c 

h'oo'oo 


O*  <N    Ol 


TfOO    *t  <N    -t     ■ 


h  |n  r^rO  n 


CO       O  t--  0\  "t  fO 


•>0  W     't^O  &OC 


0>  I'*  O  X  rf 


•?#.ft5  =  «cp? 


J2  ta 
rt  4J  J 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


269 


<     <^ 


H 

hi 


H 


00 

00 

00 

0 

■> 

CO 

H 

10 

CO 

m 

E<?     ' 

c 

O 1-             .      •      -vO 

-t 

00 

v"    •*      i 

t} 

r»  ;          ; «     '.'.'.  & 

6 

4 

>«  CO 

co 

-                                ■*                         CO 

0 

CO 

0 

vO 

t                     N 

c 

0 

0 

cs                                CO 

v> 

xn 

0    •    • 

0 

d •«*         .... 

0 

-O 

■* 

e  n  •    • 

""? 

1/-, 

00 

00 

^  co   ! 

CO 

n  ;           ;  ■*     ;  ;  ;  ; 

r~ 

0 

►*  0. 

0 

co                             co 

c 

0 

o_ 

o_ 

CO 

co 

CO 

ro 

•6 

>* 

■3- 

r~                 co                          »o 

w 

a 

co    •     • 

CO 

—     ...<>..         .    -  U)   ■ 

O 

a 

co 

j.O     •     ■ 

vO 

CO   .    .    .  0    ■    •         .    - 10   ■ 

Ol 

10 

00 
00 

k^  0"    '.     '. 

O 

0    .    .    .  t»  .    .        .    .  «    . 

a 

0 

Sh  00 

00 

r-                      CO                                  t~ 

t^ 

•0 

o_ 

q 

t-                      N 

o_ 

ro 

CO 

n 

rO 

0 

CM 

N 

0                      « 

„ 

rr 

O,     •      • 

Ov 

.......        .    .  ^f   . 

C 

10 

K  t     • 

rt 

-0 

00 

.*>  O      ' 

O 

a 

>~-o 

C 

"      ■      "      '   CO                           '      '   M      " 

<* 

0 

ro 

no 

CO 

00 

00 

co                     00 

_, 

Ov 

in    .    . 

10 

.      .      .      .  ro     ■      •           •     •  N     • 

c 

k  *:  ■ 

i- 

q 

r^ 

00 

*>  i-  ■ 

Tt 

'.     '.'."'.     '.           '.'.•*■'. 

1^ 

0" 

►mH   •   ■ 

©.                                  1*3 

^r 

O 

rq 

CO 

o_ 

CO 

cs 

N 

-O                                  t~- 

0 

N 

.    .    .    .  co    ■    •         ■    •  <->    • 

r* 

0 

s  1  ; 

0 

00 

00 
00 

*.**  ">  '.   ! 

"O     .     .          .     .  *t    . 

0 

*rt 

>iO 

>C 

0                    ■* 

m 

to 

— 

CO 

Ov 

© 

1/}                          r- 

.         .         .         .     ,j-       .         .                    .          •      TJ-        . 

0 

10 

a 

Roo     ■     • 

00 

....©•■        •    •  ©   ■ 

X 

t^ 

00 

«."  o>  :  ; 

O 

'..->..        .    .  -0    . 

00 

00 

i-H  1^ 

t~ 

Tf                                           M 

CO 

q 
ro 

q 

CO 

M 

- 

It 

•    ■    •    ■  © 

s 

00 

s  c.    ' 

C 

•••■•* 

■* 

00 

KV     "*        '■          '. 

- 

:  .  .  ,vo 

0 

0' 

^i     O 

O 

00 

00 

00 

2  .  . 

g 

2 

t*> 

8 10  . 

f- 

" 

£0  •  • 
to 

0 

0 

CO 

_, 

C 

^ 

V 

c 

.O 

a 

3 

•g 

»*- 

c 

s 

O 

c 

U 

0 

0 

c 
0 

M 

0 

- 

0 

c 

>>  ; 

a 

C 

c 

i 

CI 

j, 

£   : 

c 
0 
3 

— 
0 

"3 
> 

c  fe    • 

MC.-C  a?  £•£ 

CI) 

' 

£  0 
c—    . 

0 

'C  ^  nJ  k"o  S  C 

2  «'5 

_J 

rdinary : 
Navy  Depart 
Expenditures 
Pensions.  .  .  . 

- 
c 

t- 

••  c 
•      fc.2t 

gts.s 

•5  i-i 

1      0  c  « 
<      a  g  £ 

vil  enginee 
lilding  and 
lipbuilding 
lipbuilding 
ispatching 
dustrial  en 
iccial    expe 

aterials  for 
iscellaneoii 
isiness  capi 

Total .... 

a 

0 

T3 

C 

6 

Sr3    Cffl^^Q^t)?    S2« 

1 

O 

w 

0 

cr 

u 

"J3 

ri 

3 

£ 

•o-o 

u 

fs 

u. 

s 

c 

a 

-j 

u 

0 

- 

B 

H 

10 

cd 

<S  00 

a  « 

- 

P 

i. 

DO 

C 

> 

-1 

C 

^ 

2 

<u 

| 

OTJ 

a 

C3 

~ 

- 
O 

u 

0 
■a 
u 

a 

11 

u 

- 

H 

<u 

11 

■c 

u 

C 

3 

0 

O 

c 

m 

CJ 

a. 

—  6 

< 

(J- 

■c 

-. 

1 

J. 

V 

11 

— 

0 

0 

z 

c 

woo 

" 

c 

00 

c 

UnO) 
£t-8 

5  E  o 


270 


APPENDIX 


I 


m    5i 
.    s 

>    -a 

H 


H  (^ 
5  -^ 
W     a 

s 

s 

< 

I 


■*«< 

>       p 

po  p 

I        Too  00  O        n 

ao  t^- 

c 

p 

o  m  * 

1-       r- 

00—00         •*-<  t~  CO        i»o» 

5          T 

f     - 

O    PI    L 

?       f 

p»  «  r-      r-o  *too_     qo_qp 

•      q 

"<3 

£   fN   ir.  l 

0        p} 

rf  oo"  in      d  -too  o       -t  "to"  c 

r 

-      d 

COO< 

>      a 

aoo      ONio     oor-c 

h       r 

r^ 

o 

^.  "I00.  l 

n       in 

U1MJ1          M-O    m>0           N00    O    •■ 

< 

)       ft 

H 

ov  o> 

d 

f^  P4                                                     PI           — 

pi 

p»   P0 

o 

- 

t 

OO  ' 

t     o 

^00   PO        rf    ■  tJ-             O  M 

■)      m 

•<t  ro  i 

T        m 

•-  -i-  -       oo     •  r-    ■        tf  i-    ■ 

r     t- 

n 

j.  l-  r~< 

>           M 

ifl  r-  rr       ^-    ■  n     ■        C^  O     • 

r      « 

00 

>  -  Op 
>i  Ov  tr 

0          in 

coo  C       O    "  -'            oo  in    '. 

: 

J      •* 

^  »r,  t-        M         -^              ^-vO 

■i      t» 

q  ► 

"           ^ 

O  if.                                               M 

: 

i      p< 

•n 

in 

H 

c 

r   oo 

ro<M  < 

)         m 

mO1*)         O         O                •-    Ov 

C 

m 

p-  -^ 

>          Tj- 

0>  <N  O         t*    ■  O      ■        O   i^i     • 

O 

«    fOOO   * 

f        *. 

(n  wo      o    -  q    •      "?  »0    ' 

: 

K      in 

o 

00 

>  f-  Ov< 

>        P0 

N   "190         *-      '  00      \         r^oO      * 

i      6> 

>.  O  T 

«       o 

sQ  't  r-       m       •-•             ^f  •-< 

01 

-t 

<        ■* 

h    row                                        00  C* 

r 

pi 

in 

in 

N 

p 

^      d 

00r*)T 

r      w 

\0  oo        »fl                      O  to 

o 

-  r-< 

>      1/) 

^O  io       (s     •    •     •       r-  o     • 

C 

m 

g  n  n  r 

O  >-»  po       O     ■     •     •        r*  ro    ■ 

r 

1- 

00 

S*  ~  OvC 

■      1-^ 

o"  ro  po    >«  ;  !  ;     Nrf  ; 

: 

K        O" 

>*      o 

01 

a 

in 

t^-O   "-•                                         f*3  N 

C 

m 

ui 

m 

N 

F     oi 

00  ro  f 

00 

PC  O  00         ^       00  O         **oO  00 

r     p< 

00  ©f 

1      >-i 

C0^fO>        f>        O*  •-*       CO  o« 

•<t 

„  too  r 

OOvPC        »O-p-00         MPOPO 

c 

\      q 

o 
o> 

00 

oo" 

oVi^     po  ;  at-     i^o'^f 

oo  •-<  O        n        r-  r*       iooo  ^t 

p 

M 

S_   PO  m< 
"   MO 

■* 

r 

00_ 

nt^M                             w          lO  N 

5         P< 

in 

in 

c-i 

F     o" 

CO- 

f) 

N   IflN                                Tf         O'^tVlP' 

i 

1        CO 

1        00 

Tf  o-,  \n        •    ■    ■  p*)      o  oo  pox 

p 

o 

Ov 

s  so  O  u 

■>       00_ 

>-«  o  O         .     .     .  ro       O  r-oo  r 

X 

r- 

00 

00 

."Wh'c 

r~ 

»-^t^o*        !    1    !^o      o  d4c 

' 

'■>      pi 

l^lflMT 

r      « 

O  n*                         po      o           •- 

T 

(■     o 

f0 

•H    U^                                                    N 

c 

P} 

in 

•n 

P0 

" 

F     a 

*foo  r 

o 

►-•          N          rfsC 

p 

5         P) 

O  CO  p 

>        00 

Tf       ro    ■  r-  w 

)       : 

Ov 

00 

li  mmc 

in 

•    •    •  q      n    -oc 

c 

in 

CO 

.<u  d  d< 

•* 

'.'.'.       '.   '.    '.  <o     rf  ;  rfc 

- 

in 

r*i  OO  P 

>     o 

m         po        OX 

T 

r       •* 

in 

5      oo 

in 

in 

4 

- 

F     & 

>O00   1- 

in 

■*t        to        Of* 

1          C 

t~ 

Pl   O  P 

)      in 

O        n     •  oo  r 

t       u 

1      o 

r^ 

£  q  in  r 

o. 

oo_       io    ■  o  r 

•      ^ 

r^ 

CO 
CO 

»>  oo"  d"  t 

F      in 

;  ;  '.     '.'.'.  ™    w  ;  c>  •- 

■c 

pi 

rt^hP 

o 

O*      t^      o  r 

k     1 

•* 

Tt't 

a 

O 

oc 

00 

4 

4 

4 

T 

F     « 

roo  P 

►-■ 

00          Ov         f 

oc 

o> 

OO  - 

•* 

c 

■* 

O 

j-  O  00  c 

\           "* 

oo        ^t    •  Ov 

p 

o 

CO 
00 

*>  O  p*  r- 

o 

:  ;  !     !  ;  ;  ^   o  ;o" 

a 

oo 

«MOi- 

p- 

OO            T}- 

r' 

)      o 

'too 

P0 

M            PO 

i      q 

rn 

■* 

■* 

- 

r     co" 

+j 

, 

> 

C 
0) 

5 

E 
E 

V 

c 

jo 

s 

p 

o 

M 

c 

id 

rt 

c 

id 

u 

o 

o 

bfl 

u 

o 

c 

G 

3 

rt 

L 

3 

a 

M 

-   L 

c 

a 

S 

a 

■0 

i 

r 

IS 

'5 
Q 

-3 

penses 
warshi 
prises 
s  (con: 

0 

> 

§■8 

"o 

:•  c 

cue 
•C  -  (S 

'.'IlSf 

3 

rdinary: 
Navy  Depa 
Expenditun 

1 

0 

ttraordinary 
Constructio 
repletion 
Civil  engine 
Building  an 
Shipbuildin 

Shipbuildin 
Dispatching 
Industrial  e 
Special  exp 
warships) 
Materials  fc 
Miscellaneo 

i 

0 

o 
•v 

1 

O 

K 

3    a 


2   «J 


is  a 
fc  oj 

S  >> 

o>  ^ 

>    V 
If 


vj; 


3«        Q 


-G  w  o 
w  m  Oi 
OJ      » 

-o  ,| 
M-fl  p<  r- 

C   OT  I^CO 

i:  00  .  "-1 
o  00  a  j- 

H"u,M 
jjo1"") 

f  ^  ™  9 


Cj        jj=! 

SE-oJ! 

fcU-U-S 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


271 


55 

W 

7, 

3 
w 

a 

> 
z 

w 

w 


H 
O 

g 
H 

■0 


w 

j 
a 

< 


noO  r»  »-.  <")  m  o_  Q\ 
K   it  rf  o\  <>  OO  -tO  30   0>  00   CK^oO 


i-H      •    N   M   ^N  a     •  fO  <"0  N   m-O 
j*oo     -rJ-MOrom     -M  O  rot^N 

0\  N  IN  M    - 


(MM1  t^0O  "-.  <-.  O  ■ 


-oo  Ooo  r*ro  ^tO  rf-oO 
*  rtO^'O  On  0\  0\  <-i  C^O 


N   <*o O  OO  O   OirOflH 

g  o^Ovoo'O  Ov  >-<  00  c^  o_  "*■ 
*»  O  O  O  ^  i-T  00  r^  in  fO  O* 
Pi  0»!><nO  O*  1^00  no  r^ 


hi  00  00  moo  <*o  O  -3-oo  m    •  -h 


O  O  O  r+i  OO  N  < 
Oi  t~-  OiO  On  >-•  m  > 


>■(  ro  ^t  rn  TtoO 


00  0\  r-00  >oo  r-o  mo  ^ 
pooo  o>o\<v5t^«-.  -rt  o\  O} 


i  O   Ov  r-  fO  • 


rfOv-OO  O  ^wj'OXO 
»  00  O-lNvOoo  r-  O   Oxn  <*0 


TJ"0\t^^N    fCtuiOOO 


NIOOM   lO  ^"  lO-O   ro  ^f  *t 

N    •-(    "3"  f^OO  00    ^tNlON    N 


a  rtM    ■  . 

Oifi  '    2 


BO 


g3.s.a|  g  Si  :£ 


272 


APPENDIX 


O  OoC  -rf  in  ac   r^  < 


co  tJ-O  Or-O  tTffOO  O  0*r>r-  ~  i-  O>0  ' 


o»  oo  o.x  Tf 


O  tT  «   rocc    O  • 


rr>  tJ-tJ-  o  0.50 


)  t^-CC  00   "TO  CO  NX    "5 


i/)Tj-r-oooo  o  ii  t--  r-  r-  —  iflO  *t 

co  to  w  w  a  n  q  a 
cT  r-  r-«      «t«  ooc 


CO   HOC    nOM    f*5 
;   t-  *t  rf}         r-OC    M  O    <-0 
1    O    IflO  N    l/)|NTf 


O  n  ~  r-  < 


CO  f-00  O  OO  w  »fliON  iO  TfO  o  o  o 

*t»-«co  •  O  o.  in  *-■  r~-  r-~  r-  o  ©.  *o  -ncc 

jj   irj  h-   io  •  N  »1  ^tO   "-•  O   O  t^CO   ro  '<>  O  CO 

v  „"  X  -  ;  ^t  o  c*.  ii  -^  ■<*  n  vo  n  ;  «  o  ■*• 


><-. 


XT)  rf  <-* 

' *>  00*  d  M 


C   ^1"  C  rnoO  t-O   OO  1        O   O   ^ 


•  r*  MOO  O  -rf  rf 


co  r-  o 

qqq 


ii^fOifl  Ooo  r- 

r^(*)0    lOr^l- 


£*o  o  o»   'moi-or^<N'- 


Tfroro        vO         CO   ^  Ul  t-O   O 


O  r^  in  .-.   (^ 


OOO  r-  M  (N  f 

^  -i-oo  O  COO  ( 


mo  **; 

00    <N    I- 

iOO   ^t 


.  o  o  >-  "i-  n  o  m 


OOO 

g  q_  t-^co 
«  wo  o" 


•  N  r- 


KOcOO     ■   <N      ■      '  '7  — _     '      '      ■         Or     ■     •  <^  i 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


273 


o   Q 
tn     ?*> 

W     § 

u    ^ 

0- 

X 

w 

!* 

< 


O  CC  rt  c 

«3S  o 

o  h  «  a 


■tO-t        00 


*-<   ro  f-0  O  »C  >-»»  O   >~>   OO  •-•  ^O   OoO  cC  ^O   *t 

O  oO  OfOO  r^O  °0  O  't  ^  t^  ( 
5*   4  N  OO*  r*  d  "t  f*«3    N  N   't  fO  O   -rf  1^  t-  O 
£   r>0  M  O  O  O  <N   CiON-tOoOOCCO   rOOO 
•v     ro  00   roi^CC-O  O  00  O  N,*0  N.  ^^"3^.^ 


O  O  r-  r^  o 


O  O   ^rOH   Oi        O 
r--  *-t  -.  m  o  ro       O 


r*3 


£  .-."ot^co'-'  O  '-'  »ooo  O  O  ONr^-O  t- 
V,  -t-tr-OO  r-O  <"000  fO*-<   "-1  *3"  *4"0 

"  O  O  ^  *t  ^  |-'       O      irnooo  r-fOH 


OOfOO 

..00  r-r-O  0>O  O  O 

O  *o  <"0  t—  t"^  O  m  i^  TtrooOO  t— 


t-  1000  r- 


*»   w    ^00    O   fOfO         O^  O   »C  «    ^"  «   t^  I 
^1   O  O  r-  O  >-<  i-h         ioh   n-tMOroi 


,-.   r^-O  O   OoO 


-O   O  ""t  r-  ^t  r*3  rfsO  O 


ro  O  t^cO        00 


rfOO  ro  0. 00 


O  r-oO  O  10  < 


OoO   TfmO   O  r-  r-  ro  O  OrOrOH   10 

ts  o  r^M-o  ^O  r-  1000  r-o  ^tooo 

t  oo  oo  o  o  t^oo  io  O100  q  00  i^  n  a 

~i  o  fo  o  10  co^o  <^  t-t  o  o  0  ^toq  vO 


k     oi*ooot~-r-u^>noosO'-'ooi>*)fO»o 
r*'  ^   r-~  N   1-1         —         r*.        n   m  «-<   o  <n 


1-1       ,>aNlfl 


itiOH\00  ►-<  >o  c-  too  O  inoioo  noo  't 
*t  N  i/IO  O  M  O  00  O  OoO  r^OO  OCCO  i- 
t-oOO  r-  00  O  i-"  ^^H.  0Ttf?u}N.<*  N. 
K  po  io-O  ^OoO*  10O  fO^rO't^tNcO  Ol^-O 


r^O  Ww  hO 

00  o  t  O  r~  <n 

O  O    O    T  i~O00 


0\r-  r*5MO0   TO  O 


i  r-00  ro  wiO  O  O 


^  rooO  OONtN  Tj-00  O  iO  O  t-n   r^sO  O  rOO  <N 
Ifl^OHNH         r0        ro  ro  00  10  C 


T3  C 


a 

aJ     ■  c 

S.2S 


W  | 
00 

<G  a; 


.2  o 


in  c  C  >>  S  d.^5  ot->-    ,^<a]^i- 


rt"0  o 

"SO 


OOfl 


■H-a 

1?  g 


c  c 

r-    (/)    Cti    &    r-    hfi 


£  O  I  .S  "g  _E  I  -s 

h"i5  03  E£  o  «j 

X  U  k.  d  nj  t,  v.,2 


1-.- 


274 


AlM-iXDIX 


I 


o  = 

IT.  A. 

a  Q 

o  < 

ca 


"S  a  —  S 

-     5l    «    £ 


to  moc  c*  n  x 


N    MUtO    >0C 


C  i-  -  -^  c  r-  o  to  r*3  «o  ~~  3    -  :    •■   _   ooo  r*0  « 
c  -r  3  t  -  » io  x  —  —  (-  c  ir  -r  t-  i-  r  n  oc  "**.  —  N 


g   Ot  Ot>0   N   CQ  tO  O  <G 


O  r-oo  i-  O  O  ' 


O*  r~  r-  n 
q  ~  r-o 


c*  Oi  x  ^  o.  o  — 

n  r-    ■     ■  ro  O  "1**o  r* 

oo  O    •     ■  00  O  ^5  ifl  ifl 


o 

a  ::::::  ^  ::::::  : 
>,::::::«::::::: 

<N 

Tt 

_ "> 

s id 

o 

s  :  :  :s  : 

rD 
1/lsO       •       ■  00  00    —    O    ^ 

~ in  &>  •    ■  —  n  oq  q  o_ 

».**   I   i       I   !  o  o>  !  —  —  - 

^1  N   -  1/5 


t-  0  w  ffl  oo  O 
^  r~  r*  (n  •  o  O 
O  -  l^O     ■  N  o 


ID—   r~  <N   ID—   O   0*00   ^^"IN   *4"  Oi  -    lt.—    't-f^ 
O    O    !*)W    w    'D  ^O  lO  i  ~ 

oo  ro  <n  r~  o*  r~oo  — 


nosocooci 


^■b    IHO0C 


cc  -n: 


a 

>,  a 

ao 

.-. 

^ 

a 

— 

B 

^ 

. 

. 

3J 

u 
c 

a 
5 

3S  M5  =  £r 
»  o  5?  a  o-cs.9-5 


■-  a 

5 1 
73-5 


O  ol  id  g  «  B-g  g  gjg  §•-  c  u  C  a  g  at  § 
DS?<>S(-.HHO«M'5wM«O^U 


Srrc.K,  o  =  =  ^  ^  -r  i      I      «! 


STATISTICAL   TARLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


275 


< 


S    ■« 


•^  10  d  o  •+  n"  w  -f  in  <*  «  >c  -* 


i^. 

w   ro 

m 

•   ■*  i-i 

8 

G\ 

•   ^  O 

£ 

vO 

.   01  ^O 

ro  01"  rO  M   lO  w 
PI 


X 


£^ 


rt-  oi  mo  10  o  pi 

_    t^  rOvO    O  PI    -fO 

qv  o  —  -t-00  oi  «  oi  >l- 

O    t-^00    N    m  h    r^M 


<2, 


bE 
S  ° 


.53 

-C   o 

U  ^ 

o  rt 


ffiJS 

rt   t/)   n3   _, 

l8|s 


^ 


ca 


.2  c  8  «  ev~- 

c;  J2    e  ^    CJ  .3    5    O 

.Co     ■  j-  r  u—  ib      *ti w" 
<i>  O.  o     •  bo- a  ^«C|-0o 

aojocoi;ooi5 
c  J~,  ti       rt  °*  *j  c  .a  c  c 


s  J  2  a 

1   «'  j>    O    3    <u 

>  a  g/5  -c  is  0 

2  J|  jr  3  0=  a  i  o  £ 


CO  O  1-  t^oo  f^  IT;  10  -(■  r<5  N  O^ 
10  NvO  X  O  OO  f*^—  rO«  >0 
vO  >0  10  O  O  r-»  p-   -too   h  i^h 


00    01  00  \0    3N 

00    NO    OO 


0^  N  ro  1-1    1/5 
CO  iCOcT  to  >0 


•4-  1-1   lOOO   1-1   rO  irj  10  ro 

l~~  -1-  t^.  1— ■   NO^O    -+  -t" 

t^OO    -t-i-i    ION"    t^sO 


"  s 

o-- 
o  o 


o  o 
0)  <u 


<u  .1-    P    >    U,    jj 

rrl  _C      ""  ^   ^ 

S-u  «»  o  gCJ 

.S    3    C^--    - 

•  -  rt.y  o  3  o 

00  ,a  o  O  O 


t-  ri 

0  rt 
i;  en 

O    I- 

"1 


u    4)    ui^iJ>2^^    U    C,4J 

o  o  m-^^  ^  ca  ca  o  o-rt.Sf 

^  ^  _g  M  bfi  g  bfi  M^  «  bo  b 
°  o-S  15  S  a^  13  o  g  Jg.o 

bJ0beoj:jr  £•*=-£  Mrx' 

CC'3UCj4Jo(JCr*0 


J,J,-S&s-g&B-J,BH-a 


276 


APPENDIX 


U 


—    r)    f.  ~  C    i^  ''I    ri    —         O  00 
g  00   t~»  ri    ir.  c   C    "~.  C    T         -+  O 

,~  X    IC  N         OM   ION  £ 


u,  ^ 


t<5  -  M 


t^0»(N'-»iO01N  00    CO 

CMON"t'ti'jNr~-  moo 

1^  —    r<5  <N    <N    (N    i-i  O_00_  0_vO 

-f  -"  — "         M   N  O    — *  ff  *n  w 


(NCvNOcN-^-O    —   CJn        i-i 

c  iooo  f.  -t-  -r  «*5  ^  o       <o 


£  ^ 


1 


c  c 

31 

o  o 


CD 


o 


o    ° 
00  be 

1-   ~ 

—  -f 


U    1) 

be  t* 


-C  j3 


•  03 

•  a 

•  <u 

c 
Eg 

rt  E 

Q  o 

'•a  §  s 

o2x 


-  2^-^  «» 
g  « us  x  -°  £ 

o  »:  -  ?  c 

■-  h  r  &  sofcd 
■oSu  "ij* 

.     »  o  o  °  K 
.  -   i-  •-       - 


v  5 


-   o 


»5.&p-££f 


-    —    X     X 

r    r-  .X    X    '/j    co   co 

x  5  js  rt  «J  JJ  2 
m  /■  u  i  a  »  -g  -S  o 

^~S  5-^  ^  2  a  a.  a 

£    £    u  «  ?  £  §   u   u   u 

£   *-    x  '  u    C   t^  '—  ,~—  ,—  ,J~' 

2  2,C       r  -  .,  a,  cj  u 

JSJS     £  bj  JT.S  c  c  c 

"OT3cuj-Q~_3cucua) 
rtrtN  v/— «—  a.aa 


u 


w 


I 

lO  ro  i-i 

O      vO 

—    i-    (N 

"*        (N 

"*•  O^O 

OV          M 

-   •*■  "t      o 

■*o 

Tl- 

t^. 

<N 

vO 

<N 

vo" 

c> 

lO  rO  >- 

O       -+ 

►H      >H      <N 

•+      vD 

<*■  3^ 

O      00 

►-    tJ-tJ-       C 

Tl- 

"*Os 

^t 

UO 

s 

1 

o 

a 

,u 

8 

3 

S 

g 

o 

o 

>*-, 

C 

8 

*i 

s 

V. 

a 

■^ 

<u 

Q 

CT 
1. 

c 

c 
c 
C 

c 
a 
C 

j: 

c 

' 

CO 

^ 

CD       •    r 
co   co    r 

g.s  t 

bo  a 

if  2  2 

^^ 

"o  bej: 

rt 

5  oj  c 

o 

•  2  -  a 

•a 

u.  bin 

_ 
a 

^ 

2 

tn.S   E 

E- 

O 

C   >,x 

O  rt  x 

C_ 

_ 

y 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


277 


1-   O    N 

10  O 

<?N 

t^ 

t^  O    10i>0 

-1- 

o^ 

m\C  00_ 

rt-00 

CT; 

00 

t±  iri  1^ 

w   O" 

0* 

0* 

s 

0  0  0 

-fO 

"3- 

0 

~ 

£ 

O^NtON    " 

** 

tCoO 

f! 

CT*  m 

r^ 

(3    u 

00  4) 


J«    * 


OJ    C    rt 


£  r,  o  o  o  o 


5  c      H 


rt  «  c  c  c  c 

8*  8*  2  £  a  v- 
ooB5z 

u     U    U     1- 

<*»  P**  cd  rt  rt  ctf 

P  >  a  a  a  a 
r  d  a;  a)  u  u 

<ZQQQQ 


-7s 


APPENDIX 


o    8 


**  O  fOO  Oi  w  Ot  v»co  ci  o  CK  *o  roco  m  ro^       ocxxoo       t/5 
R  n*  ^  w  -*f  o  n  m  ro  w  in  t^oo  ti".  ^oo  ?r>  ir,  \rj      -tw.  ^-x  ^      r^ 


C  r- 

re  *n 


.  ^  00*  (^  rf  io  ro  ci<)oO~  -rfo  t^  N  r- in  ro 


IO00 


i  r*3  ►-. 


OihN-O 


i    C4 


CO  ^t^nO  tJ-sO  O*  r;  po  =C   N   ro  ~  «0  O  M  I 
u  r^iocco*(s"o^f,^ft^oo"^u^rCo^oo"fOt^> 


3  3 


;.   u 


2  c 


- 

> 

- 

u 

V 

c 

>*  nUS"* 

2.2  7  .e 

rtT3  >.■" 

H  c  O  n 

g"M  S  C 

c-co.2 

■o  £  C  3 

C  S--J3 

o  o  _  £  E 

y  : 


b.s 

jE  8  c 

)<OCh 


:S-2  u  «  j~  •- 
|  B 

b  a 
WW 


e«  0  c  5  c  , 


P  >  >  .  .  -9   3   0/  *-"«-•    *  ^        , 


STATISTICAL    TAHLKS    OF    KXPKNDITURKS 


279 


10  o 
in  ^t- 


t  >n  O  t~  I--  I- 

-  w  q  -  qq 
i\0  o  m<ofO 


0\^"3"OO*n000  OvOoO 


■  o  °o 

~  hOO  <n  -^  6  ~»o  On  <*0  oc  OOco  to 

00  >o  amtr-oiN  m-i  fooo  *o  9.  °  ^  "T 


E2 


-  "a    •      —i      ra  Is 


-  1-  —  'Js  raj 

xi  c-  u  w  a.  ^  *=;  —  «  x  x  (/>  O  <  >  < 


!5 -a*  *  >>'3j 


•Efl  ..  'S  0!  «i     • 

rt  C  rt  T3 


H     H 


28o 


AIM'KXniX 


d    - 


S3  Q 


- 


iflOO 

n 

N    3 

.r 

o 

O 

r«5  C    —  Ifl  -  O   •*•& 

ir.c  -r  -r  -  x  ~:  — 

M 

C    —  r,  i \r.  —.  -T  ir 

o 

o 

«  —  '.  _  -      IT  * 

M 

00 

!x 

t^ 

u 

o 

ts     •     •     ■ 

a 

Ov 

t^ 

o 

e   .   .   .   .  f~  .   .   . 

r~ 

Ov 

2" 

>* 

t 

■* 

8  :      :  :^2  :  :  : 

o 

£  :  :  :  :<o  :  .  : 

a t~a  «o 

N 

T-0C3     •     •     • 

M 

g  i^«  o  ooo    •    •    • 

r- 

Oi 

»  „    o    r:  :  :  : 

—               00          i-i 

<5 

-r  i^  c  3  o          oo 

o> 

-r  ;>  o  o  c    ■    -  >o 

-    IT  w.  "    "O      ■      -    N 

a 

t-* 

>,                    O            M       - 

■* 

O   O*  O  5        "--O 

vO 

O  t^00  OJ  00      •   *1-  r? 

IO 

~     fOO     0>    <N    0C         •     fO    -H 

lo 

o> 

.*»       ro  *f  rovd    ;  ■*•* 

r^ 

f-H                       t"-            **              tO   H-t 

10 

(N  O  O  r~  O  O        « 

tT  ~  'O  o  o*.  O     -00 

iO 

o 

ot*o«oo    •  r» 

1^ 

o 

r~ 

o> 

>,                    "            "                    ^ 

91 

B 

•n 

1* 

3 

01 

•SJfi 

^° 

fi/l 

E 

"*"  o 

■- 

"S"o 

D   o 

a 

.So.&«  «- 

llg-s-sg 

c 

OJ  i. 

d)  U  2  i,   M-  — 

o 

H 

h 

•7 

i 

/ 

- 

3  c 

E- 

- 

0  s  o 

00 

0  -   c 

o 

~r  r  >: 

t» 

Ifl 

i» 

"te| 

^ 

^ 

s 

Lo 

Hi 

«•-, 

s 

«i 

S 

*. 

a 

-«., 

*> 

q 

•    •  ^ 

•* 

•    -o 

o 

.    .  f 

ro. 

O  O>oc 

O 

a  o  ►■ 

r<J  Oi  « 

T^C 

M 

—   i 

n 

-  ; 

, 

3.-- 

*  tt  « 

=   it 

u.ac 

>•    3 

O  rt_ 

£ 

it  V  r 

Ct 

/,/ 

STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


28l 


r~  rOsO  Tf  ro  l~  l~  «")  rooo 

OV   Tt   t~   O 

0 

Tfr  <N  CO          0\  C*                ^U1P>0   H  M 

t-»                     MM                       HI*            P)fl 

rO 

" 

r> 

Oi 
C> 

ro 

a 
«*  • 

0. 

Ti- 

t* 

J. . 

-t 
O 

0 

O 

.  .  ;  o  .  . 

o> 

0 

10 

■      •  CO 

O 

-t 

8 

CI 

-0  c 

CO 

■  O 

CO 

£ 

> 

.    .  "> 

i/>  e- 

jr 

•f 

C 


>n  .    co  ro  ^t 


a)  «f 
1-  *-. 
o  o 


g  «  ai 


S'-S  J! 


i    3    60  . 

IE. 


^Sls 


60  c. 
C  3 
"3   " 


c  t*  >..H_ 

<U  C  C  C  c  C 


^ 

»± 

»o 

»» 

0 

fO 

«* 

0 

m 

fO 

r> 

«* 

ro 

«* 

O 

•t 

fO 

rO 

q 
■<* 

tf 

ro 

0 

10 

C> 

0 

M 

CO 

10 

"* 

r*- 

s 

CO 

0 

a 

«* 

0 

8 

s 

0 

CO 

s 

ro 

0 

rO 

00 

t-1 

" 

8 

r~ 

O 

10 

rO 

s 

10 

0 

rO 

a 

A, 

1            " 

to 

H 

CO 

N 

vO 

C, 

1* 

CO 

ro 

4 

00_ 

O 

f. 

l_l 

«* 

Ol 

c 

»* 

10 

10 

*± 

00 

M 

V 

c 

01 

C 

•a 

11 

•a 

c 
0 

c 

*s 

>.c 

fc 

a  a 

C 

3 

E 

a 

Rrt 

R 

•a 

0 

rt 

2  1 
0  ^ 

0 

H 

H 

V 

a 

(/} 

282 


AI'l'INDIX 


> 

.- 

< 

"W 

III 

B 

DP 

V 

H 

<A, 

H 

u 

< 

5    2 
S  "* 


—         ©  ro        OC4tO         NO  W 

/ 

3                CON-tf 

o  — 

x  r  -  s  —  c.  s 

to  co       »r 

© 

-    —         ~  C  —         OWN 

-. 

5                CO  CO  OO 

t—  ©       ro  co  — 

eot-       to 

—          '       i        .:-iC        po  00  CO 

■ "  -  ■-  —. 

—  ©^       ro  iq  50  »o  ©  »o 

tO  ©_         00; 

ci 

"3 

ff  ©       ©"  r—      t-t  cc  oo      o~  co  to 

30  ©         —  ~  i  -  -  • "  •  ■-'  BO 

r^ 

tr-        ©  —        NOiN        ■**•  CC  cc 

CO  oo       cs 

o 

^  —       »n           oq ~*      cc  ©  © 

i           co©cq 

"— -  ~        ".  '  *        —  —  co 

ci       to 

pa        OC  cs             t-"  oo        i.-"  — *  re 

c 

(M*  t"  ^-" 

— *  ©*         Ol*  " 

ci 

? 

^ 

©        On        o  OS  —        ©  —  — < 

r 

»o  — 00 

OO  CO  « 

—                 ©  CI          iO         © 

co            r^ 

•-< 

r--.       n-  ©       io  tt  30       coc: 

r 

co_    ■       (^  oo     ■  aq     ■  © 

cs    ■      »o 

cs 

CO 

iC       —  ci       lt  ro  ro       eq  es  » 
Ces       X—       i,"—' i-"       ©*t-o* 

c 

>            co^^co 

"^1    '       °i 

© 

1       o 

r 

©"©'-H* 

ef     ■        °» O*     "  CO     *  OO 

*rT  ;     © 

to 

1           C5 

•     o       —  *  i            —  o       co  O»oo 
•^  cs       woo             ©  tO       CO 

>            Cri'C 

© 

r 

*-0  -r  ri 

CO                i-|                                  4 

CO*                         — * 

e> 

co" 

CO 

■« 

—         CC  CO        ©  —  OC         NUSOi 

c 

— '  OOO-l 

■*•  ©         CS  lO         CO  —  CO 

CS                     ^H 

^ 

CO         ~-  CO         *C  "*"  ©         ~-  ©  00 

= 

r*  co  »o 

©  to        "O  «o      ■  CO  00  © 

•*     •      © 

o 

n 

•^        ©  OO         to  CO  —         CD  ©  CO 

2  r*~      co*  i-»"      is!  — !  -  *      -'-]'-  i 

X 

"-."^  °. 

CO  to         COO      ■  OO  >— '  ^-i 

CS_      •         CO 

o 

o 

Of 

tO  ©         ©  CO      '  OS  <— "  N^ 

os    ;     Tt** 

co" 

os 

»,      CO         CO©                ICOO         N-  ©  IO 

c 

>                N- t^  CO 

•  -  —       ro  o  j             co  co 

1-<           M« 

c 

-- c-i  p" 

t^OO_        CO  •-* 

cs 

o 

Ol 

N**H 

CO 

CO        to  — •         ©  CS  Cj         ©  1^-  © 

o 

tO  CO  N- 

co©      co  to  *r  ©  co  © 

-*         CO 

CO 

CI          •«*•  CO         tO  Is*  tO         »?OiO 

w 

COCO  CO 

n.  co       ©  co  -r  i-o  ©  CO 

•  OS        cs 

tO 

Tf      ■*^.G|0      to  t-^,  co      cs  oo  © 

tf 

eo  <r*»  *h 

©  ■«**         N-  -*■  CO  »0  'O  tO 

•  os_      co_ 

©_ 

© 

f"  cd      cc*—      tCtoN*      co©-^" 

t> 

co'io^od 

of  to       n"  cs*  to"  ©*  c-f  co" 

"  co"       to" 

© 

© 

C"  co       oc  to            -r  -r       —.  ^-  »o 

^  CS         0C  ©_               OS  ©         l»  —  M 

»r 

oor-cs 

CO  ©           ©  rf           rH  ^  CS 

cs 

Z 

■^"cs 

CO 

"*f        cc~        o  oc  co        »o  CO  — ' 

:'* 

N-  ©  CO 

to  -r       ©  --       to  o  to 

-t»       ^f 

s 

WO         ©  ©          iCM  M          ©  ©  © 

CS  CS  CO 

t-  -r       ©  o)     -©©oo 

•CO        © 

o 

n-       *— ■  ©       uoosro       cocs^ro 
"3  — "      --r  ©*      n*  ©"  oc*      — *  i"-"  ©" 

P 

—  OC  t^ 

CO  ©        to  cs      •  t^  CO  -r 

.  ^         tO 

cs 

o 

©*— *co* 

cs  to       co*  cs*    \  to  ©  c-t 

;nT    os" 

© 

U.co       —  ©            rt-N       oo  co  -r 

o 

tO  ?1  Tl 

©  i-»        OS  CS         CO  to  oo 

CO        to 

^  CS          H^S                OS  30         CO         CO 

^ 

CO  CO  rt 

eocs       cs  —^ 

CO 

s 

CO* 

ostt 

CO 

y 

cs       *#"co       ©©•—       owin 

— ■  r^co 

ooto      co  •*»«  ~*  oo  ©  r- 

CS 

^ 

5,16 

5,46 
9,29 

7,55 
1,22 

3,48 

6,61 
0,54 

©CO© 

.    .      © 

CO 

OS 

iCN         CO  ©  CO  to  to  »— < 

IO 

a 

odn« 

00  «— «         OO  -T-  to"  CO*  ©"  to" 

*    '*     o 

CO 

k     ^         WON-                IOCS         U5NQ0 
^"CS         C7SQ0_              ©N.        C©        -^r 

t 

CS  ©  © 

CJ 

o 

©  *o  iC-J 

©to        CJ^                       "  «-• 

cs»h 

N- 

CO*  CO*         *-* 

CO 

e»" 

CS       CO©       ©  to  oo       ©  t  © 

©  -<f  "0 

©  CO         CO  to  CO 

CO         -«*« 

CO 

OS         »CN.         to  tO  N-         ©  —  © 

e 

CO  oo  uo 

©  -r       oi  — '  cs     •     •     • 

■  to       cs 

N. 

00 
OS 

u0_         »CM_         to  tO  CO_         CO  OO  i-H 

•CO_         CC5 

*o 

C©*        N*  CO*         N-*  CO  CO*         CONOCO* 

N 

kO  oo*©" 

■*$"es      •-«»-.©    *    * 

!  tC      cs* 

co" 

CO 

k_CO       t«           to  co       to  ©  — 

•*■■  CS          TfCI                 ©CO         CO         CO 

N 

■<*•  to  cs 

©  ©        00  oc  to 

CS            1-H 

OS 

a 

U0N-CS 

*o       ^< 

© 

©*Cs" 

— 

CO* 

nTcs 

rt 

OS         CO©         ©  N- Tf         ©  tO  tO 

3 

^  to  -r 

©  to       CO  to  © 

*->        00 

^, 

I, JO 

1,93 
9,26 

7,65 

1,42 

0,23 
7,64 
3,30 

0OCI  N- 

©  ©         -*•  ©  Ol       •      •      • 

•  OS         CS 

cs 

x 

©  CO  t^ 

■  •H      ^ 

r*» 

O 

C* 

oo*o  — « 

©  OS         CO  CO*  OS      I       *      ' 

*oo*      nT 

co" 

CO 

L~  cs       to  n-            t^©       co  co  r- 
CS        ""^""l              ©tO        N-  -*  UO 

M-  COOS 

— t  CO         OS  I-* 

tO              ^H 

N- 

C©_*0  ^^ 

oc  to            © 

°-     ^ 

IOC4 

co" 

esTcs 

cs" 

CS 

er 

■" ' 

MO        CO -f        ©  tO  -•*«         UO  <— uo 

a: 
N 

-^-oocs 
to  ©  oo 

lO^  00  -* 

©  © 

CO         CO 

©         ©OS         tO  CO  ***         CO  CS  -?■ 

©       *—  co_      «o  ©  to       ■*  *o  -r 
Ec"      cs  cs       r-"co*»o*      ©os© 

K©         CO-*                COUO         <©  ©  -M 
*^  CS         *~1  *1              ©  "0        iC  w»c 

OS 

CO 

CS 

COO0N 

cs  cs 

CO  --< 

;os"    cs 

tO            rH 

C 

t-»  o 

CO        ^H 

©*^ 

T 

»-• 

lO*^" 

CM 

Cn 

©.       ioc^i       ©n-*j«       rococo 

3 

■*  CO  CO 

■  00         IO 

I>-         ©©         ifliON         ©  CO  OC 

OS 

CS         CO©         *0  CO  C-l_        C^OON^ 

3 

"  "**!      "^ 

C  n"      c-i*©"     r-^'-Tco*      -«r  c-fc-i 

^"osco* 

'co     ©;■'■* 

CO 

U.C^J         COOS                CS^^         TCOuO 

CO  *C  CS 

CO 

©  ^J«  — < 

n" 

8 

(O         N- CO         ©  N.  -*                       N- 

CO  00 

—                    © 

i 

©-H         • 

OS 

©         l-tO         »o  n  — «_            •      •  1-C 

";  -r     »o*  os     n-"  co'  os       ;    ;  --* 

■»± 

00  N^      • 

H 

— *\o   ; 

CO 

>      —        -r  ©              r  i  co                   *0 
•"•"^h         ©^                 '-'CO                       -f 

cr 

ir 

CO  © 

r-" 

CC 

It 

C.-H 

■  = 

•    3 

:1 

> 

.' 

E 

a 

- 

L 

a 
: 

i 

11 

e 
■og 

a  S 

i 

o 

B 

3 
a 

00 

irmosan  bandits 

djustments 

of  war  history . 

.1 

> 
a 

J-i 

p 

o 

o 

oao 
•3  S  a 

1^ 

'    C 

3 
c 

r 

0 

•o-g 

J: 

«5  c  a) 

■g  esa 

S    M    O 

Ordinary: 
Army  Depart 
Expenditures 

'    C 

&:  '^- 

T 

--    7 

I    1 

—  — 

c  — 

1 

U 

"c 

ittraordinarv': 
Construction 
Building  and 

a  be 

•11 
>■ 

other  imp» 
paign  use1 
Manufacture 
Provident  fu 
calamities. 
Quelling  of  F< 
Prevention  o 
Postbellum  a 
Compilation 

"o 

1 

o 
S 

Special  Gri 
Extension  of 
Temporary 

g 

e-1 

2  3 

W 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


283 


uo       . 
00       1 

O       ■ 
Ci 

0/0 

9,080 

197,450 
2,968,297 

3 

- 1 

(M 

10 

CO 

Oi 

10 

CO 

575 
8,476 

CO 
S3 
O 
Ol 

y 

CO 

CO 

oT 

■^ 

.  10 

;     ;      ;      '.& 

3 

CO 
O 

00 

0 

era 

0 

■  CO 

■  a 
'.         '.         .'         .'to 

00 

1^ 

CO 
°\ 

CO 

CD 
OS 
00 

CO 

CO 

>ra 

to 
0" 

CO 

5,771 
2,927 

.'0 

10 

OS 

CO 

CO 
CN 

°i 
0" 

CO 

o> 

"5 

53,526 
1,366,390 

O 

e  1 

CO 

o> 
0 
to 
00" 

CO 

O0 

CO 

»o 

QO                                            t- 

00            •            •            -~* 
t»            ■            •            .00 

o>      ;      :      ;«o 

CO 

gp 
to 

10 

•** 

0 

CO 

to 

CO. 

to" 

CO 

10 

'O 
K 

0" 

CO 

°i 
10" 

CO 

°i 

»ra 

CO 

00        t-      • 

CO     . 

'.       '.           <o"  ; 

e 
to 

CO 

0 

t>r 

60 

0" 

co       co 
era       t>.     . 
I         I       c>      0     ' 

U5 

0" 
IO 

W5 
CO 

Extraordinary — Continued: 
Special  expenses,  Hokkaido 

g 

0 

& 

-  a 

-  2 

:  _= 

Q. 
EC 

g 

•a 
-  3 

«E 
t    = 

%  5 
o._ 
5    C 
Q 

- 
3 
tx 

"o 

a 
.3  > 

=  — 

it 

s 
>  - 

c 

2 

E- 

"J 

"z 

— 
0 
- 

CO  «C  Ol  CM  CWN'TCO-'lM--'Mr/~3fC^lCC/:  /  Ci 

co  to  r-  rc>  to  /;  *t  *r  :i  /  c  r.  c  x  ri  c  n  ?i  ct  •*  o 

oi_~-  *:_30  co '^'^  ^l00.  T.  **!  "  1  *°.  *°..  "t.  ~ '„      <°_  ".  "1  — .  ~  i 

00*  »0  OJ  <-«  '  (D  O*  O  f"  »0  !T*  »C*  C  C  CO  **  -h"        C  J"  CO  *C  05  -" 

«onn  eow«o«cict-?J/  -i!       -r           -~  r  1 

Ci  — "                oc"  ■**•*  co*  -f"  ~ 


CO  CO  ~h  ■«»«  C  (T5  N  ^  C  '-    —  CT-  '-C  t  f"-  -  ^  r^  '^  ^  - 

;c  co  cr-  «.o  a,  x  o  -r  ic  w  -r  -  c  $  «  -  i"t  m  x  to  o 

rir.  /,?!_  -r  —  — ■  -i>r.  —  —  —  s      -^-.^        '~1'~lC:..t^.^, 

.-"  06  a*  co"  »-*  -^  !>•"  >rT  ^c  cri  t  1"  c*  —  ?5  —  t-       — "  o  0*  loT  — " 

lOCic:  m  c  cc  —  r-  ~  t~  c  £  c:  co 

CN  CO  >C;  -h  —  iO  t-i  rM  Cl^iO  -  °,fO  OD 

o"  — "  *-"  cc*  -*  co*  -r* '— ' 


—  CO 


10— < 


c  -  /  ri       cc  co  c.  ro  r 


r  i  co  (O  1  ~  »c  -t*  -r  o  o  r-  —  c  o 

---N^Ci-NX  ^r  t^-  -r  — 


^rcoicc:      ccov.- 

cm"  o*  co*  co      •-""  -h*  1  -*  DO  QO  -xf  — *  *rr*  1  c*  o*  co*  1  -* 

c:  co  co  — .  c-  -~  ■ 


'-  —  y  /.  —  ~.  'Z~- 


a:  »o       CO  ~h 


QO_  O-J  !>;  t» 

O  CO  CO  ' 


fl"  iO  h.  /  ^  r  c  ~  •* 

~  jr  cr.  coi-nm- 


.,     .HOOfCCXO' 

•-•  co"1  ^  •— ai"  co"  t 

^-  »o  ^1  cc  -r  c  —  -r  x  *—  — 
^h  «-^io  eO_cc  ^r^i>-  co  00 
^*-h  i>Tco"c"'"" 


OOSOtO 


117  »o  i— <  -^f  ac  ^r  ' 


KDOt^OCONt!; 


'O'CCO'l'NOO 


*  CO  OS  Oi  >0  iO 


cc  cr-  «  —       x  i"o  cr.  'O  o  cr.  1*0  o  -h  cp  oi 
^-  C:  cr.  cc       <*:  —  c.  w  '^  'O  •"  to  /  _.  c 


;  Ci—  — 
.— _o_c\ao_ 
co"co"i>r 
oi  co  -«r 


•-•iCWCO-'tOt*iCOO«0'-' 


:  to  (^  ir:  tc  /  c.  r  to 
*r  cc  oZ  -*r  •<#  <z?  *- ■co'ci-^"'— ■ 

OlCllOCX'fCOiOiOiOC-l 

00  c;  00      to  to  co_  co_  c;  co  co 
tCcoc^oi" 


^"■5  00*  C*  J" 

co«o-^ 


ONt^iOOD-^CrOCStsCOONMiO  O 

OOiCOTlN-tt^Of.  MtOT-NOTlCO  -o 

•h  >C  ^  t»  ^  — ,  t_  O  C  X  CO  '-O         *0  "^  00_  •  (O 

■^TjTco*co*o"*o*o:^i*»c*or»o      00"  •— 1*0  *eo" 

«oo^^"tccic.co^Ti      eo'—t  oa 
ooo:^      -f  -f  -h  o  00  co  *o 


o;  d  00  co 


COI>-00-^0^3»'  - 

N  CO  CO  t*  uO  C  !-•  i-O  *r  c: 

.-.  »o  cr.  1.0  -r  o  cc  o  ~r  c 


ONOCOOO 


^co  00  'ocor 


OOiOO  XXM 


ei^iocu^coococodi^oo 

Ci-^COCOCOCSCO 


-c  cr-  cr. 

cr..  to  cc 
oc'co'^h 


— <    *Tf4    ^H  •    CO    CO     SO 


-I-  CO  O         XCOCi- 


■  ^-  Oi  co  -^  00  r 


jOCCCh        O—O 


'  1—1  CO  »0  —  CO  "-r  »0         CM  ^h 

^-  CO  00  lO  <— 1         »-* 


COCO  ^  O  CO  I 


O  CO        o 


■  0)aN<-"00      t^-co    -t-H    -o» 


01  cm  00  -<r  ^h 


•T3 

B 

O 

3 

c 
0 

3> 

1 

0 
c 

•J3 

•  CO 

•  B 
'T3 

O 

E 

p 

0 

> 

JE 

c 
| 
c 

c 

> 

X 

■3 

•   O 

.S   cu 

t 

rr,     T\     rr>     □     C     flj     »-*  m     ^     —     *"•         -     >     »-■     71     -^    -       "^,    C3     ^  VJ  ■  —     3C  TT 

S  «  2  So  a"  to—  >»-3  £'x,£  c<n3-t  ^c  il:c^J>>c      £ 


cuq  cl"g 

IIs.  ■ 

■aWo-3 

5^  E  « 
fo^.E 

ofcSl 

°  s  -  s- 


!  ^  - 


tu 

3 

g 

■a 

•^ 

3 

St 

— 

B 

.. 

_ 

> 

i 

S 

_. 

Z 

3 

3 

CJ 

?i 

~ 

0 

= 

'- 

c 

■r. 

o 

< 

C 

i 

a 

— 
CO 

z~ 
— 

r 

o 

_ 

a 

3 

~ 

i 

— 

«>< 

;/■ 

c3 

» 

5.I.B     5 


.  S  S..2 

0 

2,S3 

Hit  1 

Ins 
Shi 

Q 
>> 

a 

S  £=■••« 

< 

,;—  c  § 

rS.S3"->< 

or  det 
3,  spe 
nfantr 
to  th( 

o 
p 

eg1-  E 

_i 

d 

3 

"111 

E?  ail 

§ 

ed"*   O 

o 

19 

>> 

3 

1 

iccounts 
ment  In 
in  FiftI 
special 
;  Affairs 

<;.H  aj-a  M  T 
£^  £  d  a  — 
XT:  3jo3 

^  c2c£  »  a 
o'm  Sfi  c  S-  9/ 
oc  £  ="5OK 

Is!  gg-.S  5 

tU    OT    "Jf-i     g 

s  Is;  I**  & 

co  SO  t*-3ra 
£  Q-2-n  a 

pX         c   «   >. 

""  c.2  -  s) 
"5laJT     13  a 

s  r*>  oo-jf;  ^; 

^  b  r  ^ 

glr 

lES. 


Has 


2*4 


AIM"!   \1>1\ 


o 

co  to 

eo  to 

r 

**.-*.     -V 

r-  ^  — <       c-j 

/- 

^. 

M 

C  £ 

r~  n  <o  r^ 

^ 

OS        eo  oo 

r~oo 

1     -** 

1  N 

i>- 

C-J  «C 

l>-  -O 

CO  CO  CO 

t-  t-  -^       'O       ^  r;  r^  -o  i  ^  ~  t -re 

CO 

OS        O  co        OS  ^ 

CO 

1  -^ 

»o 

tOT 

eo  os_ 

~. 

o»  cq  r* 

IC03N        »/5        NO N "?.WN N  M N 

OS 

fe  Cs 

o"oo 

cc'r-T 

■O  —  r 

csr^ur      ^h"      i,*N--MX-;c?iri 

in 

-r"      os"  eo      o  *2 

-?  to 

1  -  f 

MOO 

O  O  O       O       c^xri  /  t.   /    .-    - 

Lt 

Ol        O  Ol        oso 

00 

<o 

O 

U,^0. 

IN.O 

r^ 

O  OJ  OS 

CO  c^  co       ~       -r       —       r^  -r  —  M  c^ 

oi       os            eo  co 

'■"■ 

CO 

l~ 

os'co* 

— 
-- 

OO'tT 

ei               co               "m 

o 

f 

- 1 

co" 
oo 

CO 

^ 

o  pH 

—  o 

- 

t-O       »r; 

.767 
,565 
,171 
,713 

,000 

,987 

Mill 

,860 
,430 

oo 

^ 

o 

Ol 

—  C5 

IC  Ol 

OS 

CO       -CO 

CO 

CO 

g^- 

oq  -r 

-r  iq 

cq 

t^.      .  co 

oq_    • 

CO 

CO 

o 

i>-"of 

■* 

2         OO          T          CO          OS  W3  «©                —  CO 

CO 

oa 

^2 

oo  r*- 

r-~  — 

r. 

-"        '  OS 

^         Oi        OJ         1-                     O              Ol  i.O 

Oi     " 

CO 

CO 

CO-* 

o_ 

cO_ 

O                     O 

iq 

s 

"' 

Dl 

~ '               c' 

— 

to 

CO 

er* 

CO  — 

:i  -i 

ec 

CO  CO 

co      ^      os      ^t*o      oooj»c      r^-to 

o 

CO 

^ 

^ 

uo 

o;  os 

CO  OS 

OJ 

•Oco 

»o     -co       t—       —  co     ■  cc  to  ro        oi  -r 

- 

fe  oo 

o»« 

oq  io 

c. 

■  —  CO 

cm     -  *o      oq      co          ■  os  co  >o     ■  oj  -r 

o_ 

oq  • 

W0 

o 

-rr  -«*r 

r-^10 

:  co"  cd 

cS    'oo"      co       oo          ;io— "'eo     :*cco* 

o" 

3» 

o" 

o* 

^12 

O  CN 

cO-« 

CO         CS         C^          —                        lOCJ          OM  CO 

re 

OS 

»o 

CO 

OT 

'- 

co                co  eo            io 

CM_ 

o 

~ 

—                oj" 

W3 

CO 

^_ 

CO  CO 

•«*<  OO 

-« 

•o  -r 

_         o         —«         — —        Ol>-        CO  —  CO 

O 

OS                        IO 

OS 

o 

00 

co  oi 

O  CO 

r- 

-  OI  -M 

CO      -co        00        »c  O      -OCO     •  —  f  »o 

= 

eo     •         -oo 

o 

s  J3 

*>•« 

CO  CO 

•C*)O0_ 

O        ■  O           CO          l>-  —        ■  CO  'T           CO_  O  M  - 

r 

eo     •          •  os 

a> 

o 

tC  — 

«-Tt^ 

»o 

;  »o  ri 

■^      *  of        *C         OO"  — *"      '.  ION       ;  CO  CO"  t>T 

o" 

oo"    ;         !of 

to 

OS 

£;2 

—  r 

CO 

ro 

>ON 

—       us       «-•       eo                oco»o-r 

e 

"0 

CO  CO 

3 

O.                        1©                       — 

Os" 

-- 

CO 

CO 

Ol 

CM 

■* 

uo 

iO  OS 

iO  CO 

r. 

eo  — • 

CO       o       — «       — •  >-o  CO  •— •  i>-       »o  '-O  *o 

o 

CO         -f                     O 

CM 

o> 

o 

OS  o 

f  Ol 

■  O  CO 

io    -*o      »»•      too- '  os  os    » oa  o  co 

s 

co        eo      ■           •  Tf« 

CO 

CO 

„o 

OS  IN 

OS_CO 

*"*i 

■co-* 

IO     •  O        O        — «  Ol  »o  0\eo      ■  -r  CO  CO 

rr 

—_       eo_    -          -o^ 

oa 

OI 

OO'iO 

•oof 

■  ^co 

-/      os"      oo"      ^*      oo"  *c  of    '  os"  co  xi 

o 

O 

S*«5 

CO  uo 

lO-H 

CO 

COO 

oi       co       i—i       »>-       eo       »>-       oi  oi  co 

re 

»o 

r- co 

K 

-f  — 

kO       i—                            oi_ 

00 

to 

CO 

»o 

— 

CO 

CO 

Irt 

CO-M 

ir-.*o 

oc 

O  O-l 

— i       ^*«       co       — « <—  -rf                io  eo  to 

rr 

t^       i>-                  — 

o 

oo 

•O  OS 

— ^  o 

■  co  eo 

co     ■  oo       os       coco—     •     •     ■ -r  X)  ~r 

ri 

■»*        CO     ■           *Os 

CO 

55 

5— " 

OS  Os 

OOeO 

<- 

■  os  »o 

o*     •  r^      o       co^n     ■     •     •  t-^-^.O 

C 

cO_       »0^     ■           -^ 

oa 

»C  CO* 

(NO* 

cc 

«-J    'tC      -^7      co"—-"*    !         !-ri>-"os" 

c 

of      o"    !         !  of 

o 

GO 

^2 

CO  oi 

IO 

so 

■  —  os 

oi       »o                 -f       co                 -r  co  co 

CO         CO                     —^ 

CO 

co_ro 

3 

eo 

-r                                    co 

OS 

«* 

io" 

co 

" 

** 

-^ 

to 

00 

r^co 

-*f  CO 

X 

CM  Ol  CO 

O       co                t^- »-                     ^icro 

o 

eo       oi                oo 

CM 

o 

ic>  — 

cor- 

-* 

CO  OS  CO 

cc-oo            •         CO  OI      ■      ■      ■      •  —  --00 

= 

CO 

Os 

6« 

oo 

o  oq 

cqoqco 

%e$     •  ***                co  eo     •■-■—_  co  co_ 

= 

eo       eo^     -          •  O 

EC 

co"co* 

co"»o" 

re 

oTeooi" 

^h       '  CO             "         Ol  •**''.'.',  CO"  iO  rtT 

1C 

of      os"    ;         !  of 

M 

CO 

i-*  '° 

-rf 

OS  co  OS 

CM       '  ^                        CO  CO                               i-W«C 

^f         CO                       OS 

Tf« 

o_oi 

'- 

r^-  co 

--.                                  »o_ 

« 

eo 

q j 

UO 

oo" 

ce 

CO  — 

^rco 

CO 

O:  CO  O 

COOO—        oi        —                         enr;  -  -r 

o 

CO         —                     ** 

CO 

to 

1  - 

Os  Os  -* 

r,.  —  t--       os       »-     •     •     •     •  o:  co  *m  o 

o 

oi        t^.      *           «0 

f 

»o 

g  _J 

oqo 

el"^l'* 

occot—       o       os_----cotoos-r 

- 

X 

oq 

OS 

**  oo 

co"  os 

if! 

cfooo" 

cc'icn       »o"      to                   '  eo"  i>.  o  i  r--* 

»c 

OS*        CO      *            '.OC 

CO 

^  ■* 

eo  >.o 

'- 

CO  CO  CO 

-hhCI         i— i         l>-                               tC  OI  CO  X 

eo       co                eo 

'^p 

eo_oi 

r 

QO^t-  -h 

CO 

OJ 

o 

OS* 

Ol 

uS 

CO 

o" 

o" 

U0 

O 

--co 

io  CO 

o 

OS  »o  »c 

CO  OI                                                                  i-iOCO 

■* 

CO 

CO 

t~ 

r- 

■o  r: 

c 

lOCO  o 

oi  co     -          *          c: ■  r   s 

.      .            .(Z 

CO 

Ol 

r- co 

w: 

oq  oi_  io 

»c 

-c 

Os 

'—  .-: 

/  t  , 

of  co     "          \          '.','.'.'.'.  of  co"  co 

»o 

■*£ 

00 

'■~2 

■*  re 

CO 

fc 

7   /  •>: 

ci  —                                                   —  cm  -r 

o 

CO 

Ol_01 

(C 

w^-*H 

o_ 

CO 

-1 

oq 

'" 

'" 

CO 

-t- 

- 

od 

O0 

CO  co 

—  CO 

- 

oo  p  >o 

Ol CO                                                                  <M 

to  r- 

u; 

o> 

o 

CO  co 

co_o 

cooc 

oi  os —     •     • 

■       •         IOOS 

t^. 

OS 

Soo 

coo: 

-r 

eo  oo  »c 

•Hto      -                         O      ■      ■ 

*o_c< 

c 

■»j* 

-*-"co 

— Too 

e  i  -r  co" 

of  »o"  ;       ;       '.'.'.'.'.   '.^   '.   '. 

'.           '.             co"-^« 

l>- 

00 

CO 

U- r* 

CO  CO 

r 

coo  o 

eo  t~-                                                   — 

o 

o> 

00  — 

•- 

co_c©  >—t 

CO 
X 

CO 

o' 

COO 

GC 

—  CO  O) 

o                                            o 

OO         CO 

9 

to 

00  o 

— 

OCC.fD 

co 00     •     •     • 

•  CO        oo 

•o 

>o 

C  CO 

f 

o\co_r^ 

os    •     ■                                •     • -r    *    ■    • 

■  *°- 

»f: 

CO 

3 

30  -r 

t^ 

Os  o"»0 

oi"  '                '.  '.   '.   '.   '.  »>-**  !  ;   ; 

;      I  co 

OS 

CO 

OS  cs 

-c 

CO                                                       oi 

CM 

3! 

-1<" 

I  - 
-* 

co_»« 

EC 
if. 

o 

2. 

o 

IS    • 

§ 

8.  J   : 

1S^    ; 

d 

9 

-J 

1 

.-a 
.  a 
.  o 

s.1 

i 

T3 

a 
-- 

o 

2 

=. 

1  : 

5 
g 

g 

r:    - 

< 

^c 

II.S 
S.*"" 

a 

oks  fc 

senals 
warsh 
kmen 
urvey 
n  expi 

aj 
g  c 

s-ss 
&*  a 

1 

a* 

•dinary: 

Navy  Departm 

Expenditures  fo 

fairs1, 

e 

1 

r- 

ttraordinary: 
Construction  of 
Civil  engineerin 

Building  and  re 

Shipbuilding   ai 
on  commissio 
Shipbuilding  ex 
Special  building 
Provident  fund 

-o 
c 

C! 
■.    J 

d   i 
\    % 
Ptj 

J 

Grand  maneuve 
Preparing  of  bo 
Extension  of  ar; 
Dispatching  of 
Dispatching  woi 
Hydrographic  s 
Naval  expansio 

8  o 

'J  "7 

■§  r, 
£  ■ 

Organization 
Shimose  gun| 

Dock      impro\ 
naval  station 

Special  expense 

Naval    ordnani 

c 
3 
c 

?• 

7 

is 

1 

z 

3 

o 

-a 
c 
2 

O 

O 

U 

.2  a  — 


"  £S 


a 

* 

oo 

CO 

= 

* 

3 

-J 

d 

X 

00 

-a 

>) 

a 

o 

B, 

c 

Q 

^» 

■r 

< 

- 

V 

oS 

X 

r- 

a 

a 

2 

f 

«i 

0 

— 

- 

Pn 

bj 

a 

9 

1 

a 

2 

—  "/■- 

c. 

r 

^ 

a 

g 

3 
fc: 

— 

ri 

■< 

T3 

re 

~ 

■s 

eg 

od 

- 

S 

b 

s 

,- 

s 

■• 

^_ 

s 

_- 

sa 

_5 

)0 

ft 

a 

a,a 

■S 

3 

c 

a 
* 

1 

•£ 

- 

r3 

r 

o 

s 

J 

R 

m 

a-g 

aO'"S 

^■22  2 

fc   n   O 
-Si  C  ^^-=  Ol 

S'Eig  9* 

o  rt  O  ^  <u 

.2  o  g2  fc 
oj  «.2  £ 

fc_L^5  a  is 

a  a  S10  ° 

£   q  i3CO    C 

esc  >,°ci 

cC    O^^-O 

^  &l  i  s 


STATISTICAL   TABLKS   OF    EXPENDITURES 


285 


U 


!=> 

"X3 

H 

0 

5*. 

'A 

K| 

&- 

•*-, 

X 

w 

•■0 

W 

^ 

s 

«t! 

a 

— <  —  ©  ■ ,  . 

OO  iO  30  rfH 


S  Ol  tO  — 1  GC  00  I 


"■*-  ^  ^  ®  Vl ' '  x: '  1  ~"i '  \  "*1 

N  ©  »0  of  -*1  O*  •— '  GC  OS  CN  CO 

:o©©oicoi-.©-r-rco~t- 

N  CO  00  lO  O  >-"_  CO  M  ^>\  t^  tO 
CN  <T-J  «— 1  tO»C«3  0 


CO  |-~  CO 
P*  ©_  t- 
ts»        _~        0" 


GO 


t  CO  o  • 
I*  ©  CO  ■-" 
-OS  — 
t  <N  — < 


■  —  ©  -r  —  co  >q       os       ~-  ao 


GC  CN  t/5  CO  — 1  OS  ~- 


ro 


fflOOOoi'OrO'-CiO 

os  n  01  o  -t  'M  'x>  ir:  —  c.  10 

ic  o  cc  co  1  -  —  CO'  co  t  1  os  as 

£  co*  co*  --*  -^  ©*  00"  cc"  r-*  co"  o"  as" 

*_.    as  o  co  r--  co  ©  1  -  co  .0  >o  -* 

^*  "*•  CO  — '  CO  N  -^  O  tO  CD  *  M 


■1"O-H00O 
,°.ai0.fl0. 
!  -t**  -**  00*  — <*  GO 


lO 


1— 1  OJ  CN  CO 


■  MNCOOSTf 
h  O  i-"  00  Ol  CN 

•CDOSCDW^ 

_  «o  O  O  •— '  CO  co"  00*  -t*  o*  o*  00" 
'     «o  — ■  co  o  os  1— t  co  t-  a-  a.  a. 

"  CO  CO  — "T  C^  <N  O  1"  N  Tt< 
»o"  fhC4CN*CO 


—         <M         — 


O  —  —  CO 


-©CD©COCOCOCO»0©- 


g  ^T  ,_,  oi  OO"  00*  CO*  OS*  .c"  00*  <■*  GC 

'OOO'^OOiOONOOoiO't 

•"^aoco  —  cocioio  —  coco 


005CKDO 

■  000  *-o 


00         OS  —  CO 


.  «-H  CO 


os  00  •— "  ^-  »C  Ot  1^-  CO  C) 
OJ_CN  ©_—<.—  ©  CO  CD  CO 

£;©"©"  w  .—"  10  "*-"-♦*  co"  — 

tv,^OSO^COCDCDNN 
"^— 'Cl'-'COCM'-tOOOSOO 


—    •      oot 


-  co  as  co  o  o  c 

'TNCOOiOOI 


CO         Q0         O0  ~h 


CO  CD         OS  i-H  CO  CO 


COO 
COO 


OM0050NMO'- 
h-OlNO-tOOSOOiO 

e  N.  ^  ^  M.  't  ^  ^  "t  '"'I 
£  r^"  as*  as~  »o  ■**  co"  co  t*-  oi 
^  r--  00  as  r-  oi  tp  co  -+•  os 


■^OO-TfOOOOO 
rf  »-"  OO  OO  »f  O  N  O 
O  CO )t~^  l>-  C-*_  0  t-- 
h-"  Tji"  CO*  O0*  GO"  00"  *0 


lOic^oscoecoN'H 


L_oo-*co»oaoascocO- 
^*  —  cj      c-i  -h      »coh 


>— 'lOr-coOOiOOs 

HOUOMOOM'" 


OMhiOhmh 


■fco'tONffiooic      as 

OCCSMN^-M-fN-H 


1  '-D  err  C  CO  N  IC  N  lO 

cow      o  •-<      »o  -— '  as 


CO^t"OOOSO-+-»fiCCO 

co  *—  00  1-  co  as  co  01  os 
.  <"  00'  r*T  Qo*  co'  co*  co  io  ~  m<"    .  - 

H^C-lcOiOCOco^PUOCOiC         •— t 


»o        <-<        Ol 


OQOO'l'COOOO  r-  f-«N 

©  *— <  »0  •— <  ©  uO  -*  ©  -rf  OI  Tf 

o  -*  i-H  q*t  w«n  ■  *h  © 

01"  1^  t^r  00"  ic  of  oT  ;  co"  «^r 


C-l  CO  ©  ©  < 


^OiOONC 


©-H  ^ 


>  i-i  00  00     -co       00 


-r  ~-0  ©  -t*  1--  ©  — •  ©       os       ■— 1  c 
©  ©  iC  CO  «c  ©  »o  ©      ■  ©        h-  c 


—  CI  CO  »C  —1  »C(Mt>. 

CO  -f-  »C  >C  OS  ■  ©   ©  'X> 

gOOl-^CDOO  ■  »0  CO  ^* 

<a-  to  »o  00"  os"  f  "  '©—*"■" 
^1  ih -t  •*  ic  m 

Os  — 


MO         — 1  OO  CO 


IP 


-'  :-:-  = 


c 

>■ 

G 

1 

s 

a 

a 

ti 

0 

a) 

0 

0. 

'M 

gr^  03 

(S 

H-r 

z    z 

>£. 

'Sao. 


£  a,  c—  >_  C.2-  =  _o  ;«0_  3j  ^ 

'I  S3  >-§'S'£'>'3.g  c.sSo  g  §  ag-i 
j3tc'3  ti  c  D  o  c"  ^  s^-  CoO.^3 


5  S 
■a  S 

a-o 


m  eJ  £  fe  m  03 


O    C3 
C    C 

s  a 

i<!0 


o 


286 


APPENDIX 


a 

a    ~ 
a    5 


-    ~ 


- 


00  oc 

O   WN»- 

\r>       O        CO 

t 

OMOO^t^       r^       O        OO 

o 

tLZ  ~~ 

*i"0  O  i^  —   r*5        C*        ^        O  V 

rl 

0    U.  = 

-^  0  -T  r-oo  p*}       O        h.        »«  — 

t^ 

a 

-i^t^-— OO"       rr      n      o  o 

"6"5 

£  «  oo  o M                             «  00 

M 

-  a  ri 

^-    C  M   rcr^O 

r^ 

c 

ii".O0            o 

O 

i-  O               •-" 

•* 

o"e3  2 

huo 

c*  r*-  \r>  »fl  «                                  t-* 

00 

00    N   W^N      ■             •              •              •   t»          1 

"3 

oo  « [*n      0_    *                   •         "00 

m 

~  c*  so"  o      io  !       i       !       !  ■*      3 

o 

*>  t^  in  o       r-                                    O 

Oi 

H 

,— ,  o  ""-  f*5      oo^                                    »- 

q 

cio*            *; 

m 

M 

w 

M 

r*.  po  w                                           f 

m 

•-•  O  PO ■* 

>       00 

«»a 

PC  C£  io w 

N. 

m  m  c 
•o  o>.S 

>       ro 

*^    N     Ifl    M 

r~ 

3  "  to 

q^ 

CQ      ™ 

n" 

r<5 

<tf 

tf 

00  l/>              00                                              O 

r^ 

•* 

H 

N 

o 

21 

>*  pcoo 

"5 
00 

4j 

N 

«" 

c 

3 

o 

*-<    *t               O                                                     O 

o 

ON      •      'H       •             •             ■             'O 

o 

o 

o 

q 

Rj 

a 

,*>   O    <*5     .      .  00      .            .            .            .  oc 

o" 

"3 

N  OO  X                i-i 
NO 

o> 

q 

c 

V 

rf 

d 

p)  r-            <n                                    M 

u^ 

»fl»fl    •     -O     •          *          •          ■  C 

o> 

^  00   rf    •      -  0_     *           ■           •           ■  C 

q 

o 

£    t-T  30*      "       '  00*      |             ',              '              "    h 

O 

01 

^  oc  O             O                                        h 

o_ 

*F 

\r> 

1-1 

M 

<-    Tf  !T>         00                                                     C 

P)   PICO      -CO      ■            •            •            ■   0 

•H 

00 

^  fO  r<  0>     ■  O.     ■           •           •           •  C 

o 

o 

£   m '  S  *fi     '   c£     '.           '.           '.           "  1* 

a 

0> 

>       ^.  M30          O*                                                    H 

vO 

»-*0  r-            O 

N 

5 

f»5 

P0   Tj"  Tt   lO   I/}                                                                   t" 

00 

cs 

r- 

„  1  q  o      oo    •        '        '        "  c 

o 

5  io  i>  m     «  ;      ;      ;      ;  oc 

to 

Ol 

*     io  r~  p-i      oo                                  ^ 
^«mh       q 

o 

oo 

t-T  to             po 

a 

O  h  i/*,  o  io  m        10       O        O  c 

o 

en  o  ro  O  O  t--      r~      o       Ooc 

\ri 

.U 

""tt^t^      Q      T      '-i*0 

o_ 

rt  C 

PO  CN   "^  t^  M  PO        o         ^         io«c 

oo" 

Vi  3 

Ci^wojnOO^         *f        N        *0  C 

^  O 

t*>   N   PO  M   M   pn    M                                   w*c 

w 

^  i*fN  ^  POO 

W 

rrt~-              "> 

00 

►*    Ol                 " 

« 

M 

k     •  «     "  B     • 

3     •  3     •  3     ' 

aning 

constr 

Yasuk 
stival . 

e  •-  a  b 

o     •                   0J 

1 

O    1>    O.D 

7. 'i  «  a 

■3  :  S  :  ofc 

l_  -   V  v< 

.       -T3     •  *J-0 

(U 

of  pe 

Of  Mi 

rvice 
:ion  e 

— 

/.  g'S 

c  ">  -5     •  3  tlf 

(0 

o 

c  c 

HI   1 

a  c 

X   X 

-  o'o  [ 

i 

Hirosh 
pens 

Yedog 
tion 

Contri 
Shri 

H 

-r      -tin 

- 

Ooo  0 

O  1^  »o 

«o  - 

w.  ^f-C 

<s  —  m 

00    Oi  O 

r^  r-  cs 

■»r  nj-oi 

lO         H 

t» 

N  00   M 

00 

Ov  O.  fO         t*     •      • 

anc 

N   *-    PO         Ov     . 

<* 

PO 

•  "tC 

-  O*  io        lO     •      • 

•  o  - 

00 

.  t~  «        O     ■     • 

•  N  ro       r^    ■     • 

*t  I^O        0\ 

nwt 

>o    •    • 

►-«  ro  r»       M     •     • 

M 

M    .    . 

00  Tf  po      oo 

win  fl      r^    ■    • 

00  00  ■*       o     •     • 

MO   H 

t  :  ; 

O>00  M        *0   N   O 

Ooo  t~      N  r~  m 

«  N  O       O  «  •* 

N   P0  ro        M   -  10 

f  O" 

l^OiO 

PONO    N            Tt  Tj-  Oi 

lO          H 

t^ 

X 

ai 

hi 

01 

c 

o 

c 

d 

^ 

a 

01 

u 

"3  n  £ 

.  a 

c 
Ed 

o  , 

•oc? 

■g«S 

■is 

E 

5  c 

c 

- 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


287 


00  r-co  r- 

rOM  **0  O  O  :0   -t  -O 

ci  ~  x  r^       r»       ro 

-0  0  1 

3 

i- 

00  mo  po 

rON't^fN"!^^ 

O  »/)  »/*'  Ov        N         O 

1*  W  30    PO 

CO  r-r-^oO  C^co^io 

o_  -  t>  a      r^      - 

00  0 

^  O"  ^t  !*» 

dS^SS^o^^t 

OC    'O  d*  li^         T         O 

n'  m 

3 

0 

O    O  M    fO 

lO«    t^(S    N    N    tf 00 

i-fio  «     >o      n 

^   -T 

TfN    -    CO 

^■N        CO  fOCO   O   0\ 

0  t~  ^-          1- 

c> 

IO  tM- 

t-t   O          10  O          IflWJ 

IH  00                     00 

0 

N   N 

<fr                M                 M 

•3- 

^0 

<q 

Tf    Tf\ft 

Wh        <t              w 

1^               r^ 

co  CI 

I  - 

10 

N  h-    •  fO     ■      '  <A     • 

.  >-    .    .       m 

00  -^t 

"t 

■M&H 

O   « 

m 

0 

'  m  «*  *e? 

o«    .  "-■     .     .  ^    . 

'  irt    '     '        ir>          ' 

cT  co 

* 

r-  Tf 

r-       w             O 

ci                  vO 

0 

0 

CO    CD 

\0          t*                 M 

""           '": 

H  H 

0 

0 

CO 

10 

00 

CO 

r* 

o_ 

CO 

T 

t~ 

■* 

0" 

CO 

00 

CM 

Oi 

O* 

re 

O  <N 

»n 

O 

.  n    .    ■ 

1^00 

m 

0  10 

r^ 

!"**•! 

!  :  :  !  '.  '.<>  '. 

00"  « 

a 

O 

C* 

•<t 

O 
O* 

w 

W    hH 

N                 O 

N                       O. 

» »      10 

O 

.  N   rO     • 

..._..  ro    • 

.   -      .      .        0 

\n  0       ~} 

O  "^ 

•* 

-1- 

r^oo    ! 

*oo*   !    !      u^       ! 

■* 

-F 

M    N 

00 

CO 

00 

10 

ro  N 

<r     o*        0 

-0             0 

r*\0 

u, 

r~ 

■  O  O     • 

.  _     .  ^    .     .  rf    • 

•  O0      •      •         C5 

CO  0 

C' 

00 

•  O  Tt    - 

'  "t    '  °.    '     '  *1    ' 

.  (S     ■     .       0 

■*q 

'     I^H          * 

!h  ;  h  ;  ;  ro  ; 

;  0"  ;  :    ■*     ; 

CO 

CO 

O     O 

0 

C5                    (N 

30 

10 

VI 

3 

o* «  Wi 

u)f0       fO             O 

■^                        CN 

M    IO 

-1 

O 

•   ION    h 

NO       ■    ■*     •      •   I/>     • 

■  00     •     •         CO 

CO-O 

00 

•fOt^H 

t-«0     •  ro    *     ■  O     ■ 

•  CO     •     •        o_ 

w  cs 

ifl 

00 

O  r»  Tf            r-    '.  0\    !     !  C*     ! 

"  to  '   "     1^       ; 

i- 

10  O 

r*-       *-*             r** 

00                    10 

O 

r-  t- 

10         l>                 M 

CO                     M 

i/} 

m 

H 

^* 

10 

CO 

CO  ro  ^  <N 

CO  IflfOOOM   *"0  */" 

n  0  X  r-       O        c- 

CO  00 

CO 

a 

OO00   f'N 

O^l-^-ONMt^O 

O  fowo       O.       O 

0.  0 

OO 

CO 

t-OC  CO   N 

»-»0  f^NO   O  i-1  "" 

OOOO      00        *- 

w    •* 

<t 

m 

dico"  ^  <*• 

0"  0"  <*5  00"  c£  ^t  6"  Tf      00  t-  IN  10      CO       0 

0" 

-f 

ci 

v^^r^ro        lO'th'O   N   M   rfco 

Tf  O   O   IO         O         CN 

■* 

TfTfrOfO        *t  */)        mi-ocOCOC^        ©   ^  ^"            ^R. 

rt; 

IflNO 

mQv         lOO          ^-  W)         H4CO                     vO 

10 

00" 

0*   N 

ro           «'           m 

^r 

c 

O 
10 

u 

■3 

c 
0 
0 

0} 

CO 

■d 

B 
CD 

si 

c  : 

a_ 

a 

£ 

r 

a  ■ 

2  ^ 

<u 

CO 
CD 

•  4-.     ■  M 

■  CO    •  S 

■  0    • 

:■?  »  c 

"o  6 

s1^ 

> 

CD 

■a 

'•a  a 

■  §s 

.  cd  til 

.  c  c 

till 

■2,22  0 

av.t 

°^ 

c  a: 
.  a)  fd  ' 

a  0 c 

) 

c 
u 
a 

X 

a>  a 

'E: 
v  E 
/.  . 

■J  - 
I  -- 
J.  J 

c 

c 
i 

e 
t 

.  c 

1 

c 
cc 

-'- 

cd  < 

.H   ; 

^f  - 

In 

- 
i- 

c 

S  a"  2 

"^          k«  CD 

c  S-s 

c  7)  .22  2 

J--  £  a< 

^  i5  "  5  r 

.■Sjg  k-c  c 

***  cu 
—  ~  ■- 

bag 

|aj 

a>E 

u 

• 

■i 

cy 
| 

.   3l 

0 
H 

a 

.  -. 

0  » 
H 

APPENDIX 


2    O    C    3 


j.  cd 


^    C     ^ 


>S  ^-his 


mo  o 
*»  o  sd  fo 


Ov  Tt  in 

Tt  O*o" 

^t  moo 


r*-00    'tsC  00    fOO  C<00    l 

PC  w*© 

M   O*  O 

TfOOi'-  O  O  m  moc  CO 


n  oo  oo  O  tJ-  r*       m 


m  m  e>  t--  O  O  n  m  i-i 


h  sC  ^-O  t* TO 

cm  Tt  m  rn  o 


r--0  oc  m  i*CsO  «+  r-    •  os  On 


O0G  O  O  O  O  *fre*  r»  *m 
mo  h  o  O  io  m  a  -OO 
rooo         mNOinO      •  O  O 


-  c 

00  \r> 

-to 

OoO  »o 
r~o  oo 

•-i  O0   ro 

rooo 

O  l- 
t-  CO 

DC 

O  <N 

00 

■  rtO  r-O  CO  t^^O 


*-  t~  O*  -too  OOO  uiO  O 
(C   MOCOM   O  N   4h.n   H 

lOO  !J  IO  W)  4  Ifl  "O  &  t~0* 
-t  >-*  ^-  OC^O  r~-0  OfOoO 
't^Ot^M'lOlflM    t^  I~-  l/> 

ro  -t  -t  ~  O  O  •"-•  C*  >-<  oo"  C> 


2  c  rt  c 

'.w1"   3 


eM-5 

.2  5J  « 


C  O  4;  2  C   C.  3  Cs 
13  4J   <$   w   ,p  rt  *CJ 


=  o 


o 

F 

■a 

B 

c 

0 

41 

a 

a 

H 

T3 

to 

C 

0 

U 

B 

C 

V 

c 

-1 

4J 

C  tj 

"o 

c 

It 

0 

X 

i« 

o 

41 

>,J3 

41 

> 

>. 

it* 

.  a 


.5* 
"•a 

<U    4> 

o  e 
x  \r, 

CJ    4) 

(J 

3   C 


»    4> 

*tS 

rorr 

ro 
—   4)      . 

K  O  c 
5i  w  rt 


o 


2o  £ 


o>5 

<LV3  c 

«  o  n 


i—         4) 

rt  Si  !r, 


TO   i 

at 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF    EXPENDITURES 


289 


^ 

13 

.^ 

H 

R 

5 

w 

K 

a 

•^ 
oj 
Q 

3 

H 

Z 

w 

a 

H 

« 

«! 

Bh 

W 

0 

m   on  coco  O   CM   >-■  "0  CS  00  NO   O  CO   10  N   -tfOO   -3-  r^ 
O  r-»  On  1-1   O   CS    OnnO   CN   M   "^OO^  0_  CO  CO  On  I";  0_  t~;  10 
?  NO~  0>  ro  rf  oT  t^  G~00~NO~  CN   CM   1-1   N  >-i         m   iciONN 
C*    "3"  Tf-  0)   hh  NO   >i   1^.00   O         «")       NO  On  ON 

"  i-c         co  CN    w         co 


N  0 

O 

cOOO 

0 

t^ 

O 

~ 

^ 

O 

vo 

O 

if, 

0 

a> 


co 
o 

s ::::::::::::: 

"»  o 

>< NO 

CO 


tu  nO~ 


co   On  co 

in  '  NO  On 
NO   "  OnnO 


O    O  CO    CO 
NO    N>0 

1-1  co 
t^  CN 

0) 

I/}  I/)  N  CN 

On 

CO  ON 
O    « 

^ 

O  O  *t  -1- 
NO  CN  O  00 
NtOlfi-t 


^ 


vO   10  co 

m\OvO 

o  000 

d  6  *n 
nno  r^ 

O   1-1 


co  "0 
iO  on 


MOO  NCOCO  •*«  CO  CO  IO  m 
CN  IO00  NnO  ON  N  'CO  O  '  "5 
O  CO  NO  CO   10  On  NnO      ■   ^fCO      ■   CO 


•  10  O 

•  O  no 


•+OO    NIOONIO     ■   •d-M       .m       .1-1 

cOi-it^-ONCOi-ico  On 

CN|  00  0) 


nO__ 


CO    CN 

•  o  ~ 

■    ON  CO 


.    OJ 

O.  JO 

S «  S g  0£ 

C  y  ri1*-  0  ,_ 


o-d  — 
oj  oj  O  „ 
a-  j-  a,  3 
M  ^—  o 

o.-ox 

«  ccj  y  <g.c  rt 

!P,  o  S  ^  H  -o 
y  2  ™  ,-.  -y  c- 

c  2*  s* 


rt"S  o 

co  rt  u. 


c  c 


a 


oj  .q 
cn'O  cS  en 

y   0)  Mm 

5:2  gs 
2S.S  ° 


0  o 

bo  >> 

c  b  G  oj  ~  x 

•  -<  cd    aj    u    OJ    n) 

c  0  y*  oj  oj<~ 

oj  O.J5.  •"  c  o 

S  g 


-Q  oj 


3 

-     c^J2  3 
oj  v  <u  0  ccj  rr-—  03 


c 
^5  r<"  ^  ,^  v^ 


,,  3  u  i'   '000 


^-^2   S 


•B  § 

03  g 
—  oj 

be  a; 
SO 
T3  ■!-> 

C   C 


>  o  > 

5  So 


M<f> 


0  c 


oj 


ba 


^3 « a'sg^. 


c  5 
cd  en 


tnt-.^ 


^Q 


?N«i 

o.™ 

a— 

M    &> 

•■   M 

0;   t; 

>5 
^-  — 

05  c 

£0 

o 


to  <*> 


c«2 
o  o^ 

'5  "-a 
«  o  a 

-^3  C  rt 

H3'» 

cU  § 


a!  C 

a— 
05 


.  c 

.SO™ 
—  o  • 
(U   M   O, 

*~  C  " 
Co 

o  o-— 

M    OJ 

1=  o'H 

S  C   o 

c  *>$ 
.2  N  o 

-a  N 


290 


APPENDIX 


oc 

Z 

r-»  «*■ 

O  t^  — 

t^  i/~j  o 

IT/X) 

M 

s«o* 

(S(N\CrOCO        NO  nO 

X 

Tt-O    C_X_ 

r  *r  Pj  x  co  q_      vq_  cn 

"2 

rt 

8 

>r.  tFvO  m 

rOr-^iO—nO          f^C 

«o 

4-1 

—    —         vO 

00   COO          cOnO                c 

i      — 

o 

£ 

•<t-  cn 

m  **  a       (n 

o_ 

h* 

O 

»j 

o 

^ 

no  00 

no        r>»                           "i 

X 

C-   rO     ■       ■ 

n    •  m  •                •  o 

ON 

vO 

8 

■to    •    • 

o     '  o    '    ■             '  x 

^J- 

o 

•> 

MM      .      . 

Cn|       •    O       ■       ■       •              •  NC 

lO 

ON 

>^ 

—   <N 

C                                                H 

iO 

t^  m         C 

i^      h  mco       i«h 

o 

o  i^.   '  o 

<N        '     IflflOO            NO  NO 

o 

lO 

8 

^  ci  '  *". 

C      \   t-X    rO  O        nO_  r 

Tt 

o 

^ 

cOX~     •   H 

^f  ;  o  i-T  m  o     j^  c 

3        rC 

o 

>■< 

t^  O         >* 

NO          —          fOO                 n 

"" 

N    « 

ro       hi        « 

(S_ 

•'-. 

w 

•^ 

* 

^ 

O00   h    -t 

\0    NtO 

O 

-  n   ?-t 

!>.  (N    On 

^O 

•+ 

8 

O   C   O  t^ 

cni  -ri-  m    ' 

""l 

«a 

o 

^ 

>-.   —  ic  o 

i^  r-»  co    ■     ■ 

lO 

5 

On 

>i 

(NX           i-i 

m  totf) 

f<5 

0 

cs  h 

NO 

h5 

■fe. 

s 

"5 

1/1  cOnO 

<*■ 

OOim      ■ 

^ 

CO 

8 

OnvO  ON    " 

lO 

o 

cu 

0 

- 

vO   cO 

« 

■^ 

■_ 

- 

- 

i£ 

c 

cn 

u 

*~r 

O 

=: 

1h 

_o 
'3 

is 

u 

c 

u 

/. 

'C 

c 

u 

C 

E 
E 

cn 

a 

u 
C 

cn 

cr 

C 

o 
u 

c 

c 
c 

C 

"53 

■i 

c 

cn 

c 
«. 

E 

01   rt 

cd 

o 

^ 

■/ 

tn  a. 
c  o 
a>  r\ 


'o 

7 

in 
1) 

u 

O 

53 

c 

tn 

C 

o 

- 
c 

u 

7.      «    4-1      .,   .— 

T3 

■/. 

pen: 
al  e 
es  a 
use? 
.mil 

u 
in 

c 
o 
pq 

— 
- 

lice  ex 
1  speci 
chargi 
e  expe 
s  to  fa 

men 
for  Pi 

ards. 
e  for 

».ft 

05  *c  i 

>    U'—   >  — '  _c    c 

o  p  -C  -   '•■ 
3  lli  ^  c 

!  =  ?"=  =  t  S<"  i 

O 

'  •  -.  — i  rJS        w    r.  — 

:~-  2-2 

cers 
ovis 
ecia 
'sen 
ty  c 
cret 
efec 
at  I 
iecia 

H 

O.U    i    -  — 

u 

X 

^> 

- 

; 

r< 

- 

y 

K 

U 

J- 

PL, 

/ 

«+  O   On 
ui  r^  -3- 

(N    t-;  r-; 

O    -    ro 

«   NO 


tO»  no  O  X 
C    -    O  O    On 

ro  "J  it  fC  X_ 

o"  pi"  m  "-"no" 
X  X    (S  On 

M_  CNI    « 


M 

Cn! 

r^  Cn) 

(N 

r^ 

O 

<■'-. 

CO  ON 

NO 

HH 

-1-X    On 

mo  ■+ 
c^o_  i>. 
t-C  r-C  cT 

O   PI   fO 

-  c 


c 
o  tu 
c  u 

X    C 

.is 

7.     —    +J 

°  rt  .5 


cn   C 


o 


au  2-y 

x  i-  Ti,  ™ 
o  c"^ 

a  a  £•  c 
o  o  2 

C   c   S   n 
o  o  o  g 

_=  -  -  — 

rt  c:  ct ,° 
X;  X  X  H 


cu  Jd 


2.  .  S  a 

1  «  E^ 


tn 
cn 


bJO — ' 

-  •  -  C3 
.5  u  c  cn 
7.    g-g    % 


to    CU    r   O    C- 

°  £i.s 


Eo 
U  WD-x 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF   EXPENDITURES 


291 


Tt-  CT<  r^»  < 


o  "0<N  o  o  00  NinmM  <n  no  n  ►-  no  «o  "+  -t 

00    co  O    O   O    cOO   -tr^oO   O   WO^O   m   10  iO  t^CO 
*t<X   O~a0    0s  co  11   CS    cO00_  0_  C£00   0_  0_         N   ■""_  ■-, 


i/}nO   CO  M 
OOO    OM>. 

03  nw  o^ 


NO    cOOi^NOO    t^"-i    tT*)« 
cOnO    1-1         O    m>0   10        00    N 

m  m  10  -t-       on       «o 


00  00  o 
OnoO   r-» 

uSno"  6" 


^J-  co  **■  O  N  co 

'  c>m  rtO   ^? 
■   t~-  CO  COO   "")  O 


10  cOnO   "0  COCO    1-1 
*f-  on  -+nO    -i"  co  0) 

Tl"    01      CN    \£)_    0_    !-<__    C£ 

pf  Pi"  On  00   tJ-  co  »/5 
■3-         CO        ON 


(N  CO    N 

•  ON  '     *"     ON 

•  10  ;  cooo 
.10  •  10  co 


coo  r^i-  mooh 
CJnnO  nO    cOOO   cOO   </) 

vo  no  >-i  i-oovo  c^r-; 

.   10  o"  ^  cO  lOCO   10  •'*' 
M    r^  1-1  IOmiOh 

lO  On  CO        CO 

N    CO 


cooo   CO  O   rt-  *3" 
O   O   "0  »/>  -+0O 

co  qj      ft  ^  ^ 

vo  vo"      wiom 

O  *+n0    -+ 

0)  O    NO 


ID  1/5  I-    O 

OCO    NN 

00  o  <*■  o> 
idoo  no  ^F 

On  CO  On  O 
t^  C4    1-1 


On  "+  i-i  r^  co  on  10 

vO»   O   to*N    H 

NO     O   NO     "NO     "^  CO 

-f  co  on  «o      r^  1-1 


vO   10 
r^oo 

NO     IO 


tj-  10  -t"  On  t^ 
1-1  O  10  cONO 
m^ovo  '";o° 
vO"  m"  •+  m  w 
O    1-1         0) 

^-00 


M  00 

o  o 


OOO 
O  co  O 
O    ■*■  ON 


i/>  CO 

On  CO 


en  -3 

£    C 


rt  5 
0  rt 

u    O 


rt 


•8«- 

co   in  T3   o   3  "^ 

Kt3 


C    O, 


5  °m 


«  c7  :- 


-^  c  .3 
u.   rt  >- 

3   —      Oh 

2*  c  c 


"O  *  >-• 


5  o 


.2  oj  o  J5.y 

CO  X  ' 


to  J^5  £ 


cox 


o  c  o 


w. 


a 

n!  i£   O 


be  X  -3   O    3   £    crj  ^   — ; =   en 

1  >  o  o  -5  o  ■-  o  o 

!.g   bo  bfl  oc  be  £f  be  u  £j  5  -2 


bo 

c  c 
o--T 


UJ-"i    rn    (fl  73 
C    3 

*»-  S  '55  "5>  _ , 

3    C 


2  S  d  d 
2  x  ^  ° 

u.o^  g 


s  ° 

o,+j 

3   3 


to 
u 

3 

a 

in 

w> 

0 

X 

- 

a 

u 

N 

QHHP* 

O   rt   O   <U   H> 

,    r  ,  be  bo  $5 

h  n-1  c  c  -o 

QJ        .3  .3    b> 


~  c  c.H.S-S.S  « -5  o  3 

3'3-3l53c33^53;E 

S.2.S2-O.S-0.2  g  "  in  x 


n-'    r-    r-    ^- 

o  3  3  rt 


2"g'2  0-2,0 "2  S.o; 

Ortcaujctfojrt-60 


"ffi 

rt2ScS3.Su.'rtSiu 

c)t^i  <5  U  S  W  <5  cyo  Di  H  ^ 


JTj'O-rt 

:  3— .  <u 


=  H 


-5.2- 


2">  °* 
^S^o 

rt  bog 

all 

3  rt  >. 

i-   ^   rt 

u  a 
£•0 


OS  In   to   bo 


a:ti  b« 

03  c 


O    3    c 


292 


APPENDIX 


<"".    MOW 

00  c  c  o 

■tN  O    O 


•-   co  O 
CC  CC  vO 


in  ic  -t  c  c  woo  rf 
—  c  rcoowuo 
co^c  oo  c  o  •*,o_  M__ 

c"  t^  O  O  ^O  M  rf 


O  00  00  ION   O 

tomo  >->  r^  o 
o>  co  **■  m  >-i  io 


c 
c 

ON 


**      -     -     - 
^i  o 


-h        icoo  •+  o 

CO  coo  o 

vD   i-   CS 


cOOO   w 
C    co  C 


co  io  o 

rf  rf  -T 

>-i   i-i   cs 


c»  oo  O  vc  C  co  r- 
»*■  w  o  "0  u-.  ~c 
cooo  o  c      'too  m 


>N  o 


o  c 
c  o 
c  o 


o  o 
o  o 
—  m 


a     b 

Q 

Z 

On 

- 


o  "■>  ci 

O   i-i  t^ 
CO  iO  >-< 


<u  be 
be  c 

fa 


E      CJ    +-> 


'oca 

I-  O 
rt  • - 
C  3 
—  -f 


5  3 


2  ° 
■fiu 


3  •—  3 1-3  -m 


<u  °  ^, 
i-  c  ° 
c_  .3  o  u 


°CJ   5 

be_^ 
C    crj  *J 

3*g  g 

«  o  o 
<-.  /.  /. 


a  2  E  w>  S 

—  —  i 


CK 


ac  - 

O   O    3' 


u 


Os  o"_ 


<J    r^—    r=T? 


•=  OiE  <u 

25     * 
—  -•- 


'-  2 


S  w 

c  e 

(1)   <u 

co 

o  y 

TT  2 

"'"'ifi  ■• 

OJ    <U    c 

o  o  c 
•3  a)  S: 

BJ    CO    P 

2  ■  ^°  b- 

r ;  -n  x  c  b  • 


11 

•jg  4-1  C 

-     °  —  rt 

s    C3    U 

E^,  «  o 

§  °-S  « 

U    (fl    ra  Gj 

u  bc-n  <" 


52  o 
«  2  o 


C    bfl 

E.E 
8^  &c 


O  -C 

"5  c 

3  O 

O  u 

^-  3 

aj  cr 

.E  u 


O.S 


.5'  c 

•00 


«   u   rt.r.   = 
S '=.£•- .2 

aftfr' 


E  c 


t/..3 

-.2 


«   C'CCA5 


o 


3   o  ~   <J 


-U.  _x   -  _-;  ^  ' 


U  (^     <X  • 


PQ 


35  "C  uW 


32    3    g    C 

w  hi  B  « 

<"    c   OJ   o 


ra  .3   C 
—    c  -C    O    J 

g.2^-£  S 

if  SSo 


be  >  J2  ° 

.E  3:  v^    OJ 


u-   0*3   c.5 


O   > 


O    as   E 

a  3.2 
x  o  C  oj-o 


STATISTICAL   TABLES   OF   EXPENDITURES 


293 


co  10  o 

T   T  C 
O  00   1-1 

00"  t-C 


«  0 

_ 

0  0    • 

O 

CI  00       • 

O 

0  00   ; 

»o 

c-i  1-1 

-t- 

->  ■* 

IO 

00 

00 

t^  \r>  0 

N 

OOO 

O 

t^O    >-i 

ID 

IOO  00 

O 

cOO   « 

M 

N   C3m 

1^- 

00   O 

1- 

M 

CI 

&       ri 


ci  o  o  11  inji'+w 
-rr~^i-iptooi-i 
q_vo  100  o  1000  ©> 

ri  c  -+■  -f o~co  10  i-T 
000  *co  -to  00  00 

**■  O  CI         p-h   O 


IflH   N  ICO  00  O    IO  CI 
CO  Ti-  CI   ClO    CO    COO 

r^iot^-oo  jMin     o 


1-    U0 

10  — 

co  ci 


o  i-» 
t^  o 


00 

CO 


ci  ClO  w  ir>  c>  co  r^ 

-t-  -t-  C>  w  ci  o  10  O 
O  00  lOO  O  lOOO  CO 
cf  o"  <*  "^fo'oo"  m  C> 
O  On  "*  CO  "3"0  00  O 
rt-O  M         Tj-  O 


m  «  t^.  uoo  t^o  10  ci 

c0  •*  M   CI  O   t^O   COO 


00 

"d- 

q. 


c 


0 

o" 

M 


_o  .5 


CA)CQ 


o 


D.  c/3 
4J    li 


2  bfl 


■o-S  [2 

■w  >  a.  c. 


■o.S- 

O   03 
u   1-; 


•5J-.2 
>"u  > 

2  &S.2  &£«! 


o   rt   -. 
«J    o    c    u 

o  s  c  o 

-i   --■- 
d,  Z  g  Pl, 


o  g 

a,  u 

12  a  03 


rt.O.g 


d& 


rti 
o'rt 

?   O   O 

*B. 

C  *j    o 

.2 is  S: 
en  o  o,*, 
.2*0.2  o, 

_c   W  O  — 


2  8 .5    _; 


294 


APPENDIX 


<o 


o   <o 


r 

ti 

- 

= 

n 

a 

w 

t. 

- 

H 

^ 

Vi      ^N 


0     s 


- 


c  z 

t*3  "-.  X 

O 

ir 

M 

N   O^^CK   *1-oc 

t^ 

^-  t*5  W  \0   C   ■*  M 

•* 

«J 

—  c  t*3 -c  j>iOf)N 

o 

— 

£    -t"  -t  (N           *+  lO 

o 
H 

o 
■* 

t^ 

0 

c* 

£ 

»    N                               "" 

o 

I-  c     '           '     "  oc 

<D 

VO 

«  «o    '               "  « 

VO 

0 

,•■-     -t»        •        •        •        •    M 

Tt" 

^    <N 

cO 

t^ 

1^ 

—  ~  \n           o 

in 

t^  c  m    '     '  "*■    ' 

t^ 

in 

o 

«   N   «   O      '      '    -+■     ' 
.«  NOO  m    ■      •  fi    • 

q> 

—,  c  -  m          m 

m 

rO 

rf 

0) 

<N 

51 

N   CM   rOOO 

NC    COCO      ' 

ro 

-t- 
c 

B00   h«00      " 
."-   -C   C    —    C  m     ■ 

o\ 

>,  1^  —  1^.       -1- 

1-1 

lO 

r^ 

M 

1-1 

in 

lO 

o 

rO 

s  c- 

o 

o 

3" 

£  - 

rT> 

_, 

c 

'— 

. ,  , 

o 

<n 

CJ 

in 

C 

cu 

o 

y. 

o 

c 

in 

\3   <u 

_o 

mal 
on. 
ves 

r  ib 

en 

g 

N 

•=-r.E  s 

o 

c 

bfi 

(1  a 
stra 

try 
>r  \ 

- 
- 

o 

- 

°^  o  o 

- 

3 

o 
bo 

C  O  >—   o     ■  T 

a  -  -  ?  ;:  7 

._    1,    -    u    -    * 

c 

jje 

on  o 
gem 
ure 
of  fi 
busi 

"c- 

=  -•-  g  -  m  ./c 

V  B  U  a  3  C  r  t 

H 

7. 

- 
c 

_ 

u 
< 

.3 

J 

C 

& 

_ 

c 

ir 

n 

t^-  mx 

O00 

^ 

Oi 

n^o       CfOCceiONOvO-t 

"* 

Cm-         O   <N   O   O   C    i-   f.  t*3  ""- 

oo 

O   <N         C»    C    CM^N   «00   ^ 

N» 

c*5  rO        it.  h  M   3>  O         «cr~ 

N 

r<3  t-»         1^         IO  ^-  f>»               m  — 

Tj- 

""  °          M                       "" 

in 

c> 

Cs 

'     •                           X 

X 

'   C      ' 

O 

f5 

_                 ■-!          |%.  io              M    N 

Cn 

•   Tf           '   rO     '   **■  O      "      '   O   "* 

Cv 

•  o        "  •-    '  <n  \c    "    ■  nm 

N 

.00             -i-      -MO      •      •  00    ■<* 

in 

00                               VC    rO                 -*  C 

CN 

r^j                           ►,  o                —    l- 

in 

1^        C    -+        "~.  —  30    o 

<* 

■  t-^      cm    '  b  i-N  n    ■ 

'   -f       O  vO      'X   «)b  «    ' 

00 

.    —            ON     .    H    H    M    H       .       . 

m 

1-n.        ir;              w   t>.         b. 

rC 

BH                Tj-                         O      O 

t^ 

s 

-f                                                     -      B. 

O 

c 

■^ 

^ 

OfO       o  o  c  m 

t-^ 

c»  -^i-      cmc  « 

-t 

C  1^       C   "3"  c   c 

t 

PO 

* 

tCN          "0        00    — 

o 

S 

re  —          t^         m  rO 

". 

,<5 

I>. 

O 

*— ■ , 

<a 

s 

>> 

w 

■ttn 

<u 

4 

o 
c 

c 
a 

3 

c 

1  i 

<s. 

3 

O 

rt 

O 

E 

HI 

rt 

c/; 

o 

>. 

■*. 

c 

u 

o 

c  ° 

3 

c 

fc  >. 

^ 

o 

U 

3 

_o 

CJ 
u. 

en   p7 

.„  rt  co  o 

'o 

cj  c 
i?  O 
c  o 

5  c.S  a 

.si  S-a 
•aizs.s  ^ 

«0    oi    " 

^    tn    u    ^< 

5  3  rt-S 

9)   3          Mi; 

C    O    CJ    =J.h 
O    O    L    u    n 

CJ.Si-r 

'X    3    £ 
OJ    OS    •■ 

^ 

0 

o 

•C  =  X?«-,aSoOSi: 

1         TO 

1    oi 

fc 

E 
c 

•c  — 

'in   « 

J3D: 

3 
f. 

I 
C 

E 

:- 

-  c 

- 

J 

<- 

>   « 

D. 

c 

1 

— 

b 

.1 

c  - 

c 

'J 

E- 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


295 


"tMO  no       coi-c^      >- 

r^oo  ioa^    •  c  r^-  -t-      1- 

sC  moo  uo  co   •  <s  -*t<x 

sO_ 

O  >0  -S"  UO  Os     '   0>0>N        "i 

C)    1-1   CI  SO    CO     '   i/)m    N         00 

CO   OW  N   O         NO'*        10 

00    CI  00  \C    uo               ^tm         — 

NAM                       hi          CI 

M 

CI 

rO        h-   hh   hh                     os        id 

O      •  so   O    ■+    •      •      -00         Os 

OS     •   h-   O   "0    •      ■      •   C 

sO_ 

O      .  00   m  «*5    .      .      .CO        O 

O          rt-  -j-  10 

co        hi   1/5  10 

vq 

h-  00"  ?r> 

CO 

M 

COCO  O   N   0>        O   O   Os       SO 

»   CfOo-C 

'  lOsO   Os       00 

CI   tJ-sC  1000     "  hvO  s        •* 

+  IOHOC 

•  O  -t  <r>      co 

C  'O  co  CI    O        *0   c*}  C 

CI 

O   h\D  MO              t^i/5        N 

C|                H-.     ^    _ 

10 

H    N    P 

SO 

■tC   fO       or 

CI   U0  t: 

r       so 

OS  O   O     '  ^5-     'M   Nh 

O 

n  ■+  <si_   ;  c 

;  ■*  0  oc 

CO 

N   i")m      .   jC     .   d   co  1/ 

5       00" 

O   >-<   OS        ^-        h   flf 

3        co 

1CM    IO 

►-.  rj-i- 

;        VO_ 

N   mvO 

cTsc 

OS 

Cs 

O 

rO^O          C 

-  «  r- 

CO 

i-vC    t     '   C 

"  0C    ro  "5 

r       « 

sC    -<   1^     '   C 

-      CI      OS    H- 

Os 

CI    IOO       •    id     ■    t^OC    C 

5        00 

•tf;?            H 

■* 

VC      C       H-                  H- 

t^  H- 

id 

CI         CyS 

•-*  r- 

H 

CO 

sO   "tf-sO         C 

O  io 

M 

■^J-  hh  vo      •   os     '   Cs  O 

""5  10  Os     "Os     '   CI    OS 

CI 

Os  hh  vo      •   C 

.     O*    H-C 

0" 

CI    hi    10          C 

CO 

sO 

°1              N 

"2 

M 

H" 

0 

CJ 

u 

0 

E 

0 

U 

CO 

-a  c 

c  c 

•  —    t/3 

nl  '  ~ 

13  "3 

p  « 

c<  ?■ 

List  ice  .  .  . 
ducat  ion 
gricultur 
nm  mil  nil 

oreig 

lomc 
inane 
it.  .  . 

---^  S  £ 

i-,W  <  L 

0  c  0  z  Z 

000c 

ent 
ent 

ent 

•par 

G  c  c  c 

u  4)  cu  cU  a 

—r 

1-      —      r-     W     C 

h    h   ?    2 

Rj 

E    C    C  -    — 

c  c  c  c 

O 

H 

rt  cj  rt  >>  > 

—     —     —     u 

s  rt  cs  efl  re 

c  c  a.  £  > 

a  a  a  c 

0   0  0  c  re 

i)  a>  «  «. 

P 

— 

c 

< 

2 

DC 

(2d 

296 


APPENDIX 


« 

$ 

< 

>» 

■■.: 

■~t^ 

K 

~= 

H 

s 

c 
fa 

&3 

>. 

I* 

C3 

fa 

•*- 

H 

"a 

f. 

Q 

y 

a 

a 

s- 

X 

X 

< 

W 

-~- 

H 

s 

>r 

1 

8 

CN 

— 

=   = 

— 

p  1 

CD 

«t-c  0 

S3 

i.O 

C    'O 

CO  01 

— 

t^ 



r  ■- 

CO  ©  CO  OS.  "^  »o 

t  - 

M 

m 

OO-'C-COCCI^OMO 

■^  tO  O  CO  CO  CO  Tf 

©  t*»  ^-  CS  ^*  CO        *o 

C5  C-5 

O  CM  -*  --  1©  C ^  CJ  U>  1 0  —  1 »  CO 

cSCft^ 

OS^  10  rf  t-^  GO_  O  ^* 

t^  t^.  CO_  OJ  lO^CO         CO 

=*  -r  OS  — "  CO  lO  CO  t^  C&  t*»0  >~  -r 

-O* 

CO  -^CO 

»rf  co  co  01  —  -o'r- 

iO  CJ  x  -f"-^"co"      co" 

»  1" 

CO  CO  CO 

COWMOt^NN 

C3 

^,0  0,0  11         O  OI  ©  <M^  ©  CM 

CO 

cc  ^t^. 

lO  CO  CO  (M        CO 

*— '  CCt^Tf  C^^-t         — ' 

«  >C  !M*                «-T  ©  CO  t*  00  »-? 

CO 

i>  t-'  ci 

0"  «-T  ^-T          <>» 

co-^"      ^h*          i-T 

H 

g  ^               i-it-©"* 

CO                            <N 

•H  CM 

MOOWO^lO'- 'rfOcO® 

X 

O  O  co 

CO       0             0 

r*  i2  ^  c  °  °    co 

og 

GO  »t5  CO  ^1  «o  0  --  c  ; 

IC 

0  0  t*. 

•  CO      •  O       '       '  <M 

t  £  22  °  ®  ©     °5 

CO 

£t^©^co*t^©Go"co"^uf»e7co" 

O  O  CO 

;cn    ;o^   ;    ;os 

^i^^loo©      © 

o"o"o~ 

.10    ;  0   •   •  c4" 

0  g  g  ©*  ©"  ©"      iC 

- '  «  —  —  cr  1-       -r 

00  g 

os 

K~  CO  ©  CO  CO         -  C  X  N  C  -  t 
•*■*  CO  1—  OO                CSt^COO^TO 

Ol  CO    O. 

0 

0  I  >~    CI 

—  — *           *-T      ©"uf 

— ' 

"* 

*" 

~ 

O-^OOO'MtfMiCON 

0 

O  O  co 

CO  CS         O          CTi  C. 

!>■  >OmO  ©  ©         l>- 

00 

O'OOlNiOOi^OOOO'C      • 

CO 

0  0  I- 

CO  .—      -  O      ■  Ol  CO 

NOOhOOO        © 

c  0 

■*  iO  t-  cc  -r  ^r  f  ©  <o  0      * 

- 

0  0  so 

SO  CO      "O      'tO_C^ 

-. '  ~  rr  —  °.  °_     *p» 

°.°. 

c  s©  *  c  c  nVi  c  odicod    ; 

'- 

o'ico" 

os  co     1 0"    '.  "f  CO 

©"©CQCO*©"©"        ©" 

10*0 

OS 

.^COCCN  CO       ©  cm  co  co  co  — 

0  1  CO    ~ 

NOi^fHOt*        CO 

C-l  CO 

y 

»OCM 

CO  04                        <M 

-#  -r  -^  co            '-• 

co^h           *•*"©"  06"  «f 

** 

t'-                    ^ 

— 

mOOWOCOHcCONN 

— 

CO  CO-rt* 

•H          l-Nt^O 

co  ©  os  1.0  r>- 10      © 

00  ^ 

cc  co  0  1  —  ic  -0:  a  1  <  0  :c  •  0  ►  C  1 

CO  OS  OJ 

1-         •   SL    Ol   —   Ol   -H 

coco©  r-  1-  co       ~r 

CD  Oi 

t»  wqcn.-:  .-  co  -r  — ; ;  0  »o     • 

c; 

co  ■<*  co 

«-h      •tOXOOTf 

»C  I>-  ©  t^  lO  CO         ^H 

oo> 

Si  _T©  cd  cOfCuf  ©  iff  co"  — "-? "     ' 

—   30  CO 

oT    ;  1  ■■-  t^  / 1  -  c  1 

os  of  CO  cc  — *  co"      CO 

c'io 

© 

«NOOM       0:  —  x:  ©  ©  CO 
>iwqx           t^ ©_ cm  0      co 

c 

CO          -*  Ti          'O 

»-'  t-  ©  ©  ©  40      00 

CI  t^- 

r. 

OS        -^               -- 

■^  CO  ■*  CO                i-" 

COr-7                 *-h'o"00*O 

O 

i>T                   co" 

"<^* 

!>•                               1-1 

s 

r  --"nocoh'-om 

'- 

CS»-OQO 

^h        co  w  OC  O 

—  1  -  'jz  ci  r-            -^ 

<M-H 

icHs-i-c  ^nCcno    • 

J  - 

IOOOt* 

1  -       •  -T  ~  CO-  CO  CS 

0  1  ©  —  0 1  ©      •        CO 

^■0 

t^co  ©,co  >o  ©^ci^o^co  oj_    • 

/ 

O  CO  CO 

(^      •  i— _  CO  0 1  co 1  — 

Tp  ©_»0 -**"_cs      •       co_ 

C0O5 

PS  —  -r  O  I>^  I  -  COO  — "  -^  (C  tC     * 

I  - 

C-C*  30  B  1 

CO      1  CO  C\  CO  CO  C 

©"©of  to  of    \       CO 

co  in 

© 

."^  CO  CO  CO  CO        0  OS  OS  CO  00 10 

^  CO  OX               nCX-h         ci 

./ 

O    -     ~ 

co       1-  0 1  -c-  /:  co 

r-l  t^.  ©  CS  CO                CO 

t^o 

— 

CO  CO 

OS          t>                  O^ 

t}<  «*         CM                ^ 

0  »-4          hoVio" 

/ 

wf                     co" 

co" 

1-H 

OS 

O  O  GO         OOOh-- 

CO 

OOS  w 

oj       oi  os       oj  os 

OS  CO  -+"  »o                     © 

CM  t- 

CO  -f  ©      *  O  ©  CI  CO  t—  ©       •      • 

cc 

—  S.   ro 

t*        •  CO  ^H        -  i-H© 

—  <o  CO  O-       •      •        OJ 

*-«  »o 

©^©©      'L*COh.is.S      •      - 

CO 

0  i~;  co^ 

OS     ■  -r  —     •  0  1  ».o 

—-,— -r^-co     •     •       ^h 

O 
OS 

s  -  c.  -«"    *  tCoo  *-?«©  os  O    * 

CS 

co^*<c 

co"     "-H--      *COiC 

co  of  0  --"    !     *      wf 

,  ~  O  1  CO  CO              OS  0  CO  OS  0 
K^  CO  CC  [  -                 — _  C 1  *Q  ~  ^H 

■co       co  oq       00 

ci  r-  10  co                »-o 

CN  CD 

._ 

oi  10  co 

©            ^H                     ©_ 

^J"  »o^                      CM 

~                   ** 

co" 

tO                            i-c 

0. 

CO  O  -*         O  CO  t>-  ift  »-<  CI 

^^cp 

©       »n«Tj<eoC 

—   /.    r                          l^. 

CO 

»C  CO  ©      ,^0'*-i   >'-  <~       •      ■ 

cs     *  ©  r--  ©  cs  g© 

co  00 10    *    ;    •     t-- 

00 

0  co  aa     •  "s  •-*  (^  -*  *>i  to    •    • 

'--. 

0J.C0S 

©     ;  co  ©  r~- 1^- 

Ti-oio    ;    ;    ;     t- 

£  _**  50  --*      ;  I-  x*  tOrCtO  CO      I      ! 

fcTO  OS  »0               »OOh  £'  t- 

»*"•  CO  'Ol  -               —  —  :c    -  ! I  — ' 

— ' 

O  t^^n" 

»T     -  CO  ©"■**"© 

co©"i>r  .   .   .    1.0" 

CO 

>- 

Ci          CO  T 1           / 

CN  ©  CO                              Ol 

^. 

t«^. 

CO        ^h              co_ 

^-i  CO                              CM 

lO  -4                ^©"tsT»0 

CM  ^H 

iC                 cf 

TjT 

CO                                   ^H 

0) 

CO 

-*.  —  ?i       ooo»o»oh 

f 

U3  01  OC 

-*          ©  ©  ^  CS  CO 

N«N                            »!0 

CM  00  CO       •  »0  —  CO  1  -  ©  CO       •       ■ 

OOOH 

i— <      •  CO  ■ 

©  00  CO    ■    •    ■      1-*- 

to  -r  i-O      •  t  - ;  -r  'O  1  -  ©  »-*     -      ■ 

CO 

i-H  co»o 

i-H       •  l^.  CO   OS  CO_ 

coco©     ...      10 

0 

OS 

"?!•*-    :  1  -  — *  06  0  — " cC    ;    ; 

— ' 

iff  I-  CO 

~s  ;  co  — ■'  ?  i  ~r 

co"©©"  i  *   ;    © 

k **  CO  CO  CTl                i-O  -r   CO    V    CO 

3 

OiOM 

»o       '-r  -— '  cs  co 

CM  W  CO                              CO 

EHNCO              ~. t  1  » - 

c 

co^osco 

■*i             °. 

~i  l~  »c' 

'O 

co"                     ■^- 

Tf 

iHtocn      OoooonoOih 

CO 

»0  CO  O 

©        -rf  ©         -^lO 

»o 

0  0  — 

to     ■  0  1-       ic-r 

CO 

1-^—                                      ■    '  1  -o>      * 

v  f  -*  —  ~r    ;  t  - 1  -  c:  —  tc  1  d    ! 

.0  ostc 

co    •  tq«5    •!.-_ 

0 

OS 

■*om 

>o"    !  co'uf    1  co 

OS 

'      CO  Ol  iO               -*•  -h  —  ~  I    ./.. 

"i  ro  «.o           »c  oi  «-j  co  os 

r 

CO  OS  I.O 

'-**                     ^H            CO 

^ 

— 

*>•         CM 

^ 

I  -                      co  to  1.0  co" 

!  - 

CO                                  •r-. 

0 

CO  CO  ?  I          ~          'O   —  O  -h 

- 

CO  CO  CO 

10  — 

»o  -r  -**     ■  »o     'Cicoo     • 

— '  O  GO 

^H       .^       •       -CO-* 

10 

-r  —  co     •  10     ■  t  1  corct     ■ 

©_CO-— ( 

wt     ■  ~r     •     • co  tp 

0 

CO 

—• 

CO 

»co"^ 

— "    !  ©    !    ;  10  0 

OS 

1      O   /  -                              O  -4*  CO 

-*  00 1> 

CO        I*              »-• 

»-« ,—  x>  -r                   CO  C    1 

O           *H 

I  -                                  ^^'-TCl' 

oc 

^ 

CONfh         O         lOtOCifl         ~h 

B 

1  -  '_-  pH 

1^.           CO   Ol           —   CO 

■  -      ■  1.0      ■  — ■  «o  —  — '      -  I- 

■-0 

•O      ■  CO  1-       "*H 

t^o  >o_     ■  10     ■  CO  CO  CO     •  »c 
^  t  -  1  -                              rT  co    *  »c 

/. 

COCO  ^ 

-r      ■ •-    . 

0 

>". 

co   ;©'co    ;oi"© 

OS 

►       iO—  I  -                        Oi  C  '/.    "• 

*^  ^  -r  -r                0  ^  0  »o 

- 

' 

©      ~-           —  0 

cr 

CO         •"-" 

CO*"                              ^h'  ^H*  ^h" 

~ 

,H 

"i 

T3 

p 

[■ 

£ 

tl 
B 

VI 

08 

■a 

y 

c-lH 

Q 

tj 

'3 

T3 

a 

i. 

1 

1 

[3 
1 

0      • 

"T3     *3 

1 

0 

to 

^ 

•c    ■ 

co  S 

1 

!s  " 

1-2 

_T3 

.5 

2  l-S  a| 

0    p_g  >.-o 

H 

— 
q 

0) 

1 

0  -2 

51 

•_r 

a 

S 

_ 

c 

* 

li 

•-I 

-gla 

n15.  t 

t;  s  _ 

a 

I 

1 

i 

> 

c 

-* 

a 

a 

£ 

1- 
: 

9-  ~  '= 

1.! 

S  - 

3   : 

..  a-T3 

>.  0  a 

I  g  o°| 
■gomcc 

S^    3'TC'S    C    3    ir 

1 "a  £s£o° 

J5 
0  ( 

c  1 

1 

Si- 

1—  °  9 

oja  a 

< 

.2  2   rih»« 
&§    S  J-2-^gg 

tf       fai   fa^.s:fa 

3 

i 

c  a  a 

Pi 

0 

K 

STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


297 


00 

—  CO 

-1  to 

r^ 

CO 

MiflWOfflM 

CO 

co-r 

CO  -r  'j 

co- 

in  o» 

c-r<»--> 

a 

co" 

t^-o 

~-   r    f 

3 

t^ 

00 

CO—.. 

°°m 

cm"  05" 

OS 

<* 

OS 

■*  — ' 

CM 

c^ 

^ 

--  CO 

.       .       .CO 

I  - 

t-^CO 

.       .       .Cfc 

so 

■    "    *CN 

s ' 

00 

CD  to 

*      '      "CM 

00 

in  0 

oq 

r" 

CO 

s 

O"* 

,, 

CM 

COOS 

10 

qt>. 

©cm 

O 

to" 

gm 

Ui 

1- 

10 

1  - 

OS 

s 

■<n 

CM 

O 

CO 

CO      • 

.    .    .-*f< 

U3      • 

.    .    -o 

— - 

^f     ■ 

:  :  :a 

sg 

00" 

-rP 

I>^ 

CO 

-f* 

*o 

0 

-^ 

O! 

■»* 

.      .  o>      • 

OS 

t* 

.    .■*    . 

CO 

cm 

.     .  00    . 

— ' 

CO 

m 

CM 

CO 

~r 

IO 

S© 

Tf« 

^ 

S 

CO 

CO 

CO 

00 

.    .    .  -^ 

0 

cc- 

TjT 

■* 

CO 

i> 

CO 

IO 

Tf" 

<M 

S 

^ 

O 

0 

OS 

CO 

£?; 

OS 

:   ;  :o" 

■* 

10 

00 

CO 

00 

CO 

OS 

t^ 

OS 

-r 

** 

£_ 

00 

CO 

CO 

cc 

CO 

I- 

i>r 

X 

00 

0 

0 

'■-' 

CO 

CO 

-, 

"  0 

.  CO       •       ■ 

CM 

-  CO      •      • 

co 

■— ' 

O" 

lO 

'-. 

cO^ 

1-1 

00" 
CO 

10 

OS 

— 

■_0 

ff 

0. 

,H 

0" 

CM 

_, 

0 

CM 

CO      •      • 

CO 

Cs 

CO 

"I* 

>J 

O 

a: 

CO 
u0 

s, 

1--0 

a  cs 

«  0 

"Sis 

5   C3 

.S    S 

«  5-r 

§2"s 

111 

_o  |  S 

1*8  S 

1  0  c 

to   a"S  » 

~o& 

J II 

■Sect 

— 

O 

13  s^ 

1 

O  g,5 

£w3 

11.1.1 

£ 

0 

K 

s> .  §■ 
•3  g  g 

IN 


.So  K 


bi1- 


■o-o  a 
a  a-- 
^  as 

"S  h  a 

-    3    03 

-S-cJ-a 


5     Is 


i-H  a> 


at- 

2"°  ^ 


O    CO) 

^« 

2  o  a 
*■*>  3 

CO   O    O 


*«  S 


~         s      ° 


pfS 

5 

P, 

9) 

ft. 

0 
- 

« 

- 

? 

g 

" 

— 

=. 

a 

u-  a>  coO 
0  3  >. 
S.39.   > 

cc-ts  g-a 
^o^« 


298 


APPENDIX 


>"<co 


•  N  CO  CI  iC  I-  —  ^XN^-tD 

eo~*     *     '  c  *r  x  cc  r.  c  —  to* c  c  ti 


O I  »"  O  —  C 


>*iO_nco 


xiocoxc-fu:c»o>f:>-': 

•»-iCCO(DWt-t-ONMCO 
.  i-H  0^<N  iq  X;  CO  CC  «  ^  <N  N 
*NOS^CCO*OCo"osOcO»0 

cOio-*r-Hr^^o5oqoccoo 

CM  .-T  .-T        (Nh-'iC^-'^'         i-1 


COiOO-O 
•co^;r-o  o 

Ir-Tocio  os 

^-eo 


NOO 

r  r  r 
eo  oo  to 

. ^  *o  n-  cs 

CM 


otocicji'HcscDNt^'-io  cs  n  t  -  -  r. 

■  tic  C  I-  *r  -r  -  -  -  "  'O  CO  •      "-"^OWM 

■  N  10  r^  C  C'-C  c:  c  ~  c  -  *~i  •     •  "* .  ^  30  C5  CN 
'  e4* to  O  iO  odod  eo  ^Jcm" oft*  *■•  I     !  "*9*  CD  N  CO  OS 

CS-*iC-«CC«CCXM  CO  iO                OS-h 

w  ^<  m  ^  r-  ■*  ■-'.x  c  cc  x_  ■<*  ^i^ 

Nh'ih        NNtO*~~         rH  i-l 


X0»0  *   •  CO  t  N  <C  X  -^  X  c 

T^iO  O  *   •  C  C  CO  X  C)  —  ■*  ©  C-  CO  >c 

SU3  iO  W"  *   '  r-<  ^"o'co'x'iO  fO  Co'h-'cO  "O 

.   CO  CS  i— •  ^tiCQ- '  tO  CO  t  O)  CO  N  ^" 

tH  iC  ~*  rf  ^  CO  ?l  ^  C  X  co_  X  r-  CO  x 


lO  CO  CO  CM  O 

•oo  *■*  *a  t*"  o 

;  «*f  CD  CO  O"  OS~ 
CO  CO 


iDC0*0e0NC0tD:DCS05eDOO'— >I 
-^CD'-D^h»0'— "OC30-"" 


iC^-NI^X'f  xo 


;  x  ^  c  t-  -r  cc  ~  c  eo 


^COiCNtviOCNTfNifl^iOW' 


b©HNOJaNO''-M  O  I-  r  -  tb  1^  -^ 
CO  N  N  O_»0  ^  I—  CO  CM  C4  CO  cooxo 

si  lO  co  io  cf  of  io  rCc*  -*•  ao'co  o'  oT—  CD  t*~" 

^  OO  -*f  N  eO^HCOCCOCICOCiCO'tX 

>•<  t— n  cm_  h«oo  i-h  oOiCNtqto  oo_ 

iCHrt  N~i-h  o"oO*tO^^H         ^ 

i-t  CM 


EDO  to  C  O  ^  C 

•  oncoosooino 


OCOO<OXO^tOtONHCCCt>.! 

-    -h  oo  t—  as  »-•  f-t  -rt"  c  —■ 


NONf  QONQ-h- <  -f  CO  O  O  *0  -—  CO 

S  tD  N  O  tO  »C  X  CT.  'C  X  N  c.  CO  tC  O  "2 

ttcor^aoco      o5tr^t^tttoac*^GGt^cGG> 

.  ^  X  iC  iC  O  M  C".  ■-  -  v-  M  >C  iC  Tf1  O 

hH«5NN  ^X  h.  i-  CO  '-q  -t  -*  n  n-  ^ 

CM"  ^h  lOto'-^rtH         ^ 


■C-tCHOO 
>N(ONXC   CO 

^      eot--fr*oso 

J"      Is-  to  cd  c"  »o* 
tjl  t—  l-H 

CM  i-f 


cs  ex  co  r  -  c  i  cs  co  CO'  ~  cs  to  -*  co  cs  to  cs 

f  tO  C)  >C  CO  rO  C  tO  CI  t"-i  CO  *t  CO  CI  CI 

c-ii- noon--  c  to  io  o;  n  n  or—  o  os 


iCNNCMO 


;  x  i-  c  co  ■"!  r.  c  ci  /.  'O  ~  c  to  co  to  ' 

X   tO   -O  OS  -+•  — *  OO  HCiH  CI  T'Ot 

'  CtOt-.  CO  CO  t—         ID  OS  CO  OS  I—  CO  c 


•  OS>— i  lO  i-O  lO  —  »f  CO  — •  "•*•  CO  ~-  t— 


.  CS^CO_»0  eo  O  i 
§1  ■-#  NCO 
•j^  -f  r-  io 

•^   (ft   (TV*   1ft 


iC  D  N  O  Ol  C 


:  r  -  -  *  X  C  i-" 


•t-tOOiOtOO 


>OiO(Mr-OCOf  tOCO 
I^Cfi-t         CM  IC  lO  CO         .-(CM 


3  00  OS  tD  •— '  ^ 

to  ci  i—  ci  co  — >  »o  —  co;  crj  o  t—  o  x:  x  r~ 

^UJiOOO^CON  O^fi  WON  U?  CONN 

,N>CO  COCOCO         I"—  I—  -*  •"*  N  »-i  — « 

*  "if  CO  CD  CSiOri        COtJCCNO^'-^ 


ONONOO 
■  NOCO  tC   X    ~ 


II 


a  a 

a  c 


C.  °    O    <W 

JHblijflSit  d 

2  S  ass  I  £  Ei-a  ore     ° 


ss.se 


$<\£  P  c  t  c  -  S-3  5"*^  e  "S-r  =  a  2 


300 


APPENDIX 


> 

> 

<--. 

< 

■r 

£ 

s 

w 

13 

w 

^ 

H 

^ 

C 

- 

--. 

o  c*->  r-  :r-  r^  to 
cc r  ■—   r 

-r  o  C-  i ~  i  -  i  - 
c-  33  -.3  ro  ro  ~-  *ra 
C  —  —  to  to  —  ~* 
^  iq  c\cq  35.CQ  — 

o  —I 


w 


CM  tT-J  iO  i-H  00  ~H 

^.-^t- .-  —  r: 

§  -?-"  o  ■«*  in  -*  ci" 

'j,,  o  ^  o  o  'N  7J 


oa  x  - 


i  -*■  re  t-  — < 

—  i -    /    30 

T  — *oc  eor-Tt^io 

•      sa  c:  —  re  —  — 
•^  ^Ht^OO  CO 


-m  n  >*:  ro  *t  rt 
re  —  s  .  t  i  -  i  - 
co  o  -r  — _  to  r- 

Sr  i  os  re*  to  ■m"  eo 
.       33  CO  MWN^ 

-----  r.  w 


re  —.■  o  —  jc  — < 
en-?!™?! 

>  O  o>  00  C-  I 

;  .-"—'  »i>o"rt 


r^  »o  re  re  ro 
W  — «  O  to  CO 

~  "_[  — * »«  33   X 

"  *-*  oa ' -'  ro 


oc  71  re  ei  i- 
EO  CC  ■ H  OS 

.  33  i  -  ■ 1  oc 


'  — I PCC 


:- 


C  tO  - 


•  —    X 

j  SO  aD  '-  CO  — ' 

'  — •  —  :  7  7  i 

CO 


00  CO  —  r-  CO 
(  M  O  I*  ^  M 

:  I  ;  m  i  -  -'  3» 

-7  i-   —    X   — 


y  >7  r7    ~  r- 

-  '  ~ :"  '-, \  —,  r1 

z  -r  7  r 

•     n  c  '■".  .-:  -r 

—  7  j  —  :  i 


XtCC   3)OH 

ei  o  o  o  -r 
^  —  ■'    ■ 


OmiCONNMCDMCOOr 
vHCN0)C0OO*-H<M*-H-     - 


•  C1TC   X 


M  Oi  tD  X  ^-  C4  f- iNCHDI*"fCh»WTU! 
."9l,~lc^iir^','v  ^  "t.  ^  °V  1 ' '  ^9  O  ^C0  ^n  lO  »-j  "Ott*"i°Q 
■*  O*  «  O  Tt  <N  p*  O  CO*  C  t*  --*  t^"  Ot^~r' 


<    ■    —-    ~    -T 


,  w  h  ^-  n  c;  n  —  co  n  c  cc 

lO  -r  71  -r  —  ~  re  31        ue  *0  ■— '  O 
t^"       CI  i^TtjT       to 


to  O  CO       CO 
CO  O  00      *U3 


i-«OOCOOtO  -t-  -OO 
OOCNCOOO  -CO  -OO 
—  --717-100       -O       'OO 


ooo  o 

•  ooo  o 
■c:  3> a 

;  <o  ooo 

OJO  OO 

«-■  co^*  t^ 

OOO 

•  *o  OO 

•  -o^oo_ 
"    'o*o*"o* 

ooo 
CO  —  t^. 


»o  -*"  CO 

CO  »OcO 

co  -r  o 

O  MO  C4 


COO  t^  OO 


•  o     -we  t—      i-  -h 


O  N 
O  i-O 

*^jT    !  •-' oo"    *  o'oo 
*-<      O  o      cr;  ro 


-^  O  ^         CCO-fO 


C-  O  7*J 
*-H  «0  CN 

r^  us  -r 


■Mooio    -oor^-Oi 


Hwec-H 


•  -*  CO         CO  O  -f  71 


coco  -^       CO 


OrffOOJ 
.  —  c- J  o  o 


CO  t^-  O         H(N03 


«-■  o  »o  ^ 


cocor—  «».oot-^  -noco 

O  O  CO  •  CH  Cft  !>,  ■  CO  CO  o 

t^t-^o  Icoco'oo"  Itoc-foo 

DOO0H  ~   —   "^  *  ^H  ^H  -H 


COt^L'JiO 


O  t^-  -H 
77   -7  '-O 

COCCO 


ro  »-o  ro 
7 1_  -r 


00  0  0  r-lC-I^  ^H 


4  CO  eq       —  — «  ~  —       -r  —  ~r 
l  O  — -      'COOOJCN      •  —   /;   : 7 


-^  CO  to        to  CO 

iococo    Ico-^ 

O  CO  i-i         pHtO 


■  o  o      ».o  o> 


SCO         ^  * 


•  ,-H  — .  OS 


a! 
o  o 


■t^T1  ft"  a 


— 

«  c  S 

is  si 

13  u  rt 

Ogg3 

-    -*S§-3S 

•  es  c  _  o  >  q 


0  J2    o   gl " 


;  S-o 


. .  Q  ^  -  c  ■  - 

o 


1  =  tt-2  a  c  c  3 

I'll  8-S'"i  ' 


B  «  C 

S^  a  >  b  5  a  c1- 
a*5  a  a  g  g.o  c3^? 


3 


13^—  S'3'3  o. 

es  a  S-  =  -^-3;  r 
■g  (S      P9  M  w  H 


S.3S-JO 


>^  ™J_  a  >  e  i  §  s1^ 

So  rt^g  rt  c  o  j. 2  «,2 

s.s.s-g  is  sspaa  k 

g  S3  c.-^  p  -g ■ 

C  £  w -^  o  t  t;.-  c; 

-j;  z.  u;  3  -_)<  u,  ^  <  <  Z 


2  3 


:  I  fix 
3  111  1 1 

&  o  «   °  = 
"a  >.S   >   a> 


■J" 

la 
!& 


a      Sg 

tl 

1     6.2 

a  a—  a 

cs'w-1  a 

— 

3 

-a  S.9-2 

5;aa 

r^ 

•-  |"3.| 

■a 
p 

HU 

"I*  U 

a 

il|s 

1 
■a 

T1 

."cnT3  « 

.- 

s 

g  a  m  S 

a 

"9 

| 

14     73  ►> 

-T3   §*• 

_- 

|§.2  8 

■i 

S°i§  a 

e  accordir 
301. 

on  and  b 
in  1908-1 
3e  affairs 
ad  Ameri 

-  b£  cf..2 
m^-g  ag  o 


STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


301 


U 


^ 

^ 
^ 


^f  CO  O  00  —  T  CO 
COt^CC  ©.CO  r«<  OO 
[OMHHH  DO 


liH<4l(OOi<O^ia)QO0  GO 


co  c»  eg  o 

—  00  o  o 


■  x  ic  co  -r  ci  «e  s.  s  -r  ci  ©  ©  o 


•  co  Cfl  ■*  co  co 


©  »~  —  ©  ~  ?i 

co  co  — ■  c  1  to  -r 


2^  CM  CO  10  iO  cm  CO     _ 


ci  ca  co  *-i  e^  c&  co  1-1  ©  o 

r*  eo  r*  C".  «  -r  ~  ir:  -  c 

t^  HJOH  —  —   S3  co  —  c> 

^"  co'cs^ofcf  cd -^©o 

co  ©  — ■  1  -  ©  c  1      to  ci  00 

—  re  r  t  co  —  co       —< 


O  — '  — '  CI  ©  — <    to       — 
-r  ©  —  -r  »o  ©     ©       r- 


'O^MOMCO      CO 


MW      ^         -f      ©  CO 


C*3J  W3  ©  CO 
OcO^,CQO 

—    —  o"  — '  c  cro 

»0      CM  CM  CO  ^  CO 


©  I  -  —  —  ~*  tJ-  O 

©  © 


CO  ~-  ©  *C  CO  O  "O 

CO  ©  CO  <-«  iO  ©  t— 

,'-  «-0  -r  US  CCIh  »0 

>*  '-^'^  CM  CO  CO  CO  CO 

cf  CO 


^h    o  ■=»  c-i  ih  n  r—  »o  *~<  < 


to    coicci-rco       co^co 


CM  CO  ~*  CO 


©fMOMO  © 

co  -  :c  ?i  r.  z  :~ 

cq^©-rcot-~  CO 

S  COiO  cocot-^to  CO 

K_   ^H    TT   *0   O    "*-    -H  O 

■^  CO  •<*  CM  CO  CO  CO  t-- 


©  01  r^  01  co 

ro  O  cC >  C  1  — ; 

cT  ONON«5iOO 

co  t*-  co  ©  to  ci       r— 

t-  CM  tP  CO  CO         CM 


CO  ©  o  o 

—  -*•© 

—  a 


-Cl-f© 


O 


co  01  ©  co  c 

CO©  CO©  t 

,  co  •-« t-*.  ci  »o  c 


CO©  CO©  t--  I 

t  co  c_  .- 

►v.  W  lO  O  O  -  X  — - 

*^  •—  -*"  CI  iO  CO  CO  t  - 


.  ©  — 
s  cocr 
CO    t*-  ©  c 


■5  ©  ©  CO  CO 

—  noohS 

OS  OOi-TtH  CO  101 " 

CO  C  1  ©  CI  © 
CM  -*  COCO 


CO  -HCO  i-H 


10 


t^©  Cl  CO  CO  CO      © 


'  co  -^  ci  »c  -r  co    co      to 


CI  OONXOQG»OCC:X  O 
co  co  ©  to  r—  >o  »o  co  ©  ct  ;-  -r 
CO  —  CO  ©  co_  CO  t—  -f  ©  cc  CO  © 
7  00  ©  •— ~  ©  no  co'  co  o  co"  co*  rC 

'  C-l  CI  C-)  o 
CI  -f  t^  CO 


CI  *OCM  CI 


»o  ^00  *-•  CO  © 


CO -*  ©  ©  ©  CO   © 
t-O  CO  ©  CO  CO  ©   !>■ 


"  fj  —   -e  ©  ©  re 


CO  ©  CO  CO  CI  CI  CO  t—  C]  ©  Tf  CO  CO 

10  t->-  co  ©  ©  c  i  ©  ©  r  -  ©  co  »o  •— < 

Tt<  »o  t^  ci  co  ©  co  t>-  c-^  ©  -^r  — 1  co 

t—  CO  CI  »0  cc  © 


©  Tf  C^l  ^  lO  "<**      &\        CO  CI  CO  CO  CM         C» 


co  co  >o  -*•  ©  t-  »-o  to  — ■  -r  t^  ©  »-  ci  —  co  co  -7  —  co  ©  — « 

— .  -1  —  .-  t-  —  -r  CI  jC  CO  —  ©  ©  ©  —  «-0  ©  co  —  CI  1^  CO 

-r  1  r-  co  t-  ci  <—  —  ©  ci  ©.  —  — .  ©^©.  "jC  co_  1.0  o_  ©  ^-_©  co 
o  w^StrZ-rpin  cc  cf  --  cT^-  ©  »o  ©  ^—  co  co©  ©'  ci       10 

—  ©  CO  CO  ©  CO  CI  ©  tC  t^*  •— '  C)  CO  ©  iO    CO    »o      CO 

'OCI— "CtCl'-»CO-rt"iO©    «i"-iON    *-( 


CO 


BO 


t--  t-  CO  -*"  CI 

CT|-X?I._ 


■|./.:ii-zi 


5iO_^I>^© 

.  ^*^' J"^"-^r-*00  t*CO  N  OO.  -  - 
tc  00  *M  CO  CO  CO  OS  t*  CO  c-i  ©   ©co-^ 
•^co  CI  "-< 


^l^^^CO-HCDOO-H^HH 

co  co  co  0  —  re  co  co  ©  i  -  y  cccc 

■i^CO©©OSCO©  HW-f 

■^  ©  co  tj*  co  co  of  ci"  10 

©_^H  ^  W  CO  CM  ^H 

-HCO 


302 


APPENDIX 


z 

D 
O 
u 
u 

< 


z 

w 


S3 

z 

a 

- 

>> 

< 

« 

- 

- 

P 

ir. 

W 

r. 

^ 

- 

_ 

■-!■ 

- 

- 

- 

- 

V 

- 

W 

2 

c- 

W 

X 

- 

w 

X 

^ 

w 

- 
> 

- 

- 

< 

^ 

- 

u 

[/ 

H 

V 

0 

^ 

> 

w 

u 

- 

"- 

X 

w 

= 

r- 

2 

< 

- 

■/■ 

? 

w 

- 

- 

^ 

^ 

i: 

- 

< 

- 

- 

^ 

r. 

- 

c/ 

- 

^ 

_ 

z 

s2 
If 

IS, 


ill 

a  2  a  B 


3  >>  3  — 

S  go  c 


Ms 


°§ 


Jr^»  t^-ao  cc  30  1 


•  »r;  -r  -r  »-o  i 


•CMCO^TCMCOX-rfCOCOi-O  — f^MDOt^iOM'tW^nOOlM: 


«  t  «  «  r:  r:  r:  ri  *i  m  m  m  ?4  m  w  n  im 


f(N  co  co  co      -awx 


co  — «  cm 

--*  ©co" 


00  CM 

:©  © 


5  «  h.  l*  c  i.-:  ri  ..t  r  i  c  ^  -  m  -  -^  -  n  o  o  t^  o  't  o  cc  x  3  pi  o  ■*  to  -  «  o 

.  ich-xotOh-n  —  *-n  r.  i-3C5Nh.o«k.':>-'5oo»0)^aiox»oocxih--H 
,— ,  _h  ~-  —  —  i— i  ,—  —  —  ~j  -^  —.  — .  c-i  cm  cm  *i  -i  ?i  n  co  m  co  n  cm  cm  co  ^r  »o 

Oh 


111 


,5  so 


'~~--  g 


P5 


: :  —  —  "  i  s   - 


•  co  —  co  »a 


ec«c5^5^H 


00  CN  t^  C 
CO  ^4 


«Tir-N--X«XONOO»r:«fCOtDM51t'-'COiCOtD(Nr-iFHNXt»N 

koooi'O-  ~  i-"i  to  ^[-/_  r  i  ?i  o.  t  -  1 1*?  x  ft  :i-n-ox:ign 

,".'r.''0.~;:c.c  "*".  ^  '"  -**;  ~*. '  t  -^  '"  ,rs  ""i  "**!  """i  °i  "Tt  ^  ^  *~L °l "**i\ <?i'R. **■  •"i*"i°9» °° 

_  «n  ©~  »c*  7 1  x  id  xi  —  •  e  *  •':  c  *r  I-  n  3  c  ^  o'«c  -  o  ^*""  ^■"'t  to -* to  wn ro 

K  O  CV  M  ^  -   x—   x    /:  ?u-   X   ;i-?i--'Ci'-ri--rCf  CfTi'NNOM 
^tOiOt^ri':  £  -r  i  -  i  -  r-t  T  i  — ■_  71  —  -M  c;  ~  l^I-  30  CO  0>  90  NNlO  l-'0»OONN 

"  ^h  i-Tt-hco  oT cTo  ©  os  ©  os  ©  c*f  e4*of  co  t*- 1*  »oo  cm*  cm*  coco^eoeo»-r^^r<o»-r 


—  ©  3 


55  s  i 


<  § 


~  ~  —  —  ^  r^.  n  w  X  ^  m  >o  ^1  ~  -r  ~  »o  —  Ol  N  C-l  0O  CO  iC  »n  >o  O  O  N  CD  o 
oow  .  c  ^  ?:  *  *r  ~  -■  -  -■  n  -"  ^  --  'O  x  t  o  ^  c  t  c  c  i-  10  r-  os  «o  co 
O  O  -^      ■c.:'t?i?i/  *>00  'C  cc  t^«0  iqX-HtON  *r:  n  c  c  '^  io  M  f  h  oo  h 

■^  *  ■**  »o  co  ^h  co  oT  *«*  r^T  oo"  t^T  t-J  r^T 

N'tfCBCOCftr" 


_,  o  t-  -*       xoo:jic-ri-oc  'OC*co»*Ximio.. 

k^^-^c:     '  — •  r-  /•  -  i  -  t  ?  i  O'M'M-^c^  co  w  c  *r  **  a  ?i  ci  *t  i^  t-  o;  m  ci  ^ 
•  w       '-•so      °©  "~1  '-R'^  -^  "^  ^QC.  ^  "^1  ri"t.  ^  ri  ^  ^  ^  °°  ^  ^  "^.  ^1  ^1  ^t.  ^  °°  Q.1^ 


iHi^HCOCI  7C  CO  T 1  T I  M  CO 


^coco^QOC50^co^ocro^ooo"cood 


O  X! 


i  ..o  —  : 


JOf--ON»'-ON  GOOiCOQOeOiO-^cO 
■^-  ^r-  -*-  —  I  -  rc  —  O   Z'OiOOO*«OCJi«Cf'^"MC5 

'  ^  ^ °^  "I1 1  * '  *!  ^  ^^c^*^i^  eo  ^co  ^»-^eo  do  c« »-« 

;  Cs  »0  Os  — «  /j?it  /  '^  ro  t*  US  cr;  -f  ^ ~^* O* 00* CO  CM  ■-*  © 
-r  —  ri  —  —  i:  c  i.:  -o  -  —  xro-r»—  ■MOs-rOiOOJeo 
0,u0  NS>35  -^l^ro  CO  00  CO  os  ro  OOifiiH  ti  C  i—  ti  CO  cm 
co  t>^  os"  QO  X)  Os"  O  —  o"  — <  c  r  t  i*  -r  >r:  -r"  -r  10  — "  o*  -^*  »0  CM* 


■  co  ifl  i- 1^  iocec6coo-*^o^' 


:-   -  -  —  -O  -*  iO  t^  O-  CO 


m  -r  ~  i-  '"  ^  i-  i.1:  o  'O  -r  c  co  f  ^f 
;  — ; '"  i-  X_  :r;  —  ro  i  -  si  «C  Xj  »^  X  ~  co  t  -  -*  XNt-OCONO)ON 
•  *  :t  -*  ■  i  :.i-:c:ir.-ri-C  —  —  (DO  99)  C4  CO  CO  >"   •*  i-  c  t>-'*r  ci  t' r-*u5  to'tO* 
-  r  -  -r  ?  i  iO  O-  OS  CO  CO  »0  O  X  CO  X  CO  CO  O  -T  O  CO  iC  'O  71  I-  X  -r  »c  I-  t^.  Cl  CO  co  X 

■  '-o  -r  -r  t  j  —  -r  i  -  t  j  ~  r:  co  co  co  o  cs  to  x  .  -  --  r_  i —  — .  -s>  7 1  -*  ^-  x  cm  to  •— • 

'-«-coi*  X  X  I-  CO*  co*  COI>  3>'o>'00  OO  i^O  H  N  CO  ^*IO*^^kO  (H  o  to  o  n 


«  P   -  "r  ~  " 


-  x  rs  —  —  01  co  -t-  »c  co  t-  -x  os  o  •—  cm  co  »f  »o  co  r*»  00 

.     >h-NXXX»X»XXXXO>OC  c;  CT-  os  0-  OS  OS 
A    r .   /    / .   /    r    /    /    t    x    r   /    s   x    r   r  s .   / .   s .  r  x  x  x 


STATISTICAL   TABLES    OF    EXPENDITURES 


303 


^^^eOCOiOWCMirOCOCOCOeO^OO 


osoo^o^©'or•^co^-■-•^cMO'«*, 
ci^'eotO'toaiMCicooiOio^'f 

rHfHr-lWT-li-KMCCWWINeCNClN 


lOCOtONNWtDMO'l'OO'-'OW 


■5-1   r   :  -   /    ~    y   >".  C  ro  ~  1  —  ■ 
h  00  t^  CM  CD  CM  W0_  OS  O  — ^  CO  CO  ■ 

JOOOiC- 'ujO  •—"  co* -**  •»*»"  < 

•  00  C|  IO  O  N  ?J  rf  M  3D  r*  «  1 
i  CO  OS*  C*  tC  O  **  CM  CD  CM  Oi  'O  ( 

:  o  X  rr  1^  ci  c  c  «  cc  o  00  ( 


18,489 
56,889 
)8,504 

r8,i2i 

^9,742 
)6,048 
13,945 
^2,589 
15,203 
35,828 
11,371 
32,547 
18,400 
i  1,605 
15,706 

0" 

— 1  iC  iO  N  N  o  **  1*  *r  X  h  CO  Tf  cc  ■- ' 


s.  s_  —  1—  a.  as  00  co  01  -t<  »c  -r  'O  — ■  as 

^^QO^iC  CO  i-H  ifi --^■*r  CD  C-J>--  »0  CO  t- 

»«  •-«  t^ os  «  m  00*  10*  -1"  cm" ■-"  *-" cm  co"  o> 

cooN>-a)Ocs-HOtX'^cici*f 

t»  US  *-•  CO  00  t-H  CO _^  .C  OS  Ol  -*  CM  OO  OS 

CM  'j'lCiC'Ot  Tj5  Cd'cDOO  "O— "t^*CM  cm 

eoeocot*-coTt«<Mi!or~r^u3i-. — r  -r  -r 

^H©»ftt-»-Hi>-b-ccco 

•O-hCOC-CICCOM 

•  o  t^ co  ^o _^o  co  -j-  r-^ cd 

;  »o  od  co  >o  >c*  o*  w*  o"  ^"  ;  *   ; 

•— 1  01  ci  -p*  a-  •—  -r  l-  cd 
00  co  uo  00  *—  co  o»  iO  -h 

CM  C<1*  CM  of  CM*  o'lO-tfrt 
Nri  CO  ■—  CD^h 


-M(O^«C5C0fCXCCOiCO»COlQ0 

cd  os  cs  r-  as  ~  1  -r  t  i  <c  »o«ioc  — 


tDNOJONNCO-tClNO' 


•H^0100CCCO'?J<-NHCOOCO'---H 


THrHCSpHC-H 


COcnONONOSCONXfOOlOSNN 
COMO-iCO^Z-C    *   C  ?!  O  N  <h  UJ 

xfCBos'flcO'rC'j  co  xo  — *_©  ocoos 

O  "*t«  COO  -mO  o'-fMiOOod'O^'fO 

oocDp-  -  o  ■/_  ci  /  1  ;*:  jc  cd 

—  ^t.^.l>t0lcc,1^00.  foqoo 

**"qicoo»oof 

-  CO  O  Os  OS 


as  co  ■ 


CD  ~H  -rf   —<   ■ 


CO  »C  -T  CO  CO  CM  CM  -*  CD 


COtO-^CO^r--CO'-'CDcOcDOOiOOOt^. 

©eio-j--h-."r*.co»o©i--oco©«30 

CM  CO  — ■■  ' 

oTo  — 

INOWt..-. 

•  (DiOO 


-  -1  *"*:  -*-,  H  'i,  —  -i  ci  *~t  °°  °~i.  ^i 

.~  *_  -m  cm"  --  as  o*  a.  co  cm*  ,-h  ©  «-« 
t--ao  co 


OS  COt'-iO  <-H  CM  OS  ". 

co  cs  cm  os  ad  -r  co  10  co"  — *  co  -c'ioo"^" 
»o«5»0'j"j<FH«iocr.ccoor-oo 


CO'tOrfMC'lOSOCOOtO-tON-" 
C 1  «0  OS  IC  CO  OS  '-"  T  1   -JO  CO  CO  t>-  CM  >p-"  CO 

osi>cow-HTpic--oc\eor-     ■ 

CO  01  re  N  -  O  N  i~  CC  X  I-  ' 


iO  CD  »0  »0  -**  1— 1  CM  < 


OS  CO  —  CM  CO  ■#  U-; 


cDi^.coaso—«ojco 


osoaaccacccc  —  —  —  « 
co  asa>aia;asasasososasosaso*os 


3^ 


a 

a 

p. 

a 

3 

- 

a 

3 

-J 

o> 

^ 

sa 

rt-O 

c  a 


Jj  c. 

^5  3 
a 

8.1 
£  a 

B  8  °° 

:£:   '~   ~* 

M 

^    3   D, 

rt  c  £ 

a  °  a 
_£a.a 


a  a  a 
£■2  8 

I  If 
£§l 


«  "  S 

£.5:3 


n  ot  —  o  c>(Qf*-<o&^c)Oi- 


■  —  ooooobooooffldoooaiattciocDCDcofflcDcocccDoxN  r*  r-  r*-  r» 
a>  a)a>a>a3<fia>a>o)o>aio>a>a>cocooococDcocDGOcoco  cococococococococococo  cocoooco 


O  a  CO  r*-  o  u>FiSCAL   PERIOD 


CO  r-  cd  m  Tt  n  a  ■ 


CO  CM  —  O  Cft  CO   r-  CD  i£>  *t  CO  <N  ■ 


CD©a>CO  QO)  OCiCDO)  CDCDOODCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCD  COCOCOCDCOXCOCOCOCOCOCOCOpi  gQ  ^  l    PERIOD 

304 


cr>cq_O0bC0r*Qi 


Smc«  —  o<5<pr-<D«o«»coc<  —  oacor-ioio^mc*  —  oo>cor»<oia  fiscal  PERiOO 
oooo*S<»a>Qa<»Qc»QoocococDcococomcocDr-r-r-r-r- 
90a>aa>oGBC2QO>aa>a>ocDcoGooococoooGOQocOGOCocooococococococococococo  co" 


.  cor- ID  >0«   W  M  -. 


COW—  Oa»COh-(DiO^COC4—  OO0hVlOtBH«  O0>C0r-©iO«frC0N  —  O&G0r-©lOC0r~Oi0^ntt< 


FISCAL  PERIOD 


305 


40  pi 


<    ll.'Ul 
306 


30  40 

3      D'agram  °f  a-l-th.    * al  Percentages  for  War  Ex^ndit, 

(  hargcs,  and  Adminfc 


f  NT  eo 

Defrayed  Out  of  the  Gen 
ve  Expenditures 


eral  Account,  Armament  Expenditures,  De 


100 

bt 


307 


INDEX 


Agriculture:  expenditures  for  encour- 
agement of,  during  Sino-Japanese 
War,  138;  production  of  (1877— 
1913),  230. 

Ammunition:  108;  funds  for  purchase 
of,  13,  20;  expenditures  for  (1879- 
88),  42-3;  expenditures  for  improve- 
ment of,  51,  64. 

Annuities,  expenditures  for  decoration, 

112-13- 
Army:  armament  expenditures  of  (1868 
-76),  18  et  seq.;  (1868-76),  261; 
(1877-93),  265  et  seq.;  (1894-1903), 
282-3;  O904-13),  90  et  seq.,  296 
et  seq.;  size  of,  during  Satsuma  Re- 
hellion,  32;  expenditures  of,  for 
Korean  Affair,  37-8;  expenditures 
for  development  and  reorganiza- 
tion of,  39  et  seq.;  expenditures  of, 
for  Sino-Japanese  War,  57,  76-7, 
273;  expenditures  of,  for  North 
China  Disturbance,  60,  78-9,  278; 
ten  year  plan  of,  61;  expansion 
budgets  of,  after  Sino-Japanese  War, 
62-3;  expenditures  of,  for  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  87-8,  104-5,  286  et 
seq.;  expenditures  for  expansion  of, 
after  Russo-Japanese  War,  89-90; 
comparison  of  •  navy  expenditures 
with,  108,  in,  (chart)  305;  total 
armament  expenditures,  109;  State 
expenditures  compared  with  Army 
and     Navy     expenditures     (chart), 

304- 

Arsenals:  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of,  42;  for  enlargement  of,  65. 

Auditing,  regulations  for,  of  annual 
accounts,  128. 

Balloons,  expenditures  for,  battalion, 
89;  investigation  expenses,  93. 

Bank  notes:  redemption  of,  170,  172; 
regulations     for     convertible,      172. 

Bank  of  Japan:  loans  to  government 
by,  51,  196;  for  North  China  Dis- 
turbance, 59;  for  Sino-Japanese  War, 
71,  181,  189,  194;  for  Russo-Japa- 
nese War,  83,  101;  handling  of  na- 
tional Treasury  funds,  128;  con- 
version of  paper  money  by,  132; 
business  of,  171,  179;  issuance  of 
convertible  notes  by,  172,  183,  205; 
raising  of  interest  rate  by,  176;  in- 
creased bank  deposits,  during  Russo- 


Japanese  War,  201 ;  specie  reserve 
of  (1903-6),  205,  211. 

Bankruptcies,  211. 

Banks:  foundation  of  new,  during  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  138,  188;  plan  for 
central,  170;  regulations  for,  177; 
loans  made  by  (1894-96),  188, 
(1896-98),  194;  increased  deposits 
(1893-94),  190,  201;  (1903-6),  221, 
(1907-9),  225;  (1910-13),  227;  Hy- 
pothec, 195,  199;  runs  on,  210-11. 
See  also  Bank  of  Japan. 

Barracks,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of,  19-20,  42,  48. 

Batteries,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  new,  62,  (1897),  64. 

Bimetallic  system,  adoption  of  (1878), 
156. 

Bonds:  Navy,  50,  134;  Exchequer, 
82  et  seq.,  200-1,  220;  foreign  Ster- 
ling, 83  et  seq.,  126-7;  paper  money 
exchange,  127;  Voluntarily  Capital- 
ized Pension,  127;  Hereditary  Pen- 
sion, 130,  133;  Pro-rata  Pension,  133— 
4;  Industrial  Enterprises,  134;  Naka- 
sendo  Railway,  134;  Unregistered 
Kin-satsu  Exchange,  134;  Supple- 
mentary Railway,  134;  Consolidated 
Public,  134-5.     See  also  Loans. 

Bourse:  tax  on  trading  on,  99;  in- 
creased tax  on,  for  redemption  of 
paper  money,  132. 

Boxer  Uprising.  See  North  China 
Disturbance. 

Budget,  First  and  Second  Army  Ex- 
pansion, after  Sino-Japanese  War, 
62. 

Bureau  of  Financial  Affairs,  25. 

Changchung,  87. 

Charts:  total  state  expenditures  com- 
pared with  Army  and  Navy  arma- 
ment expenditures  (1875-1913),  304; 
Army  expenditures  compared  with 
Navy  expenditures  (1875-1913),  305; 
comparative  annual  percentages  for 
war  expenditures  (1875-1913),  306-7. 

Chemulpo,  82;  flight  of  Japanese 
minister  to,  36,  38. 

Chihli,  58. 

Chin-hai  Bay,  establishment  of  naval 
station  at,  95. 

Clearing  house,  establishment  of,  at 
Tokyo,  178. 

309 


,10 


INDEX 


Clothing,  108;  expenditures  for,  during 

Sino-Japanese  War,  57;  during  Russo- 

Japanese  War,  87. 

expenditures  for,  during  Russo- 

Japanese  War,  88;  used  in  industries 
|S77"I912).    231;    production    and 

consumption    of     (1903-6),     233-4, 

242. 
Coinage,  system  of,  from  Restoration 

to   Satsuma    Rebellion,    155   et  seq. 
Conscription    system,    foundation    of, 

18,  revision  of,  39,  61. 
Coolies,  in  army  service,  33. 
Currency:    depreciation   of    (1854-70), 

155;  amount  of,  in  circulation,  184; 

inflation    of,    189,    192,    205,    254; 

circulation  of  paper  (1868-78),  213. 

DajSkan-satsu  (paper  money);  issued, 
26,  32,  49;  issued  during  War  of 
Restoration,  125,  157. 

Discount  rates  (1907-9X225;  (1910-13), 
227. 

Enomoto,  Buyo,  10. 

Enterprises:  new,  208;  capital  invested 
in  new  (1907-13),  212;  (1905-7), 
224;  (1893-1903-12),  239. 

Eto,  Shimpei,  revolt  of,  14. 

Exchequer  bonds:  issuance  of,  82  et  seq., 
99,  200-1;  receipts  from  (1904-7), 
100;  redemption  of,  150;  economic 
results  of  issuance  of,  220. 

Expeditionary  Expenses  Control  Bu- 
reau, formation  of,  33. 

Kxports:  excess  of,  over  imports,  173, 
176,  184,  254;  growth  and  nature  of, 
240-1;  of  military  stores  (1876- 
1905),  243. 

Feudal  government:  downfall  of,  3,  13, 
252;  army  organization  of,  17; 
naval  plan  of,  23;  loan  to  purchase 
pensions  of  gentry  (Shizokn),  126. 

Formosa:  organization  of  composite 
brigade  at,  61;  expenditures  for  im- 
provements in,  during  Sino-Japanese 
War,  138,  192. 

Formosan  Expedition,  8;  expenditures 
for,  15-16. 

Fortresses,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of,  42. 

fortress  (Oust ruction  Office,  establish- 
ment of,  40. 

Foundry,  proposed,  45;  establishment 
expenditures  of,  74;  organization 
expenditures  of,  75,  139,  192. 

Fusan,   opened   to  foreign   trade,    16. 

Fushimi,  bat  1  le  at ,  to,  26. 


Garrisons,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of,  17,  102. 

Gei-Yo  Channel,  expenditures  for 
battery  at,  61,  63. 

Gendarmerie,     expenditures     for,     92. 

General  Reserve  Fund,  54,  59,  70. 

General  Staff  Office,  creation  of,  39; 
expenditures  for,  41. 

Gcnsan,  opened   to  foreign   trade,   16. 

Cold,  import  of  (1882-85),  •  73- 

Gold  standard,  adoption  of,  155-6, 
198. 

Hakodate,  10,  25. 

Hanabusa,  Yoshitada,  Minister  to 
Korea,  36. 

1  [ereditary  pension  bonds:  plan  to  use, 
for  establishment  of  central  bank, 
31;  issuance  of,  130,  133,  163. 

Hiogo,  25. 

Hiroshima,  54. 

Horse  Administration  Bureau,  estab- 
lishment of,  89;  expenditures  for,  92. 

Hsi-Tai-Hou,  Empress,  regent  of  China, 
58. 

Hypothec  Bank,  195;  establishment  of, 
199. 

Ikebe,  Kichijuro,  leader  of  Satsuma 
Rebellion,  30. 

Imperial  Body  Guard,  formation  of, 
17,  40. 

Imports:  duties,  99-100;  excess  of, 
over  exports,  167-8,  193;  (1896- 
98),  194,  196;  (1903-6)  203,  254; 
of  gold  and  silver  (1882-85),  x73: 
growth  and  nature  of  240-1 ;  of 
military     stores     (1876-1905),     244. 

Income  tax:  revision  of,  53;  enforce- 
ment of,  during  Satsuma  Rebellion, 
133;  during  Sino-Japanese  War,  143. 

Indemnity,  from  China,  15,  58,  70, 
142,  192,  196,  198. 

Industries:  progress  of  (1877-1912), 
230-1;  principal  products  of  (1877— 
1912),   232;  development  of   (1876- 

93-1903-13).  251. 

Inheritance  tax,  ioo;  decrease  of,  151. 

Insurance,  increase  of,  companies,  188. 

Interest:  on  war  and  armament  loans, 
114;  rise  in  rates  of,  168,  176,  197; 
cited  of  lowering  of  rates  of,  173, 
191;  fluctuation  of,  during  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  183-4;  rates  on  loans 
(1896-98),  195;  rates  during  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  202. 

Invalid  Soldiers'  Asylum,  expenses  of 
establishment  of,  89. 

Ishikawajima,  shipbuilding  yard  at, 
23- 


IXDKX 


311 


Iwakura,  Tomomi,  plan  of,  for  national 
bank,  31. 

Jinscn,    opened    to   foreign    trade,    16. 

Kabayama,  Sukcnori,  Naval  Minister, 

45.  73- 

Kanakawa,  expenditures  for  barracks 
built  at,  20. 

Kanazawa,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  barracks  at,  42. 

Keelung,  expenditures  for  battery  at, 
62,  65. 

Kerosene,  tax  on,  100,  102. 

Kinchow,  capture  of,  by  Japanese,  83. 

Kitan  Channel  Battery,  expenditures 
for  construction  of,  43. 

Kokura,  expenditures  for  construction 
of  barracks  at,  42. 

Korea,  14,  87;  expenses  of  garrison  at, 
92,  102;  expenditures  of  administra- 
tion of,  148. 

Korean  Affair,  8;  expenditures  for, 
16,  37  et  seq.,  49. 

Kumamoto,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  garrison  at,  17;  invasion  of,  30. 

Kure;  naval  station  at,  45;  expendi- 
tures for  construction  of  battery  at, 
61 ;  for  construction  of  arsenal  at,  96. 

Kwanto  Expedition,  12. 

Kyoto,  bankruptcies  in,  211. 

Land  tax;  25,  28,  99-100,  126;  revision 
of,  during  Satsuma  Rebellion,  133; 
during  Sino-Japanese  War,  143; 
decrease  in,  151. 

Liaotung,     87;     retrocession     of,     80. 

Liquors,  increased  tax  on,  102. 

Loans:  to  government  by  Banks  of 
Japan,  and  individuals,  26,  51, 
floated  during  Sino-Japanese  War, 
54-5,  70,  140  et  seq.,  180,  182,  192; 
receipts  from  (1904-7),  100;  floated 
during  Russo-Japanese  War,  83  et 
seq.,  149-50,  204,  foreign  public, 
126-7,  212;  interest  on,  114;  for 
redemption  of  paper  money,  127, 
130;  floated  during  Satsuma  Re- 
bellion, 133  et  seq.;  for  railroad  na- 
tionalization, 147;  redemption  of, 
150;  increase  of  national,  178;  made 
by  banks  (1894-96),  188;  economic 
effect    of,     253.     See    also     Bonds. 

Loochoo  Islands,  15. 

Maizuru,  naval  station  at,  66. 

Manchuria,  87;  expenditures  for  con- 
struction of  garrison  at,  102;  ex- 
penditures for  administration  of, 
148. 


Matsukata,  Masayoshi:  Minister  of 
Finance,  36;  reform  of  coinage  system 
by,  169-70. 

Metal  refining  works,  cost  of  establish- 
ment of,  137-8. 

Mercantile  marine,  growth  and  de- 
velopment of,  236  et  seq. 

Mexican  dollar:  attempt  to  withdraw 
from  circulation,  156,  158;  use  of, 
166;  speculation  in,  168. 

Military  school,  establishment  of,  at 
Osaka,  17. 

Military  Staff  College,  creation  of,  40. 

Military  stores,  imports  and  exports  of 
(1 876-1 905),  243. 

Military  Supervision  Office,  creation 
of,  39;  expenditures  for,  41. 

Mimbusho-satsu  (paper  money),  is- 
sued during  War  of  Restoration, 
12.5,  157-8. 

Mining,  tax  on,  99,  126. 

Mitsubishi  Company  (Nippon  Yusen 
Kaisha),  32;  growth  of,  236. 

Mitsui  and  Co.,  issuance  of  Treasury 
and  Kaitakushi  bills  by,  160. 

Money  Exchange  Company,  creation 
of,  161-2. 

Money  market,  effect  of  war  and  arma- 
ment expenditures  on,  122. 

Monopolies,  tobacco,  72,  100;  salt,  84. 

Mukden,  84,  87. 

Munitions,  exports  and  imports  of 
(1876-1905),  241,  243. 

Nagasaki,  25. 

Nagoya,  run  on  banks  of,  210. 

Naruto,  expenditures  for  construction 
of  battery  at,  61. 

National  Bank:  establishment  of,  31-2; 
loans  to  government  by,  49;  aboli- 
tion of,  177. 

National  Bank  Regulations,  162;  re- 
vision of,  163,  172. 

National  Tax  Collection  Law,  enact- 
ment of,  133. 

Naval     College,     foundation     of,     23. 

Naval  Defense  Fund,  50-1. 

Naval  stations:  establishment  of,  24, 
45;  expenditures  for,  69,  109. 

Navy:  in  Saga  insurrection,  15;  in 
Formosan  Expedition,  15;  expendi- 
tures for  expansion  of,  (1872-76) 
23  et  seq.,  (1877-93),  4-6  et  seq., 
(1893-1903),  68-9,  284-5,  (1904- 
13),  300-1;  expenditures  for  Korean 
Affair,  37-8;  expenditures  for  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  57,  76-7,  274;  ex- 
penditures for  North  China  Dis- 
turbance, 60,  78-9,  279;  expansion 
and    repletion    expenditures,    66-7, 


312  INDEX 


93   et  seq.;  expenditures   for   Russo- 
Japanese  War,  87-8,  105,  286  et  seg.; 
comparison    of    Army    expenditures 
with,    108,    in,    (chart)    305;   state 
expenditures   compared    with   Army 
and  Navy  expenditures,  304. 
Nirei,  Rear- Admiral,  36. 
Nodzu,  Major-General,  14. 
North  China  Disturbance  (Boxer  Up- 
rising):    58;     expenditures    for,     59 
et   seq.,    196,    278    et    seg.;    financial 
resources  for,   59,   72;  expenses   for 
military  affairs  of,  78-9. 
Notes: 

convertible,  172;  amount  of,  in 
circulation,  183  et  s«g.;  increased 
issue  of,  196;  amount  issued  by 
Bank  of  Japan  (i894-95),_  183  \, 
(1903-6),  205;  issued  by  Fifteenth 
Bank,  32. 
Inconvertible:  issued  during  the 
War  of  Restoration,  26,  32,  159; 
during  Satsuma  Rebellion  165; 
redemption  of,  170;  economic 
effects  of,  174. 

Okubo,    Toshimichi,    State    Councilor, 

Okuma,  Shigenobu,  chief  of  Expedi- 
tionary   Expenses    Control    Bureau, 

_33- 

Okurasho  Dakan  Shoken  (convertible 
Treasury  bills),  issued  in  1871,  125, 
[60. 

Ominato,  torpedo  division  at,  66. 

Osaka:  9,  13;  expenditures  for  garrison 
organized  at,   17;  run  on  banks  of, 

_  197;  bankruptcies  in,  211. 

I  >ti  >ri,  Keisuke,  10. 

( Kama,  ( Jeneral,  Japanese  Commander- 
in-Chief,  83. 

Panic  of  1907,  209-10. 

Paper  money:  issuance  of,  inconverti- 
ble, 26,  32,  159,  165;  for  expendi- 
tures of  Satsuma  Rebellion,  49,  156 
et  seq.,  165,  (1876-81),  214;  re- 
demption of,  by  "New",  125;  loan 
for  exchange  of,  127;  loan  for  with- 
drawal of,  130;  redemption  of, 
131-2,  169  et  seq.\  manufacture  of, 
in  Germany,  160;  depreciation  of, 
165  et  seq.;  exchange  rates  of  (1877- 
82),  166;  specie  payments  for,   175. 

Patent  medicine:  tax  on,  100,  126; 
increased  tax  on,  for  redemption  of 
paper  money,  132. 

Peking,  15,  55,  58.  _ 

Pensions:  granted  in  War  of  Restora- 
tion,   10;    expenditures    for,    in    ex- 


pansion program  of  1896,  64;  in 
Russo-Japanese  War,  92;  Navy, 
97;  bonds  issued  for,  127. 

Perry,  Commander,  visit  of,  3,  23. 

Pescadores,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  battery  at,  62,  65. 

Port  Arthur:  besieged  by  Japanese, 
82-3;  expenditures  for  establishment 
of  naval  station  at,  95,  102. 

Postal  savings:  increased  deposits  in 
(1893-94),  190;  during  Russo-Japa- 
nese War,  201,  221. 

Prices:  fluctuation  of,  during  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  206;  (1873-1913), 
245  et  seq. 

Provisions,  108;  expenditures  for,  dur- 
ing Sino-Japanese  War,  57;  during 
Russo-Japanese  War,  87. 

Railroads:  construction  expenses  of 
military,  during  Russo-JapaneseW.tr, 
87;  organization  of,  battalion,  89; 
loans  for  construction  and  improve- 
ment of,  134,  140-1;  expenditures 
for,  during  Sino-Japanese  War,  137— 
8,  188,  192;  nationalization  of,  146 
et  seq.,  207,  235,  255;  extension  of, 
234-5;  subsidies  to,  238. 

Redemption:  of  paper  money,  13 1-2, 
169    et    seq.;    of    bond    issues,    150. 

Rice:  as  a  medium  of  exchange,  II,  27; 
wholesale  price  and  production  of 
unhusked  (1877-82),  167,  (1881- 
86),  215. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  80-1;  resources 
for  expenditures  of,  82-3,  85,  97 
et  seq.,  200;  expenditures  for,  86 
et  seq.,  104-5,  110,  144,  199,  286 
et  seq.;  annual  expenditures  before 
and  after,  145;  loans  tloated  during, 
82-3,  150,  204;  loans  from  Bank  of 
Japan  for  expenses  of,  200;  war  fund 
receipts  and  war  expenditures  based 
on  special  account  of  Extraordinary 
War  Expenditures  of,  216-17;  ac- 
commodations made  to  War  Fund  of, 
218-19;  requisitioning  of  ships  dur- 
ing, 237;  departmental  expenditures 
of,  289  et  seq. 

Saga  Insurrection,  8;  expenditures  for, 
14-15;  military  transport  during,  236, 

Saghalien:  87;  Japanese  occupation  of, 
84;  expenditures  for  garrison  at, 
102;     for     administration     of,     148. 

Saigo,  Takamori,  State  Councilor 
General,  14;  resignation  as  Counci- 
lor, 30. 

Saigo,  Yorimichi,  commander  of  ex- 
pedition to  Formosa,   15;  investiga- 


INDEX 


313 


tion   of   western   army   systems  by, 
17;   commander  of   Imperial  army, 
31-2. 
Sakata,  expenditures  for  administration 

and  police  offices  at,  12. 
Sake,  tax  on,  53,  72,  99;   reformation 
and    classification    of    tax    on,    126; 
increased  tax  on,  for  redemption  of 
paper  money,  13 1-2;  tax  on,  during 
Sino-Japanese    War,     143;    revision 
of  tax,  151. 
Salt,  monopoly  of,  84. 
Samurai  (hereditary  soldiers),  17. 
Sasebo,  naval  station  at,  45;  expendi- 
tures for  construction  of  battery  at, 
61. 
Satsuma   Rebellion:   29-30;   campaign 
expenditures  for,  33-4;  relative  ex- 
penditures   for,    35;    apportionment 
of  expenditures  for,  36;  resources  for 
expenditures  for,  49  et  seq.;  expendi- 
tures before  and  after,  129;  national 
loans    floated    during,    130,     133-4; 
improvements    in    taxation    system 
during,    133;  requisitioning  of  ships 
during,  236;  total  expenditures  for, 
263-4. 

Sayings  banks;  regulations  for,  177; 
increased  deposits  in,  during  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  201. 

Schools,  military:  17,  40;  naval,  23; 
expenditures  for  new,  during  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  137-8,  192. 

Sendai:  expenditures  for  garrison  con- 
structed at,  17;  expenditures  for 
constructing  barracks  at,  42. 

Seoul,  37. 

Seymour,  British  general  (North  China 
Disturbance),  58. 

Shimonoseki  Battery:  expenditures  for 
construction  of,  43;  Treaty  of  Peace 
of  Sino-Japanese  War  signed  at,  55. 

Shinagawa,  25. 

Shipbuilding:  installation  of,  yards, 
23;  expenditures  for  (1877-93),  47; 
during    Russo-Japanese   War,    87-8. 

Shiraishi,  expenditures  for  administra- 
tion and  police  offices  at,  12. 

Shohoshi  (Business  Bureau):  establish- 
ment of,  161,  Later  Tsushoshi  (Com- 
mercial Bureau). 

Shi-Kai,  Yuan,  38. 

Shooting   licenses,    tax   on,    100,    126. 

Silver;  quotations  of,  bullion,  (1877- 
82),  166;  rise  in  price  of,  168;  ex- 
port of,  185,  193. 

Sino-Japanese  War:  loans  floated  dur- 
ing. 54-5.  70,  140-1,  180,  182,  192; 
expenditures  for,  57  et  sea.,  137-8, 
180,  273  et  seq.;  sources  of  revenue 


for  expenditures  of,  70-1;  expenses 
for  military  affairs  of,  76-7;  in- 
creased taxation  during,  143-4,  192; 
requisitioning  of  ships  during,  236. 

Soy, tax  on,  73,  99. 

Specie:  export  of,  155,  191;  excess  of 
exports  over  imports  (1896-98), 
194,  (1900),  196;  maintenance  of, 
reserve,  204;  reserve  of  Bank  of 
Japan,  (1903-6),  205,  211. 

Stamp  duty,  100,  126. 

Sterling  bonds:  flotation  of,  during 
Russo-Japanese  War,  83-4;  during 
Sino-Japanese  War,  141-2. 

Stock  exchange:  establishment  of, 
178;  quotations  of  principal  stocks 
on  Tokyo,  186-7;  (1896-98),  195; 
( 1 899-1901),  197;  (1904-5),  202; 
207-8,  (1905-7),  222-3;  (1907-9), 
226;(i9io-i3),  228. 

Subsidies,  government,  to  railroads 
and  shipping  companies,  238. 

Sugar,  tax  on,  99;  revision  of  tax  on, 
151- 

Tai-wonkun,  regent  in  Korea,  14; 
leader  of  Korean  Affair,  36. 

Taira,  expenditures  of  administration 
and  police  offices  at,  12. 

Takeshiki,  secondary  naval  station  at, 
66. 

Takashima,  Major-General,  36. 

Taruhito,  Prince,  leader  of  Imperial 
Army  in  Satsuma  Rebellion,  30. 

Taxes:  land  and  business  (1869),  25, 
28,  99-100;  on  sake  and  tobacco, 
53,  72,  99-IOO,  income,  53;  registra- 
tion, 72;  soy,  73,  99;  increase  in, 
during  Sino-Japanese  War,  73,  143, 
192;  during  Russo-Japanese  War, 
84,  99-100,  151 ;  receipts  from  (1904- 
6),  101;  uniform  system  of,  126; 
for  redemption  of  paper  money, 
1 3 1-2;  improved  system  of,  during 
Satsuma  Rebellion,  133;  economic 
effect  of,  253. 

Telephones  and  telegraph:  battalion, 
89;  _  expenditures  for  expansion  of, 
during  Sino-Japanese  War,  137-8; 
growth  of,  239. 

Textiles,  tax  on,  100. 

Tientsin,  Treaty  of,  38;  attack  upon, 
55,  58. 

Toba,  battle  at,  10,  26. 

Tobacco:  tax  on,  53,  monopoly,  72, 
100,  102;  increased  tax  on,  for  paper 
money  redemption,  132;  tax  on, 
during  Sino-Japanese  War,  143. 

Tokugawa,  Keiki  (Shogun),  surrender 
of  political  power  by,  3,  9. 


314 


INDEX 


Tokyo:  expenditures  for  garrison  and 
headquarters  at,  12,  17;  clearing 
house  at,  178;  fluctuations  of  interest 
rates  in,  183;  quotations  on  stock 
exchange  at,  187  et  seq.;  fluctuations 
of  prices  and  wages  in  (1873-1913), 
247-8. 

Tokyo  Bay  Batten-,  expenditures  for 
construction  of,  42-3;  further  ex- 
penditures for,  93. 

Torpedo  boats:  expenditures  for  re- 
plenishing of,  97,  102,  109;  ex- 
penditures for  construction  program 
for  (1881-86),  44-5;  expenditures 
for  accessories  for,  47. 

Torpedo  Practice  School,  expenditures 
for  establishment  of,  47. 

Totsugawa,  17. 

Transit  tax,  100. 

Transportation:  108;  expenditures  for, 
during  Sino-Japancse  War,  57;  dur- 
ing Russo-Japanese  War,  87;  de- 
crease of  capital  invested  in,  208; 
land,  234-5,  255;  water,  236  et  seq., 

255.\ 
Tsukiji,  naval  college  at,  23. 

Tsushima,  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  garrison  at,  61,  65. 

Wages,  fluctuation  of,  in  Tokyo 
(1873-1913),  247  et  scg. 

Wakamatsu,  expenditures  for  admin- 
istration and  police  offices  at,  12. 


Waldersee,  German  general  (North 
China  Disturbance),  58. 

War  of  the  Restoration,  8;  battles  of, 
IO;  total  war  expenditures  for,  II 
et  seq.;  resources  for  expenditures  for, 
26-7;  paper  money  issued  during, 
125;  taxation  system  during,  125-6; 
public   loans  floated  during,   126-7. 

Warships:  expenditures  for  construc- 
tion of  (1870),  24-5;  construction 
program  for  (1882),  44,  48;  expendi- 
tures for  repairing,  during  Satsuma 
Rebellion,  47;  during  North  China 
Disturbance,  60;  construction  of, 
under  expansion  scheme  of  1892, 
66-7;  construction  of  during  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  87;  expenditures  for 
new,  after  Russo-Japanese  War, 
93.  95.  97.  I02«  I09;  expenditures 
for,  during  Sino-Japanese  War,  192. 

Watanabe,  Kunitake,  Minister  of 
Finance,  53. 

Yamada,  Major-General ,  14. 

Yamagata,  Aritomo:  investigation  of 
Western  army  systems,  by  17; 
Minister  of  War,  30. 

Yasukuni  Shrine,  expenditures  for,  92. 

Yedo,  9-10. 

Yokohama,  25;   naval   station   at,   24. 

Yokohama  Specie  Bank:  169;  loans  to 
government  by,  during  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  101;  203-4. 

Yokosuka,  expenditures  for  shipbuild- 
ing yard  at,  23. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  AT  LOS  ANGELES 

THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


WWvkQ 

MAY3  11957 


Form  L-9-15,,,  :;,:;  | 


iiie  ^3 


MAR  3 {  m 
MAR  2 1  < 


R    wi»' 


&    »*« 


m 


Iepd 
MAY  2 


* 


ufa 


$  F"7- 


^1 


UNIVERSITY  of  CALIFORNIA 
AT 


K 


3  1158  00452  6322 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    001  249  51 1    5 


